IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FORMATION OF AN EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT

Created: 10/7/1949

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TxngdUte Coriaoquoncoa of tha Foxaatlon etf an Bast Gernan

motion of an east Qoraan gcrroraaexrt pjiT harroauort-torri rerx)roaflGlano fin-aui&ottt Garuaay* Soviet wltWrttwl fran the east zoos le not Hlraly to folios in the Propn^^anda based on the farrration of theGermanmil haro negligible results in vest Gernany ond onlylaasbornmoot sharply

affected by tho establishment of thie go^enrjont to theof Birlla, fiharo It tdxx canoe sq increase cffor inclusion of wast Berlin oe the tvSlfth Lnrtf of tJw

tiIti giiviriiiiiiiTii fii ilaiiiaiij'iiiiiiiiii Iiiimlu; Dooplto tbeB3SH and tba

X'-' VToBt pill ocgitinao to ssort orot their rspfjeot-iw rc^lrM:i, toe. eTUtttfl 4ire 1^

oecnpatlon pocere) 'rftiv aitecpte' &vsubwt' and anaorb .. A other. Sncu^ acrtim ciinld

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ir-^m jriBtratJ^ii and propagaaoa fl^owasosk for tho eataV llshnant of aa oast Qeraan rotjohllc pae'tiaroftilly laid. Tha voIcbb of Soviet .propaganda nhioh iwoonpaiiled tbiB movo vtob groat, bat tho txKoctivQnoaa of nuch of It oan bo oUscoanted.

1BOStepn Gt^nsany tto ropereaneioTis ofootobliaumoat

lt Oormaa Btato ttLU ba nsgligtblo becaase tho eront has been so long antlolpatod and generally regarded as of ao great sieni-9 ThaGcrownoent, pi^oeonplod with Internal proldaaB aad dlffloulUee oith taa HLgh Cceoleaion, tdll haroconoora

Sotoi Thia iiaDxavadnn has not been enwdinatad with tea intQlHcence ca*iaiMiatl0B3 ofart^nta ofmy, ftsvy, and tho air Foroe.

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uest Qartrim government tjIII continue to payJ.ee to tho concept cf national unity,, Dorder friction botoeen polloo unite of tho two roglMO vill probably develop, hoTrovor, and Its Intensity Bill depend co tho extent to which the USSR and tho Western Powers are prepared to support their respective regiass.

Tn eastern Germany, the formation of the new state Tabioh will lnolude the present Soriot Zone and the eastern sector of Berlin sill have little actual off oot except to lower still further tho Doralo of the population. Forear the present control nioonanlom hascnrrlnal adnlrtl stratlon of German affairs under the atrlot guidance of the Soviet lilitary adarlnlstraticrn. Under the new gorern-eent there sill be little cbarnge In the cfperatlctns of these bodiestho degree erf Soviet control, though various ocopooonts of tbecontrol mechanics, will probably reappear as separate gorornmontal ainlDtriea. This govornaont will bars little popular support, but will nevorthelesa bo able to enforce its authority by police-state aoonureo becked by the Soviet occupation forces. For iarosttlato propagBjriaSoviet and Cceounist spoke enen will continue to encourage Genaan hopeseparate peace treaty with the east Geraan state* earlyof (troops and diplomatic reoognltion by the USSR and Ite satellites, Ccrablned with wishful thinking, these Soviet-inspired rvoora aeeorjpeny-Ing the formation of tho new gcvornoont will probably lead tbe Oernnns tol sable doerease or withdrawal of occupation forces. erolopraiirt Ib not likely at present, as' according to current oatliaates, Soviet troop withdrawal would result In loos of control of the east cone of Geraany. Tbe ewruing dinst cawientplus the prospect of ss Indefinite continuation of present adverse eoxaUtlona. will probably plugo the population Into an incrwesed opathetlo acceptance of con-tlrntsd dcxalnstion by the USSR.

In western Berlin, tbe ismodlote effect of the snnouncement of tbe new govornaent will produce deaando for the city's fcarnal ImlDarlon as the twelfth Jflrr] of the federal Republic. Tbe presence of the east Go man oapital in tho east nectar of Berlin will probably result In ijprovweont of the oeonowio octxUtlons in the east ceo tor. This inprcvo-nont will exert ocoaelderablo attraction on the pcipulatlon and taunlcdpol adadnlatxatlon of the western see tore. If west Berlin continues to be denied admission to the Federal RejmbllQ as the twelfth Lend,.

Frlotlon bcrtveen the too reglne* will develop, and the east German govorioant nay even sttenpt to harass the Berlin garrisons of the T1 ostein Powersad ted degree. In general, however, the effect within Go many of the fcarnation of an eastern tcreurunont will be negligible until tbo too German governments gain sufficient autonorry or are oupportad by their oooupation authorltloo tooint tbat one nay sttenpt to absorb the other. Such aotion could Involve violence on

a ocalo union would further aggravate Beet-float rolaticoahips in tbe sre*. There is no reason to believe, however, thatnamtlcm ef as east Genvui govorcaent will have car/ inportent effect on existing official and unofficial rolatlonohlpe presently cod. sting between Germans in both areas.

B will atteapt to nee the oast Gernan govwroneatBeana of countering tho attraction of the Beat Qoroan Be publicocal point ef Gersan daairee for unity. To enbanow ibe appeal of ihe east Oornan state, the USSR will probably try to give it the appearance of were Independence than the Boot boo given to the west Gerocn state* If the USSR auDoeeda la strengthening its position in Goraany. it nay ultinately make an official proposal that troops be withdrawn.

Original document.

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