COP! NO.FOB THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR POD REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
, POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM GERMANY BEFORE SUMMER9
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM GERMANY BEFORE SUMMER9
SUMMARY
Thc USSR may, before thc summerropose some form of troopfrom Germany, probably In conjunction with proposalserman peace treaty. Under no circumstances, however, will the USSR withdraw completely during this period. In evacuating Its troops from Germany, the USSR would probably remove its military formations, but would leave behind sufficient military and civilian personnel to ensure continued Communist control over the political, economic, and military establishments ln eastern Germany.
A Soviet proposal to evacuate Germany would take one of three forms: awithdrawal ol all occupationnilateral withdrawal from the eastern tone;uadripartite withdrawal from Berlin. The first proposal, which wouldSoviet preference, might be made even though the Kremlin estimated Western acceptance to be Improbable at the present lime. This proposal might be issued by either the Kremlin or by an east German government The second course would have certain advantages for the USSR, although the conditions essential for Itsprobably could not be fulfilled beforehe third proposal might be madeinal attempt to get the Western Powers out ofrerequisite to course two.
An ofilcinl Soviet proposal to withdraw all troops from Germany could be exploited with limited success as propaganda, particularly ln Germany, in an attempt to force eventual Western withdrawal from Germany. Originatingequest from an east German government. Its propaganda value might be greater. An official Sovietfor quadripartite troop withdrawal from Berlin would have similar but less forceful propaganda effects. An official Soviet declaration of intention to withdraw Its troops unilaterally from eastern Germany would be played up as partoviet "peace offensive" and would have some effect throughout Germany. This effect would be partly offset by unfavorable reactions In certain of thc satellite slates, andecline hi bidlgenous support of local Communist parties hi Western Europe, becauseear of German resurgence.
The USSR will continue to advocateuadripartite withdrawal from Germany. It is probable that the Kremlin, either itself or through an east German government, will make an official proposal for quadripartite evacuation ofhole or of Berlin in ordernduce continuance of international nego nations, notably concerning Germany;ake propaganda. It is possible thai
Note: The Intelligence oreaniiaUons of thc Dcpai Unenta of state. Army. Navy, and the Air Fore* have concurred In this report. Thc Inrormatlon herein Ls as of
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POSSIBIUTY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM GERMANY BEFORE SUMMER9
1. QuAfi'ij-ATtTiTT. Trooprom All Germ amy.
Statement.
Thc USSR, through various media Including the Warsaw Conference, thc SUUn-WaJlace letter, thc Soviet-controlled German press, and other quasi-ofuclaisources, lias alreadyuadripartite withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany. The Soviet Government may either propose directly to the Western Powersithdrawal In the near future, or may Inspire an east Germanrequest for such an evacuation.equest would probably be made in conjunctionoviet request for resumption of treaty negotiations. CIA believes that the Kremlin would count on rejection ofroposal by the Western Powers and that the proposal would therefore be made solely for propaganda reasons.
to the USSR c] the Proposal.
Combined with an appeal to German national unity, the proposal would have some propaganda effect throughout Germany. Furthermore, the proposal could be capitalised upon by pro-Communist elements throughout the non-Soviet worldroof of Soviet peaceful Intentions.
Rather than make the proposal itself, thc USSR mayuture east German government to originate the proposal. The Kremlin could then announce its willingness to comply with the request, provided thc Western Powers were also agreeable to the proposal. By this tactic thc USSR might hope lo improve its own propaganda position, particularly In Germany, and also lend increased prestige to an cast German government.
to the USSR of the Proposal.
The proposal wouldenerally unfavorable reception in theof Western Europe and In the satellite states because of their continuing fearestoration of German military power. Moreover, most Western Europeans and certain elements in Germany would view unfavorably the withdrawal of Western troops, particularly US, at this time. The unpopularily of the proposal would be mitigated to the extent that It was recognizedropaganda move which the USSR realized would not be implemented.
It would reduce the appeal of Western European Communist parties In countries where nationalist tendencies and thc fear of Germany exist.
J. Unilateral Troop Withdrawal from EAsreaN Germany (Including the Soviet Sector or Berlin) .
a. General Statement.
is possible that the Soviet Government might officially announce now and lually carry outnilateral troop withdrawal from eastern Germany; the Iat-
ter is unlikely until Communist control ot eastern Germany has been consolidated. In withdrawing, the USSR would leave behind sufficient civilian and disguised military personnel to ensure Communist control.
to the USSR of Announcement.
his proposal would be of valueoviet-led "peace offensive" designed to discourage western preparedness and ultimately to promote US retirement from Europe.
to the USSR of Announcement.
I would arouse an unfavorable reaction among the satellite states, and possibly would tend to undermine the appeal of the Communist parties of Western Europe.
of Preliminary Conditions without Which Any Actual TroopWould Not Be Made,
Until the USSR had perfected the Communist control mechanism InGermany It would not withdraw its troops. It Is not believed that such acould be prepared beforer that the USSR would be willing tc withdraw all its troops without first satisfying itself of the reliability of this mechanism. This could be effected by gradual troop and military government withdrawal, giving the German Communists increasing authorityrial basis. Although the USSR might evacuate Its military formations. It would have to leave behind so many of Its nationals to ensure continued Communist control over the political, economic, and military establishments In eastern Germany, and to ensure the maintenancedemocratic state" In the Soviet sense, that thc withdrawal would be only nominal
Before withdrawing, the USSR would probably have toestern evacuation of Berlin.
Before withdrawing, the USSR would have lo recognize an eastern German government.
to the USSR of an Actual Unilateral Troojt Withdrawal.
Unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops would lend increased prestige to the Communist government of eastern Germany. This would occur despite theof thc regime.
An evacuation of the eastern roue would be more ln line with Soviet policy, which favors Indirect rather than direct control.
It would disassociate the USSR from direct responsibility for thc police state tactics which German Communists would employ in Sovkllilng eastern Germany or in attempting to penetrate western Germany.
Withdrawal would eliminate the "contamination" to which Soviet forces are subjected lo eastern Germany, and relieve thc USSR of direct blame for theand frustrations suffered by the Germans In the eastern zone.
ove wouldtrong propaganda appeal to German unity sentiment and would serve lo Increase German pressure for withdrawal of the Western Powers from Germany.
/. Disadvantages to the USSR of an Actual Unilateral Troop Withdrawal.
Unilateral withdrawal ol Soviet troops from eastern Germany would result in the loss of an advance military base.
It wouldeorganization of Soviet economic relations with eastern Germany, probably resulting In general weakening of Soviet economic controls in the area.
It would also endanger Communist political control over east Germany and encourage popular unrest.
It would reduce the Soviet bargaining position to the extent that that position Is based on the military occupation of eastern Germany.
It would facilitate penetration by the Western Powers of eastern Germany through propaganda, subversion, and espionage.
It would have unfavorable effects in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
It would deprive Soviet "Line of Communications" troops of their legal reason for being
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Troop Withdrawal from Berlin.
1
A proposal for quadripartite withdrawal of troops from Berlin might be made at any time by thc Kremlin, by the east Berlin adrninistration, or later by an eastgovernment. Thc effectiveness of the proposal would be essentially the same in either case. Thc USSR would be prepared to withdraw almost Immediately and could do soinimum of preparation and with comparative ease. The proposal would be made, however, purely for propaganda purposes in the realization that the Western Powers would notour-power withdrawal from Berlin would Inevitably leadommunist absorption of thc entire city by economic pressure and by strong-armed Communist tactics. This, in turn, would enable the USSR to prepare for an eventual troop withdrawal from the Soviet zone.
The USSR will continue to advocate unofficially quadripartite withdrawal from Germany. It is probable that thc Kremlin will make an official proposal forevacuation of either Germanyhole or of Berlin in ordernduceof International negotiations on Germany;xploit the propaganda advantages Indicated above.
Under no circumstances will the USSR withdraw completely from Germany. It Is nevertheless possible that Uie USSR may announce Its Intention to withdrawits troops from Germany, Such an announcement would be made onlyoviet proposal,oviet-sponsored east German request for quadripartite withdrawal, had been rejected by thc Western Powers. The USSR probably will not withdraw its troops from Germany until It has fully consolidated its position in eastern Germany through the establishment of an east German government and through the provision of strong and reliable Communist security forces.
The USSR will not be able to completeonsolidation before the summerfter this time the USSR will beetter position toithdrawal oi ils troops without substantially weakening Soviet control in cast Germany. The prospect of such an evacuation therefore becomes correspondingly greater after the summer
Original document.
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