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POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION8
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POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION8 Reportoint Ad Hoe Committee
THE PROBLEM
have been directed to estimate the likelihoodoviet resort to directaction
DISCUSSION
conclusions arc based on considerations discussed in the Enclosure.
CONCLUSIONS
The preponderance of available evidence and of considerations derived from the "logic of the situation" supports the conclusion that thc USSR will not resort to direct military action
However, in view of the combat readiness and disposition of thc Soviet armed forces and thc strategic advantage which the USSR might impute to the occupationestern Europe and the Near East, the possibility must be recognized thai the USSR might resort to direct military actionarticularly If lhe Kremlin shouldsome US move, or scries of moves, as indicating an intention to attack the USSR or lis satellites.
Thu rattmau waa P'cp.fKloint ad hoc committee re prtstnUnt CIA and theicence agencies or the Department of Stale, the Army, the Navy, and th* Air Force. The date of the estimate Isarch IMS.
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ENCLOSURE DISCUSSION
L Thc Soviet military forces are estimated lo have the current capability ofall of Western Europe and the Near East lo Cairohort period of time.
Soviet military forces along the frontiers of Western Europe and tho Near East are estimated Lo be combat ready and generally so disposed that they could launch an immediate offensive.
Since the end of the war Soviet Ground Forces have been reorganized toubstantial Increase In mobility, more effective firepower, and unproved leadership on all levels. The mobilization system permits tripling of strength withinays. Thc air forces have been providedubstantial number of jet aircraft and several regiments of long-range bombers and are now organized Into fifteen air armies, as compared with seventeen at the end of the war. An extensive air defense system has been developed along the Eastern and Western frontiers, employing an Increasing number of Jet interceptors and an effective radar system deployed in depth. There Is evidence of increased emphasis on the development and production of long-range high-speed submarines. Soviet industrial production has continued to emphasizerather than civilian requirements.
By exploiting the postwar political and economic instability in Europe and the rest of the world along traditional Marxist lines, Soviet leaders have already obtained very substantial results. The exploitation ol such unstable conditions Is the cheapest and safest method by which Soviet leaders can obtain their objectives.
Certain basic factual data can be produced to help determine whether or not Soviet leaders would stand to gain or lose by exercising their current militaryor overrunning Western Europe and part of thc Near East. Many factors bearing upon this problem, however, would still have to be determined on thc basis of estimate and logic rather than upon factual evidence. (This problem Is under detailed study.)
Thc determination at this time of whether or not Soviet leaders Intend to employ their military capability rests, in the last analysis, essentially upon logic rather than upon evidence. We have no access to thc thinking or decisions of the Kremlin and little contact with lower echelons of Soviet officialdom. Such evidence as is currently coming to hand, however, suggests that Soviet leaders do not presently Intend totheir military capability of overrunning Western Europe and part of the Near East. Since the Czechoslovakian coup there have been some reports suggesting that Soviet leaders may intend shortly to resort to military action but these have been from uneval-uated sources and can logically be interpreted as attempts by Soviet or anti-Soviet elements to exploit for their own purposes the fear psychosis prevalent throughout Europeesult of thc timing and rapidity of the Czech coup.
Thc Intelligence agencies have generally taken the position that thc USSR, in spite of its current military capabilities, would not commit Itselfourse of action
leading to war until, in the opinion of Sovietts economic potential had become adequatelobal war and until iteasonable stock of atomic bombs. It has also been assumed in some quarters that if. prior to the realization of the above objectives, the USSR were faced with impending stability in Europe. It wouldabandon its expansionist policy, consolidate its gains, and await thc opportunity to promote and exploit new conditions of instability as they might develop in the future.
S. The positions takenboveareful reappraisal, particularly In the light of recent US policy statements and other measures against Communist expansion.
CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MIGHT INDUCE THE SOVIET LEADERS TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION. IN THE ORDER OP THEIR IMPORTANCE:
leaders may become convinced that the US actually has Intentionsaggression within the near future. In view of the well knownin the minds of Soviet leaders, and the isolation of most of these leaderswest, II Is possible that the Politburo might come to this conclusion.
Even If Soviet leaders did not expect Imminent US aggression, they might estimate that an ultimate military clash with thc US was inevitable and that, in view of current Soviet capabilities for overrunning Western Europe and the Near East, it would be to the USSR's advantage to strike at these areasoviet leaders may estimate that their military superiority relative to the Western Powers Is now at its maximum. The USSR is faced with the prospectS rearmament and presumably the rearmament by the US of the Western European Powers now Joinedilitary alliancencreasing US production of atomic bombs and longer range aircraft which will increase US capabilities for covering strategic Soviet targets.
Soviet leaders might estimate that if they overran Europe and part of the Near East they would vastly improve their military security and might obtain cither astalemateegotiated peace based on the following considerations:
a That Soviet acquisition of Western Europe and the Near East might make it too difficult, or at least too costly, for the US to attempt an invasion of these areas by ground forces. The situation would differ greatly from that obtaining in Worldnd II. In those wars the US had beachheads on thc continent or in England and the Soviet Union was an allyeutral in the rear of Germany. In this case the US would be faced with the manpower and space of most of the Eurasian land mass.
domination of the channel coast would enable them to neutralize
the UK,
under these circumstances:
the US public might not support thc continuation of the war even if the military so desired, and
the US in any event would be restricted to an air war and naval blockade, which, although capable of inflicting substantial damage on the Soviet and European economies, would not be able to dislodge the USSR from its newly won position.
TOJ^CECltCT
d. That thc denial lo the Western Powers of Near Eastern oil would seriously Impair their war potential.
The Soviet leaders might believe that, in spite of the currently Impoverished condition of Western European economy and lhe vast difficulties Inherent in the organization, control, and assimilation of this area, the quickest and easiest way to remedy thc economic deficiencies of thc USSR would be lo seize lhe industrial capacity, the technical skills, and the scientific resources of Western Europe.
Soviet leaders might estimate that the European recovery program will succeed in stabilizing Europerotracted period and thereby deny them the possibility of gaining control of Western Europe through revolutionary and subversive methods.
CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MIGHT RESTRAIN SOVIET LEADERS FROM RESORTING TO DIRECT MILITARY ACTIONN THE ORDER OF THEIR IMPORTANCE:
The ultimate effectiveness of the European recovery program in stabilizing the economic situation in Western Europe is still far from assured, particularly in the light of Communist capabilities for disruption in Italy and France. The opportunities for further Soviet gains through the exploitation of economic, political, and socialwhile recently diminished, are by no means exhausted.
Soviet leaders have been in the past habitually cautious and deliberate, and. consequently, might be reluctant voluntarily to incur the risks inherentajor war.'
The occupation of Europe and the Near Easl would Impose serious problems on Soviet leaders and expose them to grave risks.
maintenance Df military and police forces adequate lo protectposition gained by the occupation of most of Western Europe and thewoulderious strain on both thc economic resources and manpowerthc Soviet Union. Assuming that war with thc US continues following theWestern Europe and thc Near East, the hostile populations of these areas andwould form an enormous subversive element that would becomewith thc approach of US forces.
addition lo the problem of physical security, the control andthe economies of Western Europe and the exploitation of the resources of thcwouldremendous strain upon Soviet administrative organs andresources, even with the help of well organized local Communist parties in
personnel would be exposed to the standard of living andof Western Europe. Following World War II. the Soviet leaders have had aof reindoctrinating not only the returned soldiers but the entire SovietThe exigencies of war, entirely apart from the possibility of any alienappear to undermine Soviet Ideology and discipline,
basic economic deficiencies of the USSR In terms of requirementswar against the US:
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USSR suffered enormous physical damage in World War II andnoi regained production levels0 Ln all basic industries.
Is inadequateumber of vital fields. Includingand In lhe production of steel, oil. and machine tools.
order to exploit the European economic potential, the USSR wouldsupply raw materials and food to an already impoverished European continentfrom the resources of the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the worldSoviet Union and her sphere of influence.
Soviet leaders may anticipate that, in spite of the European recovery program the Marxist prediction that the capitalist world will collapse of its own accord will be fulfilled, following thc economic dislocation of Word War n.
The USrowing slock of atomic bombs. Soviet leaders may not regard this weaponecisive factor, and may have considerable confidence in the USSR's defensive capabilities against atomic attack; they probably recognize, however, that atomic warfare can inflict vast destruction and loss of life on the USSR
The Soviet population is definitely war-weary and has long been promised an Improvement in its standard of living. While thc Russians traditionally unite to repel foreign invaders, Soviet leaders might question whether, under present circumstances, they could risk thc possibilityrotracted global war.
The politicians in the Politburo have always been suspicious of the military. War would again bring the military to thc fore and mighteal or Imagined threat to the Party leaders.
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POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION
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Addendum) PuUhlwi8
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copy ol this publication is for the Information and use of theon the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of thewho require the information for the performance of their official duties.elsewhere in the department to other offices which require thefor the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence,Department of State
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Addendum)
POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTIONeport of Ad Hoc Committee' Reviewing the Conclusions on
THE PROBLEM
have been directed to estimate if the events of thc past six monthsor decreased the likelihoodoviet resort to military action.
BASIS FOR ESTIMATE'
intelligence bearing on the stated problem is too meager to supportthat the USSR either will or will not resort to deliberate
DISCUSSION
conclusions arc based on considerations discussed in the Enclosure.
CONCLUSIONS
We do not believe that the events of the past six months have made deliberate Soviet militaryrobability. They have, however, added some weight to the factors that might induce the USSR to resort to such action. It istherefore, that thc possibilityesort to deliberate military action has been slightly Increased.
However, the developments d! thc past six months which constitute setbacks to the Soviet International position have had the effect of adding to the pressure on the USSR. This pressure increases thc possibility of thc USSR resorting to diplomatic ventures which, while not constitutjng acts of war or even envisaging the likelihood of war, will Involve an increased risk of miscalculations that could lead to war.
' This esUmate was preparedoint ad hoc committee representing CIA and the Intelligence agencies or the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Ail Force. The date of the estimate is
"The Office of Naval Intelligence concurs generally in thc discussion, as contained in thc Enclosure.
However. ONI feels that thc "Basis for Estimate'" as staled Is not valid. Evidence of Soviet Intentions Js meager, but such intellleence as is available does notesort to deliberate military action. If the position la taken that the Intelligence available cannot support conclusions one way or the other, any conclusions drawn fromasis of estimate are of doubtful value for U. S. planning.
Therefore, ONI feels that the conclusions stated in OREas modified by ONI comment, are still valid. ONI concurs, however, that the events of the past six months have increased slightly the possibility of military action through miscalculation as stated inf subject report, and would include under miscalculation the possibility that minor military Incidents might expand Into uncontrolled conflict.
iii mil J
ENCLOSURE
DISCUSSION
is made to. In general, and except for suchfollow, it is considered that the discussion and conclusions thereof are still validparticularly in respect to the economic and political factors involved, stillto thc Immediate future.
EVENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET ORBIT WHICH MIGHTSSR RESORT TO EARLY MILITARY ACTION
In the USSR itself, we find no reliable evidence of military, economic, or political developments of sufficient Importance to warrant any revision of our previous
In the Eastern European Satellites, signs of nationalist sentiment, of mass peasant antagonism to Communist agrarian policies, and of dissension in Communist ranks, have suggested the growth of wavering loyalties and resistance to centralfrom USSR. The defection of Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party is our most striking evidence for the existence of an unstable situation. There is no doubt that this situation has caused concern in the Kremlin. While the USSR might consider the use offeree to correct this situation, and general war might result, we thinkecision unlikely unless the Soviet leaders believe that the issue hasoint where it seriously threatens their control of the Soviet orbit. Atime the risk of war might seem preferable to the risk of losing control. There is no reliable evidence,that this point has been reached.
EVENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE WHICH MIGHTSSR RESORT TO EARLY MILITARY ACTION
following events in Western Europe may have brought about someSoviet strategic thinking:
n. The positive effort of the US to recreate economic and political stability through the European Recovery Program (ERP).
increasing firmness of the Western Powers towardwith the growth of military solidarity among Western European nations.
initial steps toestern German Government.
failure of Communist tactics in Western Europe.
. we stated that "the opportunities for further Soviet gainsexploitation of economic, political and social instability, while recentlyby no meanshese opportunities probably appear to Sovietbe still further limited in Western Europe. While it can be argued that anof opportunity may be an Inducement to early Soviet military action. It Is
^imv
possible that thc events noted above have added to the strain on the Communist political control of Eastern Europe and therefore contributed to the weaknesses discussed inbove. It is considered that the USSR, although confronted with resistance to Communist expansion in Europe, is still capable of exploiting existing political and economic Instability, and is therefore more likely to continue to employ these means than to accept thc risk of direct military action in the immediate future. Although Europe will remain the major objective, strategic areas elsewhere are also available for profitable exploitation.
EVENTS IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH MIGHTSSR RESORT TO EARLY MILITARY ACTION
Since Soviet leaders view, and Communist Parties are indoctrinated to regard thc US as the chief bulwark of capitalism, and hence the major antagonist of the USSR, the strategy and tactics of the Kremlin are probably strongly influenced by an analysis of US capabilities and intentions.
Until recently, it has been supposed that Soviet planners wereevere economic crisis in the US by the endnd that from this would follow aweakening of US power potential. In turn, the political and economic recovery of Western Europe would be Inhibited. It now appears possible that this assumption is being revised, and that Soviet planners now assume that US economy win continue productive and prosperous so long as it enjoys the export markets provided by thc European Recovery Program.
It appears probable that Soviet leaders will be forced toiscalculation of factors in US domestic politics which they earlier considered favorable. Neither the Isolationists, the pacifists, nor thc Wallace "Progressives" have seriously undermined popular supportirm US diplomatic line or of adequate US defense proposals. Opinion with respect to US foreign policy has not been fundamentally split along partisan lines. Never before, in peacetime, has US opinion been so uniform on aof foreign
In, we stated that "Soviet leaders may have become convinced that the US actually has intentions of military aggression In the nearecent events may have somewhat strengthened Soviet conviction in this respect.eacetime Draft Act, the continued development of atomic weapons, the general acceptance of Increased military appropriations, thc establishment of US bases within range of targets ln the USSR, the activities of US naval forces in theand the movement to Europe of US strategic airforce units are instances In point. We think it unlikely, however, that these events have actually led Soviet leaders to the conclusion that positive US aggression must be soon expected. It is considered that they are more probably taken to mean that the ultimate conflict with the capitalist system will be resolved by force rather than by the methods of "coldhile the danger of an early Soviet military move, made in calculated anticipation of this ultimate conflict may be slightly Increased by these circumstances, we do not estimate thatove hasrobability.
Soviet analysts, examining these evidences of US intentions, might conclude that they can no longer assume the early disintegration of the capitalist world, and that US military potential, now low. will steadily improve and will ultimately beby an improvement In the military potential of Western Europe. This might, in turn, suggest looking to military action for the achievement of their aims.since the usefulness of non-military methods has not yet been exhausted in Europe, and since there are other regions open to significant exploitation, we do not estimateSSR resort to deliberate military action hasrobability.
Several recentthe Soviet blockade ofserved to increase the tension between the USSR and the US With this heightened tension hasorresponding increase in the possibilityiscalculation which might result in general conflict.
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Original document.
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