copr no. t-
THE STRATEGIC VALUE TO THE USSR OF THE CONQUEST OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST (TO CAIRO) PRIOR0
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FOREWORD
This paper is supplementary to. entitled "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action. The latter paper concluded that both the available evidence and the "logic of the situation" indicated that the USSR would not resort lo military actiont the same time it suggested the possibility that the USSR might gain sufficient strategic advantages from lhe employment of lis recognized military capability of overrunning Western Europearge part of the Near East to Induce Soviet leaders to decide upon this course of action, particularly If the Kremlin should interpret some US move or series of moves as Indicating an intention to attack the USSR or Its satellites. The purpose of the present paper is lo determine, on the basis of the maximum available factual data, whether or not the conquest of these areas prior0 would actually place the USSRtrong strategicFour subcommittees have examined in detail thc economic, scientific, military, and political advantages and disadvantages that would accrue to the USSR If it adopted this course of action. The present paperynthesis based on these detailed subcommittee reports; the reports themselves will be published subsequently in the form of an appendix to this paper.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY8
THE STRATEGIC VALUE TO THE USSR OF THE CONQUEST
OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST (TO CAIRO)
PRIOR0
Reportoint Ad Hoc Committee
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
I. To analyze and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages that would accrue to the USSR if it should elect, prioro overrun the European continent and the Near East (toiew to determining whether or not thc strategic position thus acquired would be sufficiently strong per se to induce Soviet leaders to
adoptourse of action.
ASSUMPTIONS AND FACTS BEARING ON THF. PROBLEM
Thc USSR has the military capability of overrunning Europe (excluding the UK) and thc Near East to Cairohort period of time.
The Western Powers would undertake Immediate counteraction, includingemployment of US air power, using the atomic bomb at least against Soviet targets.
A substantial part of the merchant and naval ships belonging to thc countries which were overrun would manage to avoid falling under Soviet control.
A large part of the Near Eastern oil facilities and installations would be seriously damaged or destroyed prior to evacuation by present operators.
The Western Powers, through naval blockade, would effectively cut off commerce between continental Europe on the one hand and the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and Southeast Asia on the other.
In addition to the assumptions enumerated above, the basic problem of analyzing the Soviet position following the occupation of the areas in question must be considered under two broad alternative assumptions:
a. That the USSRegotiated peace shortly after thc occupation of these areas.
* This paper was preparedoint ad hoc committee represenUng CIA and theo( the Departments of Slate, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. It hasin by the Directors of the intelligence organization* ol the Departments uf State.Navy. The dissent of lhe Director of Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, is appended
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b. That, aitcr thc occupation of Western Europe and the Near East as far as Cairo, the USSR is facedontinuing global war with the US and its allies, Involving ultimate US invasion of Soviet controlled territory.
(Thc first assumption is necessary because Soviet leaders might elect to exercise their current military capabilities in the belief that, after Soviet occupation of these areas, the US public would not support the continuationar to liberate the European continent, and because, under the assumptionuick negotiated peace, the Soviet position would differ greatly from what It would be if the USSR were forced to sustain the weightontinuing global war.)
Thc position of the UK following Soviet occupation of thc European continent would obviously have an important bearing upon the basic problem, particularly under the assumptionbove. If the UK were either occupied by the USSR or completely neutralized, US capabilities for counteraction, particularly through naval and air operations, would be reduced. If, on the other hand, bases for US Naval and air operations from thc UK remain tenable, substantial continuing damage could beupon thc Soviet war potential, and shipping along the European coast would be largely Interdicted.
An effort has been made in this paper to develop the maximum number of factual data with reference to the basic problem. This has been possibleonsiderable degree with respect to the economic, scientific, and military factors. In the final analysis, however, we are stillarge extent dependent upon "the logic of the situation" and upon deductions from the pattern of Soviet behavior for ouras to the possibility of direct Soviet military action.
DISCUSSION
(See Enclosure A)
CONCLUSIONS
If the USSR couldegotiated peace shortly after the occupation of Western Europe and the Middle East to Cairo, the potential economic, scientific, and military advantages to thc USSR would appear to be very substantial, but the USSR would not begin to reap significant advantageseriod of from two to three years after the completion of thc occupation.
The occupation or Western Europe and the Middle East, however, would involve the Soviet leaders in grave political risks.
We believe that, in spite of the prospect of substantial tangible economic, scientific, and military gains, the Soviet leaders would consider these political risks sohreat to their own positions of power and to their ultimate objective of aworld that they would be unlikely to undertake thisunder the assumptionegotiatedthey anticipated an attack or becameIn military action through accident or miscalculation.
An analysis of the economic and military position of thc USSR under conditions of continuing global war against the US and its Allies priorndicates clearly that the total realizable resources under Soviet control would be Inadequate for the defense of the conquered areas
We conclude, therefore, that neither the recognized military capability ofWestern Europe and the Near East to Cairo, nor any strategic advantages to be gained thereby are of themselves likely to induce Soviet leaders to undertake this course of action prior
It is emphasized that the foregoing conclusions are based on an effort to weigh objectively the various considerations with respect to the stated problem and do not reflect an over-all estimate of Soviet military intentions prior
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ISCUSSION
L This discussion will undertake to analyze and evaluate, under the following(a) Economic,cientific, (c) Military, and (d) Political, the advantages and disadvantages which would accrue to the USSR If it should exercise, priorts
currently estimated military capability of overrunning Western Europe and the Near
EasL (to Cairo).
egotiated Peace
f the USSR couldegotiated peace shortly after the occupation of the areas in question thr economic, scientific and military advantages per se would seem so far to outweigh the disadvantages that Soviet leaders might be templed to undertake the venture. Without giving any weight to destruction during the period of theoperation, or to thc factors of non-collaboration and organizational difficulties, the theoretical potential gains may be enumerated as follows:
Occupation of this area would more than double thcmechanical,to theIt would increase thc non agricultural labor force under directillions toillions. The addition of European facilities for theprecision and special purpose machine tools, optical Instruments,erious current Soviet deficiency The supply of coal under Sovietwould be more than doubled and steel capacity almost doubled.would be increased five-fold. Although the oil of thc Mldde Easlnot be raised and transported in significant quantities to the Soviet Unionwithin the next several years, it would In the meantime be denied to thcIhc US and would eventually be available to the USSR and its newlyWithinears' time the joint economic power of the USSR, its Satellites,occupied areas would probably equal ihai of the US
The exploitation of thc facilities and the personnel of the purescientific institutions in Western Europe could, within five to seven years,the Soviet war potential by as much asercent Through thethe engineering and manufacturing facilities of Western Europe, the rale ofthe Soviet atomic energy program could be doubled and the probable datethe USSR will have exploded its first atomic bomb would be advanced fromtorepending upon whether thc USSR9 The USSR would obtain the stockpile of uranium in Franceestimated toercent of the present Soviet stockpile In suchas precision equipment, liquid fuels, metallurgy of high speed and highferrous and light metal alloys, fine chemicals and plastics, the acquisition of
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European scientific facilities and personnel would within three years accelerate Soviet developments In these Aelds by betweenndercent The electronics capacity would be doubled or tripled; production capacity for guided missiles of the operational German type would be increased byercent, and aircraft research byercent. Capabilities for the development and production of chemical and biological warfare agents would be substantially increased.
c. Military. The USSR by this operation would have extended its Westernto to the Atlantic Ocean, eliminated all potential military powers on thecontinent and all possible beachheads from which thc US could (withoutassault) begin counter-operations on this continent The extension of her territory on the south, to include all of the Near East as far as Cairo, would provide Increased protection for her vulnerable industrial areas in the Black and Caspian Sea regions Soviet submarines could operate from ports along the entire Atlantic coast, Soviet air power could cover the entire Mediterranean Sea and eSrtend far over the Atlantic So.irt capabilities for defense against US strategic air attack would be substantially increased. Under these circumstances androtracted period for the exploitation of the industrial resources and shipbuilding facilities of this vast area, the USSR would beosition to buildavyong-range air force comparable to those of the US eriod of ten years the Soviet economicfor war would equal that of the US and the manpower resources for its military forces would be vastly superior to those of the US.
3. The estimated advantages as outlined inbove could be realized, however, only If the USSR had an extended period of peace in which to organize and consolidate the area. Initially the USSR would be faced with serious problems and difficulties. Substantial, although indeterminate, damage to Industrial installations would have been effected by US atomic (probably in lhe USSR only) and ordinary bombing during the period of the military campaign Thc channels of necessary imports from the Western Hemisphere and the Far East would be reopened slowly The escaped shipping might be slow in returning to operation under Its original flags. The organization of thc area botholitical and economic standpoint wouldreat strain on Soviet administrative personnel and upon security forces. Entirely apart from bomb damage, over-all industrial production would probably decline during the first year or soesult of purges In management personnel, changes in methods, sabotage, and reluctance of the technically trained population to collaborate fully with the conquerors. An attempt to integrate quickly the Western European scientific and engineering personnel and machinery into the Soviet scientific research program might lead to confusion and dissipation of effort that would temporarily Impede scientific progress. In any event the USSR would not obtain any substantial scientific benefits for from six months to two years. However, It Is believed that underof peace, Soviet police methods could successfully cope with these problems, particularly in France and Italy where there would be large, well organizedparlies and where the tendency to Jump on the Communist bandwagon would
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be pronounced.eriod of several years, therefore, of uninterruptedon these problems, the USSR should begin to reap benefits of the magnitude Indicated In a, b,bove.
here are certain basic political considerations, however, which might restrain Soviet leaders from adopting this course of conquest even under the assumption that they would subsequentlyong period of peace In which to realize these large tangible benefits. Soviet leaders would very likely view with grave concern the sudden mass exposure of military and administrative personnel to the Ideology and thc bourgeois flcshpots of Western Europe. The increased security measures and the thorough re-indoctrination program which Soviet leaders have carried out since the war among the entire Soviet population, as well as among the returning soldiers, and the measures taken to protect the occupation troops, bear eloquent testimony to the apprehension with which Soviet leaders regard any deviation from pure Marxist ideology and discipline. Soviet leaders mighttheir fears might well beIf this vast area .were suddenly overrun by military force, rather than progressively converted to. or taken over by. communism from within, the democratic bourgeois society might,eriod of years, contaminate and absorb the conqueror with the result that the Communist regime would disintegrate. Soviet leaders might also be restrained by the realization that resort to conquest on this scale would alienate the Moslem world and the peoples of thc Far East as well as those of the Western Hemisphere; il would undermine the validity of their anti-imperialism propaganda and probably eliminate the possibility of winning the world to communism Ihrough subversion. Tn essence. Soviet leaders could not help but see in this operation serious risks to thc maintenance of their position and powerossible obstacle to the attainment of their ultimate objectiveommunist world. If they took these risks they would definitely be stepping out of character, as in the past they have always aclcd with great caution.
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It is obviously extremely difficult to estimate thc relative weight which Soviet leaders would attach to the advantages and disadvantagesourse of conquest as outlined above Admittedly, the potential tangible economic, scientific, and military gains would appear to be substantial. Communist control would be extended to all of Europe andarge part of the Near East in one quick siroke, the possibility ofimilar advance through subversion and thc collapse of capitalism would appear remote and uncertain. However, we are inclined to believe that, in spite of the large tangible advantages. Soviet leaders would be unlikely to Incur the risks inherent in this operation unless they anticipated attack and believed offensive action ncoi'ssary for defensive purposes. They hnve already made substantialthe war. They are basically realistic and concerned with the preservation of their own positions of power. They would, therefore, probably give predominate weight to the danger of thc breakdown of the Ideological discipline and security upon which their present control of the USSR and its Salelllties so largely
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ontinuing Global War
after the occupation of Western Europe and the Near East to Cairo, thefacedontinuing global war with the US and its allies. InvolvingInvasion of Soviet-controlled territory, the following basic factors wouldUSSR from obtaining the tangible advantages outlined under the assumptionabove
maintenanceaval and air blockade would effectively cul offcontinent from overseas imports vital both to the full exploitation ofunder peacetime conditions and to the prosecutionar effort.
damage to industrialions, oil facilities, andfrom US bombing.
e Increased difficulties In organizing the economic and political administration under war conditions.
d. Greatly Increased difficulties In dealing with underground movements and resistance lo collaboration on the part of the technically trained part of the population.
above can be measured In concrete terms. An analysis of theof the total Soviet-controlled area in the faceaval and airwould shut it off from the products of the Western Hemisphere, Africa, andEast, indicates the following serious deficiencies:
USSR would probably be unable to provide lhe minimum foodfor Ihls area. The area wouldeficit in grains ofndmetricear. Similar over-all deficiencies would exist for fats.other foods.
essential commodities, such as natuiul rubber, tin. cotton andcopper, lead and zinc, would not be available in adequate quantities toindustrial activity in Western Europe. Thrsc commodity shortages,the virtual absence of stockpiles of essential raw materials, the poorrepair of industrial plants, and the general economic dislocation prevailingwould resulteduction In Industrial production In Western Europeindefinite period to not overercent of that presently contemplated.
c Petroleum supplies that could be made available from limited synthetic production in Western Europe and exports of crude from the Soviet Union and its present Salellites. probably would be barely adequate In meet essential Sovietfor direct military purposes, but would not be adequate for Industrial uses This would restrict the full exploitation of industrial and transportation capabilities of Western Europe.
d The demands upon land transportation facilities would be greatly Increased by the military requirements of the extended Soviet lines of communication, increased raw material requirements from Soviet sources made necessary by the naval and
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air blockade, and thc partial disruption of coastal shipping. Land transportation facilities for East-West movement between the Soviet Union and Western Europe probably would be barely adequate for the movement of military supplies and of limited quantities of cereal grains, petroleum, and industrial raw materials. In the Middle East, transportation facilities would be adequate for occupation, but not for defensive, purposes.
The analysisbove indicates that the naval blockade alone would create for the USSR sufficient economic deficiencies to raise serious doubts as to whether, from the economic standpoint, the acquisition of Western Europe and the Near East prior0 would adequately equip the USSR for the continuationlobal war with the US. This analysis, moreover, makes no allowance for continuing bomb damage to industrial Installations, oil facilities, and transportation, nor for losses of production resulting from increased organizational difficulties, resistance of theto collaboration, and actual sabotage.
These latter factors cannot be evaluated in termsefinite percentage loss in production. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the loss would beIf this loss were superimposed upon the critical situations created by the blockade, particularly In food, oil, and transportation, the conclusion appearsthat the over-all Soviet economic capabilities forlobal war would be substantially less than adequate.
military position of the USSR after Uie occupation of thc whole ofthe Near East to Cairo would, on lhe surface, appear to be exceptionallyUSSR would have denied the enemy the bulk of readily accessible bases fromundertake large ground and amphibious attacks. It would have acquiredair and naval bases from which to strike at the enemy and his advancean early development of powerful sustained attacks against the UK andareas beyond the limits of the Soviet advance, the USSR might hope loenemy on the defensive and seriously limit thc development of hisforces and activities. With respect lo an air attack on UK. thc USSRhave facilities to support an air forceircraft (which could belo0atter of months) Guided miss'Ics could bethe UKcale equal lo that of thc German attackrovidedproduction program had been underwayufficient period. TheFleet, from thc forward bases of Western Europe, could seriouslythe shipping to and from the UK and to the Mediterranean Sea Underthe USSR could seriously reduce lhe effectiveness of, or possiblyihe defenses of the UK.
However, except for these further capabilities against thein themselves largelyUSSR would have exhausted Its capabilities for offensive action, except for air operations, after it had overrun Western Europe and the Near East to Cairo II would be forced immediately upon the strategic defensive, primarily for two reasons: (a) the conquest of these areas would not incrense significantly its re-
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sources immediately available lor the conduct of further offensive operations; (b) the USSR would havelobal war before it possessed the appropriatethe atomicong-range air force,eep seawhich to strike effectively against the US The USSR would therefore have realized its Impressive lactkal capabilities at the expense of committing itself to warituation that would probably very soon place iterious strategic disadvantage,esult of counter-attacks that would in due course greatly diminish its military capabilities and result In the lossubstantial amount of the territory which it had acquired. It would then never be able to develop the capabilities for the prosecutionrue global war that an extended period of peace might eventually have enabled It to develop.
Thc following specific weaknesses In tin* Soviet military position under conditions of continuing global war would makempossible Tor the USSR successfully to defend Its conquests against the counter-attack of the US and its allies:
a As indicated above in the analysis ol Soviet economic problems, SovietcapabiliUes forlobal war at this time, would be substantially less than adequate. Although the USSR could readily meet the estimatedofillion men for military duties, this would meanillion workers of more than average skill and productivity from the Soviet economy, thereby further reducing thc economic potential
he destruction ofart of its meager oil refining and transportwnuld seriously cripple both Soviet industrial and military capabilities fora counter-offensive.
e. Thc transportation system would be barely adequate to meet minimumand military requirements. As the US counter-offensive developed, the com-petition between military and industrial requirements would increase and thc mobility and Ihe rndurance of Soviet units far from Iheir home bases would steadily decrease.
Soviet position in the Near East would be particularly weak andLogistic difficulties would prevent the accumulation of adequate stockpilesdefensive operations in that area, and even limited enemy attacks onfacilities could seriously disrupt the very close balance betweenrequirements and capabilities for moving supplies lo the troops.circumstances, the USSR would not be assured of free use of thean extended period of time and could not defend successfully against anfrom the Persian Gulf area.
forces would be totally Inadequate to defend thc vast coastlineSoviet control.
/ Soviet military morale, politically unstable, woulderious weakness under condition of protracted occupation duties and would be an important target for Allied propaganda efforts
g. Although the USSR could probably deal successfully with resistanceand sabotage during the period ot its advance and for some time thereafter.
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these factors wouldource of great weakness when the enemy counter-offensive got under way. Basically, the USSR would be faced with the difficult problem of conducting its defensive operations along thc entire perimeter In the midst of hostile populations; It would not. as In the last war. be defending Russian territory against an Invader.
ft, Although the acquisition of advance bases for Soviet defensive aircraft would make possible early Interception of Allied air attacks upon strategic targets in the USSR, the use ot these forward bases wouldast dispersion of the Sovietair effort and diminish the Intensity of fighter defense closer to the vital targets in the Soviet Union.
i. Present Soviet radar facilities arc not sufficient lo meet the additional defensive requirements that would develop, and any reorganization of radar defensive systems required by thc conquest of Western Europe and the Near East would at leasttend to disrupt present systems.
f. The supply of Soviet antiaircraft equipment would be grossly inadequate for the defense of strategic targets In the vast area now under Soviet control
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ENCLOSURE 13
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
The paper "Thc Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest of Western Europe and the Near East <to Cairo) Priors not concurred in.
The following comments are submitted:
this paper purports to deal objectively only wilh lhe advantageswhich would accrue to Russia if she were to overrun Europe andthe Middle East, priort actually goes further and attempts to strikeand to draw conclusions and so indicatest therefore Is In ato Influence decisions. For this reason, the comments lo follow includeconclusions which this Directorate considers mare soundasis for decisions.
is admitted in the paper that thc evidence of Soviet intent is soto leave no recourse but to logic. An attempt to forecast Soviet action onbasis is considered unwarranted.
balance struck in the paper under consideration is through theWestern, not Soviet, logic.
paper implies that the Soviet leaders would be induced not to adoptof action of overrunning Western Europe solely because of anof certain factorsis the West andiven time. The totalpower is not considered, nor docs the statement of the problem itself permitof immediate advantages and disadvantages of overrunning Europe,range Soviet ambitions. It implies that Soviet leaders would adopt Orisof action if they should decide that the advantages to their strategicgreateronsequence of overrunning Western Europe and the Near Eastdisadvantages, without proper qualification as to the time period in whichor disadvantages would accrue. Thus can not be accepted as aof thc problem because the time period is not consonant withlong range expansionist plans. It is possible that adoption of the coursesoon, might pay them dividends later.
paper docs not weigh or consider those forces which will bear onpoweris the West after military action has been initiated. Thelhe communistic and democratic systems, under conditions of war, mayan unfavorable balance. For example, it is implied that being forced on adefensive" would in itselfandicap lo the Soviets in their nationalis false in the light of the basic Soviet conception of war, and their possessionresources in time and in depth totrategic defense to an ultimate advantage.
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In arrivingomparison of war making potentials. It Is necessary to consider the total national resources of the Soviets, which can be developed and exploited under the communistic system, as against the total resources of Western states which can be harnessed to war. but which must be developed and exploitedotallysystem. Using such criteria, the long-term advantages to the Soviets, from their point of view, become formidable. The habit of military organisation and command requires no readjustment of the Soviet national psychology during the period of overt military action comparable to thc great national dislocations suffered by the western democracies when they are convertedull war-time basis It Is entirely possible that the Soviets believe that their system would prove hardier under the conditions of continued global war than that of the western democracies.
he paper attempts loalance by examining and analyzing fourcategories: economic, political, scientific, and military, each explored separately in supporting papers, bul synthesized for the final estimate. Such compartmental consideration does not give full play to the dynamic inter-relationships and relative values of these factors In determining the overall strategic position of thc Sovietat any given time. Nor can they be studied without reference to the dynamic force that stems from Soviet Ideology. For this reason, any assessment of advantages or disadvantages contained alone in economic, scientific, military, and politicalwill reveal only part of the truth. It Is in the synthesis of these elements,by an over-riding, guiding principle, thc basic ideology, that somecan be reached which is bound to come nearer the whole truth.
The phenomenonew. virile society, thrusting itself conspicuously on thc world stupe andhare in world power commensurate with lis enormous mass and population Is not new or unique, but the conditions under which this phenomenon reappears requires closest study if it is to be effectively resisted. Simply slated, the emergence of the Soviet nation is due lo ils will-to-power, supportedecret police, and motivated by an Ideology that is challenging, which Influences and undermines all existing systemsontest for world domination. The Sovietof their present capability was by design andillingness to exercise it
The salient historical fact of World War II is not only that the Soviet Union emerged from that war at the greatest peak in power In the entire history of the Russian people, and as one of the two greatest world powers, but also that It hasthis in face of vast destruction, andreat cost In blood spilled. For this reason, any consideration of such factors as the economic, scientific, political, and military without link to lhe two great new forces, the unified land mass and the Ideology, is futile and dangerous.
g The paper presents an unrealistic appraisal of the political risk since it is hardly conceivable that the Soviets would take military action under circumstances whereby they are clearly the aggressor. More probably they would promote awherein they goaded the West inlo taking the offensive in which case Soviet ideology would provide the rallying point for the "down trodden" world underlings subjected lo the Wall Street imperialists If they were successful in establishing these
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conditions, the Soviet leaders and World Communism would not weaken but greatly strengthen their position,
ft. In any comparison of relative Soviet and Western potentials, it must bethat the Soviets will eventually possess an atomic capability. Where the balance will stand then is not estimated in this paper. It may not be necessary for the Soviets quantitatively to equal our atomic capability, or even toimilar weapon, in order to neutralize effectively our use of the weapon. For the Soviets to recreate the balance of power In their favor it may be unnecessary for them to subject their economy to the degree of strain that our atomic requirements impose on our own. They may consider that with their vast expanse, their reserves of slave labor, and their rigid, centralized control, in any final atomic contest our capitalistic economy could not endure the same Intensity of punishment we would be capable of visiting on the Soviets, and which they may be better equipped to absorb. This factor may to themecision in favor of military action prior toar lessthan it seems. There are also grounds for Soviet belief thathow-down, the US policy might be to not use the atomic bomb.
It would also seem dangerous to dismiss any consideration of the possibility that the Soviets have already decided that they will have thc means of neutralizing our use of atomic weapons should military action begin. Soviet capability of overrunning the Western European nationsapid thrust that would envelop large segments of populations friendly to the US. as well as many US nationals, including ourand diplomatic personnel. Is generally admitted. Thc Soviets would have no more bourgeois compunction about using these people as hostages against US use of the atomic bomb than they would in sacrificing their own diplomatic personnel in the West, if necessary. The hesitation, if not stoppage, that this maneuver would causeribute to the humanitarian aspects of our system. The Soviets suffer no such handicap. Itotential equalizing instrument that they would not hesitate to use. They may consider further that their bacteriological capabilities are anto our "equalizer".
r The Soviets have seen the economies of all the Western capitalist nations broken by World War II. The United States economy alone remains intact. Their own predictions have emphasized their belief in its collapseatter of time. So far. US economy has resisted their predictions. However, it is in keeping with Sovietto conclude that another World War may do the final job of wrecking our economy, thereby ending the last major opposition to Soviet Communist expansion, and it may well be to their advantage to get it started. Since the end of World War II, all the usual means ot Soviet war-making short of military action have been directed against the US. but resistance has, if anything, stiffened. New counter-forces are coming Into being, such as mass education in the hard realities of Communism and other types of counter-propaganda. Thc Soviets may fear that their efforts to meet this challenge may not succeed. Likewise, their efforts to promote continued economic and political chaos in the Western capitalist states, as well as to absorb into the inner Soviet system the newly dominated satellites, do not seem to be proceeding according lot
be possible that these factors, together with an evaluation of the present and impending success of the ERP would lead the Politburo to conclude that the law of diminishing returns from their use of all means sftorf of war has already set In.
j. It Is possible that the Soviets have confidence In the ultimate survival of their ideology, even though they mayilitary defeat in World War III. It Is almost inconceivable toilitary decision In an atomic war that leaves intact much of Western Civilization as we know It To the Soviets, championsew world system, avowedly to be built on the ashes of the old. this may not have so frightening an aspect. Their system thrivesrutalizallon of mankind, such as might beto the devastation of atomic warfare. Their ideology has been their mostcommodity, and their enthusiasm for building it up securely at home, at thc expense of millions of their own lives, and spreading it around the world, may dictate bold action, regardless of certain practical risks, with confidence in their ability to build out of thc ensuing chaos the new world Communist order under Soviet
3. CONCLUSIONS:
the Soviets be "provoked"defensive" military conflict withpowers, the external political position of Communism might. In thc longstrengthened, not weakened.
action on the part of the USSR which would surely bring forth USwould result in formidable destructionajor portion ofIndustry From the Soviet point of view, however, this might not be afactor.
counter blows would not necessarily resultuick militarycapabilities against the US: bacteriological, subversive, and thc use ofwouldartial counter balance to lhe atomic bomb, and awilh its greater strain on US capitalistic economy could work to theof lhe Soviets.
ii Thc situation facing theevitalized rearmed Europe, increasing Westernearmed US and development of strong counter-revolutionary forces everywhere, may be sufficient to outweigh all other considerationsecision to launch military action prior to0
c. Wc conclude, therefore, that the immediate disadvantages in the political, economic, scientific and military fields, thai would accrue to the Soviets should they eleel to adopt their capability of overrunning Western Europe and the Middle East priorre not sufficiently firm or weighty lo Justify any relaxation of US preparations to prevent or to counter such action, and further that thisshould be made unmistakably clear to all US policy makers.
Original document.
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