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REACTION OF WEST GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES TO THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIPARTITE LONDON CONFERENCE
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8
REACTION OF WEST GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES TO THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIPARTITE LONDON CONFERENCE
SUMMARY
Reaction of the political parlies in Western Germany to the decisions of thc London Conference is generally unfavorable, particularly because of thc proposedof the Ruhr and thc restrictions which have been placed on the authority of the provisional West German Government. The Christian Democratic Unionhich seems likely to dominate the new provisional government, will be forced to assume responsibility for unpopular policies of the Western Powers while lacking theauthority to represent and be responsive to the demands of Its constituents. It is therefore likely to use every possible means to evade responsibility for currentIt is also likely to lose strength to the rightist parties. The Social Democratic Parlyhich will probably be second in strength only to the Christianin the provisional government,ationalization of Ruhr industry or else the creation of an international Industrial bloc composed of thc Ruhr and adjacent foreign industrial areas.
The Communist Party will continue to function as an Implement of Soviet policy. The rlghtest splinter parties, which have appearedill gradually mergeoose-knit single political organization claiming to be lhe defender of Germanagainst the intervention of foreign powers. Although retarded by German dependence on the Western Powers for protection against the USSR, the general trend toward the rightist parties will continue, and the more moderate CDU and SPD can be expected to lose strength to the more radical political organizations of the Left and Right.
Hole: The information In tills report Is an
The intelligence organlr-allons of the Departments ol State. Amy. end the Navy havein tftis report, the Air Intelligence Division. Air Intelligence Directorate. Department of the Air Force, had no comment.
CONFj^NTlAL
CON
REACTION OF WEST OEKMAN POLITICAL PARTIES TO THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIPARTITE LONDON CONFERENCE
hc Tripartite Conference In London has presented western Germans with the task olrovisional government lor the three zones ol Western Germany, androgram which, in effect, places the highly Industrallzcd Ruhr area under foreign control. The existing political parties, which are thus obliged lo create agovernmentramework to which they ore restricted by thc Western Powers, roust also Justify to the German populace their acceptance of the removal fromcontrol of the most highly industrallzcd area in Germany. This dual task will be made all the more difficultesentful German attitude resulting from thwarted nationalistic aspirations, the inability of the Western Powers as yet to improve the general welfare appreciably, and an inherent German hostility to foreign Intervention.
2 At present thc main concern of western Germans Is with thru own economic welfare They desire economic assistance from the Western Powers, and theby these powers against the USSR. For these reasons the presence of thePowers in Germany Is toleratedemporary and unavoidable necessity More especially, however, the Germans desire an end to foreign occupation and foreignparticularly over German trade. If the present economic situation improves, and some modus vivetidi short of war is reached between East and West, thc bulk of the German population can be expected to support any rightist program promising an end to foreign intervention. For the accomplishment of this objective, they will also support any attempt to exploit the East-West struggle. Thc moderate political parties, the CDU and SPD, will probably not survive without substantial shifts In their policies, because of their apparent acceptance of Allied policies. The proposedWest German Government, in Its present form, will also have slight chance for survival without continued foreign control.
nder existing conditions the German population has no influential vehicle for the expression of Its opinions except the political parties: the Christian Democratshe Social Democratshc Communists (KPDJ. and the group of rightist splinter parties With the exception of the KPD, the parties express thc will of their constituents to the greatest extent possible under the Allied Occupation program, in order to maintain their political following and to avoid retaliatory action by anyGerman government which might be formed in the distant future
4esult, the political parties in Western Germany can be expected toof the decisions of the Tripartite Conference for the following reasons:
of thc Ruhr will beerious violationsovereignty, comparable almost lo the severencc, from Eastern Germany,area under Polish control;
adjustments In Western Germany are similarly regarded;
provisional West German Government outlined by thegrants far less autonomy than is desired by the Germans; and
CONJUCRN-riAl.
d. these decisions were imposed on the Germans by foreign powers Although these objections are common to all the Western German political parties, thc specific reaction to some of the decisions varies somewhat from parly to party, as shown below.
he Christian Democratic Unionith its Bavarian component, thc Christian Social Union (CSU) remains, despite recent reverses in local elections, thc dominant party in Western Germany. Generally conservative, but with elements ranging from moderate to reactionary, this party controls the present Bizonaland can be expected lo dominate any provisional West German government as well.
Reasons for CDU-CSU opposition to the Tripartite program may be outlined as follows:
a. opposition to Internationalization of lhe Ruhr and any consequentof German industrial interests, whose management is probably supporting the CDU at present;
o. opposition to the restricted jurisdiction of thc proposed provisionalsince the CDU, as the parly in power will be forced to assume responsibility for unpopular Allied policies without receiving sufficient power to fulfill thc desires of its constituents;
c. opposition to thc creationovernment which does not contribute to. or directly plan for, national unification. (The CDU's desire for unification of the Soviet Zone with the West Is based, in part, on the illusionon-Communist parliamentary majority can effectivelyilitant Communist minority and preventinority from blocking necessary legislation.)
The six-power decisions are likely to result in the following developments affecting the CDU:
endeavor to convince the population that the party is attemptingGerman interests despite enforced obedience to the dictates of the
of the unpopularity of the decision to internationalizein order to focus German resentment on the Occupying Powers ratherthe CDU;
designed to increase the scope of governmental jurisdictionplace the Occupying Powers In the position of vetoing measures desired byand
these maneuvers, the CDU will probably suffer long-term losslo rightist parties, which are not yet compromised by cooperation withPowers and may be able toore aggressive andin the role of champions of the German nation against the Occupying Powers.
The Social Democratic Partyepresenting non Communist German labor, can be expected to be second to the CDU in the provisional government The SPDentrailzcd party organisation and has cooperated with the US and the UK primarily because of its fear of Soviet control over all Germany.
CONFIDENTIAL
The Social Democratic Party is opposed lo the Tripartite program in relation to;
ol the Ruhr, especially because it removes thatGerman control while thc Issue of ownership of its industry is unsettled.would preferationalization of this industry or the creation of anindustrial bloc composed of the Ruhr and adjacent foreign industrial areas);
restricted jurisdiction of thc provisional government, becauseexpect more influence overovernment than over Allied
fcderalisttc structure of the proposed government which is opposeddesire for centralization.
The six-power decisions will probably result in the following developments in the Social Democratic Parly;
a. reluctance to endorse of Allied policies in Germany resulting intactics and legislation designed to embarrass the CDU or the Occupying Powers; under present conditions, however, the SPD will not resort to strikes,or exploitation of labor unrest, particularly In the Ruhr; and
oss of party strengthlthough playing the role of an opposition party, it is compromised by its association wilh the Occupation Powers and with the Bizonal Economiche centralized control of the parly oris believed to have been relaxed (extentecause, should It participate in the provisional government. It would be unable to fulfill basic points of its program, thus satisfying demands of the rank and rile.esult, it would in thc long term lose strength lo the Communists, and to rightist or more nationalistic political groupings as well.
Thc Communist Party (KPD) In Western Germany can be regarded as anof Soviet policy. The KPD cannot be expected to act independently of thc Kremlin. Its reaction lo the Tripartite decisions will directlv reflect only lhe current attitude of tlic USSR.
umber Of rightist splinter parties have appeared in Western Germany, chiefly in the US-UK Zones. Under various names, such asational Democratseutsche Bloc. Bavarian Party, and others, these groups are still uncompromised in German eyes by cooperation with thePowers. They are linked by lhe common factors of open or implied opposition to foreign intervention arid their appeal to nationalistic and irredentist elements such
fi:yees Horn German ethnic the; nrc.^tit.
these rightisl parties have had no parliamentary government In which they could acquire effective representation and have been hampered by Allied restrictions.
The rightist splinter parties are opposed to thc Tripartite program because of their objections to:
a. internationalization of the Ruhr, not only because they regard it as aof German sovereignly, but because of the consequent expropriation of German industrial interests which may be supporting these parties as well as the CDU;
CONJ/JDENTIAL
intervention and restrictions on the jurisdiction ol thegovernment which prevent their acquisition of power;
federalistic structure of that government to which {with theof the Bavarian Party) they are opposed.
Developments in the rightist splinter parties, resulting from the six-power decisions are likely to be:
merger into one political organization as minor differences are
settled;
of the unpopularity of thc internationalization of thethe new governmental structure through propaganda within Germany andcountries;
to the dominant role of the CDU and SPD, and attemptsthe two parties as collaborationists;
to convince the Western Powers that in exchange forrightist clement can assure the West of German support in any East-West struggle;
to assume the role of defender of Oerman interests bypolicies of the Occupying Powers and by parliamentary tactics (the generalbe opposition to foreign intervention,entralized,nd
n increase in strength drawn from thc CDU and from large elements of the population which at present have little interest In politics.
Original document.
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