A.
.ONFj^NTIAL'
IJEMDRAliDUi: FORi Admiral Sonera, Executive Secretary national Security Council
ofEconomic Data
four ocnorondun of9
b.. Letter to Admiral Soucrs from Dr. Clark, dated9
letter from Admiral Sou'ers to Dr. Clark
(Confidential) JS. Central Intelligence Souroes Uaed to Evaluate Soviet Economic Data (Top Secret)
Enclosure A, la forwarded In response tonclosure Jj io submitted for your information and such use as you may dosiro to make of it.
Dr. Clark's query is, ofery broad oneovernment-vide investigation would bo necessary to givo It exhaustive troatment. Ho is oonoornod with an important mutter, and you may veil wish to have other government agencies report to you on their methods for evaluating Soviet statistics, or the use to uhloh these statistics are later put by polioy-aakera.
The Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, has informally indicated that it considers Enclosureood summary of sourcea, though State reliance on any speclfie source, in view of its spoclal responsibilities, night well vary from that of CH..
Director'a File (l)
Central Records (l)
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Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. Q
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Auth: Date:
Class. CHANGED TO: TS
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The honorable John D. Clark Council of Economic Advisers Washington, D. C.
Dear Tfr. Clark:
I on now eblo to reply in seme detail to your letter of 'itrchoncerning our evaluation of Soviet economic strength, Inasmuch as tho Central Intelligence Agency is the intelligence organ of the national Security Council, tho following rcoarks pertain particularly to the evaluation of Soviet ooonondo intelligence in that office. At thean assure you that the estirates which CIA haa produced in this field are made with the greatest care. Where an irreduciblo doubt haa persisted in estimates propared for planning purposes, CIA has,atter of policy, presentod the higher figure in order to avoid tho danger of underestimating the economic strength of tbe USSR. This, however, has little practical effect on final evaluations*
Thereunber of important considerations in determining Soviet eoononio strength. The development of Soviet powerompletely Itoto-controlled economy in no way "requires us to abandon our faith ln the superior productivity of our system, of free In terns of total capacity, total production and productivity tho DS far surpasses the USSR. However, tbe Sovlot leaders through tha State Planning Commission havo established the development of military potontlol as tho prlaary task of the oconony. The formidable strength of the USSR today rests not so such on its productivity as on the goals toward which tbe factors of produotion are directed, Diroot military production; preparation of other segments of the economy for haaodiate conversion to war-time production; development of relatively self-sufficient and strategically located industrial areas; and stockpilingonsiderably higher percentage of tho over-ell ocononic effort than they do in the united States* In addition, capital goods produotion receives relatively muoh greater emphasis as opposed to consumers goods than it does in the US.
Direct government control over all phases of the oconony (the utilization of raw actortola, nachinery and equipment, transportation and finished products as well, as indisputable control ovor the tremendous manpower of thoarge measure ofin the effective accomplishmentimited number of high priority plans.
TOPWKf
It is this special emphasis on military preparedness at the iraedinte expense of tho civilian consumer that is the basis of Soviet strength as it is derivod from the economy. Control of tho Satellite economies lo nlso being employed uith this objective in view.
The analysts in CIA share your reluctance to acceptfigures without qualification, but feel that when thesecarefully checked against additional sources in which CIAgreatest confidence, they prove to hoof reel value. sourcoo include*
and non-
ofriciaJ. publications in tho DS, These sources are in turn evaluated and analysed by men with long experience in industry, agriculture, banking, and economics, ond by man who have had long reaidenoo and wide travel throughout the USSR.
Inave comploto confidence that the coordinatedproducedasis for planning is as reliable aso
Sincerely,
SID .'ST V. SOGERS Executive Secretary
TOP SECRET
Central Intellirnrice Sourcesoviet Economic pita
In addition to official Soviet Informtion (in the pross, end in industrial, acricultuxal ard econordc books and periodicals) Clt utilises the following sources in tlie determination of Soviet economic conditional
top skrei
rOP/skret
ONFIQtl/TIAL
jl. Off Publications.
InfortBation from this source isepetition of offioial data. Its value is its interpretation by experienced Internationa! ceo no nipt houever, it cannot, of course, be unqualifiedly accepted.
FyT^CT Broadcasts.
This materia! is largely of an official nature but is useful check on current developments.
jj. Publications in the PS re the USSR.
*
These publications are written by men who are specialists in certain lines. Unfortunately, in the last analysis, much of their materia! is derived fron officio! Soviet sources,arge part is the result of actual experiences of the writer in the USSR. Practically all of this materia! must be analysed with an eye to the background and proclivities of tho writer.
Original document.
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