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THE TREND OF SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS
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THE TREND OK SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS
SUMMARY
Tito's defiance of the Comlnform has precipitated the first major rift in thc USSR's satellite empire and has struck at the very core of the Stalinist concept of Soviet expansion through world Communism; for. if thc Kremlin should decideesult of the Tito affair that local Communist parties cannot be relied upon asinstruments for maintaining Soviet control over its Satellites, the Soviet leaders must then re-examine their present techniques. The primary results of such awill probablyo purge thoroughly all Communist Party leadership of unreliable elementso take strong measures aimed at neutralizing the widespread anti-Soviet antagonism of the Eastern European peoples.
Early reconciliation between Tito and the Comlnform Is unlikely. Tito will be waryeconciliation because the present Soviet regime will never forgive his kind of heresy and will, despite any temporary rapprochement, inexorably seek hisMoreover, the Kremlin cannot afford the loss of face and denial of Itswhich would result from admitting that Tito had been even partially right. Meanwhile, thc Kremlin appears to be presently unable lo institute effectivemeasures against Tito short of armed Invasion, and Tito will seek to avoid any steps which might provoke the USSR into taking such action. Consequently, neither Stalin nor Tito will risk an immediate complete break between thc two countries In the hope that developments will eventually produce some satisfactory solution of the present Impasse. An accommodation between the two countries, however, will become increasingly difficult. As each state takes steps lo consolidate its position, thebetween them will assume greater ideological as well as practical Intensity.
Despite this gradual widening of the breach between Yugoslavia and theremlin decision to use its potential to overthrow Tito by force would be motivated less by Yugoslav actions than by international developments. The possibility of direct Soviet action might increase if international tension Increases the possibility of war, or thc USSR deliberately launches World War III.
Note: Tlic Information herein Is as
The intelligence organizations ot the Departments of scute, Army. Navy, and the Air Force have concurred In this report.
THE TREND OF SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS
I. Possible Threat to Woild Communism.
Tito's defiance of the Com Inform has precipitated the first major rift in the USSR's satellite empire. Complete defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet orbit would not be of major economic importance either to the USSR or to the Westernf greater significance, however, would be the effect of successful revolt by Tito upon Soviet plans for the advancement of world Communism. Tito, by defying thc supreme authority of the Kremlin, has struck at the very core of the Stalinist concept of Soviet expansion through world Communism. Failure of the Kremlin to bring Tito back Into the fold has once again forced upon thc Soviet Politburo the realization that, unless backed by Soviet armed force. Communist Party discipline (I) may not always guarantee the complete submission to Kremlin authority demanded by the Soviet system:ay no', be sufficiently strong to Induce Communist parties to sacrifice "national" self-interest In order lo advance the cause of "international" Communism.
Thc development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, therefore, has two aspects. One concerns the Immediate effect of Yugoslavia's defection upon those matters In which Yugoslav and Soviet policy appear to coincide: namely Trieste. Austria, and Oreece. The other aspect, and the dominating one, concerns the Kremlin's ultimate success in forcing Tito's submission. For. if the Kremlin should decide,esult of Tito's defection, that local Communist parties cannot be relied upon as effective instruments for maintaining Soviet control over its Satellites, the Kremlin must re-examine Its present techniques. The principal result thus far ote-examination hasrive to purge all satellite elements considered unreliable to the Kremlin.thc Kremlin may be expected to take strong repressive measures in an attempt to bring about the neutralization of the widespread anti-Soviet antagonism of the Eastern Europe peoples
2 Imfhobabiuty or Early Ttto-Stajjn Reconciliation
Early reconciliation between Tito and the Com Inform Is highly unlikely.lhe longer thc conflict continues, the more difficult it will'become for thelo reach agreement. The Kremlin, on its part, because of the exigenciesotalitarian Communist system, cannot afford thc loss of face and denial of itswhich would result from admitting that Tile had been right; while Tito cannot capitulate knowing that the present Soviet regime will never forgive his kind of heresy and will, despite the possibility of any temporary rapprochement, inexorably seek his overthrow.
Meanwhile, thc Kremlin seems lo be unable to institute effective disciplinary measures against Tito. Armed Intervention would be firmly resisted and would involve open conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc. Economic sanctions by the USSH and thc Satellites would nol readily bring Tito lo terms especially if he were
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lo Increase Yugoslav economic ties with the West. Such sanctions might result in unfavorable economic repercussions in the Satellites. Tito's control over theCommunist Party, the army, and lhe police appears to be sufficient tooviet-inspired coup from within for the immediate future. Assassination of Tito might be accomplished, but even his death would not necessarily prevent theof his regime by such men as Bankovic. Djilas. and Kardelj. Moreover, it is unlikely that Tito will permit himself lo be provoked by the Kremlinosition which would furnish the USSRemi-legal pretext for overt action.
Despite Its failure thus far to oust Tito, the USSR cannot afford to permitdefection to remain unpunished ^definitely. The Soviet leaders cannot admit that they are unable lo control Communist parties throughout thc world, since such an admission would undermine the foundation of their plan for world domination. Moreover, for both economic and strategic reasons, the USSR is unwilling to adopt any measures which might drive Tito to align himself with the Western Powers. Thus, as far as Yugoslavia is concerned, the USSR seems to beestrained policy in dealing with Tito while it concentrates on more immediate aspects of Its struggle with the Western Powers.
Tito, as well, cannot be desirous ofhowdown, and will, in alllikewiseestrained course of action. Although confident of being able to resist all Indirect Soviet pressure. Tito will be slow to adopt any measures which would give theretext for armed intervention. During the present phase of the East-West struggle at least, Tito cannot close the door to the remote possibility of accommodation with Stalin. Although Yugoslavia would benefit economicallyomplete break with thc USSR If trade with the West were substituted,tep would be politically dangerous. Tito's best chance for survival, therefore, lies in his ability to avoid outright clashes with thc USSR In the slim hope of an ultimatesolution for the re-admission of Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit.
3. Probability or Temporary Yugoslav Support or Soviet Foreign Policy.
So long as thc outcome of Soviet-Yugoslav relations remains in doubt Yugoslavia will, on the surface at least, generally support the USSR's foreign policy; and as long as Titoommunist state, he will probably be forced to continue official attacks on Westernoreover, ln addition to wishing to keep the door ajar for an eventual accommodation with the Kremlin, Tito will be motivated not only by the fear of provoking the USSR to extreme measures, but by the realization that the Western Powers are already committed to positions which conflict with Yugoslavia's principal foreign policy alms.
Yugoslav ambitions in Trieste, for example, blocked by Western support of Italy, have thus far had the support of thc USSR. Yugoslavia can be expected to back Soviet opposition to the Western proposal for the return of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italy in the hope that. In thc final disposition of thc Territory, Yugoslavia will achieve territorial gains. The USSR, however, might alter ils position on this issue in view of its reluctance to strengthen the Tito regime and its primary desire to effect anof US troopsrieste settlement.
Tito also need expect no change In Western opposition to Yugoslavia's claims to the Slovene Carinthian area in Austria. He therefore will continue to act In the hope that thc Soviet Union may still prefer to grant this areaoubtful Yugoslavia rather thanefinitely "Western" Austria. Yugoslavia's recent actions, however, increase the likelihood that, when Austrian peace treaty discussions materialize, the USSR will abandon its previous stand on Slovene Carinthla in an effort to gain Westernon other issues.
In the case of Greece, Yugoslavia's positionis the USSR is far more delicate. The struggle in Greece Is being carried on primarily through international Communist channels, possibly including the Military Secretariat of theonsequently, Tito is nowess important role in the conduct of the Greek Communists' campaign. However, active Yugoslav opposition to the Communist cause in Greece which might invite direct Soviet-Satellite retaliation, is unlikely.
4. Probable Widrkinr of Soviet-Yugoslav Rift.
It will become increasingly unlikely that there can be an accommodation between thc USSR and Yugoslavia as long as Tito and his followers retain control ofontributing factorontinuing deterioration ofrelations will be the Kremlin's Increased efforts to chrninate those conditions In the Satellites which originally caused Yugoslavia's defection. In other words, as the Communist parties of the Satellites are ruthlessly purged of all "nationalist"elements, thc gap separating Yugoslavia from the Soviet system may become progressively wider; in fact, it has already been impossible to restrict the dispute to the Communist Party level. Meanwhile, Tito's efforts to buttress his position may also widen the gap. Tito's preoccupation with his own self-preservation may lead him to take internal measures varying somewhat from those being applied under Soviet orders in the Satellites. Having taken them, Tito would feel called upon for their Justification in terms of Marxist-Leninist rather than Stalinist ideology.
Since the Cominform's denunciation of Tito, the USSR hasigorous campaign to weed out all "nationalist" Communists In the Satellites. In Poland, this purging process reached the highest level of the Communist Party, while in other countries, dissident elements have quietly but effectively been silenced before theyhance to become politically embairassing. Coincident with this tightening of the Party ranks, there has been an Intensification of anti-Tito propaganda, both directly and Indirectly, in the form of increased emphasis on thcoscow-controlled aspects of Communism. This "cleansing" process and thehave gradually affected Yugoslav-Satellite relations and in some instances have facilitated disputes and the curtailment of relations on the governmental level. As the dispute continues, relations between the Satellites and Yugoslavia will become increasingly strained, possibly culminating In the cancellation o( mutual assistance pacts.
Concurrently with the purge in the Satellites, Tito has strengthened his own party by eliminating all those suspected of the slightest tendency to place their loyalty to thc Kremlin first and to Tito second.ajority of Yugoslav Communists, there-
lore, probably now subscribenationalist" brand of Communism which the USSR is trying to liquidate in the other Satellites.
As long as the Tito Communists remain in power, Yugoslavia's political development in the Soviet sphere may differ from that of the other Satellites, which the Kremlin will be preparing (or closer union with thc USSR or even, perhaps, for eventual incorporation Into the Soviet Union. Yugoslav economic planning too may veer somewhat from the approved satellite pattern. In the matter of collectivisation of agriculture. Tito's regime need no longer follow the Soviet timetable. Rather, Tito will be motivatedreater degree by such considerations as maintaining his political position, stockpiling to meet future needs, or exchanging agricultural products for vital materials from the West. Such divergencies may become manifest in some economic fields, since the Tito regime will feel it urgently necessary to become economically strong in order to withstand the increasing political pressure from the USSR and the Satellites. Thus. Yugoslavia can perhaps be expected progressively to lessen Its hostility to the European recovery program, and to make more determined efforts lo trade with the West. S. Soviet Potential ron Liquidating Tito.
Barring any major change in thc international situation, the trend of Yugoslav-Soviet relations will be toward continued andradual widening of the breach caused by Tito's defiance of the Comlnform. The USSR, however, has the power at any time to liquidate Tito by the use of armed force, subject, of course, to the dangers thattep might entail. As long as international tension does not increase, the USSR can afford to refrain from overt action against the Tito regime. As long as the USSR hopes to expand Its influence by political means, the Kremlin is unlikely to order drastic steps against Yugoslavia which would inevitably weaken the political strength of the Communists In other countries. Thc possibility ot direct Soviet action against Yugoslavia may increase, however, if international tension increases the possibility of war. or the USSR deliberately launches World War III.
Underlying all these considerations, however, remains the influence of the Tito affair upon the Kremlin's attempts at maintenance of discipline over Communist parlies throughout the world, as evidenced by the purges of "unreliable" elements. As the gap between Tito and the Cominform widens, the Kremlin will be concerned lest other Satellites attempt to emulate Tito's Independent stand. The Kremlin may thus feel constrained to lake further repressive measures against lhe Sotcllites. such as increased military occupation or even annexation.
Original document.
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