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STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN SUMMARY
Ji pan's defeat in World War II hasacuum of power In the Far Cast where the extension of Soviet influence and US strategic Interests have been brought into direct conflict. Fioro the point ol view ol either the US or tbe USSR, control of Japan is Important to the control of the Far Eastern area, both because of the island's geographical location and because Japan, while militarily defenseless alarge reservoir of trained manpower, which, if mobilized and provided logistic support, couldotent factor in determining the outcome of any future armed conflict embracing the Far East.
The US as f: mclpa] power In occupation presently controls Japan, the stability of whose new democratic government cannot be determined completely until theof US occupation troopsiable economy, however, present Japanese stability and pro-US orieelatioa should continue so long as the Occupation remains.
On Lhe other hand, there are certain possible developments which would greatly weaken the US position In Japan and throughoul tbe Far East, and to this extent strengthen that of the USSR. Principal among these are:
L Disruption or ills Present Status Quo is Nohtheast Asia.
Extension of Soviet control or domination over North China, Manchuria, and the whole of Korea would result in an incalculable loss of US prestige throughout the Far East.ondition might greatly facilitate further Soviet extension into Japan itself, which in turn would expedite Communist expansion in Asia against diminishing resistance.
J. Serious Dltkhimatios or Japan's Economic System.
The key factor in the postwar development of Japan is economic rehabilitation. As In the past, Japan, (or normal economic functlonirig on an industrial basis, must have access lo the Northeast AsiaticNorth China, Manchuria, andunder direct. Indirect, or potential control of the USSR. It Is believed that the Kremlin, without serious effect on its own positioa In Northeast Asia, could refuse to allow Japan economic access to these areas if political or strategicso dictated.
The short-leim kiss of Northeast Asia trade, though it would make economic re-wvery of Japan difficult, would nol render it impossible. It could be compensated lor in part by trade with Southeast Asia and the Philippine Islands where, however, there would be, in addition to US and European competition, the possible development and expansion of indigenous industries.
Hole: The infoimalion in Uiis report Is a* ofa;
The bile! licencealiDii! ol Ih; Departments ol Stale. Army, and thes tcfrl; the Directorate of Intelticviice. Air InlOllikeDCe Division. Department of tlie Air Voice had no comment.
Over ifc? long lino, exclusion of Japan from Northeast Asia trade would sodistortatural trade pattern that economic stability could be maintained only i! the US weie prepared to underwrite substantial trade deficitsontinuing basis. Should such afd be withheld or unavailable, the ensuing economic distress might easily force Japan to align itself with the USSR as the only means cf returning to economic normality.
So long as this Japanese rehabilitation is under US control. It can be resumed that Japan ol itself, with its basic economic weaknesses, cannot in the foreseeable futurehreat to US security. Only as an ally of the USSR, or as partarge anti-US coalition could Japan become once again dangerous.
So longiable economy for Japan can be constructed and maintained, thefacing the USSR in attempting to force Japan's acquiescence would beend could be largely offset through the adoption by the US of available counter* measures.
rEOIC IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN
defeat ID Worldnd subsequent occupation has Heed the USn,.Ules Iron, the
given the US the opportunity to exert. major influence on Japan for the ore^ble futu:c At the same time. Japan.MEastha* onl> partially bero filled by the US and the USSR. Moreover, the exLB Northeastern Asia has brought tbe invests ofUSSR int. dlred conflict with those of ibe US in that area. T* Fart the same timetale of dynamic flux, whUe bam force. wo-Mnr to restore as much as possible of the order existing In the Far East poor to Japanese ag-are in retreat under the attack of Indigenous nationalist moments and
Communist-ominatedinrimatr
Japan's entire political, economic and social structure has been subieci to drastic reforms^ch. hoover, have been neither formaleaceo* edouted by the Japanese. Nevertheless,onsequence ol the InsUWhl, in the t'rlxn.efeat, iselatively
cynically than are its Immediate neighbors. Fear on the part_ol olhw AscTunlrW of resurgent Jap-ese military penetrationecovery while the degree of Soviet contra! over Manchuria. China, and Korea will necessarily influence Japan's stability and future alignment.
a- ?
J. Kaxic
The graphic location of Japan renders it ofwhosere large. perUcuhtrly at the present ttao. to the In* to the USSR. Anycontrolling Japan^ouW of the North PacuV and isositioc to dominate theand c: a^ of
^HS
f which consists of Kamchatka and the KurUe Islands, If used by the- tn"ction against the US. Japan'sluonn ?rliS from Alaska to the Philippine Island, and might servetMceM stone to tbe southern regions.
ow defenseless and mus- rely for protection fromsome other nation or nations hav.ng sufuoent strength
to guarantee Japanese sovereignty. Japan's manpowerupport OOdd contain
oV> si***
the Asiatic Continent Conversely. Japanese manpower, rnobdued and OM with
lhe USSR, would, in ease oi war. force the deployment ol larger US forces in Alaska and on theasl of the US than wouid otherwise be necessary. The utilization of Japsnesfr aimies in offensive action, either In Asia or In North America, would involve the conductajor war effort. This wouid be particularly true if Japanese forces were to be directed against lhe USSR in Asia.
S. tc*s.
The key factor in the postwar development of Japan and the relationship of that development lo US security is Japanese economic rehabilitation. It is noteworthy that the Potsdam Declaration, while it provides for complete disarmament, also provides specifically that Japan should be permitted lo retain such industry as is necessary to sustain its economy. The Far Eastern Commission has determined,atter of policy, that the peaceful needs of the Japanese people should be defined as being sub-stanlially the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the. and that in estimating the nature and size of the Industrial structure within thai level, account should be taken of such factors as technological developments, balance ofand employment Factors which will influence the implementation of thisinclude: (a) the question of reparations; (b) the dependence of Japanese economic rehaoultatlon upon surrounding areas (China, Manchuria. Korea, Formosa, and Sakhalin) for markets and raw materials; (c) the extent to which these markets and raw materials can be made available to Japan; and (d) the availability of other markets and sources of raw materials if presently and potentially Soviet-dominated areas should be closed to Japanese trade,
_ The problem of reparations has not yet been solved and may have lo await the resultseace conference for final decision. Present Indications are that Industrial facilities to be made available for removal as reparations may be considerably less than originally anticipated. Howeser, until the question is settled definitely, the process of rehabilitation may be slowed down.
Japan's pre surrender economy was integrated with and dependent upon those of China. Manchuria. Korea, Formosa, and Sakhalin. However, in the decade prior to surrender, Japanese economy was progressively being distorted lo givearge military estabttshment wlilch wasar, or semi-war, footing.implementation of the Potsdam Declaration and the terms of surrender have resulted in the complete liquidation of the Japanese military establishment, thuse Japanese economy free from this buidcu. it Is nevertheless evident that Japan still must depend heavily on trade with Northeast Asiaelf-supportingis to be sustained without continuing US support. Geographical proximity and the character of Its economic development make Northeast Asia complement-try to the economy of Japan. In the prewar period. North China. Korea, Foimosa, Manchuria, and Sakhalin supplied approximatelyercent of Japan's imports and look aboutercent of Japan's exports. The principal commodftks obtained by Japan wereand raw materials such as coat, Iron ore, lumber and pulp, and salt, which Japan exchanged for exports of machinery, metal manufactures, and textiles. In spite of the
separation of this area fromdomination and aggressive rlevelcpm"nt, trade with this urea, it lhe USSR dontself denj or cause others to deny nueh trade to Japan. mijht be expected to be resumed eventually at levels approaching those of the
prewar period.
Since the surrender. Japanese trade adth these areas, with the exception of US-fosVred lr*de with South Korea, has been negligible The prolongation of present political condition* in North China, Karth Korea, Manchuria, and Sakhalin, moreover, wit' continue to Impede the resumption of Mich trade. Complete Soviet control or domination of these areas would give the Kremlin the capability of prohibiting trade be'.wcen Northeast Asia and Japan altogether, should such action, from the Saviet point of view, appear advantageous
The various arms of Northeast Asia are themselves mutually supporting. Fa example,ood surpluslso has large quantities of Iron ore which In conjunct'ith North China's coal and North Korea's ferro-alloys could constitute the basis for an Integrated heavy industry. These areas, together with the Far Cast-em USSR, could provide the largest Industrial potential of any area in the Far East It is believed, therefore, that should pollt'cal or strategic con-dderationi so dictate, the T'SSR could, wft.out serious effect on Its own position In Northeast Asia, refuse to allow Japan economic access to those tress under Soviet control
Vhr low of nccess to the markets and raw materials of North China, Korea,and Sakhalin to Japan could be compensated for. In part, by trade withand the Philippine Islands, However, If all trade with Northeast Asia were lo be cut off for an extended period, Japan would have to obtain from the United States and Canada many essential rawlumber, wood pulp, and cokingthat3 otherwise "would have come from Asia. Japan would also have to compensate for thef this areaood supplier by obtaining from Southern Asia and the United States considerably more food than wou'd otherwise be rtecessary. Coats of such Import* would be Increased substantially by shipping over long haulstht Iom of Northeast Asiatic markets for Japanese exports would have to be offset by continued austere living standards and by expansion of exports either to distant Western inarkels, where Japan faces strong competition, or to Southern Asiatic markets, where. In addition to ITS and European competition, the development or expansion ol indigenous Indusfrlcs may limit the market for Japanese goods still further.
It can be roncludedhort-term loss of trade with North China, Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin would make the economic recovery uf Japan difficult, but notT^ngtcrm exclusion from trade with these areas would, however,pan's natural pattern of trade so drastksTly that economic stability probably could be malntalnrd In Japan only if the US were prepared to underwrite substantialontinuinghould such outside aid be withheld and Japan be denied the trade of Northeast Asia, the ensuing economic distress, with Its attendant political Instability, MlgM force Japan to align Itself with the USSR. Moreover. It Is by no means Impowlblc that Japan may tend to Ir.ide with this area, either In the normal course ot exploiting Iho trade and commercial advantages arising from the proximity
of the Soviet Far East,atter of government policy calculated to gain (or Itself even larger beneats from the US.
3. PouncAL Factors.
Since its emergenceodern nation, Japan has made little use of litinstitutions to develop democratic methods and techniques of government Afterhenes* accepted without serious question the despotic polllico-mlli-lary rule Imposed ua them in the name of the Emperor. Perhaps no* an endorsement of military policy by the Japanese people, itemonstration of the fact that any Japanese governmentegardless of polltlcsl Savor, would have to be solidly setilitary foundation. Since the surrender, Japanese armed forces have ceased to exist, and Japanese democratic government has been established. By the eipedient of partyair degree of government efficiency has been maintained. It must not be overlooked, however, that the existence of SCAP and the occupation forces pro-Tide support for tbe stability of the present Japanese government^ Should suchbe removed. It Is questionable that tbe present degree or political maturity and acceptance of democratic Ideals on the part of the Japanese would resulttable government In Japan. It will be difficult, therefore, to determine the degree lo which Japan has beenr the permanence of Its post-surrender politicaluntil the occupation forces have been withdrawnapanese Government has had an opportunity to solve Its own problems without military guidance and support Assuming the continuance of the political ttalttt quo in Northeast Asia (anChinese Nationalist Govemmer.t. an Independrnl South Korea, and Japan ini rids) Ihere seems. In the predictable future, to be no likelihood of the Japanesebeing overthrown by evolution or violence from domestic sources. This condition would probably beeven after the withdrawal of the Occupation forces.
On the other hand, the extension of Soviet control or domination over North China and Manchuria, and the loss of all Korea to Soviet domination would result In anloss of US prestige throughout the Far East Domlna^on of Japan by the USSR, following such an extension of control over North China, Manchuria, and Korea, would cause political repercussions threatening US security throughout the whole of Asia. The remaining Aslstk Powers would be forced to conclude that the US was neither able nor willing to meet commitments, actual or Implied, to protect free and Independent peoples from Soviet aggression- Thus. Communist expansion throughout the Orient would be expedited against diminishing resistance.
In Japan Itself, Soviet domination would be opposed initially by traditionalantl-Communist sentiment and antipathy to the USSR. It Is believed, however, thai this opposition would prove no serious obstacle to the im pie mentation of Soviet policies once the facadelegal government" had been established. Traditional Japinese respect for authority, plus the strong support afforded the "legr.lby the presence of Soviet armed forces In nearby areas, would be sufficient to Insure relatively complete Japanese "cooperation" with the USSR.
In the fl.tsltht political stability and the coopentioo of Japan with US dependsoniable economy.resent conditions. If men ann be attained, it is quite probable that Japan will frvelopree,. .tion capable oftabilizing influence In Asia Furthermore, even though th- Kremlin should be able to exert complete domination over Northeast Asia. Japan couldresLsl Soviet domination provided It were auund of economic security as well as political and military support by the US. Conversely, underofcute economic distress and with Soviet control extending over al) of Northeastanese political siabUity.couW probably be maintained only by strong action on the part erf the occupation forces, and should those forces beolritical period, the probability that Japan world eventually succumb to Communist domination would becomeertainly.
4. larLUfMi-iTuruat Dsvuomwts.
Bee-.tive of the factors set forth above, the relationship which Japan will bear tosecurity of the US can be determined only in the light of future developments and will be bised generally on one of two economic conditions: Japan -nil either continue Ins-nt slat* of economic maladjustment, eventually degeneratingtate ofcollapse, oriable economy. Continuing economic maladjustment would presuppose insufficient outside economy aid to Japan or none at all. In this case the ensuing economic distress would eventually demand that occupation forces take strong meamirt* to intint-in political stability Furthermore, should occupation "forces be withdrawn from Japan, strong pressure could be exerted upon Japan to force K* orientation to the Soviet Union.
Ithen, lo determine whether or not Japan couldhreat to VS ocrutily i'talfla economy. For purposes of discussion It may be assumed that the followingawd on the terms of the PoUdam Declaration and de-eW' ni made In the FarCommission, would be Implemented:
a. That Japan will be permitted to retain sufficient Industry lo sustain its economy (Note: It may be iMcessAiy to accon./'sh this through the agency of continued US subsidization acooniprmied by any necessary reorientation of Japan's trade pattern lo areas other than Northeast Asia);
hat Japan wli not be pcimitlcd toilitary establishment (Note: It fellows that Japin will be dependent on either thUS orultilateral tradetoe the products ol those Industries which sue capable of direct military
II Is Implicit in the assumptions, asthat Japan would be Incapable, by it-elf, ofhreat to OS security. It could servehreat only as partoalition of powers cppc<mg the US. most probably as an ally of the USSR The means available lo the USSR for circling the integration of Japan Into the Soviet orbit may be classified Inlo 0ms general headings: Ideological penetration. politico-mlUUryand economic penetration.
iable Japanese economy, it Is highly improbable that Soviet efforts at Ideological per.etrslion would have any substantial prospect of success Traditional Japanese Ru*sophobia, together with continued economic aid from the US. would probably strve as Insuperable obstacles to tbe achievement of Soviet objectives bytechniques alone.
On theand, tlie degree of success altained by the Soviets In attempts to coerce Japan, by means of political and military pressures, into Joining an anti-irs coalition would depend on the existence of effective guarantees against SovietWithoul such guarantees, Soviet politico-military pressure might prove Uresis'. IWe Conversely, the efficacy of such possible Soviet tactics could be effectivelyandy Ihr existence of US military guarantees of Japanese security and by continuing ITS defnomtraUoris of its willingness actively to enforcearanlees. In any event. Soviet poJiIico-mllitaxy maneuvers calculated to alter Japans strategic alignment would hare to be supplemented by efforts In other fields in order to overcome Japanese enUpathy to the USSR and to ire ire Japanese economic survival In the faceossible rupture of Japan's economic relationship with the US and other areas outside the Soviet sphere.
Soviet efforts to undermine the assumed economic relationship between Japan and the US for the purpose of laying the economic basis for eventual political capture of Japan would be subject to serious limitations. The quantity of agricultural andraw materials available for export to Japan from Northeast Asia would be limited by the requirements of the European USSR and by current Soviet plans for cat-tensive Industrialist Ion of the Soviet Far East Assuming that Soviet plans for the ilntegratfonof North China, Manchuria, and KoreaFar Eastern industrial complex could include previsions for making available to Japan those goodi and markets essential for forcing Japan Into economic subordinationilateral tradethe *JSSR would still have to contend with possible US countcrrr.casures In this type of economic warfare.
From the foregoing It can be concluded that in the foreseeable future Japan Isby Itscif. ofhreat to US security but coulderious threat as an ally of the USSR In an anti-US coalition. It Is also evident thatorts to secure Jspan world have to be carried out concurrently In the Ideol^gtcaJ, politico-military, and economic spheres In order to have any prospect of success. Furthermore, the difficulties facing the USSR In the conduct of an offensive designod to force Japan's orientation to the Soviet orbit are considerable, and these difficulties could br largely offset by US adoption of available ^untermeasures.
The USSR, aware of these difficulties, must realize that lis final objective, eventual Soviet domination of Japan, Is pres-nUy unobtainable. The Kremlin, however, can be expected to use all available means to neutralise Japanotential threat and at the same time to prepare for the eventual absorption of Japan.
In order to accomplish this objective, every effort will be made to discreditnd to force their withdrawal. Propaganda attacks will be Increased. The specttr of the resurgence of Japanese military and economic aggression will be
emphasised k< Japan's Asiatic neighbors, while US 'colonization" of Japan will be vigotously pointed out to the Japanese
Continued Soviet obstrucUon in the Allied Council and in the Far Easternto efforts to effect Japanese economic rehabilitation can be expected. By means of continued demands for high reparations and refusal to participateeace conference except on Soviet terms, tlie Kremlin will hope to cause maximum confusion and to Impede Japanese recovery. In addition, all possible support will be given to the Japanese Communists in their efforts lo dominate the trade unions for the purpose of Instigating strikes and work stoppages Support to, and exploitation of. minority groups will be Increased.
Attempts at ideological penetration will be continued through the repatriation of "indoclr.riated" prisoners of war. Tbe Kremlin will undoubtedly exert maximum psyciKiiogicei pressure on the Japanese by strengthening and coi^ohdatlng lis military position in Northeast Asia; and by using as "hostages" those Japanese still remaining In Soviet hands.
The USSR can be expected to exploit,olitical weapon. Its control overAsiatic markets and sources of raw materials. It will promise Japan economic access to these areaseans of extorting concessions which will penult Soviet ideological penetration and pave the way at some future date for Japanrv politicalitling to Japanese orientation toward the USSR.
The Japanese, however, as long ss they are assured by the US of adequate eoworr.ie support aivd of security from aggression, will continue to progress toward thaof political stability and economic rehabilitation, and will remain anti-Soviet Under these conditions Japan will eventually be able to contribute to the peaceful stabilization of Asia.; support be withdrawn before Japan has attained recovery, ther-'tpan Into the Soviet orbit wouldoregoneJapan, svar. the US-Soviet conflict, can be expected to use ila strategicbetween the contestantsargaining point to obtain maximum concessions from either, or both.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN
Original document.
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