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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
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PROBABUZ DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
SUMMARY
Communist control of Taiwan and consequent Soviet access to the island lnwould nave seriously unfavorable strategic lmpbcations for the US.
From the legal standpoint, Taiwan ls not part of the Republic ofapanese peace treaty, thc Island remains occupied territory in which the US has proprietary interests.
The native population of Taiwan would welcome release from Chinese control, bul is not now strong enough touccessful revolt The Taiwanese arerestive, however, because of the Influx of Nationalist officials and military forces, and will become more susceptible to Communist influence.
Assuming US inactivity. Taiwan will eventually pass under the control of thc Chinese Communists. In any US program to prevent this, the advantages to be gained from the strategic military viewpoint would have to be weighed against unfavorable political consequences, the extent of which would vary depending upon the selection and tuning of measures for implementing the program
At the present time there appears to be no realistic means for preventing the early establishmentommunist-dominated government over all China. It can bethatovernment would strive to establish its authority in Taiwan There Is evidence that even now the Chinese Communists are seeking to extend their control to tliat island, and they may be expected to continue these efforts. The Chinesewill not finally secure their prospective victory in China until they control Taiwan, inasmuch as the present National Government is now developing Taiwanrincipal base for continuing the struggle agatnsi Communism. It is assumed In this discussion that the orientation of the Chinese Communists will remain pro-Soviet, andovernment established by them wouldartime ally of thc USSR.
Hole: The Intelligence oreanizauoru of Uie Department* of State. Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report; thc InlelllEencc Division, Department o( the Army, had no com ment. Thc Information herein Is as ot9
SBQnUT
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
Importance op Taiwan to the US.
The strategic implications of Chinese Communist control of Taiwan with the prospect of consequent Soviet access to the island, would be seriously unfavorable to the security of the US.
Communist victories in China will probably in thc near future deny US access to all the strategically valuable areas of the Chinese mainland. This circumstance will Increase the potential value to the US of Taiwan, In the event of war, as an area for staging troops,ase for strategic air operations,aval base for controlling sea routes between Japan and the south, and as an important link in the US defense chain of mutually supporting islands.
Assumingew Communist Government in China will be oriented toward the USSR, and wouldartime Soviet ally. Communist control of Taiwan would allow Soviet access to the island in the event of war. Military exploitation of Taiwan by the USSR would increase Soviet capability for disrupting sea and air communications in the Western Pacific area, and for conducting operations against the Ryukyus and the Philippines.
Taiwan does not possess any significant quantities of strategic materials nor docs itarge industrial potential. The island, nevertheless, would be an economicratheriability to any occupying power. Taiwan currently producessurpluses of rice, sugar, and other foods which could play an important role in the food-deficit economies ol either China or Japan. Ii sufficient fertilizer were available, agricultural production could be increased substantially. Although the industrial plant of Taiwan is small in comparison with that of Japan, its very existence in thebackward Far East givesignificance out of proportion to its actual size.
If Taiwan's rice and sugar were available to Japan, it would lighten the US burden in that area by partially relieving Japan's dependence on more distant and lesssources in Southeast Asia. The textiles and other consumer goods as well as industrial equipment which Japan could supply Taiwan could be profitably absorbed by the Island's economy. Thus it is very probable that thc separation of the economy of Taiwan from the Chinese mainland and the re-orientation of that economy toward Japan would under present circumstances be beneficial to Taiwan. Japan, and the US.
Status of Taiwan.
At the present time Taiwan is notart ot the Chinese Republic. Its status remains to be determined In the peace treaty with Japan. The island has, however, been under Chinese adnuhistration since the Japanese surrenderhina'sIn Taiwan restsilitary control,he Cairo Declarationn which the US and the UK as well as China announced their purpose to restore Taiwan and the Pescadores to the Republic of Clilna. The US and the UK reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration at Potsdam onubsequently thc USSR adhered lo the Potsdam Proclamation, and thereby to the Cairo Declaration. However,
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neither the US, nor Any other power, has formally recognized thc annexation by China of Taiwan, the legal status of which, until the conclusionapanese peace treaty, Is that of an occupied territory in which the US, as well as thc other participants in the war against Japan, still have proprietary interests.
3. Paorunia Dxvbloi'MKKTs in Taiwan.
There is strong sentiment ba Taiwan favoring autonomy, but the situation isby the conflicting Interests of the native Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalist elements. The Taiwanese bitterly resent the performance of the NaUonallston Taiwan since VJ-day. The Chinese rulers have exploited the nativeto the limit, without regard for their welfare or the preservation of the island's resources. The explosive nature of the Taiwanese problem was dramaticallyIn the abortive Insurrection
& Taiwanese Aspirations and Capabilities.
The native population of Taiwan would welcome release from their domination by mainland Chinese. The Taiwanese probably do not have strong aspirations forindependence, but could be expected torusteeship status under the UN or some form of US protectorate.
A successful Taiwanese rebellion against the CI iin esc Government in the near future is quite Improbable, owing to lack of effective organization and leadership and the presence of Nationalist military forces on the Island. It is quite probable,that thc Taiwanese may resort to acts of violence and sabotage at any time in protest against the current influx of mainland Chinese. These outbreaks may be prompted, not so much by hope of success asesire to draw the attention of world opinion to the Taiwanese problem Furthermore, evenon-Communist Taiwanese regime were established, its abtUtyong period of time lo withstand pressure from the Communist-dominated mainland would be slight. In view of the lack ofexperience of potential Taiwanese leaders and the economic problems which would confront their regime.
b. Nationalist Remnants in Taiwan.
With the disintegration of the National Government on thc mainland, Chinese Nationalist leaders have made significant progress In the development of Taiwanase for continued resistance andinal refuge. Tbe families and propertiesumber of highly placed Nationalists as well as some important officials have already moved to Taiwan. In addition, the government has transferred lo the island thc major part of its gold bullion resources. The government may have as many as six divisions now in training on thcumber which may be increased by withdrawal oftroops from thc mainland. The equipment and ammunition supplies of these troops have been augmented by recent slupments of war materials from thc US at the Taiwanese port of Keelung. Moreover. Taiwan is being prepared as the principal base for the Chinese Navy and Air Force.
Some Nationalist elements apparently contemplate continuing resistance to the Communists from the southeast provinces of the mainland, perhaps coordinated with other resistance offered by non-Communist elements in Uie southwest and western provinces. In this plan, Taiwan will serverincipal military and economic base, and,ast resort, the seatump National Government driven off the mainland. The Importance attached to Taiwan Is Indicated by the recent appointment of former Chief of Staff Chen Cheng as governor. There are many indications that Chiang Kai-shek, who still retains the title of President, may himself move to Taiwan. Nationalist leaders have publicly prcclaimed their Intention of making the Island anbastion for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and have privately suggested to US officials that ECA aid be diverted there, and that trade relations between Japan and Taiwan be resumed.
A Nationalist rump government on Taiwan cannot be relied upon to prevent the Communists from gaining control of the Island. The Nationalist Army. Navy, and Air Force are not only inefficient, but their loyalty and will to fight are questionable. In addition,efugee regime would be unstable because of the hostility of the local population which. In these circumstances, would be Increasingly susceptible to Communist Influence.
c. Communist Capabilities with Respect to Taiwan.
Although Communist strength on Taiwan has not yet attained significantit is apparent that the Communists plan to extend their control to the Island; they have. In fact, named Taiwan among the sixteen major centers of resistance which they intend to occupy. In the next few months thc Communists may acquireports and shipping which will provide the opportunityilitary assault on Taiwan, but this could probably be repulsed by the Nationalists so long as the navy and air force remained loyal. The Communists, therefore, will probably try to extend their influence among thc Taiwanese by infiltration and by political means, instead ofto take the Island by direct assault. Through infiltration, the Communists could provide effective leadership and arms for the Taiwanese Insurgents; and through political means, such as offering amnesty or even rewards to Nationalist leadersa Communist triumph, the Nationalist will lo resist could be reduced. Thus, the Chinese Nationalist administration, unless supported by US military force, would eventually be deposedommunist-led native movement
There Is also some prospect that the Communists might acquire control over Taiwan by political means alone,ationalist-Cominunlst agreementart of peace negotiationsational or local scale- It is unlikely that thewould agree to any settlementational scale unless the Communists, by its terms, were assured control over the government military forces and resources in Taiwan.
Assuming US inactivity, Taiwan will eventually but probably not immediately pass under the control of the Chinese Communists
or US Measures to Deny Taiwan to Communist Domination.
Any US measures lorogram of denying Taiwan lo eventualdomination would have some unfavorable political consequences.
is unlikely that the US. In any course of action, can avoid incurringof cither the Chinese Nationalists or the Taiwanese, each of whom wouldresist any US effort to support the other. US acquiescence ln NationalistTaiwan is resented by the Taiwanese. Positive support to the Nationalistsdrive the Taiwanese toward the Communists. On the other hand, USTaiwanese aspirations would require taking over authority from theregime.
measures to affect the course of events in Taiwan would provide thethe Chinese Communists with additional material for their anti-US propaganda.
sentiment probably would Increase in China, where the returnto thc Republic of China is acceptedact, although the extent wouldon the nature of the measures adopted by the US. This issue couldpopular supportommunist regime in China.
would probably preclude the US maintaining normal diplomatic andrelationshipsommunist government in China, If such relations wereThis would certainly be the case if the US supported or was accused ofa rump National government on Taiwan.
on the nature of the US program, the Taiwanese problemraised In the UN to the embarrassment of the US.
On the other hand, some courses of US action might produce results beneficial lo US interests. The will to resist Communism In Japan, In Korea, in the Philippines and elsewhere throughout the Par East, including thc southeast coastal areas of China, might beefinite US program toward Taiwan would be viewed as an Indication of US determination lo check thc advance of Communism in the Far East wherever practicable lo do so. Favorable reaction might develop if the US program were developed inay as to secure local stability and contentment in Taiwan and to satisfy Taiwanese sentiment in favor of autonomy. The program would have to be supplemented by an informational campaign designed to demonstrate that the US was favorable to Far Eastern nationalist aspirations. If not. the political consequences throughout the Far East could be distinctly unfavorable to the US.
Thc situation In Taiwan is steadily growing more critical for the US because of Taiwanese discontent. Chinese Nationalist preparation of the islandast bastion, and increasing Chinese Communist interest in and capabilities toward the island.US inactivity, Taiwan will eventually pass to thc control of the ChineseThc strategic Implications to US security ofevelopment would beunfavorable. In any US program to prevcnl Communist control of Taiwan, the advantages to be gained thereby from the strategic military viewpoint would have lo be weighed against unfavorable political consequences, the extent of which would vary depending upon thc selection and timing of measures for implementing the program.
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Original document.
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