prospects for soviet controlommunist china
MnhtJ9
central intelligence agency
Offlee of the President
NaUOoalii
National Security Beaouroe* Board
Department of 6Ule
OfBee of Seexttarr of Defease
I.'. of the * *
DejMrteaenl of the Nary
r** of the Air Force
BUU-AimyKaTj-Alr roreeaUa| Committee Joint Cbleta of Stall Atomic Kneny commlirtoo rteicarch and Development Board
JSEC*rflT*
PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET CONTROLOMMUNIST CHINASUMMARY
It Is tbe mtenttoo of the Soviet Union to advance toward Its goal of erentaal world domination by adding to tbe Soviet orbit the enormous territory and jjopuisUon of China, and by employing China to facilitate Soviet expansion into other Far Eastern areas.
A coalition gorernment farmed by tbe Chinese COrnmunlsis, whileemporary tactical maneuver, will contain no elements capable ot oflexing real oppoal-tlon to the Coourninlsts.
A moderate Chlnrae Communist policy toward small business proprietors;and peasants win help to gain popular support, at least until the government feels strong enoosgfa to launch Into the mote vigorous phases of communhslion.
The Communist timetable In China will be flexible and will be Influenced by Internal conditions in China generally, as well as by the International situation- Theofountry Use China will, undoubtedly, retard the corxwlldatton ofcontrol, but these complexities in themselves probably cannot, In the long run. prevent IL
The Chinese Communists wQl support Soviet foreign policy by diplomatic moves calculated to embarrass tbe Western Powers, by blatant anti-Western propaganda, and by assistance to the Communist parties and nationalist movements of Asia
Foreign loans which involve no political commitments will be negotiated by the Chinese Communists wherever possible, and foreign trade (under state supervision) will undoubtedly be continued with Doo-Communlst countries. This policy does not Imply permanent benevolence toward foreign business Interests ln China.
The Soviet Union will attempt to use the CCP as Its chief Instrument to consolidate control over China as it has successfully used thefl Communist parties of Eastern Europe. The strong Influence exerted by the Soviet Union over the Chinese Party has been variously revealed and provides ample indication that the presentof the Chinese Communists Identifies Itself solidly with Internationalas promulgated by Moscow. Tbe Kremlin will endeavor to prevent possible cleavages Ln the Party leadership from Jeopardising eventual Soviet control over China The present SlnoSoviet Treaty can be directed at the DS and its allies, and other agreements may provideigh degree of economic and military InbsgraUonthe USSR and China At the same time, in accoidance with Its strategy ot cresting on Its borders easily dominated political entities, the Soviet Government will probably press for poUUcal autonomy in all present Clunese border areas adjacent to the USSR.
Note: lhe taWLueence organisationUseof
have concurred In thu report The tofevmalE*^^
This paperem rfpr,o, to
^SEcjt^r^
It must bo emphasized that the process of consolidation of Soviet control over China, will unquestionably encounter considerable cUfficuley, In view of the many potcn-Ual points of coo flirt betweenR tnd the Chinese Cormminlsts, ear. the Issues of US add, control of peripheral areas, control of assistance to Communist movements In other Far Eastern areas, and the sutsservlersce which Uosoow will undoubtedlyof the CCP. While some opposition to Moscow cotrtrol probably exists ln the CCP, for such opposition to be effective the dhaJdent frcups must wrest the controlfrom the pco-Uoaoow leadrsxhtp, or that leadership Itself must change its policy toward Moscow. Until evidence Is available that an effective opposition IsIt is concluded that the CCP will remain loyal to kaosoow.
PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET CONTROLOMMTJNIST CHINA L So Tin Ihiuiiiojis a
resent Soviet policy is timed tt evvmtual world (Vwrdnatlon. to be achieved through the esiabllshirient of national Ccurimunlit irgtrnes controlled and directed from Moscow.
Soviet Intentions In China are twofold. Tbe first tovolres adding to the Soviet ofWt the erxsTDOUs territory and population of China (thereby bringing cmder Govtet control three-fourths of tbe Eurasian land mass) and, conversely, denying China to the Westotential base of operations against the USSR. The second embraces use of China as an advance base to facilitate Soviet penetration of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia tnd the Philippines; the outflanttrur of India-Pakistan tnd the strategically important areas of the Middle and Near East; tnd eventually control of tbe entire Asiatic continent and the Western Pacific.
X. PaoBJxcrs roa Caorra COmwuktst CtoXTtou or Can*.
-CoofiffoiL"
Tbe Communists have announced that they willoalition goveimmcnt upon coming to power In Ch*na By their.rei,iment wilt be. one "lad by tbe Cbuaeae Communist Party, the various democratic parties and the represenlaUrrs of lhe variousssociations which truly represent the Chinesend will exclude all "reactionaryhe coalition wiD enable tbe CCP to claim establishmentruly representative government for all China The coalition will be Coramuruit-controlled from the outset, whicharxist point of view, willrevolutionary" phase beyond that seen In those Easternr^'eiTuueuU Ln which the Communist minority parties entered legally and later wrested control from the others. Thus the coalition will avoid what Isifficult and dangerous step on tbe road to Communist dictatorship, but the CCP will still be faced with tbe problem of gaining the support of the people It cratms to represent
Commsmlif IrdernaX Policy.
The Internal policies of the Communist-controlled government will benot by tbe policies currently in force In the USSR, but by the present stage of development of the Chinese revolution according to orthodox Communist theory. This stage, at the moment of Communist victory In tne Chinese civil war, would correspond roughly to that represented ln the Bolshevik Revolution, when0 the Bolsheviks had defeated their enemies inside Russia The NEP (New Economictactical retreat, was aimed attoting tbe hostile elements In the Russian population and thereby hastening tbe economic reconstruction of the country. Mao Tse-tung's concept of "toterimhe first stage of revolutioncolonial" area, has much Uic same ends Ln view.
JECRrtT
Tbe moderate CCP policy toward nnall business proprietors aod landowners, as well as the peasant crass, will probably gain wide support (or (he Communist regime. While the basis (or future dereJopment of Chinese Industry wUL In all likelihood, be established by thellation of large-scale Industrial and cornrnercial enterprises, the toleration of small business by the regime at this time should win the farcearge segment of the population limited agricultural reforms, on the other hand, such as reduction of awawl rents and Interest rates, and land distribution, will be wd* corned try tbe peasants. Agricultural oooperatrres are also Ukdy tooal of the Communist CRrremrnent. Cbllectirlarion on the Soriet model, however, will probably not i* attemptcdmalarge scale fee many years to come, both because of the opposition It would arouse among the peasants ands at the present tune technically impracticable In southern China's rice-growing areas.
A gtrrerrunent-sponsored increment to Increase .the dze of fields underwould, nevertheless, help to create the physical conditions necessary for the development of collective farms. Through preferential taxes, subsidies for cooperative fanners,ystem of machine-tractor stations for use of the cooperative* aitrong trend In the direction of coUecUvtzed agriculture could be establlshod.
The Communist Gorexnment can be espected eventually to Incorporate these economic aspirationshree- or Five-Year Flan which wiU lay down the blueprint for development in the Immediate futnre.
At the outset, the rvxnmiinhst* wlU devote their energy toward iwhinllihlng cornplete control over the central governThe strength of this government may, nowvrer, be reduced try Soriet tectorial annemUons in Lwawawksg and Innerand by tbe maintenancepecial Soviet position Ins control of this central government is consoUdaled In the various areas, local governments, theoretically exercising complete autonomy within their own territories, will be created along the lines of the Soviet political structure, and eventually the form, if not the nameUnion of Democratic Republics'" of China will be ntlllrcd.
Inonstitution modeled on that of the Soviet Union will be drafted to provide, on paper, for freedom of speech, worship, and assembly, while guaranteeing local and racial autonomy, and the right to use their own languages in reboots, courts, and other official Institutions to China's ratnnpty groups. Tbe constitution" provide for the limited rsaUonaUitaUoo of industry envisaged by Chinese Communist leaders as applicable In the present stage of revolution.
The Communists, in "reorganising" the armed forces, willthose elements which nave already proved unreliable, and devise means to detect others as they appear.
The Communists also will not neglect to integrate existing Communist police organizations Into the present Nationalist police force, attempting to improve, perhaps with tbe aid of Russian specialists, the secret police which they have formed on the Soviet model
c. Obstacles to Communist Consolidation of Power.
In Implementing the measures outlined above, the Communist timetable will be flexible and will be Influenced by Internal conditions in China generally, as well as by
the InterruiUooal situation. The underdeveioped aod often rranesirtent cotomunlea-Uons In this vast country render most difficult any effective centralized control. Other formidable obstacles to Communist amsolidaUon of power In Chinabe problems inherent Inmall-scale afjrarianhe cUfrlculues Involved In superimposing; state control oo the present decentralized fine nclskrtroc-tine;he cultural conservatism of the Chinese people and their stubborn resistance to encroachment on their Innate sense of property rights. Tbe compleUUes ofountry like China will, undoubtedly, retard the consolidation of Communist control, but these cornnlezlues In themselves probably cannot, in the lone; run, prevent IX.
3. Cannxsa Coitarumsrr Fnassmt Potscr. a. Pro-Soviet and Anti-Western.
.
In accordance with Uie frequently expressed belief of Communist spokesmen that "tbe world Is divided Into twohinese Communist leaders may be expected to give aggressive support to the diplomacy ofhis will Involve Chinese dlptornatie measures calculated to advance the ends of Soviet foreign policy and to enibarrass the Western Powers; blatant anti-Western propaganda; and assistance tofT"nfnlTl parties and nationalist movements of Asia.
he new government will continue to explain its actions against the Western Powers In terms of protecting Asia against Western (pajticularij US)nd of safeguarding China's territorial tategrlty and rsattooati sovereignty. Ther.QT era meat will probably bring pressure to bear upon the US to withdraw its military forces from Tslngtao or from any future bases established on Taiwan; and. in time, upon Oreat Britain to give up Bmigkoog. China will continue to assert Its claim to Taiwan, and perhaps, to the Ryulcyu Archipelago, which Is presently under US occupation.
b. Foreign Trade and Assistance.
It seems likely that foreign loans which Involve no political commitments will be negotiated wherever possible, and foreign trade (under state supervision) will undoubtedly be continued. Trade agreements with non-Coounurslst countries will for the most part be calculated to procure for China petroleum, machinery, ated,goods, and other products which cannot be readily supplied by the Soviet Union. The USSR will seek to obtain, by meansrade agreement with the new government, required amounts of such Chinese products useful to It as tin, antimony, and tungsten, supplying (or promising to supply) in return Soviet manufacUircd goods and possibly agricultural products. In addition to these direct economic advantages for Itself, Ihe USSR will endeavor to make use of Chinese trade and the resources of Manchuria to exert political pressure upon Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia.
The Communists have given some indication that they would lute foreigners to continue "business as usual" This seems toove calculated to win easier recognition for their government and minimize foreign opposition to the change of regime. olicy recognizes the transitional contribution that foreign interests
can make to economic and social stability; it does not imply permanent benevolence toward foreign business interests in China,
4. So tut Relation* with Tuz Cuutssc Communists. <l The CCPvcid Instrument-
The Soriet Union will attempt to use the CCP as tne chief uistrurnent lo extend its control over China as It has successfully used various national Communist parties of Eastern Europe. While the basic techniques for the extensloa of Soriet control sm be drawn from the experience gained in Eastern Europe, these techniques will be adapted to the peculiarities of China: Its east she as compared with the countries of Eastern Europe, the absence of Soriet military occupation except In parts of slanchuria, aad the lack of ethnic and cultural bonds with the Soriet Union. In addition, Stalin wfn be mindful of the unfortunate results of Moscow'i attempt to direct determents In China durings.
6. Solidarity of Chinese Communists with Moscow.
Comingime when It would appear to the advantage of the Chineseto profess some degree of independence, the constant profession by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party of their place In the world Communist movement and reiteration of the absolute primacy of the Soviet Union In this movement, Is amplethat the present IcadersWp of the CSalnea* Communist* identifies Itself solidly with International Communism as promulgated by Moscow.
The Chinese Communists have not deviated In any way from the Soviet line on International affairs, as was strikingly demonstrated, for example, in thelr endorsernent of the Comlnform condemnation of Tito. Whether this action was the result of Soviet pressure or of the Ideological affinity of the CCP to the world Communist cause. It revealed the powerful Influence exerted by the Soriet Union over the Chinese Party. By this action, hn-thcrmore. the CCP Central Committee wasendency toward national Independence which many of Its members might previously have thought compatible with the International Communist movement and certainly
applicable to their own country.
later. Mao Tie lung, In ccnuDernoratingt anniversary of the Bolshevik
revolution, called on the "revolutionary forces" throughout the world to unite behind the Soviet Union against "American imperialism." nore recent revelation of the
strong pro-Soviet orientation of the Chinese Communists was Use scries of articles by Liu Shao chi. Deputy Chairman ot the CCP Politburo, reconciling nationalism and
"proletarian lntemalkmalism." The author clearly announced that the Chinese
Communist Party Is committedositive pro Soviet line.e said, "is impossible. If you do not stand In the imperialist camp helping Americanand its stooges to enslave the world and your own nation, you must stand In the antl-lmperialist"
C. Soviet Liaison with. CCP.
The Soriet Union in Its relations with the Chinese Communists has, in the past, been most circumspect. It may be assumed that Soviet-(XT liaison exists, and
It buequently claimed by tbo Chinese Natlcauilist Oovernmenl Mid others that military and political advice Is given to the Chinese Communist leaders by Russians. However, there Is no positive evidence to substantiate these claims. The proximity to the USSR of Chinese Communists In North China and Manchuria would makeeasy and concealment of such liaison effective. Furthermore, Itasic practice of the Kremlin carefully to hide Its connections with foreign Communists until their succession to power.
The cooaoildaUon of Communist control ln China during the first phase wHl probably bo Influenced by Soviet representatives operating unobtrusively under the cover of diplomatic, technical,or militaryUndoubtedly,Russian diplomatic and consular officers, as well as cultural and newspaper represents Uvea, will be sent to China soon after the Communist accession to power. These people will be charged withatchful eye on tbe activities of the Chinese Communists.ecent Proods article pointed out: The experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Is basically, fun darnen tally, and essentially acceptable to, and compulsory for, the Communist parties of all lands that are fightingocialist revolution or bare launched upon the building of socialism."
d Chinese Cdr/unuiurt LecufertAJp.
Almost half of the present members of the CCP Central Committee andBureau have had training In Moscow, and many olher members havethrough the French Communist Party. Although training inParts Is no guarantee of fidelity, such training Is regarded by the Kremlin asthe most Important factors In developing the loyalty and discipline of1
Soviet UethcdM to Effect Compliance of CCP.
The Soviet Union and those Communist leaders whose loyalty to the Kremlin is unquestioned are well aware of the danger of cleavages In tbe Party leadership and will endeavor to prevent the development of any moTcment which might )eopardise the Sortet effort lo establish control over China
A tested tactic employed by the USSR In awafcwtawawaSj control over local parties is the establishmentystem of checks and balances within the party leadership through pitting one personality against another. Although It has been claimed that the reUtionshlp between Mao Tse-tung and Ll Li-tan might lend Itself toechnique, at present evidence fat lacking cither that lis standing In the Party, or his actual power in Manchuria, is sufficient to be an effective check on Mao. It Is likely that the principle of checks and balances Is operating within the CCP, but Itsto specific figures Is unknown.
/. SoWei-Chinese Mutual Assistance Pacts.
The Soviet Union will continue to include China In Its existing system of mutual assistance pacts with countries bordering on the Soviet Union The Slno Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed Inrovides that both the USSR and China willointly all measures ln their power to render
secret
epetition oty js]hus, the treaty can be aimed at the us and its allies, while ostensibly intendedormer enemy. additional agreements will probably call for "close collaboration in the interests of peace" and the "strengthening of economic and culturalnd may provideigh degree of economic and military integra lion between the two countries. including the dispatch of military and technical "advisers" to china, the construction. reconstruction, and equipping of airfields in chinese territory, and the formation of sovlet-chhsese stock
companies for the development of industrial and mineral resources, especially those
which coo tribute directly to the soviet military potential.
similar pacts have been concluded by the soviet union with the "mongolian
people's republic" and tnemocrauc people's republic" of northern rosea. an
interlocking series of bilateral agreements among tho far eastern "republics'" may also
be negotiated.
g. FoUlical Contra of Peripheral Areas.
the soviet government will probably press for political autonomy of all present chinese border areas adjacent to the ussr. such an arrangement might open the way for eventual soviet anneaauon of these areas. in any event tbe policy would be in aocordance with the kremlin's strategy of creating easily dominated political entitles on tbe soviet borders.
in line with guaranteeing soviet ttppowlc interests in manchuria, the ussr will probably retain some special rights in dalren and in the port arthur naval base area. this is possible under5 olno-oovlet treaty of friendship and allianoc, which provides for the special soviet position in manchuria. -
the soviet government, while attempting to establish in manchuria the virtual autonomy of an absolutely reliable wing of the chinese communist party, will not necessarily attempt to deprive the chinese communist governmentominal sovereignty over manchuria, but will certainly seek to preserve hegemony in that area. in this manner, the ussr could better insure its access to the raw materials ofwhile at the same timeafeguard against possible political deviations on uie part of chinese communist leaders
in all likelihood, the ussr favors the formation of an autonomous territory of slnjdang. possiblyiew toew soviet union republic at some time in the future.
the soviet union might alsohinese communist ooverruoent to relinquish its claim to sections of inner mongolia, in favor of the mongolian people's
republic.
5 potumal poons or co*riser brtwrxr* rax ussr and csukesx commwists
a. Thef US Aid.
the ussr, intent upon the elimination of us influence from china, would almost certainlyommunist effort to obtain us aid under eca. although it is most unlikely that the issue of us aid could in itselfhange inommunismominated government, it is possible lhat tliis issue, especially
IT the USSR were unable or unwilling to supply the aid itself, would strengthen the Influence of those groups within the CCP that seek to avoid Soviet domination
b. Tfte ism* of the Border Areas.
The Issue of control of peripheral areas will probably prove to be one of the most Important testing grounds of Slno-Sovlet relations. Tbe objoctlve of the USSR In seeking control of these areas Is primarily to strengthen Its basic strategic pod Hoc In the Far East. If, however, It appears to tbe Chinese Communists, as It may, that tbe USSR Is attempting to weaken the Communist Government of China by depriving it (whether actually or In enact) of control over the border regions, the possibilitychism within the CCP or between the CCP and Moscow will be Increased. WhOe the Communist Oorrjnrneut of China would probably not risk, open rebellion against the DSSR over tbe Issue of border areas, aggressive and clumsy maneuvers by the DSSR In those areas would probably result In the disaffection and Insubordination of asection of the party.
e. The Issue of Communist Movements in the Far Fart.
Tbe USSR will ot course welcome the assistance of the CCP in promoting the growth of Communism tn the Far East, but the USSR must prevent the CCP from exercisingajor Influence over these movements. The USSR will attempt to control this assistance through existing Soviet channels for liaison and direction. This will be one of the most important areas of potential conflict between the USSR and the Cninese Communists.
d. Th* Issue of Subservience to Moscow.
As extension of Soviet control over the CCP becomes more obvious. It can be expected that some cleavages in the Communist high command will occur, possibly resulting In the defection of certain leaders. Adding to the potential dangers facing the Soriet Union In Its consolidation of power is the large number of present members of the Cbinese Communist Party who are not convinced Stalinists, and hence not altogether reliable as Communists. Those leaders who wish to oppose Moscow control are potential rallying points for the lukewarm elements in the party and theFor such opposition to be effective, however, the dissident groups must wrest the control apparatus. party organisation, secret police, army) from the pro-Moscow leadership, or that leadership itself must change its policy toward Moscow. Until evidence is available that an effective opposition Is developing. It follows thai Uie Chinese Communists will remain allies of Moscow,
Original document.
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