US SECURITY INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA AND THE FAR EAST
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RELATIVE US SECURITY INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA AND THE FAR EAST
OF THE PROBLEM
tabilization of thcin the European-Mediterranean area.
PROBLEM: To assess the eflect of aln the European-Mediterranean area upon Soviet policy and the relative USInterest ln that area and ln the Far East in thc new circumstances. (Primary Interest in an area does notajor effort elsewhere.)
DEFINITIONS: Thc European-Mcditerra-nean area ls deemed to extend to and include Iran. The Far East, as defined herein.all Asia east ol Iran and south of the USSR, and thc major offshore islands.
DISCUSSION
Seeor an analysis of thein the assumed circumstances.
CONCLUSIONS
he USSR desires to achieve eventual control of both the European-Mediterranean area and the Far East Soviet domination of either region would be seriouslyto the security of the Unitedefinite realignment of thc Western Europe-Mediterranean area, however, wouldore immediate and decided effect on the global balance of power than would that of the Far East The Industrial-military power of the Western Europe-Mediterranean area will for many years far exceed that of thc Far East, and thc former area offers both the US and the USSR the most advantageous
bases for developing attacks against the other. In any consideration of the' relative Importance of the two areas, therefore. It ls apparent that the European-Mediterranean area will remain the theater of primaryto both the USSR and the United States, certainly prior to any possibleof hostilities within the next decade.
In the assumed circumstances the USSR wouldreater effort toward the Far East The USSR would reinain prepared, however, again to exploit any favorablewhich developed In the European-Mediterranean area.
It would, therefore, remain the primary and most immediate concern of the United States to ensure the continued security of the European-Mediterranean area.
At the same time, the USasic long-range security requirement ln the Far East; that Is, to prevent the developmentoviet-controlled mdustrial-mJlitary power complex In that area. The development of this complex wouldong period of time. The key to its development, withto both the time required to achieve it and the ultimate strength of the complex, is Japan. The malnlenance of the alignment of Japan with the US is, therefore, the crux of the US security problem In the Far East. To protect this position, however, positiveIs required to confirm the augnment of Southeast Asia and India with the West It would also be of great importance in thisto draw China away from vassalage to the USSRodus Vivendi with the West.
ENCLOSURE A
ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE ASSUMED CIRCUMSTANCES
Geographic ConiicWatio.ru.
Europe and the Hear East (to Include Iran) are contiguous with and readily accessible from that part of the USSR which comprises the presently known sources of Soviet power. Reciprocally, that part of the USSR is more accessible from this region than from any other. In comparison, the significant part of the Far East (the Asiatic littoral and major offshore islands) is remote from tbe known seat of Soviet power and separated therefrom by what is estimated toast undcTcloped hinterland. Thus, not only In terms ofoperations, but also in terms of economic relationships, tbe USSR is relatively In closer contact with the West than it Is with the Far East.
The United States is separated from both regions by broad oceans which serve also as avenues of access for the dominant sea power. Manifestly Europe Is much nearer to the sources of US power than is the Far East. In terms of economic and of strategicthe ties of the United States with Europe are much closer lhan those with the Far East
2. Economic.
Despite recent destruction and economic dislocations, there exists in thc nonSoviet European-Mediterranean area an Industrial potential superior to that or the USSR and its satellites in terms of existing facilities and ski US. Although the portion of this potential available for military purposes in time of peace is much less than the industrialwhich the USSR does and can allocate for such purposes, its full realization coulda combined military establishment which, with Implicit US backing, wouldeterrent to Soviet aggression. On the other hand,ombination of the economicof continental Europe and thc USSR
were achieved, this might In ten years result in the creation of an Industrial powerto that of the United States today.
No ccaparable potential exists in the Orient For social as well as economicIt Is improbable that au Industrial power equivalent to that of Europe could be created in Ess: Asia In the next ten years. Japan. Indeed, came close to thc creationower complex which, while not equal to that of Europe, might have maintained regionalby reason of Its remoteness from other centers of power. The essentialof that complex were Japan itself, Manchuria, North China, and Southeast Asia-Japan, which Is the most Importantcenter In the Far East, Is dependent oo many countries of the region, particularly China, for raw materials on the one hand and for rnarket* on the other. The dependence Is mutual, however, because China and other countries of the Far East could profitably absorb Japanese manufactures of both capital and consumers goods. Without access to the Industrial facilities and skills of Japan, the Communists will not be able to achieve thepower that Japan attained prior to World
Tbe United States, on its own account, has no vital* economic requlremenU from the Fir East. It has, however, an importantnot only in denying Japan's Industrial potential to Communism, but also Inaccess to Southeast Asia, for Its ownand because of the great economic importance of that area lo Western Europe and to Japan. Commercial access to China is also desirable for the same reasons, though not essential. Economic considerations, then,S interest In denying Japan and
*ereln used to mean: euantial lacontinued tsutexter of Uie OSation, la,iri for which the US must fight.1
Asia to Communism, and inwhether trade between Japan and North China would be advantageous to US policy. In the latter respect, Chineseon overseas tradeavorable
Modern military power Is dependent onparticularly Industrial, power. Full realization of the economic potential ofEurope would permit the maintenance there of forces at least capable of initialagainst the USSR, Mo comparable potentiality exists elsewhere ln the Far East with the possible exception of Japan and(includingrientalindeed, is abundant and effective for certain purposes when suitably equipped, trained, and led. In China, for instance, tbe Communists have created mass armiesof dominating the country and rendering costly an extensive hostile intrusion. Such armies, however, are likely to remainot major air and overseas operations.
of the Near East.
The Near East itself is Incapableajor power center. Itsto the United States isonsequence of its auxiliary relationship to Western Europe (with respect to petroleum resources and communications) andase of air attack on the vital areas of the USSR. The Soviet Interest is reciprocal (acquisition and denial of oil,of communications, and prevention of attack on sensitive areas).
Significance of Australia and
These Dominions are manifestly different from thc remainder of the Far East, discussed above as the Orient They lack theand resources toower center in themselves, but, as Western states located In thc Far East, their actual military and industrial capabilities are valuable as an advanced point of support for Westernin the region. Historically, thesehave also furnished importantfor the British position in the Near East.
Significance of India.
With Indian participation, the British Commonwealth could dominate the Indian Ocean and would beosition tovaluable support for US interests in the Far East India itself is capable ofas an industrial area of intrareglonal significance. More Importantly, India,ajor Asiatic power and as the prime example of transition from colonial status to fullwithout sacrifice of mutuallyrelations with the West, Is aloneosition to compete with Chinesefor establishing Itself as the donunont Influence in Southeast Asia. India requires, however, assurance of the eventualof European colonialism in that area.
Significance of China.
China is significant today primarilythe extent of Communist domination there enhances the Soviet capability ofSoviet strategic objectives ln the Far East Soviet political orientation of thegovernment will tend to promoteSoviet control over the remainder of the Far East Soviet ability to capitalize on the situation in China will depend on the degree of consolidation and control that the Chinese Communists can exert over all elements of Chinese society, and the degree ofby the Chinese Communist leaders lo the Kremlin, It must be assumed that the grasp of the USSR upon China and of the Chinese Communists on the Chinese people will, for the foreseeable future, grow more firm.
These developments, thcrclore, wouldthe ability of the USSR to exercise con-trdlarge part of thc war potential of thc Far East (North China, Manchuria, and North Korea) by methods short of war and at tlic same time measurably increase thcof the remaining components to Soviet capture (Japan and Southeast Asia).
Finally, should war become Irnminent,China would provide bases for Soviet forces which could threaten the US security position in the For East
Policy in the Assumedassumed stabilization of the situation
in Western Europe and the Mediterranean
rrn*"
notthe ultimate objective o: the Kremlinworld dominationtheappreciation of the primary Importance of that area In relation to the achievement of that objective. The Kremlin, therefore, would continue to exert maximum effort on all fronts, both to counter any setbackIn ii given area and to exploit any favorable situation which developed whether In the West or In the Far East
Thus, what to tbe US would be an apparent shift In Soviet policy, would not forhoice between mutually exclusive alternatives. The Kremlin's strategy ls global. Itsarticular theaters both selfecotalned and Interrelated.as International Communism employs Indigenous elements In Its esploilalion of local situations, It can pursue simultaneously the locally appropriate course ot action Intheaters, the power and Influence of the USSR Itselfass ofto be used in accordance with globalase in point Isactivity In the Far East.hile the USSRenerally detached attitude In that area and directed Its primary attention and effort toward Europe- In the assumed circumstances, there would probablyeversal of this situation, without,any implication of loDg-tcrm Sovietof the then existing status inor of Communist inactivity there.
9. Soviet Policy in Europe.
Accepting the concept of ebb and flow ba the tide of the Revolution and the doctrine of thc inevitability of eventual capitalistthe Kremlin would seek to consolidate its gains in Europe {control of the Satellite States) and lo Increase East-West trade (as necessaryore rapid development ofwar Industrialaintaining an active defense, taking advantage ot any and all opportunities for dividing and weakening the West Confidentlyew crisis of capitalism which would present newIn the West, the Kremlin would re Bain alert for signs ofevelopment and would be prepared to exploit
Security Inlereils in theany sUbilizalion In the West U
wouldrimary security Interest ol the United States to support and maintain, cooperatively, the security of that area, and, so far as practicable, to loosen the Soviet hold on the Satellite States. In the assumedthe principal means to that end would be political, psychological, andSuch measures, however, wouldcontinued military backing in the form of constant readiness to render prompt and effective operational supportort likely to deter Soviet military aggression.
Objective* in the Farto the utmost the achievements
and momentum of Chinese Communism and the existing social and nationalthroughout East Asia, the USSR would seek the control and maximum extension o! Communism In the Far East Operations throughout the Far East would continue to be conducted by Indigenous CommunlsU, the USSR rcmalriing In the background. Inthe USSR would be likely to avoid such direct collision with Western Powers.
The fact however, that Commurilsm has flourished In the Far East primarily lnwith local nationalism poses afor the Kremlin in the furtherof the situation through nativeEven Chinese Communistof orthodoxy, by the evident necessity for makine them, tend to suggest thefor Tilolsm Inherent In the situation. Tho Kremlin would therefore be concerned, not only to advance the spread otbul to secure and retain control of rational,'nc Communist movements.
Except with respect to Manchuria, the Kremlin can have no illusions regarding marked economic benefits to be gained for the USSR In areas presently under Communis', domination, particularly none regarding tbe capture or creation of an industrial complex equivalent to Europe.
There arc, however, some raw materials, particularly soy beans and molybdenum In Manchuria, and lungsten In Korea, which can
-SBerrET"'"
used by the USSR to considerable
The purposes of Soviet global strategy in thc Far East would be to strengthen the global position of thc USSR and to weaken Western Europe and the United States. of the situation anywhere in the world adversely affects the political andinterest of the West in order and The existence of chaotic conditions in Southeast Asia, for example, would of itself continue to Impose severe strain on theand colonial systems of the European powers concerned, even without Communist accession to control of that area. ontinuation of disorder might be even more effective than Communist success, to thethat it resultedontinuing diversion of European resources into vain efforts tocolonial control. Similarly, although Japan wouldaluable prize forSoviet global strategy could also be served by keeping lttate of economic dependence and socialrain on US resources.
12. US Security Interests in lhe Far East.
The most Important long-range US security Interest in the Far East would be to prevent thc creationoviet-controlled powerin the region. The accomplishment of this objective would require positive action to ensure the political and military security of
Japan and Southeast Asia and to confirm the alignment of those areas and of India with the West, It would also be of greatto draw China away from vassalage to the USSRodus viveruli with the West.
These purposes are mutually supporting and interdependent. The basic problem with respect to Japan Is toiableThis in turntabilization of the situation In Southeast Asiaodus vizendi with Communist China.onstructive solution of the colonial problem in Southeast Asia and the orientation of India are intimately related.
The Far Eastern problem Is extremelyrequiring reconciliation of manyInterests. From the point of view of US security requirements, thc crux of the problem is to deny Japan to Communism. The rehabilitation of Japan, however, would arouse resentment throughout thc regionpresented as an essential and integral partenerally advantageousolution In Southeast Asia requires reconciliation of the conflicting requirements of various nationalisms, vested European Interests, and Indian aspirations, and can be achieved only in the contextutually advantageous general settlement.
The measures required for the solution of these problems are primarily pobtical and economic, but would involve some measure of military aid and potential military support for anti-Communist nations of the Far East.
ISSENT OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
The Office of Naval intelligence dissents tram subject paper In the following respects:
Pagearagraph Swritten, this paragrapholicyrather than an intelligenceconclusion. It should read: "Europe and thc Mediterranean arc the areas mostand critical to US. security."
(b) Pagearagraph 4Rewrite as follows: "The development ol amdustrial-romtary complex In the Far East wouldong period of time. Tbe key to its development, withto both the time required to achieve It and the ultimate strength of the complex, ls Japan. The maintenance of the alignment of Japan with the US. is therefore the crux of the US. security problem in the Far East.of thc alignment of Southeast Asia and India with the west ls an essential element in protecting western security. Contributing Importantly to the same end would be all
feasible measures which might be taken (a) to create difficulties for the Communist(b) to orient the Chinese people toward the West and (c) toplit between the Chinese Communist regime and tbe USSR."
Page S, SectionUS. Securityin the Fararagraphparagraph and substitute the paragraphb) of this memorandum.
PageectionUS. Securityin the Fararagraphthird sentence and substitute: 'This In turntabilization of the situation In Southeast Asiairm alignment ol Southeast Asia and India with the West The problem would be greatly alleviated If allsteps were taken to create difficulties for the Chinese Communist regime, to orient the Chinese people toward the West, and toplit between the Communist regime and the USSR."
ENCLOSURE C
DISSENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Director ofissents ln,. Security Interest ln the Euro pean-Mecuterran can Area and the Faror the reason set forth below.
It Is apparently the premise ofhat China and the Asiatic mainland are of slight strategic value. security and that alignment of Japan with. Is the crux of the security problem in the Far East. This view is not acceptable to the Director ofU.SJLF. The crux of the problem In the Far East would appear to be to contain thc expansion of Communism within the borders of China. It ls doubtful If the expansion of Communism Into Soatheast Asia could be stopped along the southern border of Cruha. Soatheast Asia, while not Immediately vital, ls of great economic and strategic Importance to the United States not only because of the
economic eflect Its loss would entail to the US. economy and the economy of Western Europe, but also because of the militaryof extended Communlit control throughout this unstable area. Theof Communist control over Southeast Asia would probably require an increase of aid funds to the nations of Western Europe,. access to strategic raw materials InAsia (rubber andake the economy of Japan and tbe Philippines dependent.nd permit theto integrate the economy of Southeast Asia Into the Communist-controUcd economy of the Far East. Success ln this program would permit Soviet Communist pressure to be exerted contiguously against India, where the development of situations extremely adverse. and Western Interests could be effectively promoted.
Original document.
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