POSSIBLE PROGRAM OF FUTURE SOVIET MOVES IN GERMANY (ORE 29-48)

Created: 4/28/1948

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

iE^RET

CIA HISTORICAL RP/BV PROGRAM RELEASE IN ffJLL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

POSSIBLE PROGRAM OF FUTURE SOVIET MOVES IN GERMANY

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OHIO8

POSSIBLE PROGRAM OP FUTURE SOVIET MOVES IN GERMANY

SUMMARY

L The following discussion coversprogram lhal mighi be resorted to by the USSR in Germany in an effort to cause thc Western Powers to leave Berlin, to con solidale the Soviet hold over Eastern Germany, and to extend Soviet Influence Into Western Qermany. Until recently this review of possible Soviet intentions waspurely speculative and thc program one that would be attempted only after the USSR had concluded that Soviet interference with the Allied efforts in Western Germany could not be effected by legal international means or through localsubversion. The timing of the Individual stages of the program wouldbe conditioned upon the timing and success of Western Power action.

The recent Soviet walkout from the Allied Control Council and Soviet efforts to Impede transportation to and from Berlin indicate that this program may already be under way. and. that while risk of war may be involved, thc plan possibly can be effected without military violence.

It is believed, therefore, that recent Western Power action may have caused the USSR to decide that:

no longer remains for Interfering through quadripartite meansproduction of Western Germany upon which the success of the Europeansubstantially depends;

Soviet Zone must be placed under permanent controlellgroup, loyal to the USSR, and supported by police stale measures;

Peoples' Congress should be thc instrument for the formation ofprovisional German Government;

order to prevent Allied interference with this process of politicalthe Allied Control Council should be abolished, or permanently boycotted,Western Powers forced out of Berlin;

new German "Government" should be acknowledged, at aas the official administration for Eastern Germany, with propagandaauthority over all of Germany;

he Soviet Army should remain as the "protector" of the new Reich pending creationew German Army, by agreement with Ihis governmcni; and

g in an effort to undermine the Western Power program Western Germanv should be pressed, by all possible methods, to "rejoin- the Reich

Note. The infornuuon in this reportApril IMS

The mtelhcence organization, ol the Dep.,tment. of Sute. Arm,.andconcurred in this

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POSSIBLE PROGRAM OF FUTURE SOVIET MOVES IN GERMANY

the conclusion of thc London tripartite talks and the decision toGermany in the ERP planning, the Kremlin may have decided that littlefor the USSR to interfere with US/UK Zone production.

Three events: the results of thc Soviet-sponsored Peoples' Congress, the abrupt departure of the Soviet delegation Irom the Allied Control Council (ACC> meeting olarch, and the subsequent Soviet efforts to impede both freight and passenger traffic between Berlin and the West Indicate that at least the first steps In the outline of possible Soviet action may no longer be entirely in thc realm of speculation.

CIA has believed and continues to believe that the USSR might encourage the Peoples' Congress touture "national" administration andt facto Government for the Eastern Zone while propagandist ically claiming to speak for all the country. The Peoples' Congress partially confirmed this opinion when it convened onarch, advocated the early establishmentovernment to replace the ACC, and evidenced its pretensions lo speak for the German people.

CIA has believed and continues to believe also that in preparation for the newhe USSR would attempt to discredit thc ACC. While the abrupt termination of thc Control Council meeting ofarch has not yet been extendedermanent Soviet withdrawal from the Council, Soviet officials have charged that the Western Powers, by unilateral action, have already made the work of the Council worthless

The presence of the Western Powers in Merlin adds lo the difficulty ofoviet puppet government In Eastern Germany, because of the "opposition" that operates from the sanctuary of the Western Powers' sections of the city. The USSR would eonsequenUy desire toestern Power evacuation of Berlin as expedili ously as possible. The Soviet attempt to Impede transport threatens to renderthe positionizeable Allied group isolatedundred miles from Uie Western area. and. additionally, to cut off the Industrial contribution of the US and UK sectors of Berlin from lhe Bizonal economic structure

5 Should the Peoples' Congress, In fact, setgovernment" ol the Soviet Zone, and lay claim lo "represent" all of Germany, Ihe Soviet Military Administration might accord it local recognition as thc established German administration and givelo its pretensions lo govern nil of tne Zones The USSR and itsmight then be expected to enter Into provisional political and economic agreements directly with thisaying thc foundation for eventual formal recognition at such time as the USSR considers it feasible lo press lhe puppet government's claim to German sovereignty.

A Soviet-sponsored provisional government which would. In all probability, control the Soviet sector of Berlin, might attempt by constant propaganda and possibly by direct interference In the public utilities affecting the Western sectors to obtain thefrom Berlin of Western representation ln the event that any still remained. The USSR could support this program with further concrete action similar to thc transport block and declare the dissolution of the ACC. seeking to place the onus for its failure on the West.

If. at any time, the Soviet Union decided that the new government of Eastern Germany is sufficiently loyal or adequately controlled by the USSR lorusted satellite, that further Soviet Interference In Western Germany through quadripartite means is hopeless, and that the Western Powers are susceptible of blame for the partition of Germany, the USSR might officially recognise the Eastern Germanand by agreement continue the "protection" of the Red Army whilea German Army and perfecting the police system. Both the USSR and theGerman "state" would thenampaign for German unity and independence designed to win sufficient Ocrman converts ln the Western Zones to reduce materially German cooperation In thc West and to attempt to undermine the program of the Western Powers.

lthough each of these successive steps involves the risk of war in the event ot miscalculation of Western resistance or of unforeseen circumstances, each move on the program could be Implemented without the application of military force if adroitly made asetaliatory measure necessitated by unilateral Western Power action, and if pressed only at opportune moments.

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Chief Of Utaft. US Army

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief ot Staff, UB Air Force

Director of Plaun and Operations. General Staff, OS Army

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)

Director Of Plant and Operations, US Air Force

Specialo the Secretary of State. Research and Intelligence

Director of Intelligence.. US Array

Chief of Naval Intelligence

Director of Intelligence. US Air Force

Secretary. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary. Joint Intelligence grt

Secretary. SlaU-Army-Navy-AU Force CeardUsaUac

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Original document.

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