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XIvTlvLLIGlJNCB HEfKltAHDUMj
SUBJECT! ooMvoooas of OS Export Controls
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of tho j
Tho US Export Control Aot9 has objectives. ,
(a) "to protoat tho donootic economy frora tho excesslvo drain of ooarcG notoriala and to reduce tho inflationary inpoot of abnornal foreign demand;
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an
(b) "to further tho foreign policy of. andtoaid la;
fulfilling ita international reeponaibmtieo;:and j
(o) "to eaoaroiee the necooenry vigilnnco over exports fron the-
B
e*aadpolnt of their ai grit flea nee to national
paper la oonoornod solely with the national soourltyexport oontrol prOfrrnn and Bpeoifioally with thes well as of parallel measures by otherorbl* and Soviot/Satellito refer only to Hnngaryy taaanla,has .been aedo to estimate the effect on Uieadopted oontrols oinilar to those
Notoi Thlo nanxnrandun has not been coordinated with the lntoUlgonco organizations of tho Departments of Stoto, Army, Ifevy, and tbe Air Poroe.
-.
DM TOontrol program has in eoooral contributed oubctantially toiard Uniting tho develojBeait of SovieVSatelllte ecooonlo oapobllitSoo for tar. (For osototIo, tB aliipmenta to tho Soviet orbit (excluding Finland) of non^tallio minerals, totals, raxrafaotarednd chonlcalB for tb* first aaxcontha7 were valuedor theperiodha value of these shipments hod dropped. Although these shlpnants inoludo eons Items not catists, they Generally represent tho aajor categories to uhloh reBtrlctloaa are applied.) EnforoeDont ofxport controls, bnvBVep-haa not been completely satin factory nor havo tha oontrola been tho sola factor In Uniting the export of strategic iteoa to the Soviet orbit. The time Is rapidly arjproaehing uhan noBeroafl other Uniting factors will no longer exist* tho effectiveness of tha export control machinery and adrdnl-atratloa uill thus soon be putar nore Bevero teat thanne of the principal difficulties will be tbe extent to which the EGA nationa can support the VS export control program with effective restrictionsthe export of prohibited itena to the Soviot orbit.
_ Thus far, implementation oi* ttwxport control prognm has been facilitated by tha existence of the following conditional *m
(a) laok of an exportable surplas in EGA countries! (b) abnormal doaeatio demand for reconstruction and reooveryj (o)ontrols on oorse IteiaH by EGA nations; and (d) inability of the BSSR or the Satellites to provide either the roods or the foreign oxoaange necessary to pur chase the restricted iters.
Tho conations listed above aro rapidly disappearing. Tho degree of industrial recovery in Europe, and pertioularly the revival ofproduotion ln Oeatsany and Japan, io eliannatlng moat of the nforerxmticnod restraints on Veeteam European exports of strategda items to tho Soviet orbit. Thus,reater extant then heretofore, effective irjplcoontotlon of thoocport aoraol prcgron vill dopond upon thoof cooperation tbat ban be obtained froa tho EGA nations In oatabllab-iog export oontrol wiebiiwry and administration, until nou, "psrallel action" by tho EGA, nations in eatabliuhing buoh oontrold has not boon, odoqoate end unless improved vill antexially undarcdne the offoctivemeao of tiiexport oontrol program.
Xn view of the EreaJlin'a continued gwnhngis on developing tbe Soviet/ Satellite war potential hy expaixiiai heavy indnotrial and rtilltaryeffootlvs) Inplebraitation of tho US export control progron would preventB and itsaohievlng production goals In Sony important aogmonts of their iecononiGff and ,thns considerably delay tho devolopnsnt ofoviov/Sjitolllte war potential. The items on tbandlists, however, ara of varying izoxn-tenoo with reapect to their effect on tho Soviet eooraTsrloroopaDillUec.
general, the denial ot sped! workingetaxxlaua refining eo^inaent andportanoo in 'impeding the eVrffelonmextnessor Ortoht,atellitef Bboh^laii metals': and' and;
theffect' of; thond -tbo'diffioultloo
.types .of.preolaion.and oontrolprofcartB has bcaa of major:expansion;ofoneojrlpment;:eloo*rio:>vor"
;
opical bstlmtaw Soviet warhe program.
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Soviet orbit dooa not havo tho capacity to produce noat ofmachinery liatod aa JrsV For tho moothoeeopooial netoriolo, epeCialiEed er^Merlng taoulodge. aof skill in their Eamrfnetare and socialised Any ooeonhination of tho above footers canvithln tho Soviet orbit of such IHI iteoa as strfral bovoland gear cutting mnoltfaes, antooatio osoillatLng racedynaolo balancing ruachinoa, and rany other types' ofincluding thoee deoigned specifically for large-scaleetratoglo
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ell
n In.thf pr^ap entire orbit, with tha possible exception ofCaOTooalovalda, was largely depsndont on inporto of aaohino toola from countries oataido the orbit. Although Soviet/Satellite produotion in tho postwar period has not ijioroassd eigrAttcsntly over, prewar levels, lend-leass aaelatonoe and wartime and postwar aoe^sitioas have Woved Tho ourrent capability_ ventory, however, rests largely on the ability to inport replacement parts, ond tofrom inventory. -. f*^^
1*
he obaraotor of- Soviet postwar orders-raflooto" a- toih^olokioal lac aojyen'ecooaity for oupplylr^iino^uatry-wlth'ndjraplaoenaat parts,atelil1eeli in,fl^tJcn.roflootB;an urgent:goods;both to satiety Soviet demands ahd^oo^suaod by tho severance orrormai^
'tfS^lv
p the USSRrom January throughh^e,
xport7of this StogS^ the
no* entirelydenrlved-the Soviet bloo-thesenecessary Irports. aohine tools have been ebipped by EGA oountrieaesult of tardy parallel action, nieintears^tat^ofDS
cou.xllty lyings, and prior obligations, Switzerland, Sweden, Western Gerrany, and Austria hove instituted no effective parallol action and haveignificant quantitytems.
Controls In thia caterory have boon effective In limiting exports tosome vital sectors of tho orbit oconoayj but their utility is seri-
d^nr^TS^^in denials and approvals, nomonclature difficultiOB, tbe lack of perallol action, and clandootino trade.
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ontrols in this category have been generally effective: but Weatoxats have lareely aerated US efforts.^though these shi^ntT havo contributed substantially to postwar recovery in nanFoegments oftho orbit economy, the rate of Industrial expansion within the eastern bloo will dependargo manure on the continued imports of this mchlnorv aad replacement parts for machinery on band..; tftitj:- *:
smuevBL fz
antt-friotdnn beerlrga (boll, roller, ead noodle bearings) are of critical la.portonoo la tha production of alroraft, %JuTmL^* la theeed for tb. rWaoture of obelle ooBbe, gone, end all itima of nunitloos, aa well aa for machine toolo and mechanical prod oc tion oquipcont of all typo 3.
Co* the countries la tea Soviet orbit, only tbe USSB and the Sonona ofre noo prc-Jnolrg eoBplete bearings. Caoch prodootionin acconbling bearings fron inportod component parts and soao domestic parts. Before tbe ear tba OBSfl and the Satollltec dependedroat extent upon Sweden and Germany for their supply of crocisirjB anti-friction bearings.
lot ttrlonigh (rioritr on laporto fron tbe OS of anti-friction beariags, snd ordered many ndllioaa ofthon for use on aircraft and tarAs. The Initial requisition, totalling over eight and one-half nnUHon bearings, was quietly eupplononted by requests
beesador lAtvis^ Soviet produotion saa netchar suitable nor sufficient for these require-oauxts.
tha emphasis of the Soviet orbit on tbe building up of Its war machine ban placed an unusual demand on ontl-frietloa besrlngs. The prodwtlbn of Or^hoslovatta and the OSSa falls ahort of mooting roqiriro-mcortB. For many of tho ortUeaUy required atses, the Soviet orbitercent dependent upon Inserts. Tbe 0SS3 and CscchceOovalrla are dapsndaat upon Sweden for tha 'peelal alloy bearing steels. Altboaani Ssoden contlnros to ealce slaable aMpasnts, oooplainta of Ina^fflciSit tonnage requirements havegistorod repeatedly.
* ftof mti-friction bosrings and ocexceuats to
the USSR snd Satellites (lnolndiig Finland) dropped froa approximatelyIn the first six Bontho7 toO in the same period This Is attributed largely to tbe inhibiting offeota of export oontrol andeaser extant, to actual denials of Uoonees.
o this data, parallel to tion of BOA countries has not passed
boyond the dloousoion stage, etter of fact, tbaas not ltaelf placed ezrtd-friotdon boarings onat. Tbe matter lo presently up for actionecoarxuxlationechnical ccemdttoe that it bo raisedue to fcolr stratoglo laportanoo.
nxports fron EGA countries continue to tho Soviet orbit basedarge extent on trade agreements. Hoot of the major produoing countries have indicated that thoy tdll coousrate In establishing export controls.
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filth the possible, oxcoption of Sweden, it is anticipated that those will be aado effective in the nsar future.
1 Jon-ECA countries ore not producers of bearingj and as such areactor. Switzerland's total produotlon anenmts to about four and one-half oillion. Their oxports, while Important in tho precision clone,ot lurgo.
Clandestine trade in anti-friction bearings hasig business in Europe. Ample evidence of this ia avails bio and haa been confimod. Shipmonta rungo in size free osrlcad lots to cuitease loads. Principal routeshrough Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. Sources of cupply includo tho IE, Blzonla, Italy, and Sweden with prefcroDco given toof the IE and Sweden as being of higher quality. Trade orgejiizationo set up by the USSR,ad Poland, directed by 'Jo - havo as one of their major objectives tho cecurisg of beorinfls of various Disc a. lists obtained indicate the high riority given to those sizes sui coble fee* tank produotlcsi and the quantities Involved eliminate tho possibilities of their use in heavy machinery or normal Industrial use.
Up to the present tino, oxport controls have boonroat extantoluntary basis by most U3 bearing manufacturers. Sons deolors have exported bearings ostensibly to Switzerland or to the EGA countries, many of these shipments have been traced as transabipecota to the Soviot. orbit, some through Holland, others through Dolglum or Franco.
The potential effectiveness of export controls Is very great and would seriously hamper further development of tho Soviet orbit military potentiali.io.it the oooporutioa of Sweden, the result would bo aboutercent effective In reducing production of the Soviet orbitery oido margin. The USSR haa prohibited Czechoslovak machine builders from using Soviot bearingsM^ tools destined for the USSR, It appears hardly possible that they would use those bearings of obviously loo quality in aircraft, tanks, or other weapons whore replacement would not bo po3slblo in the event of failure.
EfELOSDRE #3
ft^jP^gaggwtPt aflggAwMOa Araantag. aratrgau,
ists
Tho Soviet orbit lahortage of precision Instasacnts, ooieatlfio apparatus, electroaio tostlap and control oqulniaent and allied items. This type of equipment Is of tha utenot importance in the oontrol of quality produotlon and in eosontlsl to eny program of research andvolopnont. Only throe oountries within the orbit, tho OSSR, Caeohoslovukla, and moTflary, produce significant quantities of items tn this category. Tho sun of thoir produotlon cannot fill the needs of tho orbit economy.
Tba three najor prod*ueoro lack one or more of tho elements necessary for produotlontechnical knowledge, proper grade natarlalo, orused In production. Tho remaining orbit countries lack all of these or possess then in insignificant amounts.
Prewar sources for these Items woreanada, the OK, Franco.
ermany; Austria, and Japan.
esult ofxport control and cooperation by acme of these oounSleo, and war danurein some of the others, these sources are no longer open to the Soviet orbit for uniied ted use.
The shortage was sanlfbsted ln the beeryordera
by orbit nations to those oountries uhloh were able to supply theand oloctroolo instruments and apparatus. Winy of these ordera were never filled. After the introduction of export oootrols, these ordera continuedrial period* then Soviet orbit ordera decreased sharply.
The value ofxports to tha orbit In eight Important categories of preciolon apparatus3 in tho first six months7 oompered withor the sane period. Overercent of9 figure represents shipnsate to Finland. Those categoriesol.otrlo Indicating instruments; recording instruments and teeting apparatus; starting and controlling oe^pment; testing nachines; industrial JJalicotlng, recordinc and control instruments, mloroioopos and accessories! and scientific inatrunoats and laboratory apparatus.
In order to acquire precision end electroaio equipment, tho orbit countries have attecpted to circumvent oxport oontrol aad Its off cots. In order to avoid export oontrol regulations, they have placed orders with
firms outside thend have placed ordure, broken into snail lots, with firms in the OS. Some EGA oountries,the UK and Prance, have giveo fairly cloee cooperation aith OS control neaaurea. owever, mainly the Netherlands, hare been freer in their interpretation of OS regulations and more generous sith their trade policy sith the orbit.
Clandestine trade transactions and illicit shlpmaats hare also been employedeans of olreunrranting the effects of US oontrol.
US export controls in this category have had several important results. Ic some cases the Soviet orbit has been denied new production facilities for precision instruments. In other coses existing plants have been unable to achieve planned Increases in production where such increases wereon the import ofquipment. There sre also instances of actual decreases ln ths production of Soviet orbit Industries resulting from lack of vital control equipment. Lack of those items has also hindered thsof automatic machines end proper heat treatment of alloy steels, lack of tasting equipment has resultedecrease ln the quality of Soviet orbit products. hortage of laboratory apparatus hss slowed down Industrial andesearch.
Although effectlvenesa of controls hss been great, parallel action by EGA oountries would dry up remaining eources of supply outside the Soviet orbit and thereby accelerate the developmejasntlonod above.
BS #A
Shortages of oil-well and special lied refinery equipment mhich have caused the present tight petroleum situation in tho OSSR and satellites, constitute the major difficulty of the Soviet orbit petroleum industry. These deficiencies have hampered the rapid expansion of crude oil production, uhlle the continuing shortage of specialized types of refinery equipment such aaacking plants, and alkylatlon andat ion units has seriously restricted Soviet availability of vital high-octane aviation gasoline. This adverse situation in the Soviet orbit apparently cannot be alleviated by the expansion of oil eqelpatent production partiallyesult of shortages of fabricated steel, neasuring and control instruments, and other complex olemsote of the specialised types of refinery equipment referred to above such aa special pumps, valves aad reactors.
OS shipments ef petroleum products during recent years have not been instrumental in relieving the tight petroleum shortage or aiding any possible mar preparation by the Soviet Union or its satellites. hese shipments totalledercent of total Soviet supply and mere considerably loss than the amounts exported by the Soviet Onion. With the exception of high-octane aviation gasoline, and perhaps special additives and lubricants, it is doubtful if cessation of petroleum exports of this magnitude has had any appreciable effect on the Soviet-sate Hits mar potential or economic development.
The Soviet and satellites petroleum industry has never been self-sufficient in oil equipment and has had. to rely heavily on foreign countries, especially The long-atanding inadequate supply of drilling and other oil field equipment is shown by the fact'hortage of drilling equipment provented increase in crude oil output during the Second Five-Tear Plan.
The oil equipment deficiency, mhich retarded the prewar development of the petroleum Industry, was aggravated during the war by destruction of plants producing refinery equipment and by conversion of oil equipment plants to armament production. US shipments ofillion worth of equipment to the OSSReoisive factor In keeping the Soviet petroleum industry ia operation.
Because the planned postwar expansion of the Soviet orbit petroleum Industry depends in part on the availability of equipment, and proper exploitation of producing fields, considerable emphasis has been placed on the rapid development of the equipment industry. oviet oil field equipment production is planned toimes ths outputonsiderable increase in the variety of items manufactured. An Indication of Soviet requirements may be found inillion aorth of equipment shipped
Petroloum Products and Bquioraent,
to the USStt trcm thobout half waa drilling equipment, and tho remainder oecenting and prospecting equipment. During the first halfoma well-drilling equipment was shipped by the US to Poland and lugoslavJa, There wore no shipmanta sent to the sataUitea in tho firat half Bo refinery equipment was shipped in aither period.
It ia eetimatod that the OSSB can produceercent of itscombat aviation gasoline requlremente for full operationalequipment, such aa catalytic cracking plants,introduced onlytha ond cf the war by the shipment and construction of taoBcudry halts under
While the mestern eitbargo on ships-rnt of oil field and refinery equipment has drastically hampered present Sovico^.tallite oil ra-oeuotion, the action on tha part of the west has been instrumental In (a) limiting oil field exploration
f of refinery facilities prianipally
for the production of hlgh-octeto gasolone,as probably delayed anT schemes of atookpUing strategic quantities of high-octane gasoline and lubricants. Control over IA and IB shipments exercised by the EGA countriesiely prevented the Soviet Union nnd its satellites from clicumventing
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SHCLGSIHK 85
WPn^Poryoua Metals andists
Coppor, lsad, and industrial diamonds are in short supply in both tho Soviet and satellite oconorf.es. Tin and its products, such as tin plate and bearing metals are likewise docldodly abort. The denial of any one of theso materials to tha orbit, while not enough to disrupt all military and civilian production, mouldetarding factor. Even bo for* the uar the area *aa dependent on lnporto of copper, lead, tin, anddiamonds from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. Yugoslavia also contributed, and its lossource of supply for coppor and lead is forcing greater dependenco on non-orbit sourc
There is very little parallel action by tho ECA countries and while control le sometimes pledged. It has been oircumvonted in various nays-Industrial diamonds are onist, but the Netherlands supplies them to the Sovietsrade agreement signed before the lists wore prepare Copper, Iced,and tin are supplied by Chile, Uulco, Argentina, Northern Korea, and China, all non-EGA countries. In addition, therelandsotli trade in copper, lead, tin, and diamonds through the western sonno of Germany, Austria, Switserland, Belgium, and the Motherlands; and ln tin through China, Indochina, Slam, and Burma.
US controls have worked fairly nail, and if parallel action could be secured from the ECA countries, tho shortage mould be felt in all countries of the Soviet orbit despite small shipments from non-SCA countries..
snelorare #6
W.go trie Powerciting end Pigtributloa Apporntus,
tbe aleotric power Indus try, ins nsjer Items In critically short supply are steam end kydroeiactrie turbines saditching and control equijeieQt; large power trsnaforneret eterm holler* and boiler tabes; eleotrlcal indicating lnatruaentat end electric actors of.
Comparative TO export flgsrea for the first six Don the9 reflect the lap not of export controls; the total ascent Is leaso-sixth of that of tho7 period. Nor sorer, thereadical change la the pattern; the TOSS accounted for about pare ant of? amount, whereas Tin lsad accounted forare aat of9 accent, Folaadercent, and. the TOSS leesercent.
Despite the lack of firm information es to the volume of electricalactually being delivered within the orbit fron Santera sources, It Is believed that TO export controls have been effective la retarding the Industrialisation plana of the orbit oouatrlee through restrictions ea electric power equipment. Kvaa though the output of electricity la the TOSS and eo'me of tba satellites closely approximates- the Plan goole, this result la bains; obtained by excessive was aad overloading of exlotlDg equipment with eonaaqnant uooelar-ted depreciation and look of reserve capacity so ncoes* ory la cess of national emergency.
Hore electricity le availablethe orbit than ever before, bat the demand for it la greater, maintenance of adequate aleetrie aarvice requires vital repair ports moat of Which must coma from Veitera souroeo becaase the orglnlal equipment, particularly in tha Satellites, cane froaiaurope sad the TO, Prewar sources must also continue to contribute the major portion of tha equipment needed to lacrosse aleetrie capacity, at least for the next five to ten year a. Continuation aad Improvement of export controls will hamper industrial processes generally and delay the orbit la reacblBg self-rufflcleaay la electric equipment.
BNGL03URS tt
T^risncrtatlon.
iats
The. most pronounced shortage In tha Soviet orbit transportation oyataa ia that'of railroad raila. thla shortage haa reduced the noraal maintenance replacement of worn ralla andactor in the Soviet failure to meet tho railroad construction plan. Ihe shortage ie not viewed ae acute beoeuae right-of-way maintenance la apparently above mioimum operating levels, and because^ne* road construction of oconomlc as sell as strategic Importance has been go lug1 on throughout tho orbit area.
Other apparent ahertagee arsi
In the QSS8tank oars, tank trucks, ocean-going tankers, heavy-burden freightncludingnd tiros and tubesj
In the Satellitesmotor trucks, tires and tubes, locomotives,signal equipment, and safety devices.
Preigbt cars are not regarded as seriously abort because they are In excess of the prewar Inventory and are, being manufactured at nearly double the preeer rate inh and aboutimes the prewar rite ln satellltse Locomotive liitentnryercent above prewar throughout the orbit, butercent below prewar in the satellite area. The ahortsgs haa caused local traffic delays In soma areas of that satellites, but haa not been brltioal any-shere. (The shortage was worst Bastofn Germany, but it did ndt reach the point where columns of locomotives had to be taken out of reserve.)
Motor trucks are believed to be adequate Id tha Soviet Onion, ln vies of the limitations of the road network, but ere in abort supply In the satellite area where tha road systems are much better developed; The shortage of tank trueks la not driticdl In the orbit. Thay are required primarily for short haule; long haul deliveries of petroleum produoto are generally effected by rail, necessary inventories of tank trueks for tbe soviet Onion can befrom the ample track produotion.
Tankers are the weakest listing in the Soviet and Polish merchant flsste, which are no* larger than ever before. The other orbit merchant fleets are bales prewar listings and are squally soak in tankers. Greatly expanded merchant navies are planned for the entire orbit, but the bulk of the Increase
nawt be procured: from abroad because orbit shipbuilding haa not yet developedcapacity to replace obsolete vessels.
Tha Soviet Onion produced virtually all its own basic transport equipment before the ear. Satellite countries produced the larger quantity of their replacement items but their basic railroad inventories sere built in Germany and Austria, mhich countries supplied some replacement equipment in the intemar period. The satellite areas procured motor vehicles in the prewar yearB in tha world narlcet.. Germany, theustria, and Italy mere the chief suppliers, German and OS vehicles being aaaombled in several east European plants.
Suoh items as railroad signal equipment, airbrakes, and automatic couplers came chiefly from Germany and the OS.
Current capabilities of tho orbit to produce major transportation equipment items, locomotives, freight cars, rails, and trucks cannot be called critically inadequate. Special equipment is nore difficult. There is soma produotlon of signal equipment, automatic couplers, and airbrakes in the orbit, but the orbit has made attempts to procure some of these ltesa from the mest. Their importance is greater than is at first apparent because they are capable of greatly increasing lino capacities without changing tha locomotive or rolling stock establishment.
The extent of the present shortage Is most apparent in spars parts for motor vehicles and aircraft, and In merchant vessels, particularlytankers; Some shipping oo Soviot orbit account is under construction in yarda of England, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, and Italy.
Export controls governing the shipment of transport equipment fron thethe Soviet orbit have been effective. Shipmants of the key itemslocomotives, and freight oarswere much smaller in thehan in the first halfnd the export of locomotive andfell sharply over tho same '
During the first six monthshipments to the orbit mereare now covered byf theestricted categories on the "A" andarge majority of them went to the Soviot Onion,utCieaelfocomotives, all of thef the HI five-ton
From January throughhipments representing only nine of the restricted items were cade, and tha sole shipment to the OSSR consisted of three trailers. Altogether, neither locomotives nor freight cars, and only twelve five-ton trucks and two Diesel engines *ero exported to the orbit during the
first half All of tho tires and tubas.l engines, and condenser tubes, and all but one of the trucks were shipped to Finland.
Although known exports of aajor transport equipment froa ECA countries have been United to the mrchaut ships on order In eastern shipyards owntlorn above, and to motor trucks and busses built in Britain, France, and Italy for satellite states, eight trade agreements have been nods between ECA and orbit countries for supply of IA ond IB list items. Soros components, such as wheel rims, boiler and condenser tubes, and axles, sere imported from the US in lore quantities7 and from Blsonla until the "counter blockade"ome clandestine traffic ln aircraft and aircraft parts has gone on between Western Europe and the satellite area, particularly Csechoslovakia.
In suamaury, the US controls have bean highly successful in reducing orbit procurement of IA and IB items, but they havs brought about do critical ahortagss In Soviet and satellite transportation systems.
Manilaal and jgggg ffiHSSf* lnU|
ela cnta*or>notffadtrvo alnoa tha OS la not tha rrleary prodoear either of theae.aoanodltloa or of hanaonaa tolnb la tha 1analog oobatituta. tha OSSB ia noraaaalai anbataatial quant itlaa of heaeqnea xroa Moaddo,
1
Steel Mill ProdOcts andAists
Inability to procure raw aaterlals for tba production of high erode ataela ond installations aa vail aa forand eoulpoent for tha modernization and expansion of the steel ioduatrios, ia Impeding tbe fulflllnent of the econooic plana of the Soviet orbit countrlee. These raw material shortages include sttsl-alloying elanents each ee cobalt, colybdeaun, vanadium and tungsten. There aleehortage of seamless tublag. and of tin for tinritical need exlats for rolllng-cdll IraT.allatioae la the orbit, particularly ln Poland, which baa bo blooming end slabbing mill facilities,and In Cxecho Slovakia.
Before acrid Uar II, the Soviet aloeno dlfflcultlee In obtaining raw meter lale through Imeorta or la precertng neededfroa the sere Industriallxsd eoontrlea of the world. That tltnatloo no longer *etlets.
During and directly after World War II, the Soviets and Snteimoe plaeed largo orderseal mill equipment with differenteapanlee. although some of this equipment was completed, refnaal to license the shipments has prevented this each-needed equipment froa ranching tbc
The outstanding example of the effeotiveneoa of export lloense restrict ions in Cneehoalovakla wna the denial of lloensesDnO.QOO rolling mill"
Without such a
rolling mill,ioilrT one from sobs other country (which would
take several years tohere will be ao large lacreaae la rollad-
prodnete outputCtechoSlovakia for the foresaeablo future.
Zaequest for aa export licenseooningabbing- sill, built
aad the, ,
aanuincvarsoi byrefaeed aga'n te tbe
Polish-Amorwwag en the bataalf of tbe Polish
Government. Tbe Poll ah Qavarmment pieced tremendous importance oa tbe acquisition of tbe mill and failure to pro curs it baa tarloualy Impeded plena to Increase raw steel production In Poland.
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US exports of these itsoa to the orbit lo the first six months9harp dtellae as cooper ed to the corresponding period* Ala reduction, hoeetwr, ass been partially offset by tvnde eith BOA and non-ECA Countries and by sons elandeetlne trass.
Although export licensing has net stopped sxpsasloa of the Soviet orbit steel loduairy, it hss certainly hindered greater sxpeaslon aad slovad does oartaln trohnological InerovaBsats. If the DS secures par nil el set ion by tha BCA covatriret theries Boat depend on thsas elves alone for loororlng end advancing their ateel-sudring technoloay as the latest US snd sarepern cachinArv prototypes srs so longer available* ocldaoh slevsr proeets than saa faraarl7 ths case vhso aaonlnee obald be eoSlft abroad snd lostelled bypetent western eBgiPasTe.
Chemicals
ists
an of tha ohemioals onists have large tonnage requlreinents and all can be produced in the Soviet orbit if necessary. Soviet and satellite planners, aware that these producta are essential to carryar, have probably worked out plans for tholr production. With limited technical personnel, equipment, and plants, however, they are forced to allocate facilities and personnel to the most Important chemical requirements of the mesmnt.
Some stabilisers, accelerators, antl-ooddants, and oxidants for rubber, synthetic rubber, and plastics, particularly the thermo plastloa such as acrylic, vinyl, polystyrene and fluoroethylene types, seen short and great efforts have been made to obtain these, especially tetramethyl thiuraa dlsulphlde, an essential ultra-accelerator for Sovprene (neoprene). Also, there scene toerious shortage of carbon black for rubber fabrication. Production is known in Rumaniai and ln the petroleum refining areas of tbe USSR. Attempts have been node to obtain OS carbon black through transshipment through Mexico, Cuba, Belgium, Holland, England and Switzerland. Therefore, it le believed that they can and are producing essential chemical products. However, materialsertain specification topecific need may be unobtainable, and the shortages will force development and production of the required itaterial.
It is estimated that shortages of chemicals onists whileefinite retarding effect, have not affected the peacetime operations of the OSSR or satellites nearly as much ss has the restriction on shipments of special chemical equipment and accessories. The shortage of the chemicals -on the lists haa probably accelerated the necessity for tho development of these producta and the "know-how" for produotlon of potential military needs.
Chemicaltists
Bith few exceptions, all ths chemical equipment items onists are manufactured In olthsr tho USSR or Csechoslovakia; fabricating plants are oither nonexistent or negligible In number in tha other satollita nations. The supply of chendoal processing oquipoent and spare parts, however. Is reportedly not sufficient to meet tha demands of tho large restoration and expansion programs of these countries.
Lack of fabricating equipment may also have oauaed the reportad shortage of processing equipment for tho plastics industry, aa sell aa shortages of motor vehicle tires. Specific examples of ahortage3 of ehemlonl equipment aro> glass-lined equipment, apeoial valves, recording and oontrol apparatus,reactora, vacuum and preseure rumps, and special alloys for various uaes. Requests that the US supply penicillin plants point to an Inability to produce this equipment,
Humorous requests from these countries for complete plants and for special types of proceaalng equipmenterious seakneea in fabrioatlns cspacity which cannot be easily or quickly overcoae. The production of sulphuricapecially in th* Sovsono of Germany, hag been considerably hampered by the lack of spare parts for equipment.
after World War II, such chsndoal equipmentdismantled and romoved from the occupied countries, moat of thla equipment aas transported to the USSRonsiderable part of It ess probably never roaaaemblod. Part of It apparently "as irreparably damaged ln transit, and much of that not damaged was corroded and otherwise deteriorated when it was stored ln unsheltered locations The USSR, however, undoubtedly succeeded in reaaseabling aome of tho squlpmant.hich not only increased the existing manufacturing capacity, but supplied valuable models from which copies could be made.
It ia believed that the export control of the equipment items onists hasotent factor in retarding the growth of Industrial chemical capacity and consequent military potential of the USSR and satellites,.
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on duii to Intelligence Ko5Dorandu.iiStrategic Effectiveness of OS Export Controls"
Coalist
The OSSR, Poland, and Caechoalovakia aro the major coal producers of the orbit and each has its onn plants for producing mining equipment. In general, lack of spare parts lo one of the greatest impedimenta to Increase coal preoption. Progress has been made la overcoming shortagea of coal cutters, drilling machines, mechanical loaders and haulage motors; homever, shortagea ofquipment in other fields extend to ooal equipment production/ Homever, many deficiencies in mechanical equipment neceosary to meet planned coal production targets can be made uplentiful supply of labor.
Construction of coal preparation plants ln the Soviet Union ioit is estimated that this phase of the industry will not attainhero are numerous complaints about the quality of ooalthe Soviet Union and
me' Jlf^ thCalfo the Soviet Onion0 worth oftems, as coalrcotters* rock drills, mining ^chinery. Coal cottars The Soviet. Union received9 aorth of coal mining.equipment during the first sixmonths In vie. of the importance of Polish coal to Europe, contrela -are relaxed and shipments to Poland amounts to0 for7 period of0 ware ooal cutters: .During the first half9
'tli' "aTires for Czechoslovakiafere coal cutters in the first half quipment valuedaa shipped.
The USSR, Poland, and Cioohoslovalda0 aorththe first six monthsIn the aame period0
nppreciable ohipmentotems to the Soviet orbit oountries from ECA and non-ECA countries since export controls have been applied. Outside of the Soviet orbit and the US, the only other countries ehlch have been important producers of coal mining machinery are the UK, Francs, and Germany. The plight of the coal mining Lidustry in the UK and France Is well known. Both have been concentrating on
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mechanisation and havo teen Importing considerable miningfrea tbat OS. It is unlikely that the Sovlot orbit has obtained any significant quantity of coal mining ec.ulpnent through clandestine trans act ions.
Export controls on coal mining equlpasnt from the CB have been relaxed to assist certain satollita atatos to enlarge export surpluses available to eastern Europe. Controls havo been affective, however. In Halting ths expansion of naohaniwitlon and produotion in the OSSB.
Original document.
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