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PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US2 AND ITS EFFECTS ON US INTERESTS
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PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US2
AND ITS EFFECTS ON US INTERESTS
F CONTENTS
SUMMARY
I IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA TO THE US
Bases of Argentine
Argentine Importance to US In
Significance to the US of Argentine Collaboration in the
Event of War between the US and the
II. ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY UP 'IX> THE PRESENT
Bases and Historical Objectives of Argentine Foreign
Argentine Foreign Policy under the Peron
3 Groups and Individuals Influential in the Formation of Foreign
of the
IH. PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US IN THE ABSENCES-USSR WAR
Probable Argentine Policy toward the US in the AbsenceS-USSR1
IV. PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY IN THE EVENTS-USSR WAR
2
Probable Argentine Policy in thc EventS-USSR War. 14
APPENDIX
Recent Implementation of Argentine Foreign Policy
Nations
System
with European.
with the Soviet Bloc
with Latin American Countries . ,
PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US2 AND ITS EFFECTS
ON US INTERESTS
SUMMARY
Aiy.cntine foreign policy is ot particular importance to the US becauseelatively strong, "medium-class" power which rankseader In the inter-American system; and second. Argentina,ember of the regional system, has considerable capacity for independent action because it is remote from centers of US power, and its economy under normal conditions is oriented toward Europe. In time of peace Argentina ls capable, because of its situation and resources, of supporting US policy objectives, opposing them and working to displace US influence in Latin America, or of taking an intermediate position. Argentina's ability to utilize its connections with extra-Hemisphere powers not appreciably more distant than the US has been an important factor In its capacity to oppose the US In the Hemisphere. In thc event of war between thc US and the USSR, the advantages to the US ofcobelligercncy would outweigh thc demands made by Argentina and thcincurred by the US. Argentina's normally large food surpluses would beIt could insure domestic and possibly regional security against sabotage of the supply to the US of strategic materials, could stimulate production and further stability in other Latin American states through leadership and example, and could makeeffective use of US materiel and equipment for maintaining Internal order and assisting the US in regional defense. It could also supply certain materials In short supply lo its neighbors. On the other hand, Argentina would require the diversion of some US military equipment, and Argentine leaders could be expected to contribute to US difficulties by demanding recognition of an undisputed hegemony over southern South America, possession of the British-owned Falkland Islands, and armed equaUtynot superiority
Argentine foreign policy up to Peron's accession to power has been conditionedesire to malnlaln tics with European nations,trong urge for independence within the Hemisphere particularly in relation to the US. and by an ambition to achieve leadership In the Hemisphere. The Peron regime has added to these historic Argentine objectives the desire loigh degree of economic independence, andof policy has been complicated by changes in the world situation and byamong groups influencing foreign policy.
In the absenceajor war. Argentine policy will be influenced by the fact that the need for Industrialization equipment, which only the US Ls presentlyosition to supply,igh degree of cooperation with the US Peron originallythat satisfaction of his needs from available resources would require little sacri-
Note: The Intelligence omantaatlon* of the Departmciila of ilLate, Army, and the Air Poiee have concurred in this report.issent by the OJTIce of Naval Intelligence, see Enclosure A. p
The information herein ls asanuary
- SEi
flee of nationalistic independence, but lavish expenditures for industrial equipment from the US combined with decline in world demand for Argentine products vitiated original estimates,inancial crisis innd caused virtualof procurement In the US for Argentine industrial development. This crisisthc Peron regime with thc difficult choice between some sacrifice of theof economic Independence and some slackening of thc industrializationeitherangerous one for thc regimes stability. At the moment, the Argentine president seems to be temporizing. Any decision reached will be subject to constant review; if and whenever Peron decides the advantages to be gained from concessions to the US outweigh the disadvantages. Argentina will become more cooperative; If he decides that the political cost of abandoning appearance of independence is toorice to pay for US assistance, he will intensify Argentine resistance to US policy at home and abroad.
In caseS-USSR wart is estimated Argentina willobellig-erent on the side of the US. An Argentine alliance with the USSR is extremely unlikely in view of the slight possibility of reciprocal advantage, and various factors indicate Argentina would prefer cobelligcrence to neutrality. By remaining neutral Argentina would risk: another Increase of Brazilian armed strength relative to that of Argentina such as occurred from Brazilian participation in World War II; forfeit of Argentina's much-vaunted claim to leadership in Latin America; probable sanctions by the US and possibly by other American republics. Defeat of the US would, moreover, exposeto ultimate Communist rule.
There would be strong pressureeclaration of war from the anti-Communist Argentine military, and the government could expect to strengthen its position with the predominantly Catholic populace through participatingar against atheistic Communism. The government could also anticipate distinct advantages inar crisis situationeclaration of war. There ls evidence of Peron's own apprehension of international Communism; his government has reportedly madepreparations for an all out attack on Communism and Soviet agents,which include the possibility of breaking relations with thc USSR and itsThe exact nature, extent, and timing of Argentine cobelligcrence will beby the attitude of Argentina toward the US at the time and by bargains struck with thc US or arranged In an inler-Amerlcan conference under the Rio treaty.
s
PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US2 AND ITS EFFECTS
ON US INTERESTS
mportance of Argentina Iv fie VS.
L Bases of Akgkntine Imi-oittanck.
Thc foreign policy of Argentina is of particular importance to the US because this relatively strong, "medium-class" power, whichember of Che inter-American system, but remote from centers of US power and influence, has unusual capacity for independent action.
With an economy naturally competitive with rather than complementary to that of thc US. Argentina has not been heavily dependent on the US either for markets or imports. The Argentinesation ofillion people occupying an area slightly larger than thc US east of the Mississippi and have, of all Latin American countries, the highest standard of living, the highest literacy rate, the largest per capita wealth and the greatest share in world trade, and thc largest proportion of EuropeanAttainment of this position of leadership hasarge extent been possible because of the remarkable productivity of Argentina's main agriculturalonly extensive plain In the temperate zone of South America. Argentina is more than self-sufficient in foods. During the, Argentina was the world'sexporter of beef, corn. oats, cattle, hides, and skins; lt was second largest exporter of wheat and wool as well. By exporting very large quantities of agricultural products, Argentina has been able to Import sufficient fuels, raw materials, and machinery, tovirtually self-sufficientroad range of manufactured consumer goods.hn net value created by industrial production for the first lime exceeded that created by agricultural and pastoral production.
The fact that Buenos Airesiles bytwice as far asfrom Washingtonost important factor In Argentina's capacity for independent action. Unquestionably, remoteness from the centers of US power has been anelement underlying Argentine foreign policy's pursuit of the most Independent course of all the Latin American republics both within the Hemisphere and in extra-Hemisphere relations. The framers of Argentine foreign policy have evidentlythat the US would not use its power to coerce Unit country In time of peace no matter what friendly ties they made with potential enemies of the US or to whatthey failed to cooperate in thc inter-American system. They have also apparently realized that Argentina lies outside the zone in which the US could bo certain of its ability to make its will militarily effective, should the exigenciesesperate war situation Justify considering such action. Argentina therefore enjoys, more than any other Latin American country, with the exception of Chilea smaller extent-Brazil, capacity for independent action deriving from its geographical position. But because of its larger degree of assertiveness and economic self-sufficiency. Argentina actually has much greater Independence than Chile or Brazil.
SEC.
2. Argentine Importance toeacbtime.
Because of ils considerable latitude for Independent action, Argentina has thc capabilities for actingocus and head uf anti-US sentiment in the Westernboth in inter-American organizations and outside of them. Converselypro-US activities are the more influential because they are, in thc eyes of Lhe rest of the Hemisphere, generally free from suspicion of US pressure. Prior to World War II, Argentina was able to use ties with its European customers, particularly those with Germany and the UK, to counter US influence. Thc war has greatly diminished these Argentine capabilities,estoration of economic strength in WesternArgentina with industrial supplies and equipment now obtainable in quantity only in themake Argentine use of such lies again of interest to the US. Present relations with Spain show Argentina as the stronger partner and do not greatly strengthen Argentinats the US.
Argentine tendencies toward expansionism and authoritarian organization of thc stateatter of concern to the US because of thc effects of these tendencies on other American states, particularly on those states adjacent to Argentina, and because these tendencies complicate direct US-Argentine relations and activities within thc inter-American system. These tendencies combine with Argentina's relatively strong economic and military potentials to produce fear and suspicion of Argentine intentions. The states which consider themselves menaced by Argentine expansionism frequently seek US assurances of support against Argentine encroachments, and there Is reason to believe that these lears are sometimes deliberately exaggerated to increase USof economic, military and moral support. Similarly, Brazil relies on its ties with the US in its rivalry with Argentina to such an extent that US-Brazilianinevitably reflect Brazil's conceptions of US policy toward Argentina.neighbors are strongly Jealous of US-Argentine cooperation and tend to construe such cooperation as undue favoritism. Paradoxically, there lsontrary tendency among the other American republics to come to the defense of their fellow Latins when they conceive that the US ls abusing its power advantage against the Argentines. The expansionist and authoritarian tendencies of Argentina arc also ol direct Interest to US long-range policy in view ol the possibility that Argentina might succeed In altering thc balance of power in South America.
Argentina also has some importance to thc USarket and in providingand entrepreneurial opportunities. While the presentfrom impairment ol European sources of supply and Irom Increased demand due to Argentina's accelerated program ofprobably not be permanent, it is unlikely to pass away overnight. Argentina was recently thc largest market for US goods in this hemisphere (purchases during the first quarter8 reached anrate0n the past, Argentina has offered exceptionally favorable opportunities for secure and profitable investment. Although present conditions are not encouraging for private investment, it is possible that Lhis situation will change so that more than the currently estimated total0 million of US investment funds will be attracted there.
4
Significance to the US of Ahgkntini. Colladoka'i son is the Event of War between the US and the USSR.
In the event of war between thc US and the USSR, there are of course manypossible Argentine positions ranging from hostility to the US through less or more benevolent neutrality to cobelllgerence. For reasons detailed in Part IV, it now seems probable Argentina will choose cobcUigerence. ft is true that while Argentina could be expected to provide some purely military supportS war effort In the maintenance of local security and aid to US transport and communications in thc area, its far more important contributions would beon-military nature, and many of these contributions would presumably be forthcoming whether Argentinaobclligerenteutral. It is estimated, however, Ihat totalobelligerent would outweigh certain difficulties inherent in Argentine participation.
Argentina's large food surpluses would constitute its most valuable contributionestern war effort. Control of the seas would probably assure the availability of these surpluses to the US and Its allies exclusively. Although the Argentines could in any event be expected to get as much as possible for their provisions, it is probable that US procurement of Argentine supplies would be more successful if Argentina were an ally than if itolicy of neutrality, however benevolent. Furthermore, Argentina,obelligerent orenevolent neutral, could be expected toignificant contribution to the relief of US supply and transportation shortages byconsiderable amounts of foods, light manufactured consumer goods, andto the other American republics, goods which they normally obtain from the US or other sources that would be taxed or unavailable in time of war.
The fact of Argentine cobelllgerence could itself be of considerable value to the US in the force of Argentine example and leadership in Latin America. Competition between Latin American states for US favors might well result in increased efforts on the part of the various republics. Such augmented effort on the part of the Latin American slates might be expected to compensate lhe US in some degree for thcoccasioned by their conflicting demands for US military and economic support. Argentina iLself might be expected to expedite the production and delivery of moderate quantities of beryl and tungsten to aid the US war effort.
Argentina is probably better equipped than any other major Latin American republic to meet the Communist threat within Its own boundaries, and could be counted on In its own self-interest for domestic security against Communist sabotage of the flow of essential materials to the US and its allies. It is also possible that in an extreme situation of chaos induced by Communist action. Argentina, if not threatened bymight beosition toignificant contribution to regional security by assisting other countries to protect themselves against Communist guerrilla action and sabotage of the supply of critical materials.
Argentina does not now have and will not have in the predictable future thcestablishment or the natural and financial resources requisite for the creation of forces adequate to repel an attackajor power or to make any sizable contribu-
5
SECRET
tions lo an expeditionary force. In common with all other Latin American republics, Argentina would be militarily expensive to the US in any global war. since US materiel would have to be diverted for adequate modern defense. Furthermore, the contribution that Argentina could make lo common military defense of the continent would be greatly restricted by the limited extent of its sea and air power as well as by theland transportation facilities to tlic other republics.
In thc event of war with the USSR. Argentine leaders will probably demandfor regional defense, despite their country's limited military capacities. This will make it difficult to include Argentinaeneral strategic plan. It isthat the Argentine Government will seek to exploit its status as an ally to obtain military equality if not superiority to Brazil, to further ils efforts to establish an undisputed hegemony over the southern half of the continent exclusive of Brazil, and to obtain possession of the Falkland Islands. Argentine demands for USin such efforts could be expected to generate friction with that government and possibly within the inter-Amerlean system and with the UK. which frictions would tend to undermine the unity required in war.
On thc other hand, by virtue of its relatively advanced industrial and engineering experience combined with thc relatively high quality of Its military discipline andArgentina could be expected lo make more efficient use of equipment obtained from the US than any other latin American state. And it would cf course be far less costly to the US to send equipment than to send both equipment and militaryand have to maintain troops atistance.
The limitations of Argentine sea power arc such that the US could at best expect some assistance In the defense of Cape Horn and the Straits of Magellan as anroute to the Panama canal, provision of access to naval bases with their denial in Argentina's own self-interest to Soviet submarines, and limited patrol of sea lanes.
ff. Argentine Foreign Policy up to the Present.
1. istorical Objectives or Argentine Foreign Policy.
In Lhe past Argentine foreign policy has stressed Argentine ties with European nations, Argentine independence of US influence, the extension of Argentinein Latin America, and neutrality in world power conflicts.
Argentina has considered that its national interest lay in keeping the closestties with available and potential customers, in resisting any possible subordination to US economic interests, and in opposing US leadership in inter-American activities. Argentina, prior to World War II, depended on Britain lor financial development and markets for its beef, on Germany for military ideas, and on France for Intellectual stimulus. The historical precedent of Argentina's rormer position as the center of the Spanish viccroyaily of La Plata, the possession of greal wealth in agricultural resources, and the existenceroud nationalist spirit have foslered the Argentine belief that their country possesses opportunities and capacities for development greatly beyond those of any other Latin American country. Since they viewed their country's pu-
lentialitles as comparable lo those of the US in the nineteenth century, the Argentines have in the twentieth century conceived of themselves as rivals of the US for leadership in the Hemisphere. Therefore they have both resisted any inference of subordination to the US in thc inter-American system and have sought to assert their primacyrouping of neighboring stales whose endowments lhe Argentines consider inferior to their own.
2. Argentine Foreign Policy unukh the Peron Admikistration.
The Peron government has adhered to the main historical objectives of Argentine foreign policy; the postwar period has witnessed important changes, however, both at home and abroad, and these changes have had their effect on traditional attitudes. For example, the division of world power into two camps has been accompaniedeakening of Argentina's adherence to the concept of neutrality. Although the Peron group on coming to power continued Argentine neutrality and delayed aof war against the Axis until thc final stages of the conflict, and Peron himself has subsequently expressed Argentina's traditional neutrality in terms of the 'Third Position ', he has also acknowledged the Intensified world pressures against neutrals in the unprecedented public statement that Argentina will go to war on the side of the US.
Three factors have conspicuously affected the execution of Argentine policy. First, radical changes incident to World War II have strengthened Argentina's International position including Its position in South America; second, thc government hasa policy of economic Independence including an ambitious program of rapidthird, the Peron revolution in Argentina has both shifted the bases of political power in that country and changed the make-up of governmental machinery. These new factors have guided thc pursuit of continuing basic Argentine objectives and therefore have governed Argentine activities in the United Nations and In the Inter-American system, in relations with other nations, and in Hispanic and labor (See Appendix for detail on execution of Argentine foreign policy.)
Argentina has, largely by default, gained an increasingly important position in international affairsesult of world economic dislocations and the decline of Western Kuropean power, and has vigorously exploited this opportunity. Diminished world food supplies gave Argentina an opportunity to dispose of its normallyellers market and, at least temporarily, greatly increased its relative economic importance. The Peron government has made every effort to extendeconomic importance to the world political arena and has taken an aggressive part In some world organizations not paralleled since early Argentine enthusiasm for the League of Nations The destruction of Western European industrial and military capacity, together with Argentine plans for rapid industrialization, however, has placed Argentinaosition of greater dependence on the US for industrial and military equipment. While one underlying basis for bilateral trade with Europe remained as before the war, because of Europe's need for Argentine raw materials, there were fundamental changes in the patterns of Argentina's relations with the world abroad. Because the Europeans were unable temporarily to supply industrial goods in pay-
7
nicnt. they were obliged lo finance much of their purchasing through liquidation of existing investments and thereby cut important ties which had for many years bound the Argentine economy to Europe.
Thc PerOn government's emphasis on the policy ol economic independence ls clearly an attempt to gam In the economic field an independence comparable to the independence Argentina has long asserted in the political field. However, in thisArgenLina Is involvedaradoxical situation since equipment foressential to economic independence can, temporarily at least, be obtained only from the US and at the discretion of the US. The Peron adininistration has committed itselfrogram of: planned industrialnation for greater self sufficiency, liquidation of foreign holdings ln basic Industrieseclared policy of excluding new foreign investment in such areas; an increase in Argentine exports ofIn addition to maintenance of foreign markets for raw materials; andof Argentine banking, insurance, and other facilities. In large part through direct government action the administration has beenat least for the first two years, any appropriate use ofpay ofl foreign mortgages on thc national property, establish an industry complete with underlying services, satisfy the demands of military prestige, and at the same tune extend its economic Influence to foreign countries. The Pcrdn administration's policy of all-out industrlaUzatlon has both accentuated the distortion from the prewar trade pattern with Europe andrelations with the US; because of economic dislocations in Europe, only the US could provide the quantity and quaUty of machinery needed for the power,and other developments projected under the five-year plan, but US markets did not absorb Argentine exports in quantity sufficient to provide the needed dollars which could not be obtained from European customers.
Argentine efforts to overcome its postwar arms Inferiority in relation to Brazil have increased its need for US products, and considerable procurement from European countries has not eliminated this need. Argentina hopes also to continue to obtain machinery from thc US to expand the local arms industry.
Domestic conditions Incident to the revolutionary changes effected by the present administration ln the scope of governmental operations and In its personnel haveconfusion and inconsistency In the execution of foreign policy. UnderPeron, groups and institutions most influential in the formation of foreign3 havo either lost their influence or been forced out of policy-making councils. Thc old-line, conservative, landholdlng interests, who opposed industrialization nnd emphasized trade ln agricultural products with Europe and particularly with the UK. have been forced to yield their commanding position. The former staff of the Foreign Office has been cleared out and replaced by labor leaders, poets, doctors, andamong whom are many chauvinistic nationalists. The resulting organization, influenced by combinations among thc groups and individuals discussed ln thesection, has tended to emphasize the aggressive, nationalist, anti-US theme of Peronista policies to the detriment of good relations with the US and other countries.
SHJ^tKT
3 Gkoufs and Individuals Influential ik the Formation or Foreign Policy.
Considerable insight into the character of current Argentine policy, parliculaily with reference to the apparent confusion and inconsistencies mentioned in the previous section, can be obtained from an examination of the powerful groups and individuals who influence its day-to-day development and execution. The conflict between long-term requirements of nationalas industrial development and national defense on the one hand and short-run political profit to be gained from chauvinist gestures on thesharply reflected in bitter personal differences al the top level. In thc continuing struggle for influence on foreign policy, gains and losses by various elements occur with such frequency that it is Impossible to determine for anyperiod whether greatest influence has been exerted by advocates of extreme nationalistic ideas, by representatives of the armed forces, or by individual (either moderate or extreme) civilian leaders, opportunist politicians or particularof any of these. It is possible, however, to Indicate the direction in which the various groups seek lo guide foreign policy.
o. Nationalist influence.
Because Pcrdn has based his strengtharge degree on the support of the largely uninformed populace and because anti-foreign appeals have helped tohis hold on this group, the vacuum in thc field of foreign policy created by the elimination of conservative internationalist interests has been filledonsiderable extent by anti-foreign nationalist elements. The extreme nationalists do not exercise predominant Influence in the Perdn administration, but the state of mind which they represent is very important in the field of foreign policy. The reorganization and expansion of the foreign service brought in many nationalist zealots strongly prejudiced against the US and the loose and spontaneous character of Argentine administrative operations has allowed them to exaggerate nationalist aspects of the administration's foreign policy. Nationalists are to be found In largein theArgentine policy and propagandizing for the Peron administration, and it is clear that their activities are at least tolerated by the administration and that they work to Increase the conflicts between moderate and nationalist trends in Argentine foreign policy.
6. Influence of the Army.
Despite Peron's strong political support from the working class andthe fact that he has In the past publicly announced his intention ofthe Army to itshere Is little doubt that the continuity of his regime is subject to the continued approval of the army. Thus array leaders have at least twice forced Peron to alter his policy and practice. In one Instance military spokesmenhim of the necessity of restraining Senora Peron from "meddling" in foreignfollowing her return from Europe7 In another case army officersdemanded. In an atmosphereoup d'etat, that Perdnontract for thc developmentteel mil] which had involved substantial graft by the
9
President of Ihc National Economic Council Evidently, therefore, while Peron has held the loyalty of thc more influential military elements through their confidence in his ability to keep labor in line, because of the large appropriations and salary increases he has obtained for ihem, and the Important role accorded the army In theprogram, the power of the army poses definite limits within whlrh he must operate. Neither thc limits prescribed by the military nor its direct influence onpolicy ls clearly evident. However, thc record of military support formeasures for Hemisphere defense and arms standardization indicates that the predominant Influence In the armyonsiderable degree of collaboration with tho US. Support ofolicy by Argentine military leaders is understandable in view of their urgent desire to rearm and particularly to redress thc imbalance in armed strength effected by US armament of other Latin American republics, especially Brazil, and the denial of arms to Argentina during World War II Thc USost Important potential source of arms and industrial equipment and the Argentine Armyund of US dollars and goodwill to exploit that source.
There are, of course, anti-US nationalist elements within the Argentine Army, and the General Staff reportedly harbors an internaUonal policy section whichArgentine grand strategy on the bastslan to gain control of latin America when thc US shall be henvlly committed and possibly weakenedar with the USSR. However, thc army's practical interest in equipment of troopseasure of military industrial Ira lion, together with the position of the USogical supplier appears toore Important factor In military views on foreign policy than the theoreticalof the General Staff unit. In the present national crisis thc military group headed by Minister of War Sosa Molina appears to hold the balance of power and will probably exert an Influence favorable to US-Argentine cooperation in Important foreign policy decisions now pending.
c. Civilian Leaders.
PerOn's most Important civilian aides in thc field of foreign policy are Foreign Ministerramuglla. Ambassador (and Senator) Diego Luis Mollnarl, and Miguel Miranda, President of the National Economic Council. Bramuglia.ocialist lawyer active In trade-union affairs, is regarded as the most reasonable and respectable and least nationalist civilian member of the cabinet. He has shown considerable sympathy for the complaints of foreign interest with regard lo thepolicies of thc administration and may be said to represent the tendency toand deal realistically with Argentina's inevitable interdependence with the rest of the world. Senator Mollnarl, roving ambassador for the Perdn administration, who formerly exerted only nominal Influence on foreign policy, was recently reported to be one of the Influential Individuals in the administration's foreign policy. He represents in his own person thc unpredictable character of Argentine policy. Often Identified with the extreme nationalist point of view, he has frequently worked against moderate policies sponsored by Bramuglia. As leader of the Argentine delegation to the ITO conference at Havana8 he deplored US predominance In the world, attempted to defeat the ITO Charier and in generalostile line toward the US. As Argen-
10
Iina's dollar crisis has deepened, however, he has reportedly aligned himself with pro-US and moderate elements in the cabinet including his enemy Brumuglia. Miguel Miranda, as President of the NaUonal Economic Council, has controlled Argentina's foreign economic policy which is ex traord manly important in the total foreign policy developed by the Peron administration The attitudes ofelf-madewho entered Uie governmentllustrate some of the contradictions and problems of workingrogram of economic cooperation with Argentina. He is fully conscious that industrialization and thc long-range program for economiccan best be realized with foreign private investment. However, many of his actions and the trading ventures of IAPA (Argentine Trade Promotion Institute) under his direction have apparently done as much to alienate US business as the nationalists' war on foreign investors. During the past two years Miranda has gambled on his ability to finance much of Argentine capital development through shrewd trading with the outside world which has needed Argentine agricultural products.
III. Probable Argentine Policy toward the US in the AbsenceS-USSR War.
Since the long-range, permanent objectives of Argentine foreign policy Indicate anot actuallyin Western Hemisphere and in world affairs, any exceptional degree of Argentine cooperation in US objectives in the period short of war will be due either to casual coincidence of the objectives of the two countries or to some specinl situation pushing the Argentinesarger degree ofthan would normally be the case. The present impairment of European sources of supply of heavy machinery and equipment and the importance attached by the PcrOn administration to their five-year plan of industrialization constitutepecial situation; it Is therefore these admittedly temporary factors that are likely to be most influential inthe boundaries set by long-rangeexecution of Argentine policy during the next few years.
Thethe Argentine point ofthe present situation, and itsthe US point ofboth dueundamentalon the part of Uie Argentine Government. It seems clear that President Perdh originally estimated Uiat Argentine resources were such that he could carry out his ambitious five-year plan and at the same time avoid any such compromise of Argentina's long-term policy of complete independence, as would be involved In making important concessions to the US and to US capital in particular. Argentina may derive certain long-run advantages, both political and economic from development leadingreat measure of independence of US and European sources of supply, and the local political advantage deriving from the sponsorship ofrogram, can hardly be questioned. But the attempt to realize all the elements of Uie program simultaneously, and without incurring unpopular obligations to foreign countries,ighly favorable economic situation.
ertain extent Argentina did possess these advantages. When Peron assumed control late5 there was onartime accumulation5 billion in gold and foreign exchnnge. Argentina subsequently gained an equal nmoitnt of hard-
currency exchange Irom heavy jiostwar exports. With these dollar funds and with its supplies of foodstuffs Argentina wastrong position during tlic first two years of the PerOn administration. It was not only independent of US aid. the Argentine market was the largest market for US exports ln thc Hemisphere Argentina didlarge credits to European nations, but because of the urgency of European food requirements and the Impaired European capacity to supply desired industrialin return, theovernment wastrong bargaining position that enabled It to sell at high prices, demand manufactured goods, fuel or other scarce commodities at favorable prices or to demand payment In hard currency which couldused to buy Industrial equipment from the US.
Argentina seems also lo have acted on the assumption that more dollars would become available when its wartime accumulation wasUS loans and grants to Europe wouldresh supply of dollars as the original fund becameHence the Peron administration's plans for future heavy expenditure of dollars, the use of dollars for purchase of US properties, and relative indifference to the possibility of Insuring supplies of dollars by measures designed to encourage US private investment. It is true that extreme nationalist political influence, rather thanto the possibilities of securing dollars, probably explains the administration's reluctance to grant long-term concessions to foreign oil companies and thereby obtain financing for the vital development of its own additional crude production and refinery capacity. Hut the administration needlessly alienated corporations maintaining branch factories and agencies In Argentina, as thc government trade-promotioninterfered with their operations and as the Import business became more andovernment monopoly subjecting US companies to an uncertain future. In general, the growing area of government intervention, which extended to Insurance, transport services, and importation, and the obvious intention of the administration to extend its control of business both directly and indirectly, also actedeterrent to new investment.
Argentina therefore spent as If the country could draw on an inexhaustible balance. Very large Imports from the US duringeriod reached an annual rate0 million In the first quarterhen Argentine sales to the US were at an annual rate of0 million. These heavy outlays, which exhausted Argentina's expendable supply of dollars, were continued despite the renewed inconvertibility of sterling In7 In expectation of large dollar purchases by ECA. Fearhird world war and the anticipation that ECA priorities would give Europeana preferred place in the US market may explain the speed and extravagance with which purchases were made.
Thc situation became critical In June8 The backlog of expendable dollar exchange had been exhausted; payments due for goods on order or already delivered amounted to0 million; blocked remittances of dollar profits of US firms hadotalUlion. In effect Argentina wastate of default to US business despite thc administration's insistence that It would honor all obligations Tlic action taken to give foreigniberalized base on which to cal-
profits, whatever hope it held for thc future, held little immediate interest for US investors in thc absence of dollar funds to remit; and the depreciation of the peso decreed at thc same time as the liberalized base for calculating profits appeared, in the absence of any special conversion rate agreement, to cut down thc dollar total of blocked profits. Thc expected supply of FCA dollar funds did not materialize. In addition, prospects of bumper crops in the US and substantial improvement inagricultural production reversed Argentina's position in international trade from that of being able to make exorbitant demandsellers market to one of competing for buyers at reduced prices. Thc exhaustion of hard-currency exchange, the failure of new dollar supplies to materialize, and the loss of favorable position in food sales have forced the Peron administration to face the necessity of assigning priorities between the various elements in its foreign economic policy, and perhaps modifying the program of government intervention.
The crisis has underlined the conflict between the policies of independence and of economic development and the effect of these policies on the domestic position of the Peron regime and on US-Argentine relations. If the government Is unable to pay for Industrialization in dollars earned in international trade, as It had apparently counted on doing, it must pay in concessions and guarantees to US companies or in special arrangements with the US Government in order lo finance the industrialization program, and these concessions to foreign interests involve ato the stability of the Peronthe nature of Argentine domestic and foreign policy as developed by that regime. Alternatively It must modify itsprogram to suit the reduced dollar receipts, eking these out with goods from European countries, and must reckon with the possibility that failure of the industrialization program would in its turn have serious effects on the stability of the regime.
President Pcrdn is thus facedraveto sacrifice thcappearance of complete independence that is so satisfying to his extravagantly nationalist fellow-countrymen, or to modify the program of economic development that was to give Argentina real independence in the long run. The decision is the more difficult because thc chancesace-saving compromise have been lessened by the regime's own activities; the Peron administration has resorted to such extreme measures in its economic and poliUcal foreign relations, in order to maintain Argentineand to increase the administration's influence at home and abroad, that the distance between those policies tending toward cooperation with the US andwith US business and those policies now accepted as normal by Argentine public opinion has widened considerably. Thus, as the Argentine crisis has deepened,this gap has become more difficult as it has become more necessary.
At present. President Perdn, rather thanlear decision or trying toompromise, appears to be temporizing while endeavoring to determine whether or not US aid will be available in sufficient volume to offset the politicalof curbing anti-US groups. The gravity with which he regards hisdilemma is evident in recent crisis measures employed. He has been simultaneously
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trying to strengthen his political position through demagogic appeals Lo antl-USand intensifying his efforts to obtain urgently needed dollars from thc US. On the one hand he has attempted toS eltixcn and "international capitalist intrigue" in an alleged attempt on his life. On the other hand he has sent theof the Argentine central bank to the US tolan for obtaining dollars, has given renewed assurances ot willingness to comply with US requirements forIn European dollar trade, and has taken preliminary steps towardArgentine economic policyirection more consistent with US views ofcooperative trade policy.
It seems probable that some short-term decision will have to be made ln the near future, bul it seems equally probable that any such decision will always be subject to revision in thc light of Argentine necessities as they seem to the Peron administration to become lets urgent or to press for solution. If President PerOn decides that thc advantages to be gained by making thc concessions required for US aid outweigh the dlsadvantages, the US should be able to exactonsideration both some abatement of anti-US activities and propaganda and also mcrcased cooperation In International agencies and projects. If, on the other hand, meeting US terms seems toackward step in nationalistic policy that the president dare not risk, he will covertly allow thc tempo of his industrialization program to slacken and continue to try to build up Argentina as thc leaderemisphere bloc that would oppose US plans in the Hemisphere, and would stress independent action In world affairs. The coming decision, and any later decisions made in view of changed circumstances will of course be influenced by the severity or moderation of US terms as well as by Argentine need, and also by the manner of the presentation of US terms In relation to President Peron's domestic commitmentsationalist-influenced foreign policy of complete Argentine Independence. The Argentine feeling of rivalry with the US is not likely to disappear; but thc degree of its manifestation during the next fewlonger, possibly depending on USDC lessened by the favorable bargaining positiongiven Ihe US by recent Argentine overestlmatlon of their own strength and present need for US cooperation.
IV. Probable Argentine Policy in the EventS-USSR War2
While the degree of Argentine opposition to or cooperation with the US during the period In which there is no US-USSR war will vary according to the government's changing views of Argentine needs, It Is estimated, weighing all considerations as they exist at the present time, that Argentina will, in thc event ofetween the US and the USSR prioroin in thc war on the side of the US.
Argentine alliance with the USSR inar must be considered extremely unlikely. It Is true that the Peron administration, in implementing its present rather ambiguous foreign policy under the guise of the so-called "Third Position" (opposed equally to capitalist and Communistas al the propaganda level attacked the US much more vigorously than It has attacked the USSR. It is also true that the Argentine Government has engaged In tentative efforts to play Soviet states off against
SRfiiHKT
US. Bui Ihere is no visible basis for Argentinepossibly the highly tenuous basis of likeness of interest in such control of US power and influence as to permit Soviet expansion in the world and Argentine expansion in thein an Argentine-USSR alignment. In fact, Soviet efforts during the past two years toasis of collaboration with Argentina against the US have been frustrated by this lack of community of interest. One possible bond by which the Soviets may have hoped to attractof heavy equipment essential tomost cherished goal of economicproved valueless because of the Soviet's inability to furnish such equipment. In view of the present deficit position of Soviet heavy industry, such inability may be expected to last at least over the next few years, and to preclude any Argentine alignment with the USSR which would make impossible obtaining from the US, the best potential source, theso urgently required. In case of war between the US and USSR, thesewould apply with even greater force, in view of the fact ihat the US, by control of the seas, will presumably be able to interdict any significant shipments that thc Soviets might undertake to Argentina.
There ore also impressive reasons for expecting that Argentina would not only refrain from making common cause with the Soviets but would also reject neutrality in favor of cobelligerence on the side of the US.
Argentine power policy on the continent of South America hasrimarymaximum Argentine capabilities visd-vis Brazil.esult of US arming of Brazil during World War II, that countryarge power advantage overThe Peron administration, with strong army support, has demonstrated its determination to redress this balance and has made diligent efforts to obtain weapons and military equipment from all promising sources. Although Argentina's postwar arms procurement program hasonsiderable measure of success, particularly in aircraft categories, lt has not supplied Argentina with materiel adequate for amilitary establishment equivalent to Brazilian armed strength, and it is doubtful that this parity can be achievedt is highly doubtful that Argentina would risk the aggravation of Brazil's power advantage which could be expected to result from Argentine neutralityhird world war. Rivalry with Brazil is aassumption of Argentine foreign policy, and there is every reason to believe that the Peron government views prominence in military capabilities, and loyalty of the army through satisfaction of ambitions for rearmament as Important for theof its priority purpose of increased influence and prestige in Latin America.
It Is estimated also that Argentina's general position in the Hemisphere would sufferolicy of neutralityS-Soviet war. Consolidation of international sentiment against neutrals on the outbreak of hostilities would probably convince the Argentines that cobelligerence would offer better prospects for acquiring the Falkland Islands and hegemony over southern South America. It Is also probable that the demand for sanctions against any Hemisphere government which remained aloof fromar would be much stronger that in past wars, because the US public would be much more conscious of the high stakes involved.
f
By remaining neutral, Argentina would also forfeit whatever clfllm It may have to Latin American leadership. In casear between the US and thc USSR, the governments of thc other American republics can be expected to align themselves with the US more readily than in World War II. because of (ear of the consequencesommunist victory and because the pro-Soviet segments of their populations are less influential than were pro-Axis elements In the last war.
Argentina also appears to have larger reasons for supporting the US evenuture war with the Soviets did not extend to the Hemisphere security zone, and If the US had less than an even chance to win. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the death or political eclipse of Perdn would resultifferent course of action, since thc army would probably take over and could be expected to be influenced both by Its desire for US arms and equipment and Its aversion to Communism. The occupation of Western Europe by thc USSR would change present relations between Argentina and the USSRarked degree. Currently the Soviet government finds Argentine notionalist policies useful in maximizing friction in the Western Hemisphere. However, if Soviet influence extended to the Atlantic and could be brought to bear on Argentina, possibly facilitated through Communist control of Spain wiih which Argentina has close lies, Soviet policies could be expected to change in accordance with thc new opportunities. Argentine policy-makers must realize that at that time an Independent and nationalist Argentina would have less value to thc USSR, and that the USSR could be expected to work toommunist administration in Argentina.
umber of basic domestic factors will tend strongly to assure Argentine cobelligerence on the side of the US in case of war with the USSR. Military elements would exert pressure for participation and the government could expect to strengthen its position by rallying the predominantly Catholic populace In supportar which would probably be effectively propagandized by the Westrusade against atheistic Slav Communism. Furthermore, President Peron himself is reliably reported to be apprehensive of the threat of Communism to his government and to Argentina. These reports arc substantiated by his administration's development and currentof an ambitious secret master plan which contemplates thc possible necessityreak in relations with the Slav states in accomplishing the purpose of eliminating the Communist potential from Argentinany final doubt that might exist in Argentine government circles on the advisabilityeclaration of war against the Soviets wnuld In all probability be resolved by the pressing need for wartime controls and US supplies and equipment lo deal with large-scale public disturbances and acute world shortages that would Inevitablylobal corfuct between thc US and the USSR
It is not possible to predict the exact nature, extent or timing of Argentineeasonable minimum estimate wouldro forma declaration of war, strict domestic control of hostile and subversive elements, and making supplies available on terms profitable to Argentina. It is also considered highly probable that Argentina would wish to be assigned certain specific responsibilities in coordinating and executing coastal and sea-lane defense in Its area, and would desire to furnish expeditionary
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forces of the approximate size agreed on for Brazil. Both the timing of thc Argentine declaration of cobelllgcrency and thc extent of its cooperation will probably be affected by the way in which the war begins and thus by the obligations that devolve upon Argentina under the Inter-American Treaty of Heeiprocal Assistance, it Is believed that Argentina will ratify the Rio treaty and formally fulfill its obligations under that instrument If.ar begins outside the Hemisphere zone described by the treaty. Argentina may take advantage of its limited obligation to consult and thereby delay any positively helpful action lest It appear overly ready (from the traditional Argentine point of view) to come to the assistance of the US. It must be expected that the Argentines will In any event endeavor tohrewd bargain for thelr parllcipatlon. either ln direct discussion wltli US authorities if an attack occurs against the US in thc Western Hemisphere defense zone, or in inter-American deliberations according to the machinery provided by the Rio treaty in case thc war begins outside that zone.
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that, if war between thc US and thc USSR occursrgentina willobelllgerent with thc US. and that the promptness, extent and effectiveness of Argentine cooperation will depend on the future course of US-Argentine relations and on bargains struck at the time.
APPENDIX
RECENT IMPLEMENTATION OP ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY
Analysis at lhe recent implementation of Argentine foreign policy clearlythat the Peron administration has adhered to traditional Argentine objectives. It has, however, adapted its program to thc changes in its international position brought about by World War II, and has guided its relations with the US with reference to the requirements of ils accelerated industrialization program.
a. United Nations.
In central UN bodies the objectives of Argentine foreign policy have generally coincided with those ol thc US on vital Issues. The Argentine delegates have voted with the US with noteworthy consistency when the US-USSR division has been clear and unmistakable, except as on such issues as freedom of Information. But alsowith Argentina's foreign policy objectives has been the effort to capitalizeleadersliip in seeking compromise solutions, to use the UNounding board toreater Argentina under Peron leadership, to oppose the unequal position of the great powers in the UN organization, and to oppose thc censure of Spain in accordance with Argentina's long opposition to intervention in domestic affairs and its special frlendsliip for Spain.
In the special UN organizations, the pursuit of Argentine special interests has made its delegates far less cooperative than in the central UN organizations. In some they have not eventhe International Emergency Food Committee, the World Bank, and the Monetarysuch participation was considered inimical to national interests or did not suit the government line of economicIn those organizations, in which Argentine delegateshe ITO Conference in Habana--they have on the whole vigorously opposed the US program, emphasizing what they considered national Interest in spheres such as bilateral as opposed to multilateral trade. The divisions between the US andin these gatherings have been underlined by Argentine efforts to capitalize on them for propaganda purposes and by the obvious notice taken of these differences by other delegations participating.
Argentina's record at the ITO Conference is fairly typical of its activities atconlcrenccs directly involving national interests. The bitter attack of Senatorchief of the delegation, on the ITO Charter and on US economic policies was an expression of the powerful nationalist influence ln the Peion government that resists any immediate limitations on Argentina's economic sovereignty in return for what that group considers the unlikely advantages of international cooperation. This group felt that Argentina had much to lose from multilateral economic agreements and that It could strike more favorable bargainsilateral basis using its decisive weapon of control of food supplies. The attack on US economic policy was calculated to under-
mine support tor Lhe US by appealing to Latin American delegations ond to those of other undeveloped areas thai view protective quotas, exchange controls, state trading, and bilateral and preferential agreements as natural devices to protect their infant industries and to find markets for their raw materials.
b. frifcr-duicrfcan System.
Historically lhe significance of Argentina to tlic attainment of US policyhas been most clearly revealed in Argentine obstruction In inter-AmericanMotivated by the desire (or independence and leadership in Latin America and conditioned by strong ties with Europe. Argentina has been the least cooperative of republics In the Inter-American system. Inevitably this position in relation to inter-American cooperation has Involved very frequent obstruction to US inter-American policy by Argentine representatives. The attitudes of the Peron administration in the Inter-American system appear to have been no less cooperative than those of previous administrations and on certain issues they have been more cooperative.
At the7 Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiroof the Peron government supported the US-sponsored Inter-American Defense Plan which was the main item on the agenda. With Lhe backing of most of the Army and Lhe Peronista Parly, Peron offered this unprecedented degree of Argentinein inter-American affairs despite considerable domestic opposition fromRadicals, Communists, and some members of the armed forces, in doing so, he was apparently motivatedope of obtaining US technical and material aid for Argentina's industrial and armament expansion program as well asesire to perfect arrangements for defense of the Hemisphere in casehird world war.
In Insisting at the Bogota Conference8 thaL political and militaryshould be withheld from, and that no broad economic powers should be granted to. the central organization of the Inter-American system, Lhe Argenlluc represenlalivcs gave renewed evidence lhat Peron's foreign policy embraces the traditional Argentine aversion to cooperation in the inter-American sysU'in at the cost of what itossible .sacrifice of Argentine sovereignty. The traditional Argentine fearsuper state" was employed early in the conference as the basis for ostensibleto collective action against Communism Actually, this obstruction seems to have been merely partaneuver designed toargaining position on the Falkland Islands question. Eventual Argentine adherence to the resolution for the defense of democracy against international Communism was consistent with President Peron's cfforl* to initiate action of this nature atonference.
The Argentine offer at Bogota, to contribute generously to the capitalization of an Inter-American Bank for economic development and to provide an important part of the machinery and raw materials needed by the other Latin Americanwasretentious gesture designed to extend Argentine influence in the Hemisphere at the expense of that of the US The offer was timed to take advantage of the bitter disappointment of Lhe other American republics with Secretary Marshall's statement that European reconstruction was first in importance and lhal Latincountries should rely principally on private capital lor economic development.
This wasollow ofler since Argentina itself is in need of machinery and its abmty at the time to make foreign loans was essentially limited to the sale of food surpluses on credit.
c. Relations with European Countries.
The political relations of the Peron administration with Europe have been marked in general by attempts to turn Argentine economic advantage to political use in gaining power and prestige at home and abroad, and by tentative moves to engage in the game of playing off European countries against the US. Only relations with the UK and with Spain merit particular note.
Tension between Argentina and the UK over their conflicting territorial claims, which gained world attention following the dispatch of British, Argentine, and Chilean naval units to Antarctica inhaseentury-old dispute over the Falkland Islands and of recent changes in world power relationships. The Perdn government has revived the dispute at this time both for current domestic political advantage, and because it sees an opportunity in the weakening of British power to recover the islands by direct pressure or with the support of the US and thc Inter-Amcrlcan system. President Peron did not hesitate before the Bogota Conference to play off US concern with the USSR in an attempt to gain US support for Argentine claims to the Falklands against those of the UK. Failing in this, he collaborated with other governments in obtaining sufficient support at the conference for the passageesolution, from which the US abstained, that condemned the occupation of American territories by extra-continental powers. The dispute in Antarctica, which also reflects the growing ambitions of the Argentine Government, differs from the Falklandsin that the rights of the claimants are less well-defined and because otherare involved as actual or potential claimants. Recent Argentine disapproval of the termsS proposal to settle conflicting Antarctic claims through jointby an eight-power condominium and Indications that Argentina will Increase the intensity of its efforts against the UK over the Falklands emphasize the significance of the prestige-conscious and expansionist Peron foreign policy in relation to US
Present Argentine relations with Spain areense complementary to the change in its relations with Britain. The Peron administration has cut Important ties that bound Argentina to Britainentury and has declared its independence of British guidance. At the same time it has also undertaken what might be termed an Argentine adoption of Spain. The Peron government has extended credits to Franco, shipped urgently needed foodstuffs, assumed the role of his strongest defender in the UN and projected the extensive use of Spain as Argentina's entrepot for the sales of goods to Europe. In return for benefits received, Franco Spain hasonsistently friendly policy toward Peron and has lent itself to his use of propaganda emphasizing kinship with the mother country, which has been an important vehicle In his drive for Latin American union under Argentine leadership.
JEQRET
with the Soviet Rloc.
The Parte administration, although stressing its anti-Communist character in national politics, hasistinction between its attitude toward the localParty and thai toward the Soviets and has continued to canyporadic affair with the USSR. Because the Communist Party has nothreat to the Argentine Government and because Argentine propaganda is gearedeutralas between capitalism and Communism. President Peron has felt himself under no strong compulsion to break relations and to make hostile gestures toward the Soviet as part of an anti Communist campaign On the contiary. Argentine economic negotiations with thcsoon after Presidentame lo power, suspended forear, and renewed with thc gathering financial crisis and receding prospects of ECAentative effort to use the USSR as ato US Influence. Althuugh il is extremely unlikely that Argentina will find any firm basis of collaboration with the Soviets because of the stronglycharacter of Argentina and because the basis for substantia) trade Intercourse does not exist, Perdn's relative tolerance for the Soviets in the context of balance as against thc US contains potentially serious dangers to the Hemisphere and US security interests. The quasi-Marxian content of the "Third Line" propaganda offensive in Latin America directed against the US has impaired the Argentine potential forin any Hemisphere effort against Communism. Furthermore Soviet anddiplomatic representatives in Argentina have effectively used their diplomatic status for proselytizing and organizing Slav groups who constitute the chosen instrument of planned sabotage for the Soviets.
with Lotm American Countries.
The activities of the Perdn government most conspicuously directed against US inleresls have been undertaken in connection with Argentine efforts to extend its influence among Latin American states. Labor propaganda has been an outstanding weapon used by the administration in its attempts lo displace US influence. Peronista labor leaders, who have been conspicuous in Argentina's postwar foreign propaganda offensive, arc thoroughly Indoctrinated with anti-US propaganda and have made It their business to tear down the US while building up Argentina. Argentine foreign policy in the Latin American countries leans heavily on the identity of race, language, and culture, and, as in the case of its labor policy, it has taken on an anti-USPresident Peron himself appealed in his8 broadcast message to the Mexican people on lhe anniversary of Argentine independence, for the indestructible unity of the two nations "prompted by the voice of blood, religion, and language-coupling this with an attack on "imperialist capital and international trusts."
Reactions of the other Latin American governments to attempts to extend Argentine influence through labor, nationalist, military, and general propagandavary considerably. The governments of nearbyall potential membersouthernexpressed to US officials serious misgivingsthe purpose of Argentine activities. They have repeatedly complained that the
Peron administration is trying to infiltrate labor, nationalist, and military circles and thereby toommanding position in local politics. The Brazilian Government has also voiced its suspicion that Argentina Is actively working to gain control ofSouth America. Governments ol countries farther north are naturally lesswith the problem of Argentine political or economic domination. They appear in some cases to have welcomed tokens of Argentine Interest as providing aweapon in their dealings with the US. This is especially true in Central America and the Caribbean, lo which areas thc combined operations of labor, nationalist, and anti-US propaganda have been carried with particular emphasis by Argentine missions.
To date the political operations of the Argentine Government have not attained any large measure of success in Latin America. They have been hampered by lack of plan, inferior personnel, the tendency of other Latin American countries to look to the US for leadership on matters of importance,istrust of Argentina which in some casesistrust of the US, and by Argentina's own need to maintain friendly relations with the US.
DISSENT OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
he Office ol Naval Intelligence dissents from those portions (Section IV and part of Summary) ofhich estimate the probable Argentine policy in thc event of aUS-USSR waror the following reasons:
believes that, in the eventS-USSR war, Argentina woulda course of Neutrality rather than cobeffigerency on the side of the US, because:
Her foreign policy will be opportunistic and maintenanceeutral position would be to her advantage.
Neutrality would not necessarily mean the loss of Argentine leadership in South America. Basically she is far superior to other Latin nations and thisadvantage is not lost by non-participationar on the other side of the world.
Thc Communist threat to Argentina is too remote to be used as "pressureeclaration of war".
does not believe that the advantages to the US of Argentinenecessarily outweigh the disadvantages. "Benevolent" neutrality mightUS with required Argentine support but with fewer US obligations.
Si s.
Original document.
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