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COMMUNISM IN SCANDINAVIA
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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COMMUNISM IN SCANDINAVIA
SUMMARY
a great expansion during andfollowing World War II, theCommunist parties are being reduced to their prewar strength; present partyls estimated not to0n Norway,0 in Sweden. In Denmark and Norway, popularof local Communists with thc aggressive postwar actions of the USSR has dissipated the goodwill which they had earned through participation In the wartime resistance. In Sweden the USSR's postwar policy has again intensified Sweden's traditional Russophobla. Communlsm In Scandinavia ls not, however,ransitory phenomenon of the war years; small parties, consisting not only ofStalinists but alsomall group of habitual radicals, will continue to exist In all three countries.
As legal political parties the Communists have rune seats in the lowerf the Danish Rigsdag, none inem-ber Norwegian Storting, and eight seats ln the lowerf thc Swedish Riksdag. Although they conduct cacophonouscampaigns, theyinor influence on national policy and will have anto increase their influence onlyevere economic depression. In this event. Communist demands thai ecc-nomtcshstress be remedied by radicalwill appeal to the working classes, but it is probable that lnituation the labor parties themselves willore radical courso and thus prevent any significantto the Communists.
In the immediate postwar period theacquired substantial strength inlabor throughout Scandinavia This
strength has now declined sharply but is by no means eradicated. Communists, retain control of certain locals within Industries which arc vitalar economy. Thcunions, which can paralyze theScandinavian merchant marines, are anti-Communist, and in the event of war it Is likely that only onrccntagc of the personnel of the merchant fleets would be disloyal. In Denmark and Norway,and trade union leaders ore more alert lo the danger which the Communists presentubversive group than are their Swedish colleagues.
As conspiratorial underground groups the Scandinavian Communists have greater strength than their small numbers indicate andotential threat toInternal security. In all threethe underground organization is being strengthened and consolidated. With the Communist parties' reduced size, espionage remains one of the greatest security threats posed by them. The Scandinaviancan conduct considerable espionage for the USSR. All available evidence Indicates that. In the eventoviet attack onthe local Communists will endeavor to assist Soviet forcesard-core group located in vital defense areas. Particularof effort is noted in thc sparsely settled northern border areas of Norway and Sweden. If the threat of war became sothat Denmark and Norway decided to grant military bases to the US, thewould undoubtedly attempt to hlock such action by propaganda and to preventof bases by initiating strikes in the union locals which they control. In this event the
The Intelligence organisations of the Departments of state. Army. Navy and theto CIA as of
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COMMUNISM IN SCANDINAVIA
Denmark. a. Party Strength.
Organized0 and affiliated with the Third International, thc Danish Communist Party (Danmarks Komm unlstlsko Parti-DKP) representedmall fraction of Danish labor and2 did not obtain anytn thc Rigsdagn that year the DKP secured two ofseats, and in9 election it increased this number to three. During World War n, however, DKP strength wasIncreased. By spearheading theresistance movement the Communists won popular admiration- The DKP also profited from widespread public disillusionment with the conventional political parties whose policy of passivity during the occupation caused large segments of their membership to desert to the illegal resistance organizations. In the first postwar election the DKP consequentlyotes5 percent, compared3ercentnd woneats in thc Rigsdag. Party membership at this time was estimatedheserepresent thc peak of DKP numerical strength. The disillusionment of the Danish people with Soviet foreign policy In theyears dissipated the goodwill accruing to thc DKP from the resistance. Moreover, as normal political patterns were resumed, the influence of the resistance organisations In7 elections for the Rigsdag lower house the DKPefeat and lost half of its parliamentary seats. Partyhas dwindled accordingly and although DKP leaders stillembership0 It is highly unlikely that it. Geographic Distribution. Communist strength Is centered inwhich includes approximately one-fourth of the Danish population, c. Internal Party Trends.
The DKP leadership suffers from Indecision with respect to the party's immediate program
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with the result that the party Is neither united in purpose nor tightly disciplined centers primarily on the dilemma of v. "internationalism," hether to abandon pretensions ofand thus sacrifice the tacticalof mass appeal in order toisciplined bard core membership which will adhere to the Soviet/Com inform lineof local considerations. Aksel Lars en, chairman of thc DKP since its formation, tears that to admit to the rank and file that the DKP is subservient to Savlet/Cominform policy will cause greater defection than the party can sustain and survive. He haspostponed taking decisive action, hoping that the skeptical elements can be gradually conditioned to accept unquestionlngly Soviet/ Cominform policy. The party thereforeto be loosely organized, and thcrank and file Is not required to undergo intensive training nor to submit to rigid Lackefinite policy hassome factionalism and within themall body of convinced and disciplinedCommunists has organized as an elite underground group. This group,with the vacillation of thc partyhopes to Increase its power and influence until it is sufficiently strong to take control. At present it is too small to achieve this,in view of Larsen's continuedwith the rank and file.
Another conflict exists In the trade union field where parly policy decisions areresisted by Communist trade union leaders. These trade union leaders believe that the policy of intensified organizational and political activity in trade unions hasharmed the workers' interests and consequently resulted in the loss of DKPwith them. Although this dispute has resulted in resignations from the DKP by some disgruntled Communist labor leaders, itonflict over tactics and
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not yet be Interpreted as the beginning of widespread defection.
d. Political Influence.
Government.
In actual practlco the DKP exerts littleon Danish national policy, although owing to the vicissitudes of minoritythe Communists technically hold theof power In thc lower house of thcThe minority Social Democraticwith onlycats outn the lower house needs the rotes of the Radical) and thco withstand the combined opposition of the more conservativeLiberal Conservative, andtogether haveeats. Theoretically, therefore, the Communists can unseat the presentby transferring their nine votesecisive Issue to the opposition. However, since the Social Democratic government and the opposition parties arc solidlysuch an opportunity would onlyitself by accident or by poorprocedure on the part of the democratic parties. Furthermore, on Important foreign policy Issues such as tho North Atlantic Fact, the government has had support from the more conservative parties more than sufficient to compensate for loss of the Communist votes. In domestic, social, and economic questions, moreover, the Social Democratic government hasoderate middle-of-the-road course designed to secure non-socialist support, rather than championed radical measures ln order to obtainvotes.
Governmeni.
The DKP hasmall representation in local government and exercises little Influ-cnece. In the last local) the DKP obtainedf8 city and township council seats and only one of ofounty council scats.strength is strongest In Copenhagen where the DKP holdsf theityseats, and one of the Ave Copenhagen Borgmesters, elected by the Council,ommunist.
ecurity Agencies.
There has been some Communistinto the police and armed forces but it is confined to lower echelons. Before Itsand incorporation into the army inhe Home Guard wasontinuation of the wartime resistancemembership was from five to ten percent Communist, and several prominent Communists were Home Guard leaders. At present, since the Home Guardross section of the population. ItsIncludes some Communists, but leaders are screened for reliability and knownprevented from attaining positions of command.
* e. Trade Union Strength.
Communist strength ln organized labor Is largely limited to Copenhagen, with onlyoutcrops In some of the larger factories In the provincial cities.openhagen trade union locals, onlyre absolutely dominated by Communists, with achairman and majority on the local's executive board. The more Important of these Include the Copenhagen dockworkers, marine firemen, shipyard workers, municipal fire fighters, and two locals of the railway workers. In addition. Communist strength is substantial, though not controlling, inlocals of the bufiding trades unions, and among the workers employed In tbe iron and metal industry.
Communist domination docs notmean that either the Communist labor leaders or their followers arc invariablyto pursue the party line against what they believe to be their ownecent maritime dispute theexecutives of the marine firemen's union opposed the party leaders' policy of forcing the issuetrike and recommended acceptance of the conciliator's proposal.such disagreements between the party and Communist trade union leaders, future DKP capabilities to direct Danish labor should not be minimized.
8 the Social Democratic leaders who dominate thc Danish Confederation of Trade Unions haveetermined cam-
paJgn to eradicate Communist influence.esult. Individual Communists occupyingot strategic Importance are (or the most part catalogued. The arbitraryis not considered politically feasible at present, but Social Democratic leadersthat In an emergency Communistcan be sharply curbed.
ress and Propaganda.
Communist press propaganda Is largely confined to the Copenhagen dally, Land og Folk, although the party publishes three or four insignificant provincial weeklies. Land og Folk, which was published clandestinely during the German occupation, had aof0 immediately following liberation. Since then clrculaton has stcadly dwindled and today ls estimated at. Land og Folk adheres to thc Moscow party line and exploits local political Issues In orthodox fasliionas the only Danish newspaper with an extensive staff of special reporters abroad, particularly In the satellite countries, ll does have some appeal outside the party. Public interest In life and working conditions behind the Iron Curtain is fostered by special feature stories. These reports are Invariablyof the "Popular Democracies" and arc difficult to discredit since the non-Communist press does not have facilities for direct factual reporting.
Txiid og Folk's high operating costs and small circulation result In chronic financial difficulties Moreover, sinceesult of Its libelous attacks on officials of the government and the Confederation of Trade Unions, Land og Folk has beenby commercial advertisers.
DKP attempts lo disseminate propaganda through front organizations have not been significantly successful, and the majority of the organizations attract few members other than known Communists and habitual fellow-travelers.
2. Norway.
a. Party Strength.
When the Norwegian Labor PartyIts affiliation with thc Third Interna-
tionalhe party's radical wing refused to break with Moscow and, organizingeparate political group, formed thcCommunist Party (Norges Kommunis-Uskche left-wing element had been fairly strong, accounting forf thc Labor Parly'seats In the Stortingbuteparate party it failed to maintain lis position. The suspicion with which thc majority of the Norwegian people had come to view Communism, plus Indecisive leadership and Interna! disorganization In the NKP itself, caused such loss of popularUiat70 thc NKP failed to win any parUamentary seats. In the last prewar) it3 percent of the total ballot).
Worldaterially augmented the strength of the NKP. After tho German attack on thc USSR in1 theCommunists became violently anti-Nazi and carried on active and effectiveresistance. Tbe undoubtedof many of them aroused popularand the military achievements of tbe Red Army further increased NKP prestige. Many Norwegians, having been sincerelythat the Communists had becomeand patriotic, were not averse toor supporting the party. Others, though skeptical, wore willing to give thean opportunity to demonstrate tliat their wartime patriotism would continue. Clothed thusemblance of respectability, the party gained new support, and In the first post-liberation election inndeleven representatives In the Storting. Byarty membership, which before the war had been Insignificant, reached its peak of
However, the aggressive behavior of the USSR, coupled with the generaltactics of thc Communists, dissipated the goodwill which the NKP had acquired during the war. Dwindling popular support wasreflected in thelectionesult of which the NKP lost all of its seats In the Storting. It should be pointed out, however, that theof Storting seats, because of the Norwe-
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system of proportional representation, does not accurately reflect popular support, as indicated by the fact that the KKPotesercent of the totalvotes.
Even prior to the election, NKPhudteady loss withdesertions from minor party posts throughout the country. At present party membership is estimated not to
Distribution.
The NKP has Its greatest strength ln theand urban areas of Oslo, Bergen, and Sklenfjord. It is ln these areas also that Communism has Its strongest support among organized labor. In addition. Communist strength, particularly among the youth, hasignificant factor ln the strategically Important northern provinces of Troms and Finnmark.
Party Trends.
Serious dissension within the NKPdeveloped Into open schism afterlection and culminated ln thefrom the party of several prominent Communist leaders for alleged TitolstThe schism is not Ideological, but Is the productong-standing struggle of two factions for party control. Sinceho NKP leadership has contained at least two divergent wings, one represented by Emil Ldvllen, party chairmannd the other Peder Furubotn, of wartime fame as an underground leader and party secretary5 tolthough neither group questioned subservience of the NKP lo Soviel/Cfeminform domination, the difference of opinion with regard to method ofwas so strong that party meetingsbroke up in bickering, and thc NKP was unable to uniterogram of action.
Thc Ldvllen group, acutely conscious of the9 national election, strove torival splinter groups and avoided sharp disciplinary action insofar as possible so that the NKP's effort would not be divided In the election campaign. Fearing that widespread defection would follow on admission to the rank and file that NKP professions of patriotic nationalism were merely political tactics,
Lpvlien advocated andoderate course designed to mollify the party's more "Norwegian" element. Furubotn, however, opposed Ltfvlicn's conciliatory caution asand campaigned actively within the party for irnmodlate and thoroughof NKP policy with that of the USSR Apparently considering that attempts to achieve parliamentary success ln Norway are futile, he advocated reactivation of theunderground units and concentration of
NKP effort on creationtrong clandestine group.
Fanned by personal rivalry, the Lflvllen-Furubotn controversyeak at the Seventh Party Congress lnertain of Furubotn's supporters, uicludlng several of Norway's best-known Communists, failed to be re-elected to the party National Committee, and Furubotn's request for formal release from all party duties was accepted. Party unity was not thus achieved, however, since Furubotn continued his activity.to risk further weakening of the party's election prospects, the Ldvllen group postponed its counteraction. When theresulted In the loss of all NKP Storting seats, efforts to maintain superficial party unity became meaningless, and Furubotn and the leaders who had supported him were summarily expelled from the party.
Tbe expulsion, coupled with thegroundless accusation of Titolstas the excuse, serves many usefulfa) It stigmatizes Furubotn ln the eyes of the uninitiated rank and flle and renders suspect further activity on his part; (b) it forestalls and neutralizes charges of Tito ism which, although also groundless, could beat thc Lejvlien group with greater credibility; fe) itcapegoat for the election defeat; and (d) It purges the party of its cluef dissenters and leaves theposition of the Lovllen group notthreatened. The expulsion of thcgroup's leaders will probably be followed by purges in the rank and fliceneral party upheaval will take place. Although the ousted leaders will certainly protest then:It is unlikely that they will attempt toival party, realizing that they prob-
ably could not proselytize sufficient rank-and-file support and. more Importantly, thatblessing will remain with thc established party.
Present Indications are that the NKP will become progressively more esoteric. Although hope of achieving parliamentary success ls by no means abandoned, loss of parliamentary representation and.esult, loss of Its chief propaganda platform necessarily restricts the NKP's area of influence and deflects partyto other fields. The primary aim of thc party will be to obtain internal unity, and to this end emphasis will be placed onin organizational structure and Ideological indoctrination of the rank and file. In an effort to rebuild its position from the ground up. the NKP will devote increasedto labor and youth groups and to the underground organization and will avoidits efforts among widely divergent groups.
d. Politicalational Government.
The elimination of NKP representation in ttie Storting virtually reduces to nil theof the NKP to influence positively national policy. Furthermore, tbe NKP has lost aplatform from which to disseminate propaganda Yet, Communist Influence is not completely eradicated, for In formulatingpolicy the government doubtless feels lt wise to weigh among other thingsitizens who votedin9 parliamentary elections. This indirectlyearing to Communist viewpoints.
6 andowever, when the Communists still had some popularthe party was able to exert ratherinfluence on Norwegian policy,in foreign affairs. At that time the Labor Government was apprehensive that the Communists, if given an excuse, mightNorway's economic recovery by strikes. Moreover, the government did not desire to provoke the USSR, and Labor Party leaderswindling hope that Norway might still help toridge between East and West. Consequently,bor Government
was hesitant hi taking definite pro-western stands on International questionslear East-West division existed. Moreover, tho eleven Storting seats which the NKP held at that time entitled it to representation on many Storting committees, including theForeign Affairs Committee. Thisembarrassed the government when lt became necessary for the committee to discuss matters of possible concern to the USSR. With the decline of Communist strength,in the trade unions, fear ofunrest ceased to be afactor in forming national policy, and the government was able to Isolate thebypecial Stortingto handle military and foreign affairs, with Communist representation specifically excluded.
Government.
Communist Influence In local government Is waning but continues toactor which should not be ignored. The line between the NKP and the Labor Party ls by no means so clearly drawn as In national government; In many Instances municipal councilsabor-NKP coalition. Theof municipal scats won by the NKP only fellut05ut3ut tbe Influence which the Communists were able to exercise was greatly reduced. In1 municipal elections, further reductions are expected.
Agencies.
There has been some minor CommunistInto the armed forces and police, but it is confined to the lower echelons. In the volunteer Home Guard thc NKP hassucceeded in establishing cells, but this activity is not believed to be widespread. In view of the anti-Communist policy of the government and Home Guard leaders it isthat any known Communist hasor willey position in the Home Guard.
e. Trade Union Strength. Since8 the Norwegian Federation of Labor hasigorouscampaign resultingonsiderable decline of Communist strength in organized
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At present the most significantconcentration of Corxtmunlst trade union atrengui is Oslo and the adjacentindustrial district, while ln BergenInfluence Is Umm substantial but still strong. With regard fo specific unions, the NKP retainsstrength, evenmany locals. In the building trade unions and among the chemical Industry workers, metal workers, and transport(Including the Bergenhe vital Norwegian Seaiewi's Union Is largely free of NKP Influence and aJtfcougnexievvd CcmrrRniist erfo infiltrate the crews of the roes errant fleet, investigations by the union kadenMf- have to date uncovered nothing which eooJd be describedoncerted ofTensiTft
Although CcixomuTust trade union strength is waning, the NKP Is still able to exploitexisting labor grievances to thc point where work stoppsros have resulted roe majority e* these work stopnas"notby Uzef Labor and are of short dur*>'have created unrest and tr,.sight extent interfered with Norwegian reconstruction. Responsible government and Labor Federation officials are alert to the problem, however, and will be able to keep the situation from deteriorating.
ress and Propaganda.
The chief NKP press organs arc the Oslo daily, FrihcUn with an actual paid circulation of not morend the Bergen daily, Arbeidct with an estimated circulation. Arbcidct's reporting occasionallyfrom the party line and it Is generally considered more moderate than Priheten, which slavishly adheres to the Soviet-Co rain-form line. Neither paper has much appeal outside the party. Furthermore, thepress in Norway as elsewhere in Scandinavia is in chronic financial difficulties.
During the early postwar periodpropaganda was successful In exploiting public opinion on controversial international issues. For example, Communist projiaganda fanned lhe anti-Franco sentiment of the people tooint that the government was forced totand against Franco
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which was stronger than that dictated either by actual moral conviction or by nationalOnly after great difficulty did thesucceed ln extricating itself from its difficult position and regularize its relations with Spain bypanish charge In Oslo. Recently the discrediting of the NKP and the alertness of the government to the possible effects of its propaganda havedifficult NKP attempts lo exploitIssues. The so-called "peace campaign" Is the first NKP propaganda In the part year that has had appeal. The NKP hopes tothe once traditional anftsnUitarlst views of the Koarweglsxt people and coaearrfotif to espioit popular imlaUrm over consumerossible that some Norwegians who have been willing to forego anin the standard of living In order to facilitatetrue Hon may be less willing to tor defense expenditures, but It ls unlikely that any significant segment ofwill be affected by Communist agitation.
3. Swoden. a. Party Strength.
The Communist Party In Sweden (Sverges Kommunistiskawas founded1 when the Left Socialists, who had split off from thc Social Democratic Partyccepted the program of the Thirdand assumed the name Communist. Up2 the SKP, weakened by internal schism, had attainedmall membership and an insignificant place on the Swedish political scene. During the latter years of the war both Its membership and popular votegreatly. While popular admiration of the USSR's fight against Nazi Oermanyto its rise, more cogent reasons were dissatisfaction, chiefly economic, with thecoalition government from which only the Communists were excluded, and with the conservatism of the Social Democraticwhich dominates organized labor. In both4 national election and6 municipal elections, the SKP consequentlyoverercent of the total popular vote (seet the end of the war thc partyembership of Since that time the SKP's member-
Alp mid voting strength have experience steady decline, chiefly owing to anof Sweden's traditional Russophobla engendered by the aggressive postwar policy of thc USSR. In8 national election the Communist vote dropped toercent of the total, and party membership today lsat not more
Distribution.
Communist strength Is greatest ba theIndustrial belt stretching across central Sweden from Stockholm to Goteborg,In those two cities, and in the far north, notably the strategic border province ofen. Thereradition of radicalism In Norrbotten deriving chiefly from the poorconditions which once existed. Today, wages there are as high as In the rest of Sweden, but Cornmimitm. continues toThe sizable decline of tho over-allvote ln thc past two years was notin Norrbotten, where Inlection the SKP4 percent of the vote. Moreover, the SKP Is directing special attention to Norrbotten, and ismore effort there than ln the moreareas farther south, with the possibleof Stockholm. Norrbotten's location between Norway and Finland and the single rail line which runs from Narvik through the province to Finland give the areastrategic importance.
Party Trends.
SKP leaders are presently devotingeffort toward streamliningiew tolose-knit, disciplined hard-core parly. ParticularIs placed on the formation andideological andelite groups wluch could be used for illegalAttempts to achieve parliamentaryby orthodox political means have not been abandoned, but are no longer stressed, and In general the party has ceased to strive for mass popular appeal.
Tills program has developed graduallythe past year andhift of party control from the more moderate "Swedish" wing, of which former party chairman Svcn Llndcrot ls considered thc chief spokesman, to
group of new aggressive leaders whostrict adherence to the Soviet/Comlnform line regard!cm of local considerations. The ascendancy of the so-called "mtemaUonaUst" group culminated hi8 In thcof Its chief exponent, Fritjof Lager, as party secretary. Since that time lager has directed the party and the cludrman has been Utile moreigurehead. Both groups are completely loyal to Moscow, theirresulting from difference of opinion as to method rather than objective. Although ousted from actual control, thc "Swedish" group shows no separatist or divisiveit remainsront for thc newand thc facade of party harmony ls thus maintained. The selection of HUdingeading moderate, to serve as Acting Party Chairman, following Linderot'sin9 (officially and probably genuinely for reasons of health) is Indicative of the benefits which the Lager group has de-rivtd from this procedure. Hagberg ls also the SKP's Bkttt Dopular representative In the Importantce of Norrbotten. to which the SKP ispecial
Despite Its more aggressive policy, there has been no extensive party purge of the more na-tlonallsUcally inclined elements ln the rank and file. However, less able and less convinced party functionaries are gradually beingby unquestionably convinced party members.
d. Politicalational Government. The SKP Is unable lo exert significanton national policy.egal political party the SKP has eleven ofeats in the Riksdaghree ln thc uppernd eight in the lower houseit has the smallest representation In thc Riksdag and is not allied with any other party. Although theoretically, thc SKP holds lhc balance of power ln thc lowerocial Democratsof the various non-labor parties, thc practice of both houses meeting in Jointin case of failure to agree on fiscalin substance renders thc Communists
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since the Social Democrats have an absolute majority In Joint session. SKPIn the government bureaucracy Is practically non-existent.
Government.
Communist influence In local government agencies Is more significant. In theMunicipal Council, largelyesultuasl-coalition with Social Democrats who have onlycats outndeats) support toworking class" majority. Communists serve on the civil defense board, thc harbor board, and the street administration board. Inrominent Communist, Set Persson, heads the Police Board, which is chiefly concerned with the fiscal administration of the city police. This situation has aroused considerablefrom non-socialist parties, but the Social Democratic national government has refused to resort to any drastic measures, believing that elections (next municipal elections will berovide the best means ofthe Communists. Significant Commu-nist Influence In local government agencies also existsumber of other towns, notably in the Important west coast port of Gbteborg and in Kiruna, the center of the northern iron ore mining industry.
Agencies.
Communist Infiltration Into thc armed forces Is minor and is confined to lower echelons. In thc volunteer Home Guard,ofen undernd overears of age, applicants are screened for reliability and Communist Infiltration Isslight. However, membership in the Communist Party does not automatically bar enlistment and Communists admittedly are endeavoring to enlist. The presenceew local home guard boards facilitates infiltration.
e. Trade Union Strength.
Prior6eaction against the Communists began in the trade unions, thcir infiuence in organized labor was substantial. At present, however, no trade union federation and not moreercent of the union locals are Communist-con trolled. In some instances Communist losses have been spec-
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tacular (for example,5 the SKP electedf theelegates to thc SwedishUnion Congress, whereas9 only two Communists were returned) but inthe pattern of Communist declineradual but steady loss of support to theDemocrats.
Geographically, the greatest concentration of Communist-controlled labor ls In thenorthern border province of Norrbotten where theyubstantial number of railroad and mine workers' unions. Among the various trade union federations, theare powerful In the Manual andWorkers' and the Metal Workers' unions. The Social Democrats have regained the management of most of the Important metal workers' locals but Communist Influence among tho rank ond flic Is still strong.
Despite the reversals of the past four years. Communist Influence In organized labora potential threat to Sweden'sSocial Democratic victories In union elections often have been won only by small margins and the continuance of Socialcontrol is thus not firmly assured. Social Democratic party and trade uniondo not appear fully aware of the danger which the Communists poseubversive group or, believing that In the event of an emergency they will be able to counteraction, are unwilling to resort to action now which might be considered anof civil liberties. Known andConimunlsts have therefore been tolerated as minor union functionaries.arge element of tho rank-and-file union merbership apparently Is unablewedish Communist fellow-worker mayotential traitor.
ress and Propaganda.
The SKP has an active press, but In general Its content is tooepetition of Soviet propaganda to have much popular appeal. Consequently, It exerts little influence except on the party faithful. Ny Dag, Stockholm daily, is the chief newspaper, with aofecond inIs Norrskemflamman, SKP daily for North Sweden.odd weeklies, largely made up of material reprinted from Ny Dag,
fr
are distributed in the provinces. In addition the SKP publishes several rather obscureaimed al specific Interest groups, as well as pamphlets presenting the party line on various Issues. The SKP press organs are all suffering financial difficulties, and theircirculation reflects the decline In party memberslilp.
Considerably greater success InCommunist propaganda is attained by front organizations, particularly when tbe alleged aim of the organization Is to promote peace and International understanding. The average Swede is hyper-suspicious towardresembling foreign propaganda and prides himself on being open-minded andon International problems. While the hope that Sweden may serve as the bridge to unite East and West in mutual harmony no longer has the prestige of being government policy. It survivesillingness to meet with the Communists In allegedly non-political and objective organizations. In the long run the majority of front organizations cither fade into obscurity or arc publicly exposed assubterfuges. In the meantime,the Communists succeed hi exploiting the naivete of fairly prominent(and occasionally even anti-Communist) intellectuals, and, by Inducing them toat least temporarily in an "opinionufficiently cloak organizations Inrobes to attract others.
A. International Relation*.
Reliable information concerning therelations of the ScandinavianParties is so meager that anyof their nature and extent Is necessarily speculative. The available evidence Indicates that the Scandinavian parties do not enjoy close relations with Moscow and normallytheir policies with the Moscow line chiefly on the basis of material released bypublic information media. Since the formation of the Cominform, however, there appears to be some increase hi direct contacts, and. although the Scandinavian parties are not openly affiliated with thcrowing tendency on the part of Scandinavian Communist leaders to look to the Cominform
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for guidance. In general, however, It appears that Moscow, nrce<rnizing that there Is scant hope of significant Communist advances In Scandinavia, at present pays little more than perfunctory attention to the Scandinavian parties. Scandinavian party leaders, rather than Moscow, have Initiated the majority of contacts known to exist. Overt and semi-overt contacts arc maintained chiefly Uirough the visits of Scandinavian Communists to Eastern European countries as "tourists" or as delegates to the congresses of variousCommunist front organizations. Since these groups Include not only party leaders but also trade unionists drawn from the more strategically important areas and industries In Scandinavia, lt Is probable that some training and Indoctrination axe received during the tour. Presumably somecontact is maintained with USSR and satellite diplomatic missions and commercial agencies, but its type and extent arc not known.
Although there is considerable informal liaison among the Scandinavian parties, no formal regional organization to coordinate plans and policy ls believed to exist Each party Interprets the Moscow party lineandourse based on that interpretation without consultation with the other parties. Inter-Scandinavianto formulate common plans arc not standard procedure. There Is some evidence that the few Joint conferences known to have been held were not spontaneous but wereby non-Scandinavian Cornmunists,In the hopes of stimulating theparties to greater activity. In general, however, relations with other Communist parties do not seem to be close.
5. Capabilities.
Communism in Scandinavia was notransitory phenomenon of the war years butontinuing potential threat toInternal security. As legal political parties, the Communists have suffered aloss of party membership and voting strength and are being reduced to minusculeard-core membership remains, however, and will continue to have thc support
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only of convinced Stalinists but alsomall group of habitual radicals who believe that the Social Detnocratic parties, with their assumption of power and responsibility, have become too moderate. Althoughacophonous propaganda campaign, they are able at present to exert only minor influence on naUonal policy, and will not be able to increase their influenceScandinaviaevere economicwith accompanying socialIn this event, Uie Communists willUiat economic distress be remedied by radicalrogram which will have wide appeal for thc working class; and unless Uie moderate labor parties propose andsuch measures, they will face risingcompetition for the labor vote. Inituation, however, it Is expected that thc moderate labor parties would enact thc measures necessary to counteract economic distress, thus preventing any significantgain.
Although Communist influence in organized labor has also sharply declined, lt ls by no means eradicated.ew union locals remain Communist dominated but those locals are withinworking,buildingar economy. Moreover. In several Swedish locals in which Social Democratichave regained control, strongminorities arc able to influence thc policy of the Social Democratic leaders, who cannot afford to ignore completely the desires and wishesarge minority. The maritime unions, which can paralyze the important Scandinavian merchant marines, arc antt-Cominunist, and in the event of war lt is highly unlikely that more than an insignificantof the personnel of the merchant fleets would be disloyal Yet. the possibility ofsabotage in the merchant fleeta problem, in view of the difficulty of maintaining surveillance on board ship.
As conspiratorial, underground groups, the Scandinavian Communists have greater pc-tenUal strength than their small numbersDanish and Norwegian Communists obviously possess some small arms which, as individuals, they retained from thc wartime
resistance. In all three countries, Uieorganisation is being strengthened and consolidated, and training In espionage and sabotage is being conducted. With Uiein CbM of the Scandinavianparties, one of the greatest security threats still posed by them is In the field ot espionage. Acting within the Sovietnetwork, thc Scandinavian Communists will remain capable of conductingespionage activity, not only against their own countries but also against toe NorthTreaty nations and Uie Western world in general. Thc Communists are evidently readying themselves to assist the Soviet forcesard-core group strategically located in vital defense areas In the eventSSR attack on Scandinavia. Tho concenlraUon of Communist efforts in the sparsely settled northern border areas of Norway and Sweden, where the securing of Uie Lnlea-Narvlk rail line wouldajor military objective,ase in point. Shortoviet attack on Scandinavia or direct orders from Moscow, It is higlUy unlikely, however, that thewould resort to Illegal action other than espionageignificant scale. If toe threat of war became so imminent thatand Norway should decide to grantbases to the US, toe Communists would undoubtedly attempt to block such action and prevent the construction of bases byand by initiating strikes in the trade union locals which they control, If these strikes were permitted to continue, serious damage to Danish and Norwegian defensewould result, but if international tension were so great thai the Danish and Norwegian governments were willing lo grant bases to the US. they would also be willing to dealh Communist strikes and nosecurity measures on the part of US forces would be required. Barring direct orders from Moscow, lt is unlikely that the Communists would in peacetime resortarge scale, principally for fear of exposing their organizaUon with small hope of significant gain.
The threat to internal security fromsubversive activity is greatest in Sweden. Swedish Social Democratic party
se^Tet
trade union leaders seem less alert to Communist capabilities than comparableand Danish leaders. The Swedishin general have not been directly exposeduisling group and arc reluctant tothat native-born Swedes, even though Communists, could be traitors. On the other
hand, thc Swedish Communists do not possess the experience wluch the Norwegian andCommunists gained through their wartime resistance activities, but this does notasandicap to them as docs lack of experience to the Swedish
sEarnst
OMMUNIST PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION
2
76
DENMARK Upper House3
Social Democrats Communists All Other
Total
2
76
Upper House
Social Democrats
Communists
AllOther
Total
4
3 03
160
House (Folkeiing)
Democrats
Communists
AUOther
Total
Democrats
Other
Communists All Other
230
110
230
OMMUNIST POPULAR VOTE
DENMARK
G* (County
Councils) City and Town
7 (FoVceting)
emocrats
%
Others
In6 elections, the Communist Partycat ofounty councU sealseals out8 city and town council seats.
NOKWAY
Labor
Others
ISIS (Storting)
(Municipal)
(Municipal)
(Storting)
5 the Communists obtained 9S5 seals out7 the Communist*eats outPreliminary usurcs; includes all citiesutural districts.
SWEDEN
% All Others % Total
8 (Riksdag)
2
7 2 4 5
6 ihc Communist*eats in provincial assemblies and In the councils of the large1n other towns Uie Communistscats out.
17
Original document.
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