COFT HO.81
FOR THt: ASSlSliM vIPFc.uP FOR REPORT* *KZ RU1 iiVt;
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FUTURE DANUBE RIVER NAVIGATION AND CONTROL
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FUTURE DANUBE RIVER NAVIGATION AND CONTROL SUMMARY
Tlic question or international control of the Danube will again arise at aonuly inubject of international discussion since theof Viennahe Danube has nowactor in the East-West struggle for control of Europe. The scheduled conference (which willecision by the Council of Foreign Ministers6 to discuss navigation on the Danube) will deal primarily with the question of freedom of navigation and the restoration ofcontrols.
Since World War II, however, the Soviet Union has attained de facto economic,and military control over the Danube from Vienna to thc Black Sea. The USSR Is thusosition to eliminate the obstacles arising from international rivalry which formerlynified development of the Danube and its resources. The Danube can thus be expected lo become increasingly important to the USSR both strategically and economically.
In view of these prospects, the Soviet bloc at the forthcoming Danube conference will not agree to any proposal which would weaken Soviet control over the area, despite apparent concessions it may make to thc Western position. Thus the USSR will agree to international control, but will insist that only riparian states can have an effective voice in such control. The Soviet Union will also agree to the principle of freedom of navigation on thc Danube for all states, but in practice will be able to use its political and economic stranglehold over the Satellites lo deny use of the Danube to non-riparian vessels. Thc USSR will probably insist that only riparian military vessels be permitted on the Danube.
Western success at the forthcoming conference, in establishing such controls as may be feasible over eventual Soviet development of the valley's full potential foraggression, will depend upon the extcnl to which thc USSR desires to avoid awith the West on this issue. The Kremlin may fear thateadlock would have an adverse effect on world public opinion and would block Soviet efforts tothat part of the Danube currently under US control in Austria and Germany.
Note: The Information in this report ia as o(
The InUrllicenoc organisations of the DepartreenU ol Stale. Army.the Navy have concurred in this report: thc Air IntelliEenre Division. Air Intelligence Directorate. Department of the Air
Force, had no comment.
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future danube river navigation and control
Postwar Danube.
The problem of international control of thcubject of debate since thc Congress of Viennaill once again be discussedonference scheduled foruly in Belgrade. Although the USSR and its Satellites gained effective control alter World War II over the major part of the river, the Western Powers were able6 to obtain Soviet agreement toanubian conference1 within six months of ratification of the Satellite peace treaties.
Postwar Soviet control over the Danube has greatly increased Its economic and military potential because international rivalries which formerlynified development of thc river and its resources have been eliminated. Thc Soviet Union, as undisputed master of the Danube from the Black Sea to Vienna, Isosition to (a) supervise reconstruction of installations damaged during the war; (b) direct the implementation of plans for flood control, channel improvements, and hydroelectric development; (c) control the movement and direction of river commerce to its own or its Satellites* advantage; and (d) manipulate any river project inay that it will be consistent with eventual Soviet military plans.
Western Power interest in the Danube, therefore, derives primarily from the rivers contribution under Soviet control to the Soviet war potential. Thc Western Powers are also interested In the possibility ofoice, however small, In Danubian affairs in the hope of facilitating East-West trade for the benefit of Austria and Western
to Soviet Wab Potential.
a. Economic.
The Danube is an important trade route for traffic between the riparian states in an area where overland communications are relatively underdeveloped. Before the war, upstream traffic was nearly three times as heavy as downstream traffic, andprimarily of shipments of raw materials from Rumania and Yugoslavia. The principal downstream traffic consisted of heavy machinery, scrap iron, and other bulky commodities from Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Although thc dollar volume of prewar traffic on the Danube was small compared with the total volume of goods moving between these countries, shipment of the bulky and heavy machinery and raw materials involved would have been far more expensive by land and would havetaxed the limited rail and highway facilities in the area
Realization of postwar plans for linking the Danube by canals with the Baltic and the Rhine, coupled with Communist efforts to industrialize the satellite nations, would enhance the importance of the Danube as an artery of communication. This
'Participants it the conference will Include the USSR. US. UK. Prance, lhe Ukraine. Rumania. BulEarla. Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia Austriaalso parlkipal* a> an observer.
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importance, however, will depend upon the development of East-West relations and thc extent lo which the Satellites will be permitted lo trade with the nations of Western Europe. If freedom of navigation on the Danube were to be restored and East-West trade were to increase, much traffic between Eastern and Western Europe could be profitably shipped via the Danube and the proposed canals On lhe olher hand, aSoviet curtailment In East-West trade would not resultet decrease of Danube traffic over prewar volume since Soviet emphasis on industrialization of the Satellites and on increased Inter-SalclUle and Soviet-Satellite trade will result In aincrease in traffic on the Danube.
Full exploitation of the Danube's water power would also contributeto tlic economic development of Eastern Europe. Prior to the assumption of power in this area by the USSR, political disunity among thc Danubian and Balkan stales prevented thc execution of cooperative plans to use the Danube for theof hydroelectric power or for large scale irrigation projects. Political conditions are now ripe for cooperative projects intended to increase lhe production of hydroelectric power and lo reclaim, through Irrigation, much land of only marginal value underconditions. Plans for such projects are currently being considered and. Ifwill greatly Increase the industrial and agricultural potential of Eastern Europe.
h Strategic.
Control of the Danubetrategic necessity for military control ofEurope but from thc point of view of logistics, the Danube is both an assetiability. Though the river itself can be used for the transport of military supplies and for the maintenance of normal commercial traffic important to the prosecutionar, Danubian traffic in time of war Is particularly vulnerable to attack by mines dropped from the air. (Sweeping Hie Danube for mines is not only an arduous job, but also one which is not particularly effective because of the difficulty of locating mines which become burled in the muddy bottom or which change location with the current)
The Danube isatural barrier separating the Balkans (Yugoslavia.Albania, andorthern Iialy. and most of Austria from the Soviet Union and lhe olher Satellites. As such, it would be of advantage lo the USSRefensive war in which Soviet forces had retreated beyond the Danube. Maintenance of lines of supply across the Danube would be essential, however, for the support of Soviet forces on the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. These lines in turn depend upon the Danube's rail and highway bridges, most of which were destroyed during the last war and would be vulnerable to air attack In any future war. Although temporary pontoon bridges could handle such military traffic, the dcsiruction of the rail bridges across the Danube wouldrippling effect on the entire southeastern European economy.
3. Probable Soviet Position at tbe Conttutfcr.
Al the forthcoming conference in Belgrade, the USSR can be expected, in general, to oppose any proposal which would threaten existing Soviet political, economic, and
rnililaiy controls over the river. The USSR has apparently decided to try to obtain International sanction of ils de facto control over the Danube and may utilize theto further its "peaceonfident that it has nothing to lose.
The Western Powers will be represented by the US, UK, and France. Theirover the Danube is presently confined to physical possession of the German and Austrian zones of occupation. UK and French membership on prewar international Danube commissions will also provide these powersasis loeturn lo the prewar status. However, the Soviet majority will beosition to override any Western proposal and thus the chief restraining influence on the Soviet bloc will be the Kremlin's fear of the reaction on world public opinion of an extreme Soviet stand Moreover, the Kremlin may fearomplete break with the Western Powers would prolong indefinitely the existing barrier to Danube traffic at the border of the US-Soviet rones of Austria. (See Appendixhe maintenance of this barrier would hamper East-West trade (which continues lo be as important to the Fast as to the West) and would block Soviet designs to obtain greater control over Austrian shipping facilities.
The USSR, therefore, will probably take the official position lhat (a) the Danubian regime as set up by the Versailles Treaty Is invalid and that an entirely newof the Danube musi be organized; (b) only riparian states have the right to be represented on any international Danubian administration; and (c) there should be freedom of commercial navigation on the Danube for all states, but non-riparianvessels should be excluded.
Although thc USSR has permitted Austria to attend the conference as an observer, the Soviet bloc will probably vote against Including Austria In the new body at this lime.osition would postpone the admission of Austria until after theof the peace treaty. Depending upon the terms of the treaty and the extent of Soviet control over Austria at that lime, the USSR could then decide whether it would be In the Soviet interest to permit Austrian participation in thc administration of the Danube.
The Soviet bloc will almost certainly agree at the conference to the adoptionesolution calling for freedom of navigation on the Danube for ships of all nations.road agreement to the principle of free navigation, however, will have noresults unless specific measures are adopted designed to overcome the existing military, political, and economic controls exercised by the USSR and its Satellites In practice, these controls enable the USSR to prevent navigation on the Danube by non-riparian vessels The dominant position of lhe Soviet Danube fleet and of the joint Soviet-Satellite shipping companies permits lhe USSR to enforce preferential schedules and rates which would prevent profitable operation by non-riparian companies. More-over, all important port and repair facilities are under direct or indirect Soviet control and consequently non-riparian vessels can be denied their use Military control of the greater pari of the Danube will also remain in Soviet hands and non-riparian vessels can be discouraged from using the Danube by thc onerous military regulationspassage on the Danube by non-riparians.
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APPENDIX I
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE DANUBE
1. Prewar
The principle of international control of the Danube has been recognized for many years International control was necessitated by the neednsuring freedom of navigation for vessels of allaintaining the river In navigablebtaining uniformity In rules and regulations concerning the movement of ships;ndertaking tasks regarding development of the river which were beyond the scope of any individual riparian.
International administration of thc Danube prior lo World War II was theof the European Danube Commissionhich had jurisdiction over the maritime Danube only, and of the International Danube Commissionhich concerned itself only with the fluvial Danube. The legal right of these two organizations to reassume their prewar status is currently being disputed by the USSR.
Although thc principle of freedom of navigation on international rivers wasat the Congress of Viennat was nothat the European Danube Commission (CED) came Into being. CED was authorized to keep the Danube mouth in navigable condition, provide pilotage for ocean-going vessels entering and leaving thc Danube, and enforce freedom of navigation for vessels of all nations. The original members of CED Included Austria, France. Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. Various changes In membership occurred until1 Great Britain. France, Italy, and Rumania were the only member states. At thattatute was passed stipulating that CED could not terminate Its activities except by unanimous approval of the member states. The CED's powers were reduced8 when Rumaniaan autonomousMaritime Danube Commissionmaintain thc maritime channel of the Danube CED was still empowered to provide pilotage and enforce free navigation.azi Germany had also pressured itself Into membership in the CED.
Priordministration of the fluvial Danube was localized, unorganized, and spotty, with each riparian state maintaining virtual autonomy In theof its section of Uie Danube. Establishment9 of the International Danube Commission (CID) still failed toruly international administration. Theasupervisory and coordinating body to watch over the application of basic international law as it affected navigation on the Danube. It had powers of review over all plans for river construcUon which might affect navigation. Uniform regulations for river police and navigation were made by the Commission but were actually approved, initiated, and carried out by the riparian states. The Commission's
of the CID included France, UK. Italy. Germany. Austria. Czechoslovakia, Yucoslavla. Hungary. Bulgaria, and Rumania.
authority also extended to the navigable portions of the Danube tributaries which traversed more than one country and to the river's lateral canal system. CID'sdecisions could be appealed to the League of Nations or the Court ofJustice.
2. Postwar .
Shortly after the outbreak of World War II, Germany dissolved the CID anda Council of the Fluvial Danube Inreat Britain and France were excluded from the Council, although the Soviet Unionember from1 until the German invasion of the USSR.ermany also dissolved CKD and compelled Rumania to accept German representatives In thc DDM.
Since the war, the powers represented at the London Conference on European TransportUSA, UK, USSR. France, Belgium, the Netherlands. Norway.and Greece) initially declared Germany's dissolution of CID and CED as invalid and recognized the continued existence of the prewar commissions. Subsequently, the USSR Insisted that all reference to the Danube be stricken from the final agreements Meanwhile, the USSR occupied thc Danubian area and itself once again became astate through the acquisition of Bessarabia. The USSR thus effectivelyalliles of the navigable Danube. The outcome of the internationalagreed to by the Council of Foreign Ministers In6 will determine whether or not CED and CID will resume their prewar functions. Meanwhile, these functions are being carried out by tho USSR and thc riparian states.
APPENDIX II
PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE DANUBE
Unusual drought conditions during thc past few years, neglected dredging during and after the war, submerged vessels and bridges, and the existence of mines laidthe war have greatly interfered with Uie navigability of the Danube during the postwar period.
1. Fluvial Dak ubr
Level.
Several years of extremely dry weatherlimax in the summer7 when the water level of the Danube fellecord low ofnches below normal. Thisomplete halt In river traffic for several weeks In sections such as the Iron Gate and the area between Bratislava and Komarno in Czechoslovakia. Other areas seriously affected by the low water level included: (I) the Corabia-Turnu Ma-gurele and Uie Calarusi-Harsova sectors In Rumania where there are extensive alluvial deposits and sandie section of the Danube south of Dunafoldvarie area immediately north of Belgrade in Yugoslavia. In order to traverse these sections barges had to reduce their usual cargo weight to one-third. The river started to rise in December, however, and by8 It was normal.
The difficulties arising from Uie low water level were aggravated byof silt resulting from inadequate dredging during the past few years. In some areas, however, the authorities took advantage of the low water to begin dredgingIn Uie Mohov channel between the Yugoslav ports of Vukovar and Beeka Palanka the river bed was leveled and cleaned out Dredging was carried on in the Hungarian sector of the Danube although some of the channels which requireattention are still unusable. The Soviets also sought the aid of the Czechoslovaks in having the Hungarian and Slovak sides of the Danube dredged.
Aided by the unusually mild weather, navigation on thc lower Danube continued throughout the, although ice prevented navigation In the upper reaches of the river.
Damages.
Although thc USSR announced inS that the Danube was clear for navigation from Tulln to Uie Black Sea, traffic is still very slow, often moving in only one directionime because of Uie narrowness of the cleared channel. Pilots are still necessary in many places. Inn observer rcp-irted athips and barges between Braila, Rumania, and Komarom, Hungary. Thcof the greatest obstacle in the upper Danube, the wrecked Tulln bridgeiles above Vienna, left the river clear as far south as Komaiom Although most wrecked bridges have been removed, the following serious hindranceshe railway
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bridges at Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, and Baja.he road bridge at Dunafoldvar, Hungary,he Ujpest railway bridge and several road bridges in Budapest.
c. Mine Danger.
4 the Britishines in the Danube between Giurgiu and Bratislava; thc Germans, Soviets, and Rumanians also laid many mines. The river was swept by Soviet occupation authorities right after the war but danger frommines and those located in coastal and shallow waters still exists. The Soviets and thc riparian states have expressed their concern over this condition and have made plans for cooperative efforts in rnine-swecping operations7 at least three vessels were blown up in Rumanian waters above Giurgiu despite several sweepings by Rumanians in thc summernd inine exploded near Corabia. Several Soviet vessels ran into mines at Esztergora, Hungary, which caused thc Soviets to order that each ship traveling between Komarom and Budapest be
SovieL/Satellite efforts to free the Danube of mines is reflectedoviet request on7 that the Rumanians resume mine-sweeping7 Yugoslav proposal to the Rumanian Government for cooperative mine-sweeping activities along the common Yugoslav-Rumanian stretch of Lhe Danube;umanian recommendation that the Yugoslav Navy sweep thc river between Bazias (northern poinl on joint Yugoslav-Rumanian border) and Orsova (which is just below the Ironhe Rumanian Navy sweep thc section from Orsova to Grula and, with the assistance of the Bulgarian Navy, sweep the portion from Gruia (at theborder) to Giurgiu. It was reported in8 that Sovietwere also taking part in sweeping activities in Yugoslav waters. During7 Czechoslovakia and the USSR completed negotiations for opening the Danube to trafficarger scale. The USSR agreed to clear theiles of the Czechoslovak Danube in thc spring8 The Czechs will meet the cost up0) of the operation which the Soviets assert willf their Danube fleet personnel three weeks to complete. The Czechs will not befor losses suffered by thc USSR during the sweep and the USSR will not be responsible for lasses after it is completed. Unless similar arrangements arc being made between the USSR and the other riparians, il is unlikely that thc Danube can be cleared of minesweeping will have to be continued for some years in order to remove mines buried in sand bars or lodged in shallow banks. Moreover, the USSR can be expected to use the presence of mines as an additional pretext to prevent or at least control all traffic by non-riparian states.
2. Mar it imf. Danubk.
Ever since the European Danube Commission chose to maintain the Sulina branch of thc Danube delta as the channel for ocean-going vessels, constant dredging has been required to keep it open. ThcSlnaia Agreement8 entrusted the technical aspects of maintaining the channel to the Danube Maritime Administrationn auton-
omous Rumanian organization. Since6 thc DDM has been operating under the jurisdiction of the Rumanian Department of Ports and Waterways of thc Ministry or Communications.he DDM has been absorbed by the Department of Ports and Waterways. Although handicapped by Inadequate equipment, coal and fuel oil shortages, and lack of funds, the Rumanians have nevertheless been able to: (a) maintain the Sulina channel ateet; (b) extend the northern breakwatereet; <c) extend the channel' fromoiles from the mouth; (d)ubic feet of siltengtheetidtheet.
Since thc USSR re-acquired Bessarabiat has assumed complete control of the Chllia branch of thc Danube delta, which now forms the Soviet-RumanianAlthough this branch Is not navigable by sea-goingt does receiveercent of the Danube water. Most of this water goes through the Stary Slamboul. the southernmost of the Chilia Delta streams, andarge quantity ot sill around the Sulina mouth. The Soviets have thus far barred the Rumanian technicians from this area. Consequently, the Rumanians have been unable to make the periodicof lhe area directly north of the breakwaters protecting the Sulina mouth, which must be made to determine what dredging and technical work should be done.
mlle mine field at Sulina mouth has handicapped dredging andhannel has been swept to Serpilor Island. Pilots are required on all vessels entering Sulina mouth. Sulina channel and the Maritime Danube are well marked with buoys, lighthouses, and mile markers. Wrecks and sandbars are clearly marked.
One solution of the problem of keeping the Sulina branch open is to divert thc Stary Stamboul stream into one or more of the northern branches of the Chilia delta.tep would protect thc Sulina mouth from the silt now threatening It Work on this was started3 and the USSR may, in its own self-interest, dredge the Oceakov channel for small vessels that ply between Odessa and Danube river ports.
Some Rumanian technical experts recommend the construction of another channel from the Sulina arm to the Black Sea which would allow ships to enterointiles to the south of the present mouth. Plans for this were drawn up7 It was reported in7 that work on this project was underway. Althoughhave also been made for opening the St. George branch of the Danube delta for ocean-going vessels, this is not considered feasible. The constructionanal from Cernavoda to Conslantza has also been proposed.roject would eliminatedependence on the USSR for maintenance of the maritime Danube and would shorten thc distance between the fluvial Danube and the Black Seailes.
Till* channel is protected by two walls whichtdi under normallevel and which reduce the accumulation of silt
attempts by the Soviets0en the Chilia branch which iseel deep at lhe mouth proved that ihis could not be done without the construction ol permanent jetties.
APPENDIX III SHIPPING COMPANIES
1. Implications ok Soviet Control op Shipping.
94 Germany dominated Danube shipping through its control of shipping companies. Thc Goering Combine appropriated the Bavarian Lloydand the two major Austrian companies, andontrolling interest in the Slovak. Croatian, and Bulgarian companies. Germany thus was able to control the two Danubian cartels to which all transportation contracts accrued. Consequently.Yugoslav, and Hungarian shipping companies were under Germandespite their apparently independent status. Soviet control over the Danubeis more stringent and direct than that exercised by the Germans The USSR has established "jointo which the USSR and thc respective riparian eachf the assets but which are under Soviet direction. Through these companies the USSR has also gained control of the majority of the ports, port facilities, and shipbuilding yards in the riparian states.
Of the riparians under Soviet influence. Rumania and Hungary were forced tojoint companies and Yugoslavia freely agreed to establish one. Althoughhas apparently not yet been asked tooint company, it will nowagree ifequest Is made. Bulgaria, with its few vessels already under Communist control, may not be asked tooint Soviet company, although thc recent navigation treaty with thc USSR may prove to be thc basis forompany. In addition to these Joint shipping companies, the USSR has organized Its own shipping company which operates on the Danube below Vienna. It Is subject to no regulations, not even national customs and border checks.
These agreements creating thc Joint shipping companies by granting theotential monopoly of river navigation, loading and unloading, repair and fuelingthroughout the Danube area, will provide the Soviet Union with an effective weapon to prevent freedom of traffic on the Danube. To dale, the Soviets have used the pretext of military restrictions to keep non-riparian vessels out of thc Danube. However, if at the forthcoming Danube conference thc USSR agrees to the principle of freedom for non-riparian vessels, the monopolistic powers granted the USSR byof the Joint companies will, in practice, prevent non-riparians from using thefreely.
These powers include: (a) the absence ol any provision in the contracts leasing the ports to the joint companies that the port facilities be made available to all users-lb) the capability to charge other users exorbitant rates lor use of these facilities; and (c) the special privileges granted the joint companies, such as freedom from taxes, preferential treatment In obtaining foreign exchange, right of cabotage, and all the rights purely national companies are entitled to
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USSR, through the joint companies, has thus obtained the potentialpowers over the volume, type, and cost of transport on the Danube formerly wielded by the major shipping companies which formed cartels dominatingon the river, resulting in discriminatory practices and artificially high rates. The USSR can thus use these economic controls in addition to its polilical controls over the riparian states to obviate any international regulations which may be laid down concerning freedom of movement.
2. Rumania-Hungary.
Establishment of the joint Soviet-Rumanian (Sovromlransport) and(Messhart) Shipping Companies was authorized by the economic collaboration agreements concluded by the two countries with the USSR. The Rumanian company was established inut anti-Communists delayed establishment of thecompany untilhe joint companies were charged with theand exploitation of river and maritime transport and the management of ports, port facilities, and shipbuilding enterprises.
Although each "partner" was. In theory, to make equal contributions of vessels, equipment, installations, supplies, and capital, Rumania and Hungary have actually made far greater contributions than the USSR. For instance, Rumania was forced to contribute many vessels for which no credit was given since Rumania was charged for the cost of repairs which exceeded the base price. In Hungary, one of the Soviet contributions to MESZHART was the Fees coal mines, which the USSR arbitrarily valued atillion dollars.6 the mines were valuedillion dollars. Moreover, Rumania and Hungary were forced to lease ports, shipyards, and vessels to thc joint companies at only nominal rates. The two countnes were also to participate equally in the management of the companies. Actually the general manageroviet in each company and consequently the USSR has the power to administer the entire activities, properly, and funds of the companies.
Originally SOVROMTRANSPORTessels, ofere contributed by the Rumanians andy the Soviets. By6 SOVROMTRANSPORT vessels had increasedesult of thc addition ofraft returned to Rumania by the USSR, on condition that they be contributed to SOVROMTRANSPORT, andelonging lo the Rumanian Danube Navigation Company (SRD) which wasby SOVROMTRANSPORT.essels were requisitioned by thegovernment and leased to SOVROMTRANSPORT lo help carry out armistice deliveries. The Rumanian government is exerting such economic pressure on the privately owned vessels operating independently of SOVROMTRANSPORT that they arc slowly being driven out of business. For example, in the summer7 the Ministry of Communications ordered government and government-controlled agencies to use SOVROMTRANSPORT facilities when shipping via the Danube, and in8 SOVROMTRANSPORT wasonopoly over the commercial transport ofand cargo over specified routes Moreover, SOVROMTRANSPORT was given the right to lease port facilities and shipyards at Conslantza, Galatz, Braila, and Giurgiu wllh preference for leasing the rest or Ihc ports in Rumania.
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Soviet contributions to the joint Soviet-Hungarian Shipping Company (MESZ-HART) included the assets In Hungary of the First Danube Steamship Company (DDSG) of Austria which the USSR claimed as German reparations and whichthe Pecs coal mines and several apartment houses and factories. The USSR also contributedessels seized as war booty in Hungary and Rumania. Hungary gave all the assets of the Royal Hungarian River and Sea Shipping Company (MFTR)theessels then in Hungary and all Hungarian ports except Budapest, Gyor, Baja. Mohacs, and Szeged, which are leased to the company. Hungary was also supposed to contributeFTR vessels which were at that lime in the US zone of Austria. When these vessels were returned, however, they apparently remained under the control of MFTR and its subsidiary, thc Danube Ocean Shipping Companyhis is probablyemporary arrangement which will end whenever the Soviets request implementation of thc earlier agreement.
Meanwhile, the three operating Hungarian shipping companies are:ithugs and freighters andarges and tankers; (b> MFTR, withugs and freightersarges and tankers; (c) DTRT.ea-going vessels currently scheduled to operate to Near Eastern ports. Despite the relative smallness of MESZ-HART. Soviet control over Hungary's Danube shipping Is assured through MESZHART's control over the major ports, and faculties and the preferential treatment accorded MESZHART by the Hungarian government.
Neither SOVROMTRANSPORT nor MESZHART can be liquidated except by Joint agreement of the two countries involved.
3. Yugoslavia.
Unhkc the Rumanian and Hungarian joint companies, the Yugoslav-Soviet Joint Shipping Companyormed ins the result of an agreement between two ostensibly independent countries, but it Is very similar to the othercompanies. Like MESZHART and SOVROMTRANSPORT, JUSPAD was formed "to exploit river navigation on the Danube and its tributaries; to utilize ports, quays, facilities, and equipment; to organize river and marine transport, construct, expand! and exploit shipbuilding yards; and to transact transport and commercialhe capital is divided equally between the two countries, but instead of contributing vessels, each country has contributed an equal amount of capitalillionhares of the company cannot be sold without permission of both parties. The Board of Directors is equally divided between representatives of both countries. The Soviets control JUSPAD through the sweeping powers given the Director Generaloviet citizen) just as they control MESZHART and SOVROMTRANSPORT through thegeneral manager of these companies.
Whereas ihc joint companies in Rumania and Hungary handle Internal as well as international shipping, JUSPAD is limited to handling Yugoslav shipping io other countries, while all traffic within Yugoslavia is controlled by the State River Navigation
ompany of
hich leases 1S1 ofessels to JUSPADay each. In return, thc USSK has agreed to build the largest drydock lnat Ada Chuaj. The USSR has clearly demanded much less of Yugoslavia than it has of Hungary and Rumania, although it has sufficient inlercsL in Yugoslav shipping to assure continued control of international Danube traffic through Yugoslav waters.
Immediately after the war ended, the USSR established the Soviet Danube State Shipping Company (SDOP) whose fleet consisted of captured Austrian, Hungarian, and German vessels, and of vessels delivered under the terms ol the Rumanian armistice,ew Czechoslovak and Dutch craft. Headquarters for this company are in Ismail and Reni, newly acquired Soviet ports in Bessarabia. SDGP reportedlyin the springDGP is the Soviet agency which participates in the Joint companies with Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania.
The SDGP primarily carries cargoes for thc Soviet government and its military authorities, but also offers commercial freight service. Although SDOP, operating under stale subsidy, could afford to make its tariff rates so low as to precludeby other Danube shipping firms, there is no evidence thai the Soviet stateengages In unfair competitive practices or enters into any exclusive operating agreements with other firms. The fad that SDGP vessels do not respect frontier or customs regulations in traveling along the Danube indicates that the USSR has noof according even formal recognition to the sovereignly of the Satellites in this matter.
The USSR has thus far been unable to obtain complete control of the two Austrian shippingFirst Danube Shipping Company (DDSG) and ContinentalCompanyrior to the war Austrian vessels constituted the thirdfleet operating on the Danube, and contributed substantially to the economy of Austria and the Danube basinhole. The presence ln the US Zone of Austria oft the vessels belonging to these companies has blocked Soviet attempts to absorb the companies. Moreover, as long as these vessels remain under Westerntheyhreat to complete Soviet domination of the Danube.
Final disposition of these companies and their vessels must awail conclusion of the Austrian treaty. The USSR maintains that it Is entitled to DDSG assets under the Potsdam Agreementesult of the purchase9 by the Goering Combine ofnterest in DDSG owned by the Italians. Originally the USSR had demanded all DDSG assets in the Soviel-conlrolled Satellites as wellf those In Austria.however. Soviet peace treaty negotiators haveisposition to compromise on their original demands as lo the percentage of DDSG shares they will insist on.
olution of this problem, operations by the Austrian companies areirtual standstill. In the US zone, some ships are operating passenger routes between Linz and Fngelhartszcllrns of Ruhronth are being moved on DDSG
from Regensburg to Li nr. Although accurate figures are unavailable, themajority of the DDSG vessels In the US zone) arcDisposition of the company'sessels in the Soviet zone is unknown Some have unquestionably been seized as war booty by the Soviets; others have been transferred to Soviet-dominated companies. Regardless of their present status, it is unlikely that after the peace treaty Is concluded the USSR will agree tomany of these vessels to DDSO. Thai loss of vessels, coupled with Soviet seUure of DDSG assets (including dock, cranes, port facilities,n the Soviet zone of Austria, Hungary, and Rumania, will seriously reduce the importance of DDSG If freedom of navigation on the Danube is ever again resumed.
Meanwhile, the USSR can be expected to continue its attempts to gain control of DDSG and COMOS. Principal levers thc Soviets may use in this campaign include:romise that if Austria will agree tooint Soviet-Austrian company, the USSR will return to the joint company all vessels and facilities seized as German assets, and (b) threats that only by allowing Soviet participation in DDSG will Austria have access to the Soviet-controlled Danube.
Thus, continued Austrian refusal of Soviet demands will seriously weaken theposition of the Austrian companies and may result in their exclusion from the Soviet-controlled Danube. On the other hand, capitulation to the Soviet demands would extend Soviet control of the Danube to Germany and Increase thc USSR'sfor additional penetration of the Austrian economy.
In the springhe Czechoslovakian Danube Navigation Companyonsisting ofessels, was nationalized and put under the management of theSection of the Ministry of Transport.essels have since been restituted to Czechoslovakia by thc US and theo far, the USSR has not demanded that the Czechoslovaksoint Soviet company. However, the USSR may take advantage of its recently strengthened position In Czechoslovakia to do so In order to gain control of thc large modern Skoda shipyard at Komamo; the important port of Bratislava: and the Czechoslovak fleet which thc Czechs plan to increase to twice its prewar size.
The Bulgarian River Navigation Company (BRP) Is state-owned and operated by the Division of Water Communications of the Ministry of Railroad. Automobile and Water Communications. Most of the BRP fleet was destroyed during the war. Inhe BRP had approximatelyessels in operation. Not more thanrivately owned vessels operate In Bulgaria. So far the Soviets have notoint company with Bulgaria, probably because the Bulgarian fleet is so insignificant However, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which was signed by Bulgaria and
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13
USSR Inrovides for increased economic collaboration between the two countries and may result in the formationoint company.
8. Non-Riparian Countries.
The French Navigation Company <SFND) which had headquarters at Bralla,before the war. ownedesselsFKD now hasessels on theready to start operation as soon as circumstances permit. Three vessels are still in Soviet hands, two are in the US rone of Austria, and two are being repaired by the Rumanians In7 the USSR attempted to charter or purchase the SFND fleet but the French refused.
Utile Is known concerning the disposition of the British. Dutch, and OTeck prewar fleets. Many were seized by Germany and the USSR, many were destroyed and some have been taken from the Danube for use elsewhere by thc parent companies. The USSR returnedessels to the British, most of which arc now being repaired byaccording to the provisions of the Armisticeentative contract was maderivate Rumanian company for the charter of three of the bargesrepaired but governmental pressure prevented the charterers from implementing theritish tug has been under charter to thc Rumanian government since7 and Is permitted to fly the Britishew Greek vessels are Idle Inwaters; others have been chartered to SOVROMTRANSPORT; and some have been purchased (but not paid for as yet) by Rumania for delivery as reparations to the USSR Utile is known of the disposition of thc Dutch fleet which comprisedessels before thc war. The Sindey-Itallan Danube Navigation Company Is under liquidation because all its vessels were scuttled or seized.
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APPENDIX IV
SHIPPING ACTIVITIES
Incomplete reports on postwar shipping on the Danubelow increase in traffic since the end of the war. The return of vessels by the SovieL Union and the United States, thc repair of port facilities, the re-establishment of shipping companies, and the resumption of trade contributed to increased traffic among the SatelliteOn the other hand, there has been practically no activity on the Danubethe US zones of Germany and Austria and the Soviet zone of Austria. The USSR has consistently prevented passage of vessels from the US zones to thc lower Danube and consequently the US has been forced to retaliate by preventing the entry into its zone of Soviet or Satellite vessels. The Soviets have also excluded practically all non-riparian vessels from the Danube.
Although numerous obstaclesapid restoration of Danube traffic tolevels, the Danube, under Soviet domination, may become an even more important artery of commerce than it was in prewar days. Soviet emphasis on vastly Increased trade between the Satellites will result in an increase in Danube traffic. In prewar days, much of Hungary's exports to the West went by rail via Trieste; much ofgrain and oil was shipped to Western markets via the Maritime Danube only, while Yugoslav exports to the West also were shipped via Adriatic ports or by rail. Postwar curtailment of these Western exports and their gradual diversion to other Satellites or the USSR may substantially increase the percentage of Satellite traffic carried on the Danube. Such an Increase would in part compensate for the decrease in Danube traffic which would result If the Austrian and German portions remain separated from the Soviet-dominated Danube and if East-West trade is not resumed.
The rate at which this trend toward Increased Danube traffic materializes willupon the ability of the USSR and its Satellites to: (a) restore the physicalof the Danube <scc Appendixb) restore the Danube fleets and port(see Appendices litnd (c) restore thc general economic level of the Satellites.
7 Czechoslovak traffic had reachedt6 level. The Czechoslovak government hopes to quadruple7 traffic and to take over the major part of the shipping previously handled by Austria Czech river ports were visited by Yugoslav, Bulgarian. Rumanian, and Soviet vessels
During the last four monthsessels traveled through the Hungarian Danube.f these were flying the Soviet flag,lew the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak flags, respectively. f thc vessels
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were Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian, whereas before thel the vessels were of these nationalities Movement of vessels on the Danube in Hungary from January to7, an increasever the corresponding period
An indication of thc amount of traffic at Budapest is the loadings and unload-ings at the Free Port of Csepel.oadings in the commercial basinnd unloadlngs% as comparedn the other hand, traffic in the oil basinn unload in gsn loadings compared8 figures. The decrease in commercial basin activity was due primarily to thc lack of vessels (many of which were still In the US rones of Germany and Austria) and thc extremely bad harvest. In addition to shipments to riparian countries, three Hungarianvessels3 metric tons of cargo to the Near East during thc first six months
Vessels from the USSR, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary servicedports. The Insignificance of the Danube to Bulgaria's economy, however, Is illustrated by thc fact that7 fromay throughctober activity at the Bulgarian ports of Ruse. Lorn, Somovit, and Svishtov consisted onlyive Soviet vessels bringing Iron and steel products, rubber goods, and rawine Czcchoslovakian vessels carrying agricultural implements, machinery and equipment, chemicals, and consumers'our Hungarian vessels loaded with electricand railroadne Rumanian vessel carrying pitch;ourvessels bringing goods from Czechoslovakia and Rumania.
SOVROMTRANSPORT has established regular passenger service lo mostports, including such long distance lines as that between Galatz and Vienna with stops at Giurgtu, Tumu Scverin. Belgrade. Budapest, and Bratislava. The round trip takesays and three trips monthly are scheduled.
Official Rumanian figures indicate that SOVROMTRANSPORT transported upstream during April and7 nearly as many metric tons of cargo as It hadthe wholeetric tons as compared2 metric tons.
Rem, which the USSR acquired with Bessarabia, is replacing Oalatz and Bialia as the most important Danube maritime port. Goods are brought downstream from the riparian countries by Czech, Rumanian, and Yugoslav vessels and transferred at Renl to Soviet vessels for shipment to the USSR Most of these goods arc reparations. Likewise. Soviet ships transfer Iron ore and pyrites at Renl to Yugoslav. Czcchoslovakian. and Rumanian vessels for shipment up the Danube. Since Rem is also the terminus of an oil pipeline from Ploesti. Soviet tankers sail from here with oil for the Soviet Union.
B
2. Traffic on the Maritime Danube.
An analysis of traffic passing through the port of Sulina shows that the percentage of Soviet vessels entering or leaving the Danube decreasedf thc total6* for the period covered6 only five Satellite vessels passed out through the Sulina channel whileame in. Duringweek periodowever, seven Satellite vessels left the Danube andeturned. Moreover, the percentage of Soviet vessels entering the Danube with cargo increasedf the total number of incoming Soviet vessels6week periodor which figures are available. During these sameno non-riparian vessels entered or exited the Sulina channel
ORTS
Although the principal Danubian ports were badly damaged during the war, most of them have been repaired and could now operate at nearly prewar capacity.and enlarging of port and shipyard facilities are part of the postwaractivities of the Danubian countries.
The USSR has obtained effective control over all the Danube's major port facilities except those in the US zones of Germany and Austria. The USSR exercises indirect control over the ports in Vienna, the Czechoslovak ports, some minor ports in Rumania (which may. however, be taken over by SOVROMTRANSPORT at any lime) and the Bulgarian ports (which are controlled by the Bulgarianhc USSRdirect control over all other ports, which are administered either by Sovietauthorities or by joint shipping companies.
After completion of the Danube-Oder canal, (which will require at least six years) Bratislava is expected lo become one of the most important Danubian ports. Damage done during the war has been repaired and the Two-Year Economic Plan callsercent expansion of its facilities. There are nowarehousesapacityq. fed;ranes, one grain exhauster,il tanksapacilyubic feet each and oneubic feet, four pontoon fueling stations, twofueling stations,iles of railroad tracks. Bratislava's winter port has two basinsq. feet.
In expectation of greatly increased shipping after the completion of the Danube-Oder canal, the Czechoslovak government also plans to improve and expand the port of Komarno. This port suffered little war damage and, al though smaller thanis more modern. There are four warehouses with storage capacity0 sq. feel, five cranes andiles of tracks. Since the war, Komarno hasreat deal of traffic between Czechoslovakia and thc Balkans. The nationalized Skoda shipyard is also located at Komarno. Under the Two-Yearillion kesillion dollars) has been allocated lo double the capacily ol this shipyard by the end
The port at Budapest (Csepel) is the most important Of theungarian ports; before lhe war it handledercent of the entireaffle, more than any other Danube port. Repair of the badly damaged port was begun right after lhe siege andew weeks it was in use again. However, extensive repairs will be required before the port attains ils prewar capacity. 6 all the facilities Of Ihis port were
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to MESZHART (joint Soviet-Hungarian company) (orears. Gyor. Baja. Mohacs. and Szeged were also leased to MESZHART. All other former MFTR port facilities in Hungary were ceded outright to MESZHART.
The contract leasing the Tort of Budapest to MESZHART reveals the extent to which the USSR has used the joint shipping company technique to dominate Satellite Danubian traffic. The terms of the contract makeossible for thc USSR to: (a) obtain thc maximum "profit" from all Hungarian shipping; (b) exercise considerable control over Hungary's economy; and (c) carry out monopolistic practices designed to deny Hungarian waters and facilities to any company or nation not acceptable to the USSR MESZHART has beenyear lease on all harbor equipment (except repairncluding docks; landing stations; factory, dwelling, auxiliary and other buildings; warehouses and elevators; mechanical transshipment facilities; mechanical installations in the oil, commercial, free, and industrial basins; railways and other communication lines in the port's territories. Thc comjany and thc USSR have also obtained preferential rights in the mailer of the rent to be paid to the Hungarian government. The company will determine the administrative expenses charged to the operation of thc rented facilities This amount will be deducted from the gross income derived from thc facilities and the rent will beercent of thc difference. Of thc remainingercent, the Soviet and Hungarian partners of MESZHART will obtain an equal share. Although thc Hungarian government has the theoretical right to check the accounts of the company, the USSR can in practice avoid paying any rent by arbitrarily Inflating the amount of the expenses. Moreover, the Hungarianis responsible for thc upkeep of the harbor Installations at Its own expense. MESZHART Is permitted to sublease any harbor equipment listed in the contract This provision, in addition to permitting the Soviets to obtain even more direct control of the port, could also result In greater financial benefits to the company and the USSR. MESZHART is guaranteed all the rights which the ports former management had (such as issuing of warehouse warrants and duty-free handling of goods In the freeut is not compelled to adhere to those former regulations which provided for equal treatment of all vessels regardless of flag or origin.
3. Yugoslavia.
Although nominally the Yugoslav State River Navigation Company (DRB)all ports in YugoslaviaIncluding the major ones at Belgradeanccvo. Nov! Sad. Smedcrevo. andUSSR virtually controls Pancevo and Prahovo which are used primarily for Yugoslavia's trade with the Soviet Union. Supplies and war materials deatlned for western Yugoslavia are unloaded at Pancevo (across tho river fromhile shipments lor southern Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Greek guerrillas pass through Prahovo nrnr the Yugoslav-Bulgiirian border Before the war Prahovoelatively insignificant port Under Soviet pressure, however, the Yugoslavs arc attempting to expand Its facilities, although lack of modem equipment has thus far prevented new construction and the adjoining port of Kusjak has been pressed into service Considerable improvements in the port will be necessary
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toecurrence of7 traffic tie-up which resulted from the inability to operate the port during the period of low water level. Soviet use of the undeveloped ports of Pancevo and Prahovo instead of such better equipped ports as Belgrade and Nov! sad was probably intended to: (a) facilitate the movement of military supplies with the maximum secrecy; and (b) concentrate Soviet shipping in as few ports as possible.
Bulgarian ports handledercent of all prewar Danubian traffic. Although Bulgaria's Two-Year plan calls for improvements of the major ports of Ruse and Lorn, Danube traffic is unlikely to play an important part in Bulgaria's economy, because the Balkan mountain range cuts off so much of the country from the river.lack or capital and equipment will retard the planned harbor Improvements.
The Bulgarian government assumed complete control of all Danube ports onhe Directorate of Water Communications is authorized to organize, administer, manage, and control all activities at all Bulgarian ports and all other public or private institutions were forbidden to engage in such activities.
The most important Rumanian ports on the maritime Danube are Galatz. Braila. and Sulina. Galatz and Braila are Important transfer points for cargo entering the Danube destined for fluvial ports. Braila and Galatz are Rumania's principal grain terminals on the Danube, while Galatz isimber terminal. Sulina has no inland rail and poor road connections and is important primarily as headquarters for the administration of thc Danube mouth. All three ports were badly damaged during the war. By7 Galatz wasercent reconstructed. The shipyard is in operation and there are plans for converting former naval enterprisesewfor building tugs. etc. Plans to rebuild Braila8 include repairing warextending the port's rail network, building landing pontoons, and connecting the grain elevators directly to the port. Little reconstruction has taken place so far at Sulina. Thc Soviet Army was reported still in charge at Braila, Galatz, and Sulina in the fall
On the fluvial Danube Giurgiu. Turnu Severln. Moldova. Orsova, and Oltenita are the most important ports. Oiurgiu was formerly used extensively for thc shipment of oil, grain, and timber up the Danube. Wartime destruction of nearlyercent of its oil storage capacity and the preponderance of oil shipments to the USSR have limited present port activity. Moldova and Orsova were enlarged during the war, while war damage to Turnu Severin had been repaired
The agreement creating SOVROMTRANSPORTyear lease of most of the quays' warehouses and other port facilities at thc three leading Rumanian portsGalatz, and Braila. The company has also leased virtually allshipbuilding and repair yards. In addition, the company has preferential rights to lease the remaining port facilities on the Danube. By denying privately
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owned or non-riparian ships access lo the repair facilities in these shipyards,can effectively control all shipping activity on thc lower Danube.
Soviet acquisition of the former Rumanian ports of Reni and Ismail has contributed to the USSR's potential for domination of the Danube. Both ports are being repaired to prewar capacity and arc important export centers for Bessarabian wheal. Reni Is also lhe terminus of an oil pipe line from Plocsli. The increasing dependence of Rumania and the other Danube states on imports from the USSR has increased thc significance of Soviet control over Reni. The USSR can direct incoming Soviet ocean vessels to transship at Reni. thus diverting traffic from Rumania's maritime ports and permuting the USSR to give preferential treatment to its own Danubian vessels.
Linz is the only major Austrian port which is not in thc Soviet zone. DDSG owns lhe port facilities at Linz. which is now the US zone headquarters for the company. As the southernmost port on that part of the Danube which can be used by German and Austrian vessels, it is important as the unloading point for Ruhr coal.
Soviet controlonsiderable portion of lhe Danube in Austria has deprived United States authoritiesonvenient transportation route for supplying United States troops and thc indigenous population in Vienna. At the present time, supplies for Vienna shipped via the Danube from Germany are unloaded al Linz and reloaded on rail cars and motor trucks.
The USSR has taken over all DDSG port facilities in its zone; those which the USSR cannot claim as DDSG property, such as the Kuchelau dockyard in Vienna, thc Soviet Army has appropriated for its use. Korneuburg, just north of Vienna, is lheport used by thc Soviets. Located near lhe important Zistersdorf oil fields, it serves as the outlet for oil shipped to the USSR via lhe Danube. The Viennese ports of Winlerhafen, Fischamend. Bruckc der Rolen Armcewischen-brucken, and Donaukaibahnhof. now under Soviet control, were badly damaged during the war and have not yet been fully repaired.
The only undamaged port in the Soviet zone which is not under Soviet control isiles fromlan for the development of Albernree port was presented to the Economic Cabinet Committee in7eans to regain Vienna's prewar positionajor port (second only lo Budapest in amount of traffic handled) As one step in developing Albernompetitor with Bratislava for traffic from lhe Danube-Oder Canal, the Austrians have already constructed one quarteranal between Albern and Angcrn on the Danube-Oder Canaliles upstream from Bratislava. This canal would facilitate the shipment of goods directly to Vienna rather than to Bratislava.
Albern is connected with Vienna IV: miles awayood roadailroad. The port is deep and will accommodate at leastverage size barges. Austrianslate that the port Is ready for immediate use, although necessary warehouses
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a wall enclosing the free port area would have to be built Port facilities Include four modern storage elevators (the Soviets claim one as an external Germanhe planning group also wants to include In thc free port area the winterew miles upstream and the port of Lobau directly across the river, both of which are larger than Albern. The winter harbor which could accommodatearges and Lobau which had excellent oil facilities were both badly damaged during the war and have not yet been reconstructed The Austrians hope to have branch offices,and assembly plants of foreign firms in the free area.
Plans for developing Bratislava as the crossroads between the Baltic and thc Adriatic and Black Seas are causing Austrians concern for Vienna's prewar position as the central point for commerce between Central Europe and the Balkans. Not only the Danube-Oder Canal but also the proposed highway, rail lines, andanal from Bratislava to Trieste across the Hungarian plain are aimed at keeping allcast of Austria,
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APPENDIX VI DANUBE BRIDGES
Aims.
Thc expansion ot Sovici interest in Eastern Europe has increased thc military and strategic importance of rail and road bridges across the Danube. Prior to thc war, the major land routes crossing the Danube were at Bratislava, Budapest, Novi Sad, and Belgrade. Reconstruction of these bridges (destroyed by the retreating German army) has thusardinal factor in the USSR's postwar plans for the militaryof Eastern Europe. Soviet troops and engineers consequently assisted in theof these bridges. The USSR was also instrumental in formulating plans for the constructionew rail bridge connecting Rumania with Bulgaria at Corabla. The location of this bridge suggests that it was chosen primarily for strategic rather than economic considerations. Moreover, the importance of these bridges to the USSR's strategic and military interests in Easlem and Southern Europe provides thewith an additional incentive lo maintain control over the Danube and to exclude all non-riparian vessels.
Thc principal bridges across the Danube in Germany and Austria, including the important Krautelstein bridge at Passau and the Tulln railway bridge at Vienna, were destroyed during the war. Most of these have since been rebuilt or repaired.
Reconstruction of the Bratislava bridge was compiled by Red Army engineers and Czechoslovak workers infi.
Restoration of the Danube bridges in Hungary has been under wayut the large number of bridges destroyed has made Hungary's task far more difficult than that of the other Satellites. Of the four prewar railroad bridges in Hungary, only onethe South Railway Bridge in Budapesthas been reconstructed and that only provisionally. Wreckage has been removed from lhe sites of the rail bridges at UJpcsl and Baja and their reconstruction has been started under the Hungarian Three-Year plan, which also calls for the constructionermanent steel railroad bridge to replace the provisional South Railway Bridge in Budapest. The rail bridge linking the Hungarian port of Komarom with Komarno in Czechoslovakia is also being
Some progress has also been made to rebuild or replace Budapest's destroyed road bridges. By8 work was completed on one permanent road bridge (Szabadsag
23
Hid) and on one semi-permanent bridge (Kossuthermanent bridge (Marglt Hid) was completed to an island in the center of the river with the remainder scheduled for completion byhe chain bridge is being rebuilt; and work ison the Arpad bridge which had been started before the war. The Arpad bridge willeet long andeet wide and is designed lo permit through Vicnna-Bel-grade-Bucharcst traffic to by-pass city traffic In Budapest. It will thus facilitate the movement of military ground forces across Hungary.
Primarily for strategic reasons, the USSR has contributed substantially toward the reconstruction of Yugoslav railway and vehicle bridges. Soviet army engineers completed construction by7 of permanent bridges at Belgrade and at Erdut. The Belgrade span, whicheet in length, was named "The Bridge of thc Red Army" and was highly publicized as an example of the close liaison between Moscow and Belgrade. Itignificant commercial and military link between Yugoslavia and Soviet forces in Austria, Hungary, and thc USSR. Thc Erdut bridge reducesiles thc overland distance between the northeastern province of Vojvadina nnd the provinces to theew rail and vehicular bridge at Novl Sad was completed
Rumania's only Danube bridge at Cernavoda providing rail connections between Bucharest and Constantsa was not daniHged during the war. Prior to thc war, the majority of communications between Rumania and Bulgaria was by coastal vessels or on Danube ferries carrying railroad ears and other vehicles Since the war thc USSR has set up pontoon bridges at various points in the lower Danube for use when needed by Red Army troops or local traffic.
Plans have now been completed, however, at thc direct instigation of the USSR for the constructionew rail bridge to run from Corabia In Rumania to Qigen in Bulgaria. Although prewar plans calledridge between Giurgiu and Ruse (which would have been of more immediate economic benefit to the twohe USSR apparently insisted upon the Corabia-Glgen site as an Integral part of the over-all Soviet plan for Integration of the Soviet-Satellite rail systems. The new bridge, which will be constructed with the help of thc USSR, Poland, and Yugoslavia as well as Rumania and Bulgaria, willore direct highway and rail connectionthe Baltic slates and the Near East Three rail routes lead into the lineat Corabia:ine from Czechoslovakia and Poland through the Oltul Valley; (b) lhe line connecting with the new Craiova-Bucharest line and Ihcnce to the USSR; and <c) the main line from Hungary and Central Europe On the Bulgarian side, thc new bridge connectsailroad under construction from Gigen to Pleven where connections can be made to: (a) Sofia, Skoplje, and Salonika; and (b) Lovech, Troganong tunnel to be cut In the Stara Plamnaarlovo. Plovdiv, and on to Istanbul and Alexandruupolls.
USSR.
Inhe Soviets completed constructionridge at Reni over the River Prut (where it meets thehis bridge connects Galatz and the Plocsti oil fields with South Bessarabia and the rest ot the USSR. The cost of this all-steel bridge, whicheet long andeet high, was borne jointly by the Soviets and Rumanians. It was opened in
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APPENDIX VII
CANALS
The importance of the Danubehannel of communication in Eastern and Central Europe is greatly enhanced by the canal systems which are planned eventually to conned the Danube with the Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic Sea.
Canal.
The fust concrete efforts to link the Rhine system with the Danube began in the middle ofh century whenile Ludwig Canal (Main-Danube) was built. The Ludwig Canal was reopened in7 but navigation in some sections was limited to vesselsons. After the first World War, plans were drawn up for the constructionhine-Main-Danube Canal which would accommodate vessels upons. This canal, with terminal points at Mainz and Kelhelm, would make use of part of lhe old Ludwig Canal. If completed, this canal would facilitate East-West trade andirect line of inland communication from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea.
Canal.
Planning has been underway1 on projects to connect the Elbe. Oder, and Danube Rivers. Present plans, however, are limitedanube-Oder Canal in line with the Soviet policy of reducing Eastern Europe's dependence on Western Europe. Plans for the canal were first announced In7 at the signing of the Czech-Polish Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. Construction of thc canal was further provided for in the Polish-Czech Trade Agreement of7 and In the Czechoslovak Two-Year Plan. Plans call for dredging the Oder River from Kozle in Poland to Moravska Ostrava in Czechoslovakia. From shortly beyond Moravskaanal will be built to the Morava River, which will be made navigable lo its confluence with the Danube just above Bratislava. The syslem williles long and accommodate vessels upons. (Austria has agreed to giveoot strip on the west bank of the Morava River from its confluence with the Danube lo the point where it enters Czechoslovakia so that thc Czechoslovak government can betterthehe canal will take six years to build and will cost anoland and Czechoslovakia will bear the greater part of the expense but Austria, Hungary, Rumania. Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria will also be asked lo contribute. When completed, this waterway will connect the Baltic with the Black Sea. It will also link industrial Poland and Czechoslovakia with thc predominantly agricultural Balkan countries. The canal will assume even greater importance ii trade between Western and Eastern Europe is cut off.
Canal.
Thc Yugoslav Danube south of the Hungarian border winds irregularly between marshy banks It is too shallow in places for normal traffic and it often floods ex-
tensive nearby areas. Consequently, Yugoslavia decided toanal from the Danube at Bezdan to the Tisa at Stary Bccej and back to thc Danube at Uanatska Palanka. Construction ofile canal began int willeet wide andeet deep It will shorten Danube navigation byiles.
The canal project will also include:hole network of lateral canals linking important towns; (b) iingatlon canals serving agricultural areas; (c) constructionam at Staiy Beccj to regulate the course of the Tisa and provide hydroelectric power, and (d) the development of lakes from thc marshland which will be stocked with fresh water fish. The two existing canals in this area will be incorporated Into this syslem. They are the Krai Peter Canal (which Is inadequate for modernand must be improved) connecting the Danube at Batina (Bezdan) and the Tisa at Stary Bccej, and the Kratje Alexsandre Canal which connects Mall Stapar on thc Krai Peter Canal with Ndvi Sad on the Danube.
Canal Project.
Inlan for the constructionanal from Vukovar on the Danube to Samac on the Sava is being studied. This canal would shorten the water route between Vukovar and Samacoupplementary plan calls for the canalization of the River Bosnia to Doboj (an Important future industrial center) thus connecting Bosnia with Central Europe. Movable gates would be built at Samacittle below the mouth of the River Bosnia) which would: (a) supply the canal with sufficient water for navigation; (b) utilize the water power of the Sava; (c) Increase the depth of the Sava upstream from Samac; (d) make navigation possible on the River Bosnia foriles to where canalization would start; (e) supply the network of irrigation canals at Posavlja with water; (f) lessen flood danger on the lower Sava: and (g)eservoir of water in the valley of the Sava which could be used for electric power or irrigation.
Canal.
The Sio Canal connecting Lake Balaton and thc Danube in Hungary was opened int is importantink between the bauxite-producing region of Hungary and thc USSR, principal recipient of this product
tous Projects.
Minor canals proposed or under construction are: (a) the Bratlslava-Komamo canal on which preparatory research work has been renewed, (b) the Cernavoda-Con-stantza canal which is under consideration; (c) the Danube-Tisa canal betweenand Szolnuk on which work has started.
Construction of theCernavoda-Constantza canal would considerably reduce theof the maritime Danube by enabling ocean-going vessels to transship at the more adequate port of Constantsaanal would thus eliminate the need to maintain thc mouth of the Danube navigable for ocean-going vessels and would reduce Rumania's dependence on the USSR ln this connection If thc USSR should permit the Rumanian government to construct this canal, the Kremlin would probably insist on obtaining controls over it sufficient at least to compensate for the dominant position derived Irom Its control over the maritime Danube (see
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APPENDIX VIII
REPARATIONS AND RESTITUTION
The relative strength ol the various postwar Danubian shipping fleeLs will dependreat exlent on the final solution of the reparations problem.ercent of thc reparations payments by Rumania and Hungary to the USSR comprise vessels, technical fleets, harbor machines, and floating docks, most of which mustillion dollars worth by Hungary andillion byhe USSR has incorporated some ofiver vessels which have already been received from these countries into the Soviet Danube Shipping Companythers are being used on Soviet inland waterways.
Czechoslovakia has asked that nearlyercent of Hungary's reparationsbe in the form of ships and shipping facilities.
Thc problems connected with the definition of external German assets has held up the settlement of DDSG property In Austria. DDSG assets located In Hungary and Rumania have been appropriated by thc USSR. Thc Soviets, furthermore, are claiming all the DDSG property In their zone of Austria. Czechoslovakia andwill probably demand river craft as part of their reparations from Germany.
Restitution of vessels has been slow because (a) thc US held the vessels in its possession until freedom of navigation had been provided for In the Satellite peace treaties; and (b) the Soviets used the vessels they had for the transportation of war booty and reparations to the USSR. Onhe US announced that it would return all vessels from the US zones of Austria and Germany to all nations except Austria and Germany. Approximatelyessels have been returned too Hungary (thc US retainedungarian vessels in Germany as waro Yugoslavia, ando Rumania. The few vessels belonging to Bulgaria, the Netherlands, France, and thc USSR were also returned.
As ofhe USSR had returned all butf the Czechoslovak vessels and it is in the process of returning those. French and Greek craft were returnedhc USSR alsoumber of vessels to thc Joint navigation companies in Hungary and Rumania as part of its capital contribution. In7 the Soviets returneddditional vessels to Hungary, some of which had been damaged during the war but had been repaired.
Since the total number of United Nations vessels turned over to the USSR by the Armistice Agreements1 for use during the war and the total number of ex-enemy vessels seized by the USSR as war booty are not known, it Is impassible to ascertain exactly how many of these vessels are still held by thc USSR. The number is probably small.
1 Article IX lor Rumania and Hungary and XIV for Bui curia.
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APPENDIX IX IRON GATE
One of ihc features of the Danube which has always demanded special attention is the Iron Gate, one of the Carpathian gorges. Situated between thc Rumanian ports of Turnu Sevcrin and Orsova,oot gorge Is interlaced with rocky barriers and reefs which make navigation hazardous at low water. The narrowness of the channel and the swift current (up tonots) add to the navigational difficulties. Although five attempts have been made to blast channels in this section of the river, the Iron Gate remains the bottleneck of the Danube. Vessels largerons cannoi pass through the Iron Gate and tugs moving upstream must reduce thc number of barges in tow andteam locomotive, located on the Yugoslav side. Night navigation is Impossible.
Because of these difficulties, the need for special administration of the Iron Gate has long been recognized. An Iron Gale Administration (APF) was set up under the Danube Statute1 to maintain and Improve the condition of this sector of thc Danube. Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the International Danube Commission wereon the APF. During the war, Rumania and Yugoslavia successfully opposed German attempts to gain absolute control over the Iron Gate.
The present legal status of the APF is obscure. Earlyoint Rumanian-Yugoslav committee was established to take care of the technical aspects of navigation through Uie Iron Gate As far as is known, this provisional committee isoviet representative as observer. Originally the committee considered itself as thc legal caretaker for lhe old APF until such time as the International Danube Commission was re-established. Since that time, however, plans haveew Rumanian-Yugoslav agreement which, by eliminating any reference to the prewar APF, will be more in consonance with the Soviet line that all prewar international Danube agreements are now invalid.
Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia hove discussed cooperative plans for theand development of the Iron Gate. No definite decision has yet been reached, however, and in view of the technical difficulties involved, ji will probably be some years before any far-reaching plan can be Implemented. At present theare attempting to obtain blueprints (Uie only known copies are In the US and UK zones of Germany)cheme worked out by Uie Germans during the war. which would eliminate Ihe navigation bottleneck as well as provideP of electricity.
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ANUBIAN TV A
Inepresentatives from Czechoslovakia, Hungary. Yugoslavia, Hu-mania. and Bulgaria met torogramTVA" of the Danube which would Include expanded use of inland waterways, flood control, canalization, bridgeand electric power projects. Another conference of engineers andwas held in March, at which technical questions relating to this program were studied.
rogram could only be implemented through Joint riparian cooperation since thc individual countries cannot supply the capital and technical help needed to carry out improvements in the Danube channel, much less an extensive program of agricultural and hydroelectric projects. If successfully completed, the venture would vastly increase thc economic potential of the Danubian countries by Irrigatingillion acres, developing cheap electricity and permitting thcof agriculture and the establishment of new industries. Although politicalare ripe for such apresumably will be pushed by thelack of capital equipment, labor, and materials will delay Its execution for some time.
SE#RET
APPENDIX XI
PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF SOVIET DANUBE POLICY
As early0 the Soviet Union Indicated what Its policy would be in regard to the Danube. In answerrolest by Great Britain on thc calling by the USSR ol the Bucharest Conference ont replied:
he USSR Is forced to recognize as Incorrect the assertion of the British Government to the effect that thc recognition by the Soviet Government of the necessity ofew Danube Commission and the participation of the Soviet Union in thc conversations at Bucharestiolation of neutrality. The formationanube Commission with the participation of the Soviet Union and also of the states bordering on the Danube or close to thc Danube constitutes the re-establtshment of justice which was violated by thc Versailles and other treaties by virtue of which the Soviet Union was eliminated from the composition of not only the International but also of the European Danube Commissions.
"The Danube Commission must naturally be composed of the representatives of the states bordering Dn the Danube or closely connected with thc Danube or utilizing the Danubehannel for trade (for example. Italy).
"It is understandable that Great Britain separated from the Danube by thousands of kilometers cannot be counted among the number of such
What is probably the most recent expression of the Soviet view was outlinedamphlet by Professor Durdenevski who stated, "It is necessary that no outside forces prevent the Danubian states from building their own future for themselves" andthat British-American Interest In the Danube was in no way justified. While conceding that the principle of equality for commercial shipping yii the Danube should be recognized, he insisted that non-Danubian powers should not be permitted to send "military" ships onto thc river; on the other hand, he claimed that Soviet war vessels should be allowed free passage from the upper Tisa in Soviet territory to the mouth of the Danulw, also in Soviet territory. The Professor claimedommissionof the riparian states only would eliminate "every kind of intrigue arising from non-Danubian countries."
The Soviets have repeatedly reiterated this policy notheir ownbut also through their Communist spokesmen in the Danubian countries. The approach taken with regard to the European Danube Commission (CED)ucharest newspajier in. There is no need for the CED. the article slated, because (a) it did not accomplish Its technical duties before the war; <b) the situation is different from what it washen CED was formedRu-
mania now being capable of taking care of the Danube mouth, (c) thc CED set tariffs much higher than those on the Elbe or Rhine to the detriment of thc Rumanian(d) the CED interfered in the authority of the Rumanian government; (e> thc CED was gradually transformedechnical bodyommeirial enterprise Czechoslovak Foreign Minister dementis In an interview inhat the "solution of the Danube problem should be left exclusivelye agreed, however, that Die river should be open lo vessels of all nations under equal terms.
Since thc summereries of bilateral agreements between the Danubian stales have been concluded which layoint policy of riparian administration of lhe Danube. Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary', and Czechoslovakia all agreed "to follow an identical policy with view to safeguarding the rights and Interests of lhe riparian states,"
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APPENDIX XII
NOTE
Further details concerning thc Danube can be found in the following documents:
The Danube Ilwcr and Us Controlffice of Strategic.
5 (Unrestricted) The Danube Organization of Shipping Companies, Department of State,
(Secret)
Recent Danube Negotiations Regarding Freedom of Navigation, Department of State Intelligence Mem0 (Secret)
Contract for the Lease of the Port of Budapestavy Department,udapest. (Confidential)
Considerations Bearing on New International Danube Regulations, Department of State, (Confidential)
Brief Descriptions of all Usable Rumanian Ports on the Danube, Navy Department,ucharest. (Confidential)
The Negotiation of the Treaties of Peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, Department of StateHistory of Negotiations re Danube" (Secret)
Three tcclinical reports which give the navigational plan for thc postwar Danube:
From the Mouth of the Danube to Vienna, Navy Department,ucharest. (Confidential)
From thc St. George Channel Mouth to Braila via Sulina Mouth, Navy Departmentucharest. (Confidential)
From Braila to Bratislava, CIQ1ondon. (Secret)
DISTRIBUTION
The President Secretary of State
Chief of BUS to Commander ta Chief Secretary ol Defcoae Secretary of- the Arm;
Secretary ot th* Nary
Secretary of the Sir Porn
Executive Secretary. National Security
Chairman, National Security Resourcea Board Chief of Buff. US Army Chief of Naval Operatlona Chief of SUIT. OS Air Puree
Director ol Plan* andeneral Staff,rray
Deputy Chief of Naval Operation* (Operation?)
Director of Plana and OperaUona. us Air Force
Special AatUtant to thc Secretary of State. Research and Inlelllcenoe
Director ofencral Staff. US Army
Chief ot Naval Intelligence
Director of InUlufeaoe, US Air Force
Secretary. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary, Joint IntelUcr.c- Orcup
Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Alr Force CoordmaUne Committee
KxtcuUt* Secretary, Military Liaison Committee to tha Atomic Inerty Oommlaatog
Director of Security and InteUieroce. Atomic Energy Commlaaton
Chief, AcquUlUon aad DtatribuUon, OICD. Departmeot of State
Original document.
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