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SOVIET CONTROL MECHANISM IN GERMANY
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SOVIET CONTROL MECHANISM IN GERMANY SUMMARY
Tbe purpose of this paper is, first, to describe thc mechanism of Soviet control hi Germany, and secondly, to estimate the effectiveness of this mechanism.
Since the collapse of the Third Reich, the USSR has attempted to create inin the easternpohtical and economic system throughould exercise an Indirect but complete control, even under conditions ol nominal German independence. The components of this system arc closely Integrated, and function under the supervision of the Soviet authorities in East Germany. For convenience of discussion, however, the political and economic control organizations in eastern Germany,,and the Communist organization In Western Germany arc here considered separately.
The Soviet organization for political control of East Germanyattern similar to tliat employed for that purpose by thc Naziombination of police forcesominant political party. It is estimated that the USSR wouldoyal security police force and partywellumber of Soviet personnel in plainorder to exert certain control of East Germany In the event of Soviet troop withdrawal. The training and organization ofechanism may be Impossible to achieve in thc Immediate future. This does not mean, however, that the USSR would not withdraw troops from Eastern Germany because its controlwasdequate. If other factors madeithdrawal expedient. Even thereafter, tne USSR would probably have to maintain under various guises close supervision ol thc mechanism to insure Its reliability.
For economic control of the Soviet Zone, the Soviet Military Administration employs the German Economicighly centralized authority. In the economic administrations of the various states in the Zone, each department Isto ils rornsponding branch in the Commission, which is thereby enabled toertical and generally close control over each element of economic activity In the area The commission's five main branches, being thus organized, could be adaptedinimum of delay as economic ministries of an East German state. Although key positions in the German Economic Commission arc held by Germans considered comparatively reliable by the Soviet administration, their actual loyalty to Sovietis questionable.
In Western Germany, Soviet controls can be exerted only within the relatively weak German Couuuunist Party. This organization, however, is highly centralized and functions under the direction of the Soviet Military Administration and in Close liaison with the Socialist Unity Party in the Soviet Zone. At present, the Communist
Note: Tht Intelligence oreanuaUons nf the Departments of Suite. Army. Navy, and the Air Force have concurred ln this report- The lo'ormaiion herein is ai5.
Parly in Wcsl Germany functions principallyropaganda medium buttrength disproportionate to its membership because most Germans are apprehensiveuture Soviet occupation of West Germany and the authority the Germanwould probably exercise thereafter. The Communist Party ls closelyinto the control organization which the USSR has established for thc Soviet Zone and hopes to extend to all Germany.
SOVIET CONTROL MECHANISM IN GERMANY
1. OSGVtTZATIOS FOB PoiXnCAI.ZOJOS.
Because Uic organization lor political control now being activated by the USSRattern similar to that formerly used by thc Nazi Party and thc Third Reich for control of thc approximate area of wlint ls now the Sovietomparison of the two systems ln that area provides an approximate estimate of the present stage of development of the Soviet organization.omparative estimate Is, however,by thc fact that the Nazi organization9 applied to an area not yet suffering the effects of Worldnd enjoyed popular support In sharp contrast to the general dislike Germans still feel toward Communism and the USSR. Because of this dislike, the USSR Is faced with special difficulties ba Its impositionuppet regime for control of Germany and can rely upon such control only so long as this regime ls sustained by the presence of large numbers of Soviet personnel. 0. Devices for Political Control under Nazi Regime.
Under ID tier, the control organization for thc area approximating theZone had two parallel and coordinated systems: tbc military and policeas the executive arm of the Third Reich, and thc structure of the Naziand Its affiliated
Military and stale police control of this area9 was exerted through garrt%ons of troops, SS formations, and the regular police (Including thclic total strength of these police organs was. In relation to the population, the ratio was
In addition to these governmental controls, the German population was supervised by the Nazi Party. All phases of German life were also organized by thc vat in us affiliates of this party, and no sizable element of the population could avoid regimentation In one or more of such organizations as the Hitler Youth and the Labor Front.
Spread throughout the Nazi Party and its affiliates were representatives of the party jwlicehese maintained close liaison with the Gestapo, lo which they rcpoiUd all subversion within thc party for action hy the official German police.
Tlus joint control organization functionedigh degree of efficiency9 until the latter part ol the war. organizing and guiding tbe Germanlo exploit its productive capacities to the utmost.
COMPARATIVE NAZI AND SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS FOR POLITICAL CONTROL
OF SOVIET ZONE AREA Organization
olicingPolicing Organs
(a) Army garrisons ofThe Soviet Army of Occupation
total strengtha total strength
as of
Nazi Organization
Right AUgememe SS Abschnitte (zones) each controlling about threetandarUen.
0 members ot the official police (Ordnungspoltzeff.
(Total strength ol the policingwas. In relation to the population the ratio was)
arty Organs
(a) The Nan*ighlypolitical structure based on the Zell, whose strengthC0.
(b) The party nffihales such asIsiltor Fronthich successfully regimented theot all sizable elements of the population In the Interests of the state.
(e) The partyhose representatives were spread throughout the party and Itsfor the purpose ofsubversion lo lite stale police organs, chiefly the Gestapo.
Note: Estimates o! police ctrength In theZone are from tne J_ D, Depart-mcut ofrmy.'
Soviet Organization
The German paramilitary police, operating under the Ministry of Uie Interior and including0 Itercitschaftpolizet and0 Border Police.
Criminal police and theirUie political police,.also under the Ministry of the Interior. (Total actual German police strength, mcludingpolice, is estimated as of9 at. In relation to the population the ratio of German police Is. The ratio of Germanplus Soviet Occupationto the population Is about .
arty Organs
The Socialist Unity Party, acentralized poliUcal structure,asic unit slightly larger than thc Nazi ZeU, but with little popular support.
The mass organizations,by members of Uie SED, such as thc Free German Trade Union Leagueave wide mcmlKirsidp bui slight actual-
For party police the USSR relics on various types of controlwhich arc set up on all but the most subordinate party level. In addition, other less conspicuous groups may also be used for surveillance. Thesecorn missions probably have some connection with thePolice Department of theMinistry ol the Interior.
TOT* fJHCJBJKl1
b. Agenciesoviet Political Control.
The organization for political control now being prepared by thc USSR is In general similar lo that employed by the Third Kclch. ns can be observed from the introductory chart. Two parallel and theoretically coordinated systems are being sethe German Administration of thc Interiorhich not only exerts quasi-goYernmcnLal police controls hut also controls the Central Administration lor Justice,hc Co nun unlst-conlrolled Socialist Unity Party (RED) and Its affiliates. .
In addition to Its own army of occupation, with units stationed at all key points and Soviet personnel for surveillance of all German organizations (totals ofthe USSR employs the following as executive organs of the German Ministry of the Interior.
Tbe para-military German police, composed of the Border Police and the Internal security componentss ofotal Bereit-tchaftpollzei strength was estimated0otal strength of the Border Police is believed to be
Tbe regular policehe present ratio of thc Ordnungs-potieei to the population Is not known. Total actual German police strength, however, Including the para-rrulitary police, Is estimated at. In relation to the German population, therefore, the ratio of security control is, as compared to the ratio3 under the Nazi regime. The ratio of German police plus Soviet occupation personnel to the population Is
In addition to powers exercised by the Soviet Army and the Interiorthe USSR Is attempting. In order to supplement Its control of the Soviet Zone, to make the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and Its affiliateseliable Communist-controlled party structure similar to the Nazi Party. Theoretically the partyis builtasic unit slightly larger than the Nazi Party cellembers. The SEDide membership but has failed to attract real popular support, and Its rank and flic are either apathetic or hostile to the party and Its programs. Implemen-talior. of party policies is in the handsinority of Communists and pro-Soviet opportunists. Supplementary to the SED, thc USSR Is endeavoring to create mass organizations controlled by Communist or pro-Soviet elements, which would regiment the German population in support of Soviet-Communist policies, or at least reduceto the present regime. Various front organizations, ostensibly non-political, have been employed, such as the Free German Trade Union Federation and the Free German Youth. In addition, the USSR has used the surviving remnants ofpoliUcal parties and various Soviet-created political groups. Staffed by pro-Soviet elements, these organizationside membership but have almost no actual support from thc population.
or close supervision of the SED and its affiliates, the USSR relies on various types of control commissions, having Eurvcillancc functions and set up on all except thc most subordinate party level. Functioningell within their respective party headquarters, these probably have direct or Indirect connection with the Criminal Police Department of the Interior Ministry. Though Uie efficiency of this system of
5
control commissions has born gradually improving, tt does not appear to be very great.
c. Relative Difficulty oj Soviet PoUttcal Control.
The present control organization (or the Soviet Zone, although designed tooncerted effort of the population, has been obliged to function for theof anti-Soviet elements. lacking thc loyalty and support of the German people. It has not yet even remotely approached tho high degree of efficiency of thc Nazi control organization.
Because of German hostility. It Is csthnatcd that the USSR wouldoyal security police force and partywellumber of SovietIn plainorder to exert certain control of East Germany in the event of Soviet troop withdrawal The training and organization ofechanism may be Impossible to achieve In the immediate future, at leastThis does not mean, however, that the USSR would not withdraw troops from Eastern Germany because Its control mechanism was not adequate, if other factors made suchhef para-military police forces, even If they were Increased to more than double the present figure, would be doubtful In thc eventomplete Soviet troop withdrawal Because of naUoriallstic and anti-Soviet tendencies, already evident ln the present control organization, it Is doubtful that tbe USSR can. within the next few years, find sufficient "loyal" Germans to staff Its controladequately or effectively. Thc Soviet control will, therefore, be Ineffective unless tbe USSR maintains ba Germany for an indefinite period the Soviet personnelbelieved to be infiltrated within the control mc*chanism at all levels.
At present the USSRts control organizations almost entirely separated, except for high-level coordination and policy directives of the political bureau of tlic BED. By continuing this policy the USSR can forestall the Integration of the admlnls-Irallve agenciesuture East German state which otherwise might be more likely to develop strong nationalistic tendencies.
2. OscAriizATios' roa EconomicZonk.
In order to raise thc level of industrial production ia the Soviet Zone and thereby Incrcasc thc volume of commodities which can be drained from the Zone for Soviet use, the USSR hasaster plan, known as thc Two-Year Plan, whose production schedules are similar to those employed in the USSR itself. This plan was introduced through the SED, which, as has previously been pointed out, servesajor vehicle for Soviet political control within thc Zone. Execution of this plan, to which the entire economy of the Soviet Zone is subordinated, has been entrusted to the German Economic Commission (DWK).
The DWK, like the SED. Is little moreerman appendage of thc Soviet Militaryighly centralired admirustrativc agency. It controls almost all production and distribution of goods ln the Soviet Zone (The majoris the SAG. or Soviet Corporation, which controls about twenty percent ol thc major Soviet Zone industries.)
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Thc DWK Is divided into five main brunches, which are in turn subdivided into numerous departments covering all aspects uf economic activity within Uie Zonetate of Uie Zone, Uie economic departments of the state government have been subordinated directly to their corresponding functional branches in theBy reason of this direct subordination, Uie branches of Uie DWK are able toertical control over all economic enterprises In Uie Zone.
Within the DWK. authority appears lo be vested In two experienced Communists: the chairman. Heinrich Ran, and thc deputy chairman. Fritz Bclbmann, whoseand acts, however, are subject to the approval of the Soviet MilitaryActually, internal policy Is probably madeecretariat composed of Uie chiefs of Uie Ave main branches of Uie DWK, together with rcpresentaUves from the various front and party organizations. Thc German Administration of the Interior (GAI) has some measure of control over Uie DWK through the Central Controlof nine members appointed JolnUy by the chairman of the DWK and theof the GAL This commission has wide powers of invcstlgaUon and dismissal, ostensibly to eliminate bureaucracy and to counter economic sabotage. Theprobably functionsurveillance agency within the DWK and appears to hare close liaison with the Criminal Police Division of the Interior Ministry. In each Land, thereimilar Control Committee, subordinate to the Central Control Commission.
Key positions In the DWK bureaucracy arc held by "reliable" Germans, most of whom belong to the SED. Continuing purges have greatly reduced the number of DWK personnel who were not also members of Uiat party. Such purging, however, will probably not increase the loyalty of the DWK, either to thc SED or to Uie USSR.cases of misappropriation of goodsarge scale by responsible DWK officials have occurred In consumer goods industries; production quotas have not beenfulfilled; and raw material allocations have been diverted to non-scheduledAlthough available inforrnation on the efficiency of the DWK organization Is limited, it is believed that because of thc bureaucratic nature of the agency, and because of thc opportunistic attitude of many of its officials, its over-all efficiency is not very great.
Thc primary significance of thc DWK at present lies in its irnmcdiate availabilityovernment for the Soviet Zone. Because its five main branches arc organized vertically, they could, without delay, becomo thc economic ministries of an Eaststate. Together with thc Interior Ministry and its satellite Centralfor Justice, as well as the Central Administration for Education, thc DWK already functionse facto government under Soviet supervision. Ira positionseudo-democratic legislative body at thc top ot the control organization and officialby the Eastern bloc are the only two factors not yet supplied by Uie USSR for the creation of an East German government
3. Tirr. Communist Organization in Wkrun Germany.
Thc Communist Party (KPD) of Western Germany is closely integrated into the system which the USSR has set up for control of the Soviet Zone and hopes to extend over all Germany. Thc Dreizemenvorstandhe headquarters of thc western
Bi>CliET
Communist Party, has bren given wide latitude in the field of policy-making during thc past year. Previously, the DZV was definitely subordinated U> tlic Central Secretariat of the SKD In Berlin, which may still retain some final authority on fundamental issues. The DZV maintains rigid party discipline and enforces compliance with Its Instructions on all subordinate party levels. Its members are called to Berlin to confer on broad policy with the SED Politburo, and both presumably take their directives from the Soviet Military Adralnlstratlon. Communications between Berlin and the DZV are handledranch of thc organization section of thc SET) Central Secretariat under the direction of an old-time Communist, Richard Stahlmann,
The KPDighly centralized organization of5 It has consistently sought to wrest from the Socialists thcof German labor ln the hope ofevolutionary situation and obslnicllng German economic recovery, and has tried vigorously to win the support of thc West German public by Communist propaganda In neither effort have the Communists achieved marked success. German labor has remained predominantly Socialist, and,arge extent; has withdrawn Its support from the KPD. The numerous Communist propaganda campaigns have proved generally ineffective Thc KPD has been the palpable tool of the DSSR for too long to win over any sizable segment of tbe German public Paradoxically, however, fear of the USSR Is the principal source of KPD strength. Although they are anti-Soviet andCommunist, most Germans, always apprehensiveuture Soviet occupation of Western Germany and consequent reprisals by the Communists, will go to considerable lengths to avoid antagonizing the KPD.
In an attempt to reduce distrust of the KPD and allow It to pursue policiesfrom those of the SED, the headquarters of both parties have publishedannouncing the formal dissolution of the KPD/SED working alliance. Each party Is ostensibly to operate Independently In the future. The top levels of thc KPD now receive policy directives from the SMA in Berlin, allhough the lower echelons will probably continue to cooperate with their counterparts in thc Soviet Zone,
ThcPD is much weaker than the3 parly in membership,resources, and capability for Illegal activities Itslandestinethc Illegal or Kippeiibergcr Apparat, was liquidated by thc Gestapo, and few survivors have returned to Germany.esult, the personnel needed to rebuild an efficient illegal organization would have to be trained and organizedong-term basis. At present, some covert activity is conducted by the Organization andsections of the KPD at various party levels, but no organization similar to the old Apparat has appeared. The various measure: now being taken by thc Party to tighten control over the rank and file may be designed to form an organization which would be similar to thc Apparat and capable of going underground.
Since the currency reform inhe KPD has had considerable difficulty in meeting Party expenses, previously covered by funds from the Soviet Zone, The Party's regular and dependable Income results from the sale of its propaganda publications and from collection of party membership dues, on which great emphasis is now placed.
-Mi.'
Other sources ol KPD income are Uic sale or various commodities smuggled from the Soviet Zone, and donations Irom individuals desiring to insure themselves against the dangers inherentossible future Soviet occupation of thc Western Zones By thc use of pamphlets and newspapers shipped or smuggled from the Soviet Zone, the KPD has been able to exceed any other political party in thc volume of propaganda produced. In addition, the recent Importationonsiderable quantity of printing equipment
from the Soviet Zone is expected to increase materially the propaganda capabilities
of the KPD.
The consolidation of the Communist Parties outside the USSR has been reflected In KPD programs to increase centralisation of the party structure and weed outelements. New party membership cards, reorganization of the basic party units, and checks on the personnel arc all directed toward this goal Although theof the party is decreased by such measures, they tend toisciplined and fairly reliable organization
During coming months, KPD propaganda will be directed chiefly at theby thc Western Powers In German affairs, as evidenced by thc Ruhr Authority, the Occupation Statute, and the terms of trizonal fusion. All Incidents of friction between the Occupation Powers and the Germans will be aggressively attacked.the KPD will have two objectives: exploitation of the general Germanagainst occupation controls, and preparation for an eventual East German state claiming national sovereignty. Although KPD tactics may somewhat heightenresentment against occupation controls, the KPD ls not expected, under present conditions, to Improve either Its capabilities or Its party strength.
Original document.
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