CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KOREA
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THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KOREA SUMMARY
US strategic Interests would be seriously affected by the absorption ol Korea into thc Soviet orbit. The current political, economic, and military situation in thc US and Soviet Zones, respectively, makes it unlikely that any government erected in South Korea under UN auspices could long survive the withdrawal of US forces unless It were to receive continuing and extensive US economic, technical, and military aid. Present indications areovernment dominated by the Extreme Rightists under Rhee Syngrnan will emerge from the forthcoming UN-observed elections.egime, if left to itself, would be incapable of withstanding Ideological and military pressure from North Korea. On the other hand, any unconditional US commitments tootentially unpopular and unreliable government mightource of futureto US policy in thc Ear East.
Nole: The InformaUon In Oils report Is asttune the report was submitted to the inteUlEcnee organizations of the Departments of State. Army. Hayy. and Air Force for concurrence or substanUal dissent.
The intelligence organliaUonj of the Departments of State. NaTy. and Air Force hareIn the report; the Intelligence Division. Department of the Army, has concurred in the military aspects of the report.
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KOREA
1. Importance or Korea.
Absorption of Korea Into the Soviet sphere of influence would: a. eriously adverse political and psychological Impact throughout the already unstable Far East, particularly in China, Japan, and the Philippines; which would increase in direct proportion to the Investment made by the US in Korea prior to any surrender of that country to Soviet domination;
njure US prestige throughout Uie world where it is recognized that the US has substantial moral commitments In Korea, one of thc three countries where the US and USSR stand face to face, directly associated with activities andwithin their respective zones;
c. In case of war, furnish an important Soviet position threatening both Japan and the North China coast.
2. Conditions in the US Zone (South. The Political Situation.
The struggle between the US and the USSR over thc future poliUcalof Korea has served both to condiUon and to obscure the nature of politicalwithin South Korea. As Is true in most relatively undeveloped areas, the bulk of thc population is ignorant of political realities and is. In general, more concerned with the business ofiving than with Uie larger issues of national andpolitics. The continued presence of foreign occupation forces on Korean soil has resulted In chronic native resentment at the delay of the long-promised independence of Korea and at the protracted artificial split of Uie country. However, the continued economic distress hasore senous factor in producing Uie bitter restlessness which characterizes the attitude of the mass of thc South Koreanat the present time.
The political organizations struggling for control of the inarticulate South Korean population can be broadly classified as: Right, Moderate, and Left. The slakes involved in this struggle are considerable The greatest portion of the wealth of South Korea was formerly Japanese owned and is now frozen In thc form of "vestedhc problem of the future disposition of this vested properly is thc core of poliUcal differences within South Korea upon which the larger US-USSR struggle has been grafted. The tendency of all political factions to adapt the international situation to domestic rivalries by seeking lhe support of one or the other power has served lo obscure the domestic issues and to polarize the domestic conflict into two contending extremist camps.
when, for example, the left gravitated toward the Soviet Union as theadvocate of equalitarian distribution of the national wealth, italuable ally but lost its freedom of action: it was rapidly infiltrated and forgedolitical instrument for eventual Soviet domination of South Korea. Along with substantial financial assistance from North Korea, it had lo accept an external direction which forced it to adopt extreme tactics in supporting the dictates of Soviet policy.
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The tactics of the Left inevitably forced an immediate reaction from the Right. The leadership of this group of parties is provided by that numerically small class which virtually monopolizes the native wealth and education of the country. Since it fears that an equalitartan distribution of the vested Japanese assets would serverecedent for the confiscation of concentrated Korean-owned wealth, it has been brought into basic opposition with the Left. Since this class could not have acquired and maintained its favored position under Japanese ruleertain minimum oft has experienced difficulty in finding acceptable candidates for poUti-cal office and has been forced to support imported expatriate politicians such as Rhee Syngman and Kim Koo. These, while they have no pro-Japanese taint, are essentially demagogues bent on autocratic rule. Acceptance of this extremist leadership has forced the Right to discard its more moderate elements and has served to widen thc gulf between thc two opposing camps.
Korea's complete lackemocratic tradition made it certain that both sides would resort to violence as the only weapon available for the settlement of political disputes. Hence each side organized and subsidized "youth groups" to furnish strong-arm support for propaganda and organizational endeavors among the mass of the population and to counter, by force, the efforts of Its adversary.
When the Left resorted to terrorism to achieve its ends, one of its first targets was the South Korean policeogical target for twohereeservoir of popular resentment against the police which could be tapped at any time;t represented thc constituted authority which the Left was under orders to undermine. The latent popular resentment against the policeecessary result of the only tradition which the police had to draw upon in the execution of their tasks. Whatever administrative skills the police force possessed it had learned from theat the same tune that It was acquiring whatever respect for civil liberties it now possesses. Hence, the police force, faced with the emergency of Leftist terrorism, replied in thc only way it knew by being ruthlessly brutal in suppressing disorder. For thisit is now in the position of being inevitably committed to support of the Right, since it realizes that thc successful creationeftist regime in South Korea would mean the massacre of police personnel.
Thc enforced alliance of the police with the Right has been reflected in the cooperation of thc police with Rightist youth groups for the purpose of completelyLeftist activity. This alignment has had the effect ol forcing the Left to operate as an underground organization since it could not effectively compete in asense even if it should so desire. In this situation the Left has adopted the tactic of sporadically suspending its campaign of terrorism against individuals in order to bring into bolder relief the extortions and brutalities of the police force and Rightist youth groups. In addition, Communist propaganda contrasts the "proletarianol North Korea with the continued economic distress of the South. The Left thus plays upon the basic dissatisfactions of thc South Koreans in order to undermineand economic stability through the instigation of public disorders and sabotage at any moment considered propitious by thc Communist leadership. Current Communist-organized opposition to thc holding of elections in South Koieaase in point.
Although the Moderates, led by Dr. Kirnm Kiu Sik. represent perhaps the only potentially democratic force In Korea today, they areohesive groupoose assemblage of splinter partieselatively small popular following. As aof the continuing polarization of South Korean politics, the Moderates are being driven toward the extremes if only for future self-protection. Without active US support and encouragement, they cannot hope to cope with the demagogic appeal of the Extreme Right or the conspiratorial efficiency of the Extreme Left
The Rightists, perceiving in this situation the assurance of an overwhelming victory in an early parliamentary election, are presently engageduthless struggle among themselves for control of the reins of power with Rhce Syngman having the best prospects for success. Alliances of convenience are being formed in an attempt tonited front, but there Is every prospect that Rhce's accession to power will be followed by Inlra-party cleavages and by thc ruthless suppression of all non-Rhee Rightist, Moderate, and Leftist opposition.
Situation.
The rupturing of Korea's prewar economic relationship with Japan and thc artificial separation of South Korea from the North has resulted In chronic shortages of such basic items as fertilizer, coal, and electric power as well as of technical and administrative skills. These shortages arc reflectedeneral paucity of consumers' goods androwing Inflation. In addition, the Rightists' control of the South Korean Interim Legislature has permitted them successluly to obstruct certain vitally needed economic reforms.
There is no immediate prospectessation of this economic distress. It has been estimated that under the best conditions, involving considerable US aid. South Korea could notarginal self-supporting status in lessears. In any case. South Korea will remain dependent on the Soviet Zone for most of its electric power supply for some time. By Inciting unrest in South Korea and by choking off the supply of power, the USSR has the capability of effectively sabotaging andany recovery program initiated in the South.
Situation.
There is at present no native military establishment In South Korea which could execute an effective defense against outside aggression. It is estimated that it wouldinimum of one year for the US to train andorce which could meet the North Korean "People'sn even terms, at that army's present strength.
3. Conditionsoviet Zone <North Korea) a. Political Situation.
The USSR Is ln continuing process ofolitical regime in North Korea, molded in the Soviet Image and designedase from which control can be extended to all Korea. At the present time, efforts are being concentrated on equipping this regime with all thc institutional apparatus necessary for recognizing itovereign and independent "Korean People's Republic."
A "Draft Provisional Constitution" was submitted to the North Korean People's Assemblyebruary, and it was decided to refer it lo the "people" for "discussion"
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prior io lis formal adoption some time In mid-March. This document showssigns of Soviet influence and quite clearly anticipates eventual Incorporation of all of Korea under the contemplated "People's Republic of Korea" even to the point of specifying Seoul, capital of the present US Zone, as the future capitalnited Korea By completing all major preparations for the establishmentPeople's Republic" thc USSR is giving itself the capability of anticipating or countering thc efficacy of any attempt by the UN toovernment In South Korea,oviet puppet regime can be announced and recognized as the legal government of Korea at any lime that poliUcal exigencies demandove.
Thc USSR is constantly refining thc procedure whereby it masks its ever-increasing centralized control over the puppet regime. Potential dissidents having been eliminated from the area soon after the arrival of the Red Army, there is no reliable evidence of any serious disaffection or organized resistance among thcillion North Koreans, despite the factull-blown police state is emerging. This situation has been made possible largely through the characteristically shrewd Soviet recogniUon of the basic needs of the native population (land reform, politicaleducation,nd through Ihc crecUonegime equipped to satisfy those desires if only by means of an incessant propaganda barrage. As long as no structure better adapted lo Korean needs Is established in South Korea to compete for Korean loyalty, It is fruitless to hope for extensive defections from this North Korean regime which gives every Indication of increasing its strength as its political and economic plans reach maturity.
b Economic Situation,
Soviet political efforts lo insure the absorption of North Korea into the Soviet orbit have been accompanied by similar steps in the economic sphere, in the form of joinl Soviet-Korean corporations, barter agreements, and institutional reform along Soviet lines. Despite continued Soviet removal of Korean commodlUes andwhich tends lo impede any solution of Norlh Korea's economic problems, it is safe to say that economic conditions In the Soviet Zone are at least no worse than those in thc US Zone even though the latter lias received fairly extensive relief supplies. This can be explained by the fact that the North Korean economy is better balanced Industrially lhan that of the South and that there is comparatively less pressure on its food resources. Moreover. Uie USSR is apparently engaged in integrating the North Korean Industrial complex with the Manchurian agricultural economy.lan. If successfully implemented, would force South Korea to "wither on the vine" unless it could avail Itself of an Industrialor thecomplement itsproduction. At the same time the North Korean economy would suffer no detrimental effect by reason of its enforced rupture from Uie South, c. Military Situation.
he North Korean People's Committee, in celebration of its second anniversary, unveiled thc "Korean People's Army" (KPA) and significantly
called attention lo the South Korean "uprisings" against the UN Commission which had been instigated by Communist agents inay as lo occur simultaneously.
Thc KPA. operatingDepartment of Nationals estimated to have
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approximate strength. is Soviet trained and advised, and has beenwith adequate infantry and infantry-support weapons of Soviet manufacture which, although obsolete, are apparently In excellent condition. Soviet-inspired propaganda is psychologically preparing thc North Koreans for using this force in an eventual "war of national liberation" in South Korea. For the present, the force is valuableropaganda standpoint ln that it enhances the prestige of the North Korean regime internally and can be used for "scare" purposesolitically unstable South Korea. More important, as in the political sphere, it gives the USSR theof anticipating, or Immediately duplicating, another US move. Should the US withdraw ils troops, the USSR could easily fulfill its self-imposed commitment ofwithdrawal" of occupation forces with no impairment of its superior position. The USSR has been constantly stripping ils forces in North Korea in preparation forove. The structure of control would survive the troop withdrawal, and the KPA would be competent to handle any probable missions requiredilitarily defenseless South Korea.
4. Phobadle Future Deveiopments.
The decision of the UN Interim Committee to authorize the UN Cornnussion in Korea to observe elections In lhe US Zone will result in the formation in South KoreaNational Assembly"National Government" representing two-thirds of the total Korean population.overnment will have Utile prospect of permanency. Politically It will be faced with the immediate threatompeting Soviet-sponsored regime to the North. Economically. It will have no immediate prospect for alleviation of chronic distress. The new government will also have to contendontinuous effort on the part of the Communist "Fifth Column- to instigate sabotage and disorder on the basis of economic and political discontent, thus multiplying the difficulties now existing.
Lastly, the South Korean Government will be threatened with military disaster following an early withdrawal of US forces.ithdrawal would probably beor shortly followed by similar Soviet action. Ihus leaving thc KPA free to engage in its long-awaited "liberation" of South Korea with the aid of its organised "Fifth Column" and with no danger of effective opposition.
Delay of US withdrawal for the time necessary to organise an adequate South Korean defense force would serve touccessful North Korean Invasion but. by itself, would not prevent it. The basic economic and political problems would remain unsolved, and the defense forces would be left operating on the basis of an "ox-cart" economy and an unstable political structure. Only continued and extensive UScould preserve any future Korean regime from the imminent threat ofextinction,
An early election in South Korea will resultightist sweep and in the probable formationovernment headed by Extreme Rightist Rhee Syngman since lhe Left will boycott the elections and the Moderates will be loath to participate too activelyull US guarantee of the independence of the future government. (Thc
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Moderates arc. however, masking their basic feelings of Insncurity by raising the specious objection that the elections will encouragen the basis of Rhee's past record and present conduct. It is probablehee Government, if left to its own devices, would play directly into Soviet hands. Soviet propaganda would be providedubstantial basis in fact for charging the regime with being corrupt, reactionary, and oppressive. By discrediting Itself with the South Korean population,egime would facilitate the task of the KPA in "liberating" South Korea following the withdrawal of US forces At this juncture Rhee would probably look to the US for support. The US might then be faced with the choice of giving aid and comfortiscredited, unpopular regime while risking the censure of world opinion; or of withdrawing its support In response to moral pressure and face the charge of breaking another promise in the Far East.
Original document.
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