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SOVIET AND SATELLITE GRAIN
ublished August8
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CON
SOVIET AND SATELLITE GRAIN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
*
B
a
Page
Summary
Introduction
The Area Under Consideration
Tib Grain SituationSpecitiid Abbas within thm Sphere ot Sovtst Influence.
Production
Bread Orains
Coarse Grains
4 Total Grain
Relationship ot Grain Production In All Area* to Total Population
Tax Grain Sttvatton nt rar Soviet Union (Present Boundaries)
roduction
2 Bread Grains
I. Coarse
10
i22 13
Relationship ot Grain Production in the Soviet Union to7 Oram Production In the Soviet Union50 In Relationship to Total Suppliesthe War
The Grain Export Potential In the Soviet Union as8
Bread Grains
Coarse Grains
Grain Stocks
Potential Exportable Surplus or Grain7 Harvest
5 Grain Export ComrnitmenU
8 Transportation Limitation*
Tin Giant Situation i> Selected Eastbsn European Cocrxrarxa (Present
Production
Bread7 Production Compared to Prewar)
Coarse7 ProductKm Compared to Prewar) *
Total Grain Including7 Production Compared to
Prewar 1
T
Page
roduction Expectancy50 15
Relationship of Grain Production to Total Population . 16
The Grain Situation in
7 Production and Expectancy5roduction Prior to World
Bread
Coarse
Total
Relationship of Production to Total
International Tbade or Grains in Specified
Prewar
Current
Trade Expectancy0
appendix i
Grain Situation in Sblectbd Eastern European Countries
The Prewar
omparison Base 24
7
4 Bread 24
oarse
Expectancy In Grain
I. Deficit
2 Surplus
appendix ii
7 Pboduction Situation in Specified Eastern European Countries in Relation to Self-sufficiency AND Intshnatiunal Trade . . .
Finland .
Hungary
Bulgaria .
Albania
CONFIDENTIAL
(Continued) APPENDIX III
Page
Statistical Summary or the Grain Situation i* Sflectro Countries inwith Estimatesith Expectanciesnd with prewar averages
Summary Tables by
Wheal and
0
Oats
Other Coarse Grains
Total Coarse
Rice
Total
Summary Tables byAreas Takenhole
44
4r.
Soviet Union .
Selected Eastern European Countries
Manchuria
APPENDIX IV
The Relationship or Grain Production to Total Population
Summary Tables by Commodities
Bread
Coarse
Total
APPENDIX V
48
48
49
Population Estimates of Selected Countries (Present Boundaries)
Summary Table by Areas
Population Estimates of Selected Countries
Apdsndum
CONFr^^IAL
SOVIET AND SATELLITE DRAIN
'The Orclm Situation in the Soviet Onion ana Specified Area* Under Soviet Influence In Prewar? aad Production Sneclancv In. S. and IKO)
SUMMARY
The Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries now under Soviet influence constitute the largest grain producing area in the world. In prewar years, bread grain production in the Soviet Union alone was approximately three times that ot any other country. Also, prior to World War n. net grain exports from the Soviet group of countries' to outside areas averagedillion metric tons annually. In recent years, the production of grain in these countries has been considerably less than that of prewar. It does not appear likely that prewar annual production of more thanillion metric tons of bread grains and aroundillion metric tons of other grain will be attained until5' Because of curtailment of grain consumption in these countries, however, reserve stocks are being accumulated and some tonnages are being made available for export.
he expectancy In total grain production has been placedillion metric tons as compared with an average productionillion metric ton?the prewar.
While total production of grain is expected to reach prewar levelsbe per capitas expected to recover to around onlyercent of prewar levels
The use of thes the prewar reference period should not beto mean that production In the areas under consideration mustverage levels before these countries would beosition to support or participateajor war effort as far as cereal food is concerned. For example, ln the Soviet Union, theotal grain supply Is estimatedtlogramsper capita, while during the warhe supply wasilograms per person per year. Current estimates of the combined grain production in the Soviet Union7otal supply ofilograms per person perupply slightly greater than that available during the war years.
The quantity of grain in the Soviet Union available for export, stockpiling, or other uses from7 harvest which is in the hands of producers and at the dlspo-
1 The Soviet Union. Manchuria nnd the toileting Em tern European Satellite countries: Finland. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. Rumugoslavia. Bulgaria and Albania. 'See Tableejrc i. 'See Tableageee Table
Note: The Information In this report Is aaS (see Addendum,.
The intelligence orf imitations of Ihe Departmenw ol State. Army, and tbe Nary harehis report; the Air Intelligence Division. Air InteUlaence Directorate, Department ol tbe Air Force, had no comment.
iltion of the government, after domestic utilization at present low levels has been covered. Is estimated to beillion metric tons ofillion metric tons are bread grainsillion metric tons are coarse grains Of these quantities,illion metric tons of bread (trainsillion tons of coarse grains were harvested within relatively easy access to export points.
Ashe Soviet Union had made commitments to ship to various Europeanotal9 million tons of grain of which0 million tons were bread grains and6 minion tons were coarse grains.'
There are transportation limitations to the shipment of large quantities of grain from the Soviet Union which may make lt difficult, if not impossible, for the above commitments to be fulfilled.
Based on present consumption rates,of. grain for carry-over, export and other uses In the Soviet Union in future years may be expected to Increase. The degree to which such surpluses will be stockpiled, released to the non self-suppliers to augment their low rations, or shipped abroad to build up political prestige or to confuse thc international trade of the capitalistic world will be based, not on our conception of economic surpluses or deficits, but will be In conformity with the policies of the Krem-lln
Shipments of grain from7 harvest by the Satellite countries have been and will be relatively small In view of the confusion and disturbances expected in the Eastern European.Satellite countries, resulting from the land reform program to be followed by collectivisation, it is believed that during the next several years the export able surpluses of grains will be relatively inatgnlflcant in comparison to prewar exports and that. In general, the future policy may be directed toward in tec-Satellite trade or trade with the East rather than with the Western countries. In years of exceptionally good harvests, however, or under pressure of political expediency, oreans ofcritically short capital equipment, sporadic shipments to the West may be expected.
A map showing bread grain production, coarse grain production and totalin the Soviet Union and the Satellite countriesompared to estimates0 is attached.
-1
TIAL
SOVIET AND SATELLITE GRAIN
'W Onion ndond Prodartfc*,Inand
INTRODOCTION
Foodeapon of major significance in establishing and stabilising peace during periods Immediately following world wars. This Is especially true of countries which In normal times were not self-sufficient in foodains, particularly bread grains (wheat andccupy first place in work) food trade and also are the major constituents of dietsorld-wide basis.
Food production decreased In most of the countries of the world during andfollowing World War II and will not recover to prewar levels on abasiseriod of several years. This decline in production has been due to shortages of farm laborers, draft power, farm machinery, ferUllser, pesticides, seed, consumer (incentive) goods available to farmers for purchase or exchange for their farm products, and in many countries to unstable currency.
Thc severity of the decline in food production and supply during the war and postwar periods has been further magnifiedet Increase in the population of the world. Since the beginning of World War II. the world's population has increased byillion persons or approximately eight percent Present Indications are that population increases throughout the world will continueapid rate for several years.
THE ARIA UNDER CONSIDERATION'
The areas included In this analysis are the Soviet Union. Manchuria, and the following Eastern European countries: Finland, Poland. Ctechoslovakia. Hungary,Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. All of these countries are directly orunder the influence of the Politburo in Moscow which no doubt willominant Influence in determining future developments and relationships between the Eastern and Western powers.
Production estimates Included in this report pertain to quantities actually garnered and not to unharvested grain. In the Soviet Union, the word production usually pertains to so-called "biological" production which Is an estimate of grain as It stands in the field prior to harvesting Normally the Soviet Union's estimate of "biological" production is considerably higher than the quantity of grain harvested because delivery quotas Imposed on farmers are based on "biological" estimates and no allowance Is made for losses in harvesting, which in thc Soviet Union are high.
' Data mniM on th* SovMt Colon and the Eastern European SaieUlunsedM
The prewar reference years used ln this report are two five-year,6he latest prewar period for whichInformation is available on production in relation to worldrains
during consumption. TheS9 has been accepted as the conventional prewar reference period for thc production
of agricultural products.
The analysU presented In this study Is based largely on Information obtained from the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, US Departf Agriculture; published data from the International institute of Agriculture in Rome and from the Pood and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations; Agricultural Attache and otherfrom missions ln the various countries concerned und special reports from the different intelligence services.
Estimated production.0 as appraised by agriculturalfamiliar with the areas concerned takes into consideration the recovery andprograms being sponsored by the several governments. These appraisals for any one period are predicated on the assumption of normal weather conditions Although other alternatives are conceivable which might materially change these ap-proximatiorui. the production expectancies0 are based on th* assumption that the agricultural programs ln the Satellite countries will follow the general patterns that have prevailed in the Soviet Union since the Communist Party came Into power, but with Important differences as regards rate, timing, and local adaptation of the Soviet pattern. In general, this program was first to break up the estates of large landed proprietors Into smaller holdings which were placed tn the possession of the peasant farmers. Later, in the Soviet Union, these peasant farmers were forced to pool their land holdings and other means of production Into collective (arms under thc control of the State. It Is believed that the small landholders in certain of the Satellite states will seriously object to the establishment of such collective farms and that, when this policy is forced upon them, confusion in farm operations will ensue accompaniedignificant decline In food production. It is expected that this phase of thc program will take place05 which accounts for the relatively low production estimates given in this report
It must be borne In mind that all numerical values used Ln referring to current and prospective production are only estimates based on certain axiumed conditions even though such words astc, are sometimes omitted.
Production and population estimates used ln this report are based on Information available as ofhis study will be revised from year to year as more recent Information ]usuries changes ln the eitimates.
"The coaiumplion rear In Eeatern Europeueuitthe rear araln la harvested and end* SI Julr of Um loUovrlns rear.
>"'ON:-'i.^LVT'l A:
THE GRAIN SITUATION IN SPECIFIED AREAS' WITHIN THE SPHERE
OF SOVIET INFLUENCE
The production of grain during the prewar baseompared to estimated current and prospective production0 is summarized in Tablehe grain data arc summarized and discussed in terms of breadoarsend total grains including relatively small quantities of rice.
Grains.
Bread grain production7 is estimated9 million metric tons which represents an increaseillion metricercent) over6 production
RAIN: Production in AJX AREAS.' xMlmaMt lor IMS7 compared with prewar averagend with expectancyMS. and 1SO0
Drain.*
Coaxte
Oralns
Oraln Including Mot
eo.i
0s. a
uia
AHUIo* afstrtcS
ma
S
' Bread jralns Include wheat and rye.
'Coarse trains Include: barley, corn, oats, buckwheat, maslln.pelt, broom corn, kaollaos (Innd small Quantities of other unspecified trains, but doea not Include rice which,ood grain, is conventionally not Included In data pertalnlac to either bread grains or coarse grains.
' Areas Included are the Soviet Onion. Manchuria, and the following Eastern European countries: Finland. Poland. Ciochoslorakla, Hungary, Rumania. Yugoslovla. Bulgaria and Albania. All esUmales have been corrected to conform to present boundaries.
1 million metric tons, although much less than the average annual production9 million metric tons during the five-year prewar.
During the next three years the production of bread grains, particularly in the Soviet Union, is expected to increaseore rapid rate than that of coarse grains reaching0 million metric tons15 declines In production in certain Satellite countries are expected to be more than offset by increases in production in the Soviet Union. Manchuria, and Czechoslovakiaproduction may be expected to reach6 million metric tons, or lessercent below the prewar average. In all countries, production emphasis will be placed on bread grains60 resultingombined production at the end of the period of2 million metric tons or more thanercent above the prewar average9 million metric ions.
NTIAL
S. Ooun Grains.
The production, of coarse grain7 is eelimated9 million metric tons whichillion metricercent) more than6 million metric tona produced ln the poor cropetillion metric2 percent) below the average annual production5 million metric tons.
Some increase ln coarse grain production (aroundillion metric tona) may be expected during the next three years, bringing0 harvest up to approximatelyillion metric tons. During the five1ontinuingtrend hi the Soviet Union will tend to more than offset decreases in the Satellite states resultinget gain of aroundillion metric tons, bringing5 production up to6 million metric tons.0 coarse grain production may be expected to8 million metric tons or to exceed slightlyverage ofillion metric tons,
4. Total Obain.
7 production of total grain in all areas Included In this analysis Is estimated toillion metric tons whichillion metricercent) more thanillion metric tons estimated to have been produced67 production, however, isillion metricercent) belowverage annual productionillion metric tons
During the next threeeneral upward trend may be expected in theof all grains resulting in an increase of0 million metric tonsuring the1he upward trend In production is expected to continue in certain countries, particularly in the Soviet Union, which will more than offset reduced production in certain Satellite countries caused by confusion in farm activities. The net effect may be expected to result5 production of total groin ofillion metric tons, nearlyillion tons greater than0 production but stillercent belowverage. During the next five years It is anticipated that ail governments under the influence of the Soviet Union will be encouraged to strive toward Increased production to meet Increased cVrmesticand to build up grain stocks. 0 production may be expected to reach
million metric tons, orndercent above the prewar average of
million metric tons
RELATIONSHIP OF GRAIN PRODUCTION IN ALL AREAS TO TOTAL POPULATION
During the5otal grain production in the areas under cooslderatlon is expected to increase fromillion metric tons5 toillion0 as compared wltn the prewar average productionillion metric tons (seeowever, since the populations of these areas ore lrrcesaing6 millionillion0 as compared5 million; see Table R.ore accurate relationship of
Consumption Year -
S1
ISM
Percent
Par Tr.
Percent
Total Chain Inc. Rice
s 78
3
Par Yr.
etric tons Production per person per yearkHoerejm
Coarse Oralns
Productionmetric tons
etricroducUon per person per
643
1
1M7
view of the relatively rapid Increase in total population of tne areas under consideration, the production of grainer capita basis will not return to prewar levels as quickly as the data shown inndicate0 total grainIn the area under consideration is expected toercent ofverage On thc basis of data presented In Tablehe per capita production of grain0 will have reached aboutercent of prewar levels.
The government programs for Increasing food production in most of the countries under consideration include plans for thc mechanization of agriculture which. If realized, may tend to reduce the numbers of draft animals used on farms as compared lo prewar numbers.eduction in numbers of draft animals would. In effect, release some grain tor human consumption or other uses. The magnitude of this development cannot be accurately appraised quantitatively at this time, but lt isthat relatively larger quantities of lhe total grain production In future years will be used domes!:rally for human food than was the case during prewar years.
' Grain production has been expresseder capita basts became of the lack of raOaate Informs-Uoa on all areas covered In Ihta report from "lilch to taUmMs probable utilisation. Tbc per capitafor the five-yearas been computed and given an arbitrary valuexpectanclas per capita In subsequent years have been eiprasetdercentage of the prewar base period OB the assumpuoa thaton wUI foOow about the same over-all pattern* and ratios ai in prewtr raara. and thai populationore reliable criteria to which to relate production than any other measure available.
OOlvTli^riTIAL
THE OBAIN SITUATION LN THE SOVIET UNION (PRESENT BOUNDARIES) 1 Production .
OnUn productloo In the Soviet Union during the prewar referenceompared with estimated current and future production0 isIn Tabichis summaryresented in terms of bread grains, coarse grains, and total grains including small quantities of rice
2. Bread Grains
The bread grain harvest of1 million metric tons7 represents an increaseillion metric tonsercent) over1 million metric tons produced Compared to prewar product inn. however,7 harvest wis
illion metricercent) below the average annual harvest8 million
metric tons
During the next few years bread grain production will tend to Increase, exceeding the prewar averageercent5 and byercent or more. Coarse Grains.
Coarse grain production of7 million metric tons7 was an increaseillion metricercent) over6 production' estimated2 million metric tona. but6 million metricercent) below the average annual productionfillion metric tons.
Although coarse grain production Is expected to increase during the next several years, thc rate probably will be much slower than that of bread grains and is notto reach prewar levels of production much
4- Total Grain.
7 production of all grain including rice, estimatedillion metric tons,illion metricercent) greater than8 production5 million metric tons. Compared to production, however,7 harvest of total grainsillion metricercent) below production during the prewar base period. It will be noted fromhat the estimated total production of grain in the Soviet Union Is expected to continue to increaseairly constant rate and that0 the total production will reachillion metric tons orillion metricercent) more than the average annual production3 million metric tons.
The production of specified grains ln the Soviet Union during prewar yearsto estimated production67 is surnnuulzed In Table 4.
' The production ol coone ireln vnu ereeUy reduced In mteSSTB drouctai.
3.RAIN: Production tai the SOVIET UNION. SKlmatea (or IMS end 1MTpreward with evpectaaer lor6 tad 1MO
verage
0
Ondn Including Rice
MUlto* afetrfc Tom
4
TABUProduction of apecUled cereal* laIET ONION. matee7 compared8 end the prewar
In
Over IBM
etric Tom
Wheat
WW
Grains
Oralni
.
Oram
RELATIONSHIP OF ORAIN PRODUCTION LN THE SOVIET UNION
TO TOTAL POPULATION
It Is estimated that tbe total population in the Soviet Union wiU Increaseate slightly In excessercent per year throughout the duration of the period covered in this analysis (see Table R,he relationship of grainexpressed as bread grains, coarse grains and total grainelatively 5msH quantity ol rice) to total population Is shown In Table 5.
On the basis of total production,5 grain harvest In the Soviet Union isto equal the averagearvest (seehen total grain production Is expresseder capita basis, however, the recovery to prewar levels is much slower.or example, the per capita production of bread grains willercent of prewar, coarse grainsercent, and total cerealsercent.
comij^ENTiAL
TASLEPer capita production In the aovrsrr UNION. KKlmaiea for IBM7 and expectanej forUK and IBM eapreased In kilograms per person per year and aa percent**en of the prewar erereae
Consumption Year
Oralna
Oraln Inc. Riot
Far Yr.
Per Tr.
Per Yr.
7 GRAIN PRODUCTION IN THE SOVIET UNION ANDEXPECTANCY50 IN RELATIONSHIP TO TOTAL SUPPLIES AVAILABLE DURING THE WAR
In using the five-yearrewar reference base for grainIt should not be inferred that the various countries under consideration must again achieve prewar levels of production before they canajor war effort. In the event of an extreme emergency such as was experienced in World War II. countries can adjust themselves to significantly smaller quantities per capita than were available In time of peace.
The data summarized inndicate that the grain supplies available in the Soviet Unioner capita basis during the consumptionrc somewhat greater than the grain supplies available during the war. It is expected that during subsequent years the per capita production will continue to increase and willevelfercent of that, but (as Indicated In Tableboutercent of the prewar production during the five-year.
TABLES.ORAM: Per capita production In the SOVIET UNION. Estimates6xpectancy50 expressed In klloerams per person par year and as percentages of th* war1i4-
Consumption
Oralns
Oralns
Inc. ;
Rice
Per Yr.
Per Tr.
Per Yr.
118
Consumption4 to5
CONTpss^TIAL
GRAIN EXPORT POTENTIAL IN THE SOVIET UNION AS8
1. Bhud Obacni.
After deducting allowances for teed. vuU, and human coruumptlon from7 garnered (bam) production of wheat and rye, It la estimated that the bread grain In the hands of farmers and the grain to be procured by the Soviet government for stockpiling, export, and other uUhxatloD during7 to8nUlion metric tons. The comparable figureillion metric tons of bread grains (see
stimated production. utilisation and residual of BREAD GRAINS in tne BO VIET ONION
Item
from the )M8 andarvniu
afUlloa MrtrV
ProdoeUon 41
red tor Aeed
Wute
Oaed for Human Consumption
Reatawal laraHaMe tor carrr-prer. espcev sloe* ptr.es. ett.i _
As of7 the rationing of bread was discontinued in the Soviet Union. The abandoning of bread rationing will not be followedroportionate Increase In bread grain consumption by each of the rationed categories. Self-supplying farmers will continue to consumeilograms per capita per year. The Armed Forces are not expected to Increase materially their cocsumptionilograms per man per year. Political prisoners and some other categories of consumers willlittle if any more bread than during the rationing period. On the other hand, workers and employees and their dependents may be expected to Increaseonsiderable degree. It is believed that additional quantities of gram required to cover Increased consumption from7 until8 harvest becomes available for utilisation In August will not exceedillion metric tons This Increased consumption for the remainder ofonsumption year was taken into account in computing the bread grain residualillion metric tons referred to above.
Some low grade wheat and rye are always fed to livestock and utilised Industrially. On the other nand, barley, oats, and other grains may be, and frequently are, added to the bread mixture. There Is no basis for numerically approximating the quantity of these and other admixtures actually used, but It may be assumed that they offset the use of bread grains for purposes other lhan human consumption
Thc bread grain residualillion metric tons above domestic utilisation from7 harvest may be further Increased by the addition of potatoes and more water to the breadommon practice In Soviet government bakeries.
II
coxf^tCntial 2. co ami grains.
After deducting allowances for seed, waste, industrial utilization, reed for livestock, and food for human consumption from7 garnered production of coarse grains. It is calculated that the residual in the hands of farmers and grain available to the Soviet government for stockpiling, export, or other utilisations during the consumption7 to8illion metric tons comparedillion metric tons. as shown in Table 8.
MUnaled preelueUoo. uUUtaUoa tnd rcjldual of CO ARAB GRAINS lo lb* SOVIET ONION
treCD tbe IM7 berveet
Jfetrtc Tea*
Feed for
Human Food
Mlic irtlru Including corn.,
<sril.niejc* crrr-over. evport. ttcrtytitag. etc.)
'In the Soviet Union police oreert of the minedloneoui coonMrom the meager dot. avoUoble on thl. group ol grolru itot ponlble to eetreeote puUeo.
Stocks.
There is no information available concerning stocks of grain In the Soviet Union at the conclusion of World War IL Because of the relatively poor harvests during the war years, however, it is not considered feasible that reserve stocks of grains could have been estsblished prior to6 harvest Based on current estimates ofand utilisation of8 harvest. It Is believed that the surpluses aboveutilisation ofillion metric tons of bread grainsillion metric tons of coarse grains were stored as reserve stocks.
Ex port asm Surplus op Grain7 Harvrst.
Based on Information available as ofppears that theof grain from7 harvest at the disposition ot the government and ln the hands of producers after domestic utilization has been covered liesillion metric tons. The statistical balanceotal grain residualrdHlonions ofillion metric tons are bread grainsnilllon tons are coarse grains. ubstantial portion of these tonnages may he exported.
5 Grain Export Commit mi
The Soviet Union has made commitments (aso ship to various Europeanotalhousand metric tons of grain ofmetric tons were bread grainshousand metric tons were coarse grains
' See Addendum, page
Details of thc commitments and thc planned shipping program are summarized in Table o.
TAHl*rt commitments of the SOVIET UNION for 1MT1 and planned
inlpptnc protram
lo
Be Shipped
7
[ Coarse
Coarse
Grain*
Metric ro*.
Klnnrloni
50
!
40
iiln
30
20
IM
is imjiouiuie to estimate the extent to which the Soviet government, underof iwlltlcnl expediency, may attempt to ship more grain to Western Europeanlhan is Indicated by the above table ol commitments. On the other hand, there Is no certainty that lhe Soviet government will or can fulfill its present commitments. There ate apparent limitations to the shipment of grain in large quantities which will be difficult. If not impossible, for the Soviet Union to overcome. 6. TftANM-ovtaiion Limitations.
wuh Icm exceptions, bulk grain is not transported byhe Soviet Union, but l* Uiunlly sacked in qualities or one0 pounds) per sack. This requires the useianixrwer per ton of grain handled Lhan is necessary in most otherSoviet railroads are of wide gauge which necessitates unloading from wide gauge cats and lontlinr, lo standard gauge car, at national bnnudarles or transferring Soviet boxcars from wide gauge to standard pug. trucks All railroad equipment In theUnion ts hi .hurt supply and mucn of ppd Qf rfpair
il'" " BUK* were
by cmne JL. ? '^ w Bn" mual *
^^ZZ^TShcarficr
mitment meeting their export com-
enthusUvstlc^ llWservices of young
chine XS'PGovernrne"talunder dictatorial compulsion should not be under-
PI
CONFIDENTIAL
THE GRAIN SITUATION IN SELECTED EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES'
(PRESENT BOUNDARIES)
Because of Incomplete information, it is not possible toalance forsituation in the Satellite countries with the -am* degree of accuracv as wasthe case of the Sovietnone
apPTa,sals othaveessimistic bias
when not actually failed by some particular government actuated by the necessity of keeping reparation levies by the Soviet Union at asevel as possible o, ofthe sympathy of UNRRA or the Umted States to increase allotments for relief and reconstruction.
Three of the countries in the group under consideration. Finland, Chechoslovakia.
' Weregrain during thehrough
ed average yearly totalhousand metric tonsnee) to supplement the combined indigenous productionhousand metric tons.
On thc other hand. Poland. Hungary. Rumania. Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria were normally net exporters, shipping abroadn averagehousand metric tons of grain after Indigenous requirements had been coveredombined production1 thousand metric Ions of bread grams and coarse grains togetheregligible quantity of rice.
With the information now available, it is not considered possible torain balance for any one ol these Eastern European countries. eneral idea of thein any given year can be obtained for the area takenhole by calculating the relationship of total production to total population as is summarized in. Production
The production of grain during the prewar baseompared to estimated current snd prospective production0 is summarised In Tablehese data are summarized and discussed in terms oi bread grains, coarse grains, and total cereals Including negligible quantities of rice.
1ure defiled di^usileci et
TABLE lo-CHAINASTERN EUROPE. Ewimale* lor |SSJ .ndlor0 compared wllh prewar averse9
Year
Oraln
Rice
if Still Tom
Arcrace
3
3
C
1*f
CON^IENTIAI.
t. MU7 PsoouCTiON Compared to Prxwar).
The combined production of bread grain7 In the Eastern European countries Included In this analysis takenhole is raUrnated3 million melrtc tons, which isillion metric tonsercent) less than6 million metric tons produced6illion metricercent) below thc average production o!illion metric tons during the prewar base.
7 Production Compared to Pre wax).
Coarse gram productionstimated atillion metric tons, represents an Increaseillion metricercent) over theillion metric tons produced In the preceding year. The drought0 in Eastern Europe was more acute In thc regions where coarse grains are normally grown than In the broad grain regions7 harvest wasillion metricercent) below the prewar average production3 million metric tons
Total Ohain Including7 Production Compared to Pukwar) Total production of grain Including negligible quantities of rice7 isatillion metric tons, or an increaseillion metricercent) over production65 million metric tons Compared to prewar harvests. howe*er.7 production0 million metricercent) below theproduction ofillion metric Ions
Production Expectancy
It already appears evident that the Soviet government will eventually impose es sentlally the same general agricultural policies upon the puppet governments of the Satellite countries as have prevailed in the Soviet Union during recent years, making any necessary adjustments to local political ami economic conditions These policies include further land reform programs in which thc large estates are divided into smaller holdings which are then placed in the possession ol peasant farmers. The peasants change thc former pattern of farming to the extent ol producing more lood forand using larger quantities of coarse groins lor feeding Lhe additional numbers of livestock they normally acquire In improving their Individual food supply. The net effect ofhangeountry-wide basis is to improve the standard of living for the peasant farmers, but to reduce the quantity and Change the composition offarm surpluses previously available for feeding Ihe non-farm population or for export toother countries.
esult of the decline In the marketable surpluses ot foodstuffs and the difficulty of assembling such small farm surpluses as are produced, it Is expected that thcOovemmcnta, acting upon theof the Soviet government, will encourage or force the peasants to combine their individual small land holdings and livestock into co ectlve farm centers. This phase o: th-m is evicted to be strongly resentedUin WBW" and disturbances resulting therefrom will causedecreases in food production It is believed that this development will occur
Emh* ,of the effect of this program upon grain pro-
duction as5Q is ind.cated in
CON PlMRTIAl.
OF GRAIN PRODUCTION TO TOTAL POPULATION
The population ol the Satellite countries in Eastern Europe at the end of the7 is estimated3 million. II is expected that this combined population will increase to6 millionhc relationship ol grain productionas bread grains, coarse grains, and total grain to total population is shown ln
TABLEPer capita production in EASTERN EUROPE expressed in kilograms per person per year and as percentages olverage. EstUinales67 and expectancy50
Year
1
Biead Oral in
Percent
ICO T5
77
Coarse Grain*
KM. Per Yr.
155
21C
2V?
Total Grain Inc Rice
Kss Per Yr.
408
a per capita basis, an increase In grain production in the Satellite countries takenhole is expected to continue until0 at which time per capita production would be approximatelyercent ol production during the prewar base period. Following the land reform, coarse grain production Is expected to build up more rapidly than bread grain production because the peasants will be more interested in building up their Mocks and herds than in producing surpluses to feed the non-farm population or to export. Also, in much of this area, cornoarse grain) is thecereal food of the peasants, whereas urban dwellers eat bread grains almost
During thc6overnments will stress the production of bread grains which may reach aroundercent ol prewarer capita basisery little change in the per capita production o! coarse grains is Id be expected throughout this period.
It is expected that exportable surpluses of bread grains from Eastern Europe to Western Europe will be relatively insignificant for many years to come. However, in years of exceptional harvests, or under pressure of political expediency, oreans uf obtaining critically short capital equipment, sporadic shipments to the West may be expected. Nevertheless, until and if therehift in the Iron Curtain, the general policy of the Satellite countries under the tutelage of the Kremlin is expected to be directed toward inter-Satellite trade with shipments of such over-all surpluses, as may from time to time develop, toward the East rather than toward the West.
' >NFjJ^NTIAL
THE GRAIN SITUATION IN MANCHURIA1
Prior to World War II. Manchuria was nearly sen-sufficient In thc production of grains. Importshousand metric tons per year ofhousand tons were bread grains and SO thousand tons were rice. Exportshousand metric tons ofhousand tons were millets andhousand tons were corn. The net import balance during the37housand tons per year, or about one percent of1 thousand tons used domestically.
7 PRODUCTION AND EXPECTANCY5O PRODUCTION PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
The production of grain prior to World War II compared to estimated current and prospective production0 is summarized inhis summary Is presented and discussed in terms of bread grains, coarse grains, and total grainrice.
TABLE II -GRAIN: ProductionANCHURIA Estimates ior lMe7 and eipeeiencr50 compared wiiri the prewar averace
Year
Grain*
Grains
flr.in< Incluriine nice
Metric Tons
5
SO)
0
<m
lad Grains
bread grain harvest7 is estimatedhousand metric tons comparedhousand tonsn increasehousand tons orercent Compared lo prewar production, however,7 harvesthousandercent) below the prewar averagehousand Ions. It is believed that bread grainw.ll increase in future years and0 willhousand tonshousandercent) above prewar production.
2 Coawsr Ohains
The production of coarse grains7 Is estimated tohousand metric tons,ecreasehousand ionsercent) belowhousand tonsfi Compared to prewar production,7 harvesthousand
unp" ' nlorraeuor,
del. .1 MSBMalIn Manchuria from ataU.iK.al
* . ^ .
CONFT^JtlTIAL
tonsercent) below the prewar average productionhousand tons. It Is expected that coarse grain production will increase to0 thousand tons0 or an Increase of approximatelyercent compared to prewar harvests.
3. Total Grain.
The total grain production including rice in Manchuria7housand metric tons. Thisecreasehousand tonsercent) below7 thousand tons produced6ecreasehousandercent) below the prewar average production8 thousand tons. The production of all grains is expected to increase0 thousand tonsbove prewar)0 thousand tonsercent above prewar) and0 thousand tonsrercent above prewar production.
RELATIONSHIP OP GRAIN PRODUCTION TO TOTAL POPULATION
Population in Manchuria has been increasing rapidly in recent yearsercent per year) and It Is expected that the present rate of increase will continue throughout the period covered In this analysis. The relationship of total population to grain production is summarized in
TABLEGRAIN: Per capita prodiicUon In MANCHURIA expressed Ml kilograms per person per year, andercentage ol thc prewar aveiaee compared with estimates67 and witti the expectancies
Grains
Grains
Grain
Rice
Yr.
Yr.
Per Yr.
production estimates of grains shown in. indicate that the total harvest of all cereals00 thousand metric tons will exceed the average8 thousand metric tons during the prewar periodercent. When thc production is expresseder capita basis, however, the total grain harvest0 will be aboutercent ol prewar production. Uy luGO the per capita production ol bread grains will be approximatelyercent of prewar; coarse grainsnd total grainsercent Of prewar harvests
CONFIDENTIAL
CONPTnjBlTIAL
INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF GRAINS IN SPECIFIED COUNTRIES I. Prxwah Background.
Two of the areas included in this analysis, the Soviet Union and the group ofEastern European countries takenhole, were net exporters of grain during the five-year. the latest prewar period for whichdata on International trade in grains are available. Manchuriaetof grains.
The Soviet Unionmall quantity of rice from the Par East, but exported annually an averagehousand metric tons of other grain, ofhousand tons were bread grainshousand tons were coarse grains. The coarse gram was composedhousand tons ofhousand tons of cornons of oats. In order of their importance, the principal export markets for bread grains were the United Kingdom. Germany. Netherlands. Italy, and Denmark. Coarse grain shipments went to Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands. Italy, and Denmark
Earh of the Eastern European Satellite countries, except Bulgaria, imported ricehousand metric tons annually, chiefly from Burma and Slam. Bulgaria exported nn averageetric tons of rice annually (sec Appendix II for details) Finlandereal deficit country importing an averagehousand tons of bread grains andhousand tons of coarse grains per year. The bulk of these grainsoverseas, although in some years relatively small quantities were received from the Danube Basin and Russia Czechoslovakia was. onrain deficit country mportinr;housand tons of bread grains andhousand tons of coarse grains, chiefly from tho Danube Basin. An average ofhousand tons of wheat was exported annually, chiefly to Austria. Albania imported an average ofhousand tons of wheathousand tons of rice per year.
Thc other five countries were net exporters of cereals. Some grain each yeai was shipped from one or another of these countries to Czechoslovakia and in some years small shipments were made to Finland, but the bulk of the exports were destined for* Western Europe. Rumania was the largest exporter, shipping annually an averagehousand tons of bread grainshousand tons of coarse grains, chiefiy to Austria, United Kingdom, and Germany with smaller quantities to almost all of thc other Western European countries. Polsnd was the .second largest exporting country cl this group and shipped on averagehousand metric Ions of bread grains, prln-cipa'iy to Oermany, the Low Countries, and the United Kingdom. Yugoslavia exportedhousand tons of bread gramshousand tons ol coarse grains chiefly to Austria. Czechoslovakia. Germany, and Italy Hungary exported onhousand tons of bread grains (chiefly wheat) andhousand tons of coarse Bimins largely to Austria, Italy. Switzerland, and Finland. Bulgaria made small annual exportshousand tons ol bread grains andhousand tons of coarse -rains, chiefly to the United Kingdom. Belgium, and Italy.
CONFIDENTIAL
The combined average exports from these five countries before thc warhousand metric tons of bread grainshousand tons ol coarse grains,housand melric tons in all. In addition. Bulgaria exported approximately one thousand tons of rice per year.
Manchuria imported an averagehousand metric tons of wheat largely from Australia with relatively small tonnages from Canada, andhousand tons of rice chiefly from Siam. An averagehousand metric tons of millets andhousand metric tons of corn were exported each year to Korea and deficit areas within China.
2 Current trade.
Of the three areas included in this analysis (the Soviet Union, the EasternSatellite countries, andhe Soviet Union is the only area fromignificant quantity of grains is being exported from thc productionsrade agreements had been concluded between the Soviet Union and certain European countries for the exporthousand metric tons ofhese agreementshousand metric tons of bread grainshousand metric tons of coarse grains Thc European countries involved in these trade agreements, the cereal grain commitments made by the Soviet Union to each country, and the shipping program are summarized in Tableurther details ofinternational trade In grain of the Eastern European Satellite countries are given in Appendix II.1
he deficit of Finland is being covered chiefly by shipments from the Soviet Union with smaller imjwits from the United States and Argentina.expects to cover the bulk of its deficit by Imports from the Soviet Union. Small shipments of grains were nude during the latter part7 from the United States and Canada, and it is reported that Hungary has supplied or willonsiderable quantity of wheat (for the credit of the Soviet Union) and ihat Argentina will supply-up tohousand metric Ions. Albaniaeficit which may remain uncovered, but grain for military requirements may be imported. Poland's current grain deficit has been partially covered by small shipments from the United States and Canada and large Imports from the Soviet Union. Rumania is deficient in small grains and has received both wheat and barley from the Soviet Union, but is long on corn and claims to be in the export market with more than cue million metric tons. Before7 crop became available, the United Slates and Argentina shipped considerable quantities of coarse grains and some bread grains to Rumania. Bulgaria Is deficient in small grains, buturplus of corn. The Soviet Unioneported to have shipped both wheat and barley lo Bulgaria for civilianecent report indicates that the Soviet Union will ship an additionalhousand metric tons which mayilitary significance. On the other hand, it is reported that Bulgaria has offered corn to Italy. Although Hungary is statistically deficit in grain forit is reportedhousand metric Ions of grain have been or will beas reparations due thc Soviet Union. This grain is said to be destined for
1 Also see Addendum, pace
CONFj^flAX
Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia is the only country in Eastern Europe which8 grain balance. Reports up8 Indicate that Yugoslavia will ship grain (probably corn) to Italy and Belgium.
It Is too early torain balance Tor thc Eastern Europeancountries, bul It ts evident (ashat this area takenhole has deteriorated from Its prewar position ofet surplus ofhousand metric tonsosition of being materially deficient In gram production to coveronsumption requirements
There is no Information available st the present time concerning Manchuria with regard to recent trade agreements or current negotiations for the import or export of grain.
A summary of the production, imports, and exports of grain during the five-year7or ali countries included in this analysis Is niTen in
3. Trade ExercTANCT0
It is to be expected during the next three years that the Soviet Union will steadily increase its grain production andts export potential will be greater than it. During the following ten years the rate of production will tend tomore rapidly than that of population so thaturplus production, that Is production in excess of domestic requirements, may be expected tor more'percent greater than before the war. The surplus grain produced In the Soviet Union however cannot be expected to be sufficient to cover the import requirements of Western Europe'
Although considerable improvement may be expected during the next three years in the grain production of the Eastern European Satellite countries, there is expected tohift away from the production of bread grains toward coarse grains.f any. bread grain tonnage is expected to be available for shipment to Western Europe though some coarse grain (particularly corn) may be ofTered for international trade
During the following five years, the agriculture of this group of countries is expected toonfused stateeneral drop in production, thus further reducing ex-ixwt potentialities
Although some improvement in production is to be expectedt Is not brheved that the agricultural potential of these countries will haveufll-uently favorable position to enable them to export any considerable quantity of bread
ie It ,s
ml? ofultural production (see Appendix II,
aUn<Urd*** b. imposed upon the masses of^on Li-suppliershese countries as has been the casehe Soviet Union.
The expectancy In Manchuria is not clear because of the paucity of inforrnaUon
COKPJ^sWTiAL
TABLE H. AVERAGE ANNUAL GRAIN PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES DURING THEPreliminary)
tfrtric Tom)
Grains
Grains
Country
Im-
Ex-
Im-
Ex-
Union (In
and Asia)
Europe
401
Eastern
Manchuria
Total Oralns (Including rice)
5
0
These totals inrolvc the followlne quantities ol interregional Brain trade expressed in thousand* or metric tons: wheat and wheat flour expressed as; rye and rye flour expressed asarley; ricend other
22
CONFJ^Bo^IAL
APPENDIX I
GRAIN SITUATION IN SELECTED EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
1. Tnr. Prewar Situation
The Eastern European countries selected for analysis Include threeFinland, Chechoslovakia, and Albania, which before the war were deficit in total grain production. Importing during the five-yearhousand metric tons (including rice) to supplement their combinedproductionillion metric tons. Thisombined total domestic supplyillion metric tons for the three importing countries.
The group also includes fiveHungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, which before the war were surplus in total grain production exporting during the five-yearn averageillion metric tonsombined Indigenous production8 million metric tons. TiUs indicatescombined total domestic supply3 million metric tons for the five exporting countries.
Considering this selected group of eight Eastern European countrieshole, the average production of total grains (including small quantities of rice) during thc five-year3asillion metric tons from which not exportsillion metric tonsercent. This indicates an over-all domestic supply8 million metric tons
roup takenholeercent self-sufficient In breadvirent self-sufficient in coarse grains, butercent deficient In rice
annual exports (net) during this period averaged:
Metric
Bread
Coarse
Imports (net)
Total Net
There are no comparable data available lor imports and exports after the sumphon7;omparable production data tmue to be available for the89 and therefore the average of the
CONFlffENTIAI.
CONF^NTIAL
five-year59 has been conventionally adopted as the prewarperiod (or production.
omparison Bass.
Considering the selected Eastern European group of countriesholeroduction of total grains6 million metric tons or an average increaseillion metric2 percent, oververage7 million metric tons. Although the over-all difference between the two averages is small, there arc often significant differences between countries and crops. Some of these differences arc undoubtedly influenced by fluctuations In weather, but during the last year or two before the impending conflict was precipitated, significant changes in acreages were made in certain countries that on balance resultedositivetrend in production. Therefore, the averages of the five-yearre used when measuring the degree of shifts in the production potential during the war and postwar years.
ituation.
7 combined total grain production in the selected Eastern European group of countries has been placed atillion metric tons which,illion metricercent, greater than the low production5 million tons in the droughtasillionercent, belowverage7 million tons,illion tonsl percent) below the average supply lor domestic utilization8 million tons during ihc five-year.
Because or population increaseshese two average differences7 are not strictly comparable, but they dc indicate that the populations of the areahole areeficit position In respect to total grains which on balance indicate the need for imports or. falling these, the necessity of reducing domesticor other utilization.
The low productions compared with the prewar averages, is in part attributable to climatic condition and alsoc lowered agricultural potentialthe devastations of war. Another factor adversely affecting7 agricultural potential was the land reform instituted a: the close of the war in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, andesser extent, in Cacchnsiovakia and Yugoslavia.
Grains.
7 combined bread grain production in the selected Eastern European group of countries has been placedillion metric tons whichecause oi adverse weather conditions in the winter gram producing areasillion metric Ions ta percent) below6 million metric tons produced6illion metricercent, belowverage production2 million metric tons.7 production of bread grain*illion metricetCeiit) less than4 million metric tons average annual supply for domestic utilization during the five-year.
confjJKntiai
While weather conditions in the winter grain areasreponderant role in depressing7 bread grain production below thathe relative level below the prewar averages was determined largely by the land reform (attendedhift away from bread grain acreages) and,esser degree, by war devastation that reduced the quality of the plowing, seeding, and other farm work on such acreages as were seeded.
5. i rains.
7 combined coarse gram production In the selected Eastern European group of countries has been placed2 million metric tons which,illion metricercent) more than0 production8 million tons, wasillionercent) belowillion tons average production during the five-year.7 coarse grain productionhousand metric tonsercent) below the average supply available for domestic utilization during the five
The increased production of coarse grams7 ofercentC was due not only to increased acreages but alsoeculiar combination of weather factors in the southern spring grain areas that was particularly favorable to corn. The more favorable relation of7 production of coarse grains to the prewar averages than that of bread grains was determined to no small degreeore rapid recovery of coarse grains following the land reform.
EXPECTANCY IN GRAIN PRODUCTION
During the three0 the general production trend in all ol the selected Eastern European countries will be toward building up the agricultural potential. It is nnpossible to foresee the trends in individual countries accurately although in Appendix III an attempt has been made to Indicate expectancy infor each of these countrieseneral way.
1 Dincir "
In two of the food deficit countries. Cvecrwstcvakla and Finland, where there has been little or no effect of the land reform, the immediate trend of production will be towicl building up bread grains at the expense of coarse grains. he buildup
iw mnS",nSercent above the prewar IMS-IMP- average accompaniedoss in coarse grains ofercent.
be'"*rlcullural Potential in both countries may am IZTc- Production level of abouter-etnlprewar and coarse grains aboutercent aboveverage
60 may
ayf0
y
rfsTIAl.
above !he* 5
CONjJ^NTLAL
2. Surplus Countries.
In the surplus-producing countriesPoland. Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgariaa general build-up of the agricultural potential from the low levelwar devastation may be expectedecause of the customary trend in peasant agriculture,and reform, coarse grains may be expected to build up more rapidly than bread grains, which0 cannot beio recoverevel of more thanoercent ofverage as compared with coarse grains which may recover toercent of the prewar average.
Not only may0 production of bread grains be appreciably below theaverage, but the several governments will find it increasingly difficult to collect sufficient foodstuffs lo feed the non-farm population. Before thc war, relatively large marketable surpluses for urban consumption and export were assembled from eachelatively few large landed proprietors After the land reform, such marketable surpluses as are available will have to be assembled from thousands of smallimilar situation developed in the Soviet Union after the first World War. and the system ol small proprietors had to be abandoned in favor of re-establishing large units of production which were known as collective farms.
It would have been better economically from the governments' point of view If large-scnle farming could have been established immediately after the Axis forces had been driven out of the several countries. But at that time the governments were not strong enough to risk the violent reaction of the peasants toward having their private property nationalized and consolidated into socialistic (arming units. The support of the peasunts was essential to the security of each of the so-called CommunisticTo secure that support, or al least lo lessen thc opposition of the peasantry, large estates were expropriated and the land was parceled out to the peasants. This was contrary to the principles promulgated by the Moscow government in that this action strengthened the small farmer capitalists and increased their number bylandless rural proletariats into small landed capitalists Not only Is private land ownership hi violation of the Ideology of the CommunisLs but the operationiicialivt stale is slowed down, if not threatened, by tho difficulty of assembling food and materials to maintain non self-suppliers As In the Soviet Union, this situation is bound to become increasingly serious, and therefore in each of the Satellite States, governments will sooner or later consider it essential to follow the example of the Soviet Union and expropriate small land holdings and livestock and establish large unit areas of production and large collectivized herds
It is inevitable thattep will be iiccontpanieil by some violence and bloodshed in the villages just as It wns In the Soviet Union. It Is to be expected that the confusion caused hy sabotage of reluctant peasants will resultharp decline in thcpotential. It is assumed that collectivization followed by confusion in agricultureecline in production will occur for the areahole This decline,does not apply to all the countries since Finland and Czechoslovakia are expected to improve their position. The decline in the other countries will be In varying degrees.
CONFI^^TIAL
of course, and at different periods within the next few years.5 thepotential for the areahole Is expected to be below the level
The tables in Appendix ttl give the productions attributable to the several crops in each of the specified countries. Taking thc export countrieshole, the drop In bread grains may be expected to be sharper than that In coarse grains and may fall to as much asoercent ofverage. Coarse grains may be expected lo fail on* to aroundoercent of prewar.
After collectivization, during which the better peasants probably will be driven out of thc villages or confined in concentration camps, government pressure on thepeasants may be expected to cause agriculture to regain some of Its lost potentiality during the80
However, such gains prior0 can hardly be expected to bring production up to0 level Bread grains may be expected to build up to aroundercent of9 average and coarse grains tooercent of prewar.
Thc foregoing comparisons arc intended only lo bring out the probability that postwar recovery of the agricultural potential in the former export countries, now under the domination of the Moscow government, willet-back sometime0nd that by the latter date these countries can scarcely beto haveroduction position to enable them to export any considerable quantity o( bread grains to Western Europe or toaterial source of supply for the Soviet Union. It Is not improbable that because of the confusion of agriculturalaterially reduced standard of living may be imposed upon the masses of non self-suppliers in each of these countries as has been the case ln thc Soviet Union
'IT
CONFMSNTIAL
APPENDIX II
7 PRODUCTION SITUATION IN SPECIFIED EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN RELATION TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1. Finland.
During the five-year, Finland, with angrain productionhousand metric tons,0 percent of its total cereal requirementhousand metric tons.
Indigenous production suppliedercent of the bread grains.ercent of Ihe coarse grains, but none of the rice used domestically.
Imports during this periodhousand metric tons of bread grains,housand metric Ions of coarse grains, andhousand metric tons of rice.
7 total grain production in Finland was placedhousand metric tons, whichhousandercent) more thanhousand ions produceduthousandercent) belowverage productionhousand tonshousand metric tons belowverage domestic requirement.
To meet the consumption requirements of thc. Finland applied to thc International Emergency Food Councilrain allotmenthousand tons ol bread and coarse grains. After screening by the Cereal Committee. Finland'swas placedhousand ions, which, when added Lohousand tons produced domestically would bring the total availability of grain up to the prewar average. The allotment was apportioned as follows: wheat and rye (including flour in terms ofhousand tons; and coarse grains.housand tons.
Shipments of wheat and rye (including flour in terms of grains) lo Finland during the six months which ended7 werehousand lung Ions from the United States andhousand long tons from Argentina. Since long ton shipments were counted as metric tons, therehousand tons of bread grains andhousand metric tons of coarse grains to be shipped during the first six lo seven months
A recent report indicates that the Soviet Union is committed to ship to Finland before the end ofhousand metric tons of rye.housand tons of wheat,housand tons uf oats,housand tons of corn.
The situation in Finland is, al the date of this report, too obscure to more thaneficit in grain production that will be more or less covered by imports for the most part from thc Soviet Union.
If the Soviet Union fulfills its commitments, Finland will receive slightly morehousand metric tons of bread grains andhousand metric tons of coarse grams to supplement indigenous production, bringing the total supplyp to morehousand metric tons, or more thanercent ofverage.
During the five-year. Poland, with an average production of total grains5 thousand metric tons,housand tonsercent of its indigenous production of bread grains and coarse grains, but Importedhousand metric tons of rice. This indicates an average total domestic supply2 thousand metric tons.
Polandercent self-sufficient ln breadercent aelf-sufficient ln coarse grains,ercent deficient in rice.
Exports during this periodhousand metric tons of bread grainshousand metric tons of coarse grains per year.
7 tola] grain production of Poland was placedhousand metric tons, which,housand motrlcercent) abovehousand metric tons, was stillercent below the average production8 thousand metric tons during the five-yearhousand metricercent) belowverage domestic supply.
To meet claimed consumption requirements of the, Poland applied to International Emergency Food Council for an allotmenthousand metric tons of total gram After screening by the Cereal Committee. Poland's allotment was placedhousand metric tons as follows, wheat and rye (Including flour in terms ofX7 thousand tuns; and coarse grain,housand tons.
During Ihc six months endedhe United States and Canada shipped to Poland the equivalent7 thousand long tons of bread grains In lieu of an equal number of metric tons. This wouldhousand tons of bread grains andhousand metric tons of coarse grains,otal ofhousand metric tons to be obtained from other sources.
Polandommitmenthousand metric tons of bread grains andhousand metric ions of coarse grains to be shipped from the Soviet Union It is reported that this commitment has been fulfilled.
If the allotment made by the International Emergency Food Council is covered,housand metric ions o( grain are still to be received by Poland during the first six to seven months
During the five-year. Czechoslovakia, with an average productionhousand metric tons.ercent of Its total grain requirementhousand metric tons
Indigenous production suppliedercent of the biead grains andercent of thc coaise grams, but none of the nee used domesticallv.
Imports during this period averagedhousand metric tons of bread grains.housand ions o* coarse grains, andhousand tons of rice per year.
7 grain production or Czechoslovakia is estimatedhousand metric tons whichhousandercent) below6 production
CONFI^^TIAL
CONKTjfeYr-IAL
thousand tonshousandercent) belowverage,housand metric tons belowveragerequirement.
To meet the consumption requirements of thc, Czechoslovakiato International Emergency Food Council for an allotmenthousand metric tons of grain. After screening by the Cereal Committee, Czechoslovakia'swas placedhousand metric tons composedhousand tons of wheat and rye (including flour in terms ofhousand tons of coarse grains.
During the sixuly tohipments and programs for shipment of wheat and rye (Including flour In terms of grain)7 thousand metric tons andhousand metric tons of coarse grains Six thousand long tons (in lieu of metric tons) of wheat were shipped from the United Statesong tons from Canada, Indicating thathousand metric tons of bread grains andhousand metric tons of coarse grains were received from other sources.
It is reported that Czechoslovakia has obtained commitments from the Soviet Union for thc shipmenthousand metric tons of bread grainshousand metric tons of coarse grains. Of these quantities.housand tons of bread grains andhousand tons of coarse grains are reported to hare been shipped or were lo be shipped by
If) thousand tons of bread grains andhousand tons of coarse grains of the Soviet Union's commitment have been shipped lo Czechoslovakia, then therehousand tons of bread grainshousand metric tons of coarse grains to be shipped during the first sbe to seven months8 This quantityhousand tons, if shipped, will probably have to be transported by rail through Poland or by barge up the Danube River Doubt has been expressed as to the possibility of the Soviet government being able to shipuantity of grain (equivalent to more0 car loads ofons per car) during the next few months over the single-track railroad through Southern Polandransfer point near the frontier of Czechoslovakia. Shipment by barge up the Danube would be still more difficult. There are reports that Czechoslovakia is to receive upetric tons ol grain from Argentina.
4 Hungary
During the five-year. Hungary, with anproduction of total grainhousand metric tons,housand metric tons4 percent of Its indigenous production of bread and coarse grains, but importedhousand tons of rice. This Indicates an average total domestic supplyhousand metric tons.
Hungaryercent self-sufficient in breadercentin coarse grains,ercent deficient In rice.
Exports during this periodhousand metric tons of bread grains (chiefly wheatl andhousand metric tons of coarse grains
30
7 total production of Hungary was placedhousand tons which,housand metricercent) above6 production
OONFHH5NTIAL
COffFT^^FTAL
thousand metric tons, was stillercent below the average productionhousand metric tons during the five-year,housand metricercent) belowverage domestic supply.
There are reports that, in spite of an obvious shortage in supply of bread grains, Hungary is to pay the Soviethousand metric tons of wheat which will be shipped to Czechoslovakia (or the account of the Soviet Union.
It has been reported that, in addition to wheat, Hungary would shiphousand metric tons of coarse grain to Czechoslovakia.
5. Rumania.
During the five-year, Rumania, with anproduction of total grainshousand metric tons,housand metric tons4 percent of its indigenous production of bread and coarse grains, but importedhousand metric tons of rice. This indicates an average total domestic supplyhousand metric tons.
Rumaniaercent self-sufficient in bread grainsercent in coarse grains,ercent deficient in rice.
Exports during this periodhousand metric tons of bread grainshousand metric tons of coarse grains per year.
7 production of grain in Rumania was estimatedhousand metric ions whichhousandercent) (for the most part corn) above thc poor production6 placedhousand tons, washousandercent! below the average production during the five-yearhousand metric tons,housand metric7 percent, greater thanverage domestic supply.
Rumania received during lhe last six monthsong tons of bread grains andhousand long tons of corn from the United States as wellfiains from Argentina. These shipments were probably made to cover Hiiiiinni.Vs most urgent prc-hnrvest requirements
H Is further, rcporlrri that ihe Soviet Union shipped Rumaniahousand melric ions of wheat andhousand tons Of barley from7 production.
Recent reports indicate that Rumania mayhousand metric tons of corn available for export
Yugoslavia.
;'iT"
of total gramhousand metric tons,housandcen*ts lnd.gc.imis production ol bread and coarse grains, bul importedhousand metric tons of rice. This indicates an average total domestic supplyhousand metric tons.
Yugoslaviaercent self-sufficient in breadercentoarse grains, but wasercent deficient in rice.
his periodhousand metric tons or bread grainshousand metric tons of coarse grains (chiefly coin) per year.
AL
7 grain production of Yugoslavia was estimatedhousand metric tons which (chiefly becausearge corn production)housandercent) greater thanhousand tons produced7 production wasercentrewar averagehousand metric tons,housand metric tons greater thanverage domestic supply.
arge percentage of the South Slavs eat bread made from corn meal. Yugoslavia is the only country among the Satellite group that has not to dateeed for grain Imports. On the other hand, it Is rumored that Yugoslavia may ofTer grain, particularly corn, for export.
There are reports that Yugoslavia will ship grain (probably corn) to Italy and Belgium.
7. Bulgaria.
During the five-year, Bulgaria, with anproduction of total cerealshousand metric tons,housand metric tonsercent of its indigenous production of bread and coarse grains and rice. This indicates an average total domestic supplyhousand metric tons.
Exports during this periodhousand metric tons of bread grains,housand metric tons of coarse grains,housand metric tons of rice.
7 grain production of Bulgaria was estimatedhousand metric tons whichhousandercent) less thanhousand tons produced64 percent below the average productionhousand tons during the five-year.7 productionhousand metric tons belowverage domestic supply.
The drought7 adversely affected the production of small grains rather than corn, thc production of which exceeded thatollowing the harvestheat was doubtless in short supply and an appeal was made to Moscow. The Soviet Union shipped to Bulgariahousand metric Ions oi wheathousand metric tons of barley which wasesture. Unless bread grain is shipped in the spring, the Bulgarian people, who are essentially wheat caters, will have to substitute com for wheat in the bread mixture or go on short rations.
It has been reported that Bulgaria will ship com valuedpossiblyhousand metric tons) lo Italy.
A recent report indicated thai the Soviet Union will ship anetric tons ol wheat lo Bulgaria This mayilitary significance.
8 Albania.
During the five-year, Albania with anproductionhousand metric tons1 percent o(housand metric tons.
Indigenous production suppliedercent of thc breadercent of the coarse grains, bul none of the rice used domestically. Imports during this period
averagedhousand metric tons of bread grains (wheat)housand metric tons of rice.
7 production of grain in Albania is estimatedhousand metric tons orhousandercent) below6 productionhousand inns.7 production wascrcenl above the average productionhousand tons, but onlyhousand metric tons belowverage domestic requirement
Although7 production of Albania was less than thc normal prewarit is Improbable that grain for civilian consumption will be imported during the consumption, hut there is the strong probability that grain to supply the requirements of Albanian or other miliLary forces will be shipped throughports to Tirana.
CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX III
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE GRAIN SITUATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES7 COMPARED WITH ESTIMATESITH EXPECTANCIES0 AND WITH PREWAR AVERAGES
Attached inre commodity summaries for the various grains, showingroduction and trade, estimated production6nd expectancy0 compared to prewar production duringase period.
In Tables K, L, M. and N, attached, are summaries by areas and commodities showing production estimates7 compared with production6 and the average annual production.
TABLEPRODUCTION. TRADE. AND TOTAL SUPPLY IN SPECIFIED COUNTRIES
ipRESEjrr BOUNDARIES)
Prewarompared with Production: Approximations6 andnd Expectancy50
1
Melnc Tom;
Union (In
Europe and Asia) Eastern Europe
Finland
Poland
Chechoslovakia
Hungary
Rumania
Yugoslavia
Bulcarla
Albania
Eastern Europe
Sub-total Manchuria
s i
TDtal
621 1 6 0 0 0 0
110
DO
1
li.IlV
-
Oi;
v.n
:i;
cnmumpUOnucu.it touly.
1 Wheat and wheat flour In terms of train.
' Conventional prewar comparison boxe lor production
:0Ng*5ljrTIAI,
Specified Country
nion (In
Europe and AUa> Eailrrn Europe
Finland
Poland
CMrhoslovakJa Hungary Human ia YucoUavta Rule aria Albania
Eastern Europe Sut>-tota!
Manchuria
Total
etric Tom/
PRODUCTION
2
4t
PI
(tflOO Metric Tout)
1
1
201
48
IS! ff"
400
:i
34 ,Ml
62
82 9
JNPiuifNTiAi
CONFp^NTIAL
C.-WHEAT AND BYE; PSODOCTION. TRADE. AND TOTAL SUPPLY IN SPECIFIED
PRODUCTION
COUNTRIESS7 compared with Production:nd ExpectancyS50
'
Country
Soviet Union <tn
Europe and Altai
Eulfm Europe Finland Poland
CrectiOAlovakia Hungary Ku.
Bulgaria Albania
Eastern Europe Sub-total
Manchuria
Total
etric Tons'
440
..
M
48 35
105
J51 0 0
0
8 8
- Bt"' 7 3 9
CONFIDENTIAL
ram*.
CONFJ^^IAL
Spcclfled Country
nion ao Europe and Ada>
Eastern Europe Finland Poland
CrechoMnvakta
Huruinry
Rumania
Yutoalavia
Bulgaria
Albania
Ea*iern Europe Sub-total Manchuria
Tol
PRODUCTION
1
(1MB Metric TonTi
(IMO Metric Tom'
2
&
a o
73
10
0
49
0
M
838 0
544
260
IS-i
5
184
141
ij;
140
180
;o9
are
j_UW 4 0flMllJTO M
available on the basis of the
CONFUffNTIAL
TABLE PRODOCTION. TRADE, AND TOTAL SUPPLY
(PRESENT BOUNDARIES) Prewarompared with Production0nd Expectancy5 a
SPECHTED COUNTRTKS
ppKHimaUotu for0
etric Tantl
Specified Country
a .ooa MctncTonti
r.
S
A
SovM Union (in
Europea> Eastern Europe
Finland Poland
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Rumania
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Albania
Eastern Europr Sub-total
Marvel) una
Total
S available on tin- basis of ihr.
I I
125
rj
5
latest five-year period (or which international trad* data are consumption1 July.
'Conventional prewar comparison base for production.
CONFMKNTIAL
COKP^^TXAL
OATS: PRODUCTION. TRADE. AND TOTAL SUPPLY IN SPECIFIED COUNTRIES
(PRESENT BOUNDARIES) Prewarompared with Production; Approximations8nd Expectancy in5
-
Speclfled Country
s
Soviet Union 'In
Europe and Asia1 Eastern Europe
Finland
Poland
Crechoslovatla
Hungary
Rumania
Yuia
Bulgaria
Albania
Eastern Europe Sub-total Mancnuria
etric Tons/
1
0
nW9 0 0 0 0
14
'111
-
102
132
140
180
14 9 8 8 0 5 0
laW,twhich international trade data tn available on the Dasi7cTthe
consumptionugust touly.
'Conventional prewar comparison base lor production.
CONyupENTIAL
CONFipfeNTIAL
TABLECWARSE GRAINS:PRODUCTION. TRADE. AND TOTAL SUPPLY IN SPECIFIED COUNTRIES (PRESENT BOUNDARIES.
WSnd50
37
PRODUCTION
Tons'
o
f
Union (in
Europe and Auji Eaitnn Eiiiipe
I
Poland
CrccnlMlovaktn
Hungary
Rumania
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Albania
Europe
sjo-wu:
Manrburta
Total
Ii 'i 13
sn
93
OO OO P8
99
.
1
8
CONFIDENTIAL
NTIAL
TABLECOARSERODUCTION. TRADE. AND TOTAL SUPPLY iri
SPECIFIED COUNTRIES 'PRESENT BOUNDARIES) Prewarompared with Production; Approximations6nd Expectancy50
7
Country
Soviet Union 'In
Europe and Asia)
Eastern Europe Finland Poland
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Rumania
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Albania
Eastern Europe Sub-total
Manchuria
Tola)
C c
I
a ..
P.
HMO Metric Tent)
s
282
SO
227
Sr.
small quantities of other unspecifiedui does not include rice.
*
CONFJ^^TIAL
Specified Country
Soviet Union <in
Europe and Asia)
3
J
I {
etric Tom)
3
1
33
Poland
Cxechoslovalcia
Hungary
Rumania
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Albania
Eastern Europe
1 IB
ta0
3 11
4
13
i 10
Sub-total Manchuria
3
years.
CONFIDENTIAL
i^
1
CONF^^TIAL
RODUCTION. TRADE. AND TOTAL SUPPLY IN SPECIFIED COUNTRIES (PRESENT BOUNDARIES)
Prewarompared with Production; Approximations6nd Expectancy5
7
Metric Tons)
AM Metric Tonal
Country
i
s i
X
M
I
ot
Ok
Union (in
and Asia)
Europe
,
Europe Sub-total
S1
:
life.
TABLESUMMARY FOR ALL AREAS TAKENHOLE '
Production
Production *
With
'
ric
2.7
70
6.4
Oralns
4-7
0.8
Coarse Grains 3
9.4
Coarse Grains
44
Grains
'
Include the Soviet Union. Manchuria, and thc following Eastern European countries; Finland. Poland. Czech Oslo vak la. Huncary. Rumania. Yucoslavla. Bulgaria, and Albania.
TABLESUMMARY FOR SOVIET UNION
Production
Compared Wi'.h
on :i
|
'
6.9
Grains
U
5
f Ii
Coarse Grains
Coarse Grains
40
1.4
Grain*
9h;
CONFIDENTIAL
IAL
TABLESUMMARY FOR SELECTED EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Wlic a'.
Biead Grains
Barley
Corn
OaU
Other Coarse Grains Tola! Coarse Grains Rice
Total Grains
1.CC1 Metric Tons
1 9
F.'ILmaicd Production
183
73
143
380
41
73
4
23
1
7.1
COMMODITY SUMMARY FOR MANCHURIA
Tons
437
22
10
5.0
213
30
87
730
5
-its
63
95
529
COKE^K
C ONFfcfJENT IAI,
APPENDIX IV
THE RELATIONSHIP OF GRAIN PRODUCTION TO TOTAL POPULATION
In analyzing thc food positionarticular country or area, it is conventional lo relate current production or expectancy for any given period to prewar production. If the population of the area concerned is changing, as la true of all the areas Included In this analysis (see Table R.t Is necessary to relate production to population in order lo obtain more accurate relationships.
In this analysis the five-yearas been usedrewar base and thc production per capita given an arbitrary valueroduction per capita for subsequent years has been computed and expressedercentage of production per capita duringase period. Thesefor each country Included In this report expressed in terms of breadoarse grains, and total grains Including rice are summarized in the following
TABLEGRAINPRODUCTION PER CAPITA. Estimates670 Expressed in Kilograms Per Person Per Year and as Percentages of the Prewar
Country
H
t
t i
i
I
3
1
i
Union (in
Europe and Asia! 76 62 88 94
Eastern Europe
Finland
0
.Hi
a:
15
Europe
1:
246
183
74
77
318
89
:<
Bread cralut Includennd rye. 'Five-year.
r
CON FavBNTI
TABLE PGRAIN1 PRODUCTION PER CAPITA. EstimatesG7SS.0 Expressed In Kilograms Per Person Per Tear and as percentages or the Prewar
0
I
Country
a
K
u
i
Union <ln Europe and Asia l
Europe
86
Europe Sub-total
Manchuria
Total
i:7
1
Includes barley. oat*rcorn. buckwheat, mastln. millets, spelt, broom corn, kaoliang iin Mancliurlat and small quantities of Other Unspecified Brains, bul does not include lice. 'Five-year prewar.
TABLEGRAIN1 PRODUCTION PER CAPITA. Estlniales670 Expressed in Kllocrams Per Person Pea- Year and as Percentage of lhe Prewar
Country
ii
102
:i
1
00
.
i
"
13
Includes rice.
'Five-year prewar.
CONF1PENTIAI,
APPENDIX V
POPULATION ESTIMATES OP SELECTED COUNTRIES (PRESENT BOUNDARIES)
Population estimates for the countries Included In this analysis were computed in consultation with the Population and Labor Branch. Division of International and Functional Intelligence of the State Department. These estimates, as shown In Table R, are for the periods
In view of the unsettled economic, social, and political situations in al! of these areas, population estimates for the present and even more so for the future are subjectide margin of error. Estimates for future periods are based on the assumption that rales of population growth will continue at approximately the same rates thatbefore the war. It is thus assumed that the postwar boom In births in certain countries. Finland and Czechoslovakia) will not continue. At the same time, the figures make no allowance for long-run downward trends in fertility. It is assumed that in the Satellite Countries, as in the Soviet Union, the Communist regimes will endeavor to increase thc population through policies which favor large families and that these policies will offset declines in birlh rates which would otherwise be expected to occur.
The population7 has been used to represent the average population for the five-year prewar.
OPULATION ESTIMATES OP SELECTEDhousands)
Specified Country
7
!
Union (In
and Asia!
ooo
Europe Finland Poland
Chechoslovakia
Hungary
Rumania
Yugoslavia
BulKAria
Albania
t teo
.
0
l.Iii.
5
0
n
0
1 :or:
0
0
:
0li:
Europe
'
1 m.
'toPresent
CONEjWENTIAL
ADDENDUM
The production estimates included In this report7 were based onavailable as ofore recent information on7 bread grain harvest in Poland indicates an Increasehousand metric tons of ryehousand metric tons of wheat more lhan is shown in the summary tables. Revised estimates of7 grain harvest in other countries show some variations from theovember estimates. However, most of the changes are relatively
The datarain export commitments of the Soviet Union included In this report were based on information available as8 the Soviet Union has made further grain export commitmentsillion metricummaryhese commitments as8 is given below.
SOVIET naOTt: Ormln Export OH*Ml' up8
Grains 1
TomO Poundt
Great Britain
Cirrhotlovakut
Poland
U*1ulnm
Finland
Eiryut
Norway
Humania
ff M
941s
591
m
N N
;
84
84
firmor actual shtpntnta arclwat and rye.
'Oau. corn.
*one loos undcslinaicd as to kind ol train Dsttiaaj March-December. 1MB.
ionsla kind of ciaia0 Ionsone lens undent no led ai to kind ol pram.
n^aaWllAL
Original document.
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