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CURRENT SITUATION IN BURMA SUMMARY
Burma's importance to the security interests of the US lies less in Ils geographical location than in Its economic potential and its political positionoung nation newly freed from colonial controls. Burma's present governmenttrong "anti-imperialist" bias, and its program for reconstruction of the country is based onstale socialism Al lhe endhaotic year of independence, the government is In serious straits, faced with dangerous economic dislocationesult of the armed revolt of numerous factions The government will probably be Dble to surviveime, partly through the assistance of foreign loans and partly because thc dissident factions arc not united. No person, group, or combination of groups appears to be capable of regaining control over all of Burma. Before II Is able to revive authority and restore peace, the government will have to obtain different leadership and broaden its representative base. As matters stand the government can probably maintain its position through force of arms. Otherwise any change can mean surrender of power through further assassinationsoup d'etat.
In short. Burma's future appears extremely gloomy The Burmese Government Is incapable of developing an orderly state by its own efforts However, should ato Burma's unstable Internal condition be foundovernment friendly to the Western Powers emerge, the example of this successful transfer from colonialism to independence willonsiderable effect on the orientation of other Southeast Asian nations facing the same problems- If the transition Is unsuccessful, however, not only willdden Burma be open to Soviet exploitation, but the rest of Southeast Asia will interpret this as evidenceurther decline in western ability to stem the advance of Communism in the Fur East.
Note The intelligence organizations of lheol Si.ue.d sheove concurred in Uiis report The information herein is as
CURRENT SITUATION IN BURMA 1. iMfORTAJiCS TO TUB US.
Burma, as one of the nations of Southeast Asia, is locatedritical geographical area of the Far East Its political importanceS point of view will Increase as Communist influence in China continues to extend southward Economically, Burma is importantood surplus areaegion of food deficits. Burma is alsolo the US, however, because Its position in international alignments is stiltAlthough the present Burmese Governmentesire for friendlywith all major powers, thereopular antipathy towards "Anglo-Americannd unstable conditions in Burma arc conducive to the penetration and extension of Soviet influence.
ommunist government gained firm control of South China, it would be able to render aid to indigenous Burmese Communists and seriously embarrass theof Burma. One result mightommunist or Communist-dominated regime in Rangoon.evelopment, especiallyro-Soviet Government gained control of French Indochina, wouldirect threat to the existing regimes in Slam and Malaya Should these developments materialize, events in Burma would indirectly affect US access to the extensive human and natural resources and strategic military bases in Southeast Asia
US-Burma trade In the past has never been of great consequence, but consumer goods arc in strong demand in Burma, and trade could be stimulated when and if Burma were stabilized. As the world's leading exporter of rice. Burma normallyital economic contribution to several areas in the Far East. Before World War II, Burma's annual export of rice exceeded three million tons, more than forty percent of the total moving In world trade About one-third of thc prewar average Is presently being exported. Rice production, which had climbed steadily after the war's end, has been hampered seriously by the outbreak of widespread insurrection that occurred earlyhisatter of concern because Burma's rice surplus Is required to relieve food shortages in China. Japan. Malaya, India, and Ceylon, which countries contribute directly or indirectly to the success of the European Recovery Program, and where the US has important economic and strategic interests of its own
The unstable Burmese political situation Is of more Immediate importance to the US. The provisions of the new Burmese constitution and the pronouncements ofBurmese leaders place Burma politically far to the left and commit the countryrogram of state socialism Furthermore, while no Burman is known to have visited the USSR for Indoctrination. Soviet propaganda and political philosophy havetriking effect on Burmese thinking. Many Influential Burmans, olher than uvowed Communists, advocate closer relations with the USSR and regard with suspicion the UK and US, which they consider "imperialistic andinally avowed Burman Communists are in armed rebellion against the government in widely scattered
Communists, whether or not in cooperation with the several other dissident groups In Burma, are capablerolonged struggle which will retard, if not prevent, the establishment of stable internal conditions
If future stability and prosperity in Burma could be partly attributed lo Western assistance, it might incline other nations of Southeast Asia to identify their interests with the Western Democracies. The country could assume an important, although limited, role In the restoration and expansion of world trade, international cooperation, and general political stability. An unstable Burma, however, wouldurther extension of Soviet influences in both the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas
3. abu Ftttuke Develop mxnts.
The present Burmese Government, with or without modification, will probably survive for some time, but its chance of reasserting control over all of Burma is very remote. No person, group, or combination of groups appears to be capable of putting Burma's house In order. Before it Is able lo revive authority and restore peacethe country, the government will have to infuse new and more capable leadership into its administration, broaden Its representative base, obtain foreign financial and military assistance, and come to an effective working agreement with the various ethnic minority groups- Its ability to accomplish any one. much less all. of these tasks Is highly questionable.
The Government of Burma is dominated by young, ambitious, inexperienced and inept politicians of the more extreme nationalistic, leftist variety. None of them appears capable of assuming constructive leadership Furthermore, their ideologies and private ambitions do not always coincide, since personal considerations are often placed above the general welfare of the country.s almost inevitable that these politicians, rather than voluntarily give up the power and position they have so recently acquired, will resort increasingly to policeethods in order to remain in office. If so. the possibilityhange in government, by means ofoup d'etat, should not be ruled out.
There is no doubt that Burma's economic situation will continue to deteriorate under existing conditions. While the government may receive some financial assistance from Ihe UK and perhaps from India, it will encounter serious difficulties in preventing inflation and in maintaining the currency at its present rate of exchange The fall of exports, imports, and production is likely to resulttandard of living at alevel or below
No general, amicable settlement o( Burma's most pressing political problem, Kurcn-Burman animosity, is expected in the near future. If the government succeeds In Itslo unite thc Burmans in the face of the Karen threat, the Karens are likely to be overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers in the lowland areas, and either be annihilated or driven Into the hillsstern Burma If Buimans remain divided politically,the Karens may be able to gain control of considerable areas of the lowlands and set up some sort of state of their own. It would be subject to constant pressure from Burmans both from within and without, and its existence would be precarious The
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notably the Shuns, Chins, and Kachlns, will take advantage of Burman preoccupation to strengthen their own autonomy.
There arc two other possible political developments in Burma. Thc first Is that various Burman insurgent groups couldoalition, probably underleadership, which might be capable of overthrowing the present government,If assistance were forthcoming from Communist China Operating against this is the fact thatoalition would experience serious internal stresses ofand, externally, would find ranged against it both those Burmans who now support the government and the various minorities as well. The second and more likely possibility is that the government mightoliUcal settlement with Its fcllow-Burman rebels, particularly since differences, when they exist In Burmeseoften assume far less significance than personalities, power and prestige. If the Burmans unite,evelopment may offer the Communists an opportunity toa coalition government on terms more favorable than have heretofore been offered them. In this event, the ethnic mlnoriues would probably oppose the arrangement vigorously, with thc result that ethnic factionalism would be greaUy intensified.
In short. Burma's future appears extremely gloomy. The Burmese Government is Incapable of developing an orderly state by its own efforts Some type of foreign mediation, perhaps under Indian leadership, may be attempted lo stop Karen-Burman fighting.olution appears remote at this time because ideological differences are so great, emotional animosities so deep, and Burman resentment and fear of foreign intervention so pathological. Even though outside mediation of the racial problem succeeded, the difficulties created by other dissident elements would remain. Chaotic conditions will continue until some forceful and generally acceptable Burman leader, or group, capable of restoring stability to thc entire country, appears upon the scene. The only alternative is western Intervention which Is Improbable at the present. Until effective leadership emerges, the present disorders may be expected to continue, leaving Burma with Utile moree jure government
3. The Political Situation.
Someillion citizens ol the Republic of the Union of Burma became independent of the British Commonwealthft in an atmosphere of high optimism regarding the future. Burmese leaders and their followers alike believed thatand state socialism would be the solution to most of their country'spolitical and economic problems. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFU. the most influential political organlzaUon In Burma, commanded anmajority in the Provisional Parliament, and possessed widespread popular supportesult of its leading role In the struggle for independence. Thc only effective opposition organizaUons were the Burma Communisl Party (BCP| and the Karen National Union (KNUJ, the latter representing Burma's largest ethnicgroup. The BCP held only seven of over two hundred seals In tin- Chamber of
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Deputies (the lowerhile the KNU had no lepresentation in the government because it had boycotted the7 elections. The assassination, however, on7 of the guiding genius and revered leader ol the Burmese independence move ment. Aung San, together with six other high Burmese officials, deprived Burma of its most promising leadership.
ear of independence, no effective leadership has emerged. The three major problems which had faced the newof law and order, development of an effective administration, and hastening of economicunsolved. Atomplete break-down of governmental authority is threatened by political factionalism expressed through armed revolt, chronicracial violence between Karens and Burmans. inexperience of high governmeni officials, and political nepotism. Cabinet ministers live behind barbed wire and are never without bodyguards. The government, dominated by the Socialist Parly which Is the only Important entity remaining in the AFPFL. maintains itself only through the support of its armed forces and by increasing use of police state methods. Even so. the police and army control only thc larger centers of population ln dissident areas, and have great difficulty maintaining communications. Some army and police units have deserted lo the insurgents, and more may be expected lo follow. This instability has been accompaniedteady deterioration of the country's economy. Under these conditions, the government has last considerable prestige and support.
Five distinct groups are in armed insurrection against the Burmese Government. Three of these groups, the "Redommunists, and the "While Band" PVO', are ethnically Burman organizations. Their struggle against lhe Governmentailer of conflicting ambition rather than any basic ideological difference. The other two groups are Karen' andthnic minorities who, suspicious and apprehensive of living under Burman rule,arge degree of autonomy or complete independence.
1 The "Red Flae"n offshoot of the Burmese Communist Partyerein Januaryed Flagrobably not more than aare eaueraely aeUve. largely in the Arakan DUtnct and the oil-field regions of(seelthough Thaain floe, teaser of ine Red Flags, has been Ln governmentKverat months, his arrest haa not hampered the actions of his followers
'The "White Flap" CornmuruaU iBCFl followed the Tied Flag- group underground in March IMS. when the government finally took firm measure* to curtail their acuities. The BCP's nu-mrrkcal strength ia unknown,uch greater than th* Red Fiag group, and it has afollowing among Burmesetudent* and the press 3CP acuvitlei center In the Yamethln and Pegu Districts of renual Burma, the Irrawaddy Delta, and in* Irrawaddy and Sit'.ang River valleys isee map).
'The 'Whit* Band"he major factionartime military
People'* Volunteer OrganizationMl up by Ihc late Aung San. The PVO together with the Socialists, In turn, were the major members ol thc coalition Anti-Fasclstreedom Lcacuc Parly (AFPKLi When, Inie government proposed to accept Communist groups, upon condition that they disarm,ew all-inclusive Leftist Union Party designed lo replace the AFPKU Uie "White Band" PVO rocoEniwd an oppormnity io enhance iu Influence "White Band" PVO leaders demanded that the governmeni first negotiate with the Communists before asking them to stop their Insurrection. The government refused The "While Band" PVO Ihen waited out leaving the Socialism in controleriously weakened government "While Band" PVOoughly csumated to be at. and Include* tomr moit
Although the Communists have only slight ideological grounds for disagreement with the government's socialistic policy, they have strenuously objected to certain provisions of the Anglo-Burmese Treaty, and have used the Treaty as thc basis of their attacks upon the existing regime. They criticize the provisions ot the Treaty which require payment for all UK interests which are nationalized, payment of outstanding debts owed to the UK, and acceptanceK military mission. The BCP opposes payment for expropriated land, particularly that wliich is foreign-owned. Internally, the Communists have advocated, with considerableolicy ofof rents and taxes. There is no proof of direct contact between the BCP and the USSR, but it appears that general directions arc relayed to Burma via India, with the details of practical implementation left to local functionaries. As Communist penetration in China moves south, however, it Is possible that the BCP may veer away from India toward China not only as to directives and advice, but also for material aid and assistance.
In an effort to unite all left-wing Burman political factions Prime Minister Thakin Nu on8 presented his now famous "Leftist Unityhis plan, which was largely inspiredeading Burmese Communist, Tetpongyi Thein Pe, is in keeping with contemporary Burman political thinking. The planingle Leftist Unity Party in which the PVO and the Socialists would drop their identity, and in which the Communists would be included if they laid down their arms. Of theoints, thc most important propose: (a) to establish political and economic relations with the USSR and its satellites, (b) to nationalize all "monopoly capitalist" undertakings. (c( to reject any foreign aid which would compromise political andindependence, (d) to reorganize the armyPeoples Democratice) to establish "peoples governments" in the villages, (f) to abolish private ownership
d Is re [hilements. This insurrection resulted In the desertion of numerous sympathizers in the army, including one entire battalion.
'There are anarens In Burma, the ureal majority of whom arc located in thc hills of Eastern Burma, In the Irrawaddy Delta and in lhe Tenasserim Division ofBurma (see map) The Karens differ ethnically from thc Burmans. being of Tai-Chlnesc descent rather than ot Tlbeto-Burman slock. Before the BriUsh conquest of Burma, the Karens were treated as un inferior race by the more numerous and ruling Burmans. Racial friction was not eliminated during the British era. although communal violence was effectively held In check. The Karens accepted the British ai protectors, and missionaries (mostly Americans! hadsuccess In converting Karens to Christianity. This Karen affinity for foreigners became another source of antagonism and, during- the Japanese occupation, several thousand Karens were massacred by Burmans. particularly in the Irrawaddy Delta where the two people are highly Intermixed. When Burma became independent, mutual fear and district remained undispcllcd and,esult, the Karen National Union IKNU1 developed as the instrument through which most articulate Karens express their desire for freedom from Burman domination Karen leadership is almost exclusively Christian and opposed to the radicalism that marks present Burman political thought. Furthermore, the Karens are anxious for closer cooperation with thc US and UK.
rakanese. ethnically closely related to the Burmans. live mainly on the northwest coast of Burma which is cflecUvely separated from Burma proper by thc Arakan Hills iseeeparatist tendencies have long been strong among ihc Arakanpie and sporadic clashes between Arskanese and government forces have taken place ever since Burma became independent. However, this trouble Is fairly well confined andt expected toilua-Uon that would be comparable to Karen-Burman strife.
land and distribute holdings among the farmers, and <g) tonited front against "capitalists" in order to raise wages, reduce rents, and industrialize Burma. Thakin Nu hastened lo add, however, that It is to Bui ma's best interest that friendly relations be maintained with all nations.rogram such as the leftist Unity Plan Is acceptable to most Burman politicians and some of it is already in the process of being implemented, the matter of control and the distribution of the spoils still remains an insurmountable obstacleeneral political settlement
The government attempted to deal with the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) rebellion by sending out "Peace Missions" toapprochement These missions appear to have made limited headway in convincing the PVO that it was necessary lor all Burmans to unite. Recently, many PVO's temporarily came above ground to Join forces with thc government against the Karens, and may do so again.
Before Burma became independent. Burmese leaders feared that one of their greatest problems would be In dealing with the various ethnic minority groups, many of which had been separately administered under British rule The most Important of these groups areillion Karens, whose relations with Burmans have never been good. InR, the Karens took control of most of the Karenm States in Eastern Burma,art of the Tenasscrlm Division in Southern Burma,the Important port of Moulmeln. They are also rc|>orled as being in control ol some areas of the rich Irrawaddy Delta. Since the early part of9 serious fighting has been increasing between Karens and Burmans. especially in theDelta area, the suburbs of Rangoon and around Mandalay. This communal fighting has been ferocious and destructive. The Burmese Government views these clashesevolt, but the trouble was precipitated by irresponsible elements on both sides. The internal difficulties are nowtrong racial complexion. Thc Burmese press and high government officials have constantly whipped up anil-Karen feeling by raising the bogey of foreign intervention. The Karens are described asaided and Incited by "Anglo-American Imperialists."
The other indigenous minorities, Shans, Chins, and Kachins. appear to besatisfied with their semi autonomous status under the Constitution. Recently there have been Indications that some tribal chiefs are becoming alarmed by existing conditions in the predominantly Burman parts of the country and are attempting to minimize Burman influence in tribal areas.hole, these peoples are moreund less politically sophisticated than most Bur man political elements. In the event of full-scale Karen-Barman trouble these tribes are likely lo sympathize with, if not actively support, the Karens. At present, Ihc Mons. another minority group, are cooperating with Karens in Ihe Tenasserim district.
Ironically, it is upon these minorities. Karens included, that the presentdepends, possiblyecisive degree, lo maintain itself in power Most of thednble personnel of the army and police, including some high-ranking officers, are drawn from the minorlly peoples The withdrawal of their support, or active rebellion, would further undermine the government's already seriously weakened position. To placate the restless non-Burman nilnoilllps, the government apjx>lnted a
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Commission for Regional Autonomy, composed of Burman officials together with Karen, Arakanesr, and Mon leaders. The Commission was charged with studying minority claims and aspirations and making recommendations to the government. It has obviously failed to serve any useful purpose.
Despite some reports of cooperation between the two Communist groups and the PVO, it is believed that they agree only in their opposition to the governmentbetween these groups, however, may increase as the Burman-Karen fighting intensifies. There has been no effective concerted effort on the part of the various Burman Insurgents to overthrow the government, and no proof of cooperation between the Burman insurgents and the Karens. While the insurgents are relatively free to roam over large areas of Burma, they have been either unable or unwilling to meet government forces In positional engagements. The result is disorder bordering upon chaos, wherein thc Burmese Government is the de lacto authority only In limited areas.
4. The Economic Situation.
Burma's economy depends primarily upon the production and export of rice. Theillion acres planted to rice before the war producedillion tons of paddy annually, from which wellillion tons of cleaned rice were exported. During Japanese occupation, acreage was cut approximately in half, and exports practically ceased Production has increased since the war's end, in response to present high prices, reopened markets, and government encouragement.ee plantingcres with an export target setons The government had optimistically hoped to achieve prewar export levels.
Under normal conditions, the chances are that thc government's plans would be reasonably successful Widespread political disorder, however, has seriously disrupted these plans Government military forces cannot provide adequate protection from raids, to each village and its surrounding rice fields. Further, the movement of rice to mills and ports is slowed and often prevented by thc dislocation of land and water transportation. Bice exportsotalledons.rop was good and has been harvested, but insurgent activities have seriouslywith its movement to market. Exports will miss the original targetonside margin and it is highly unlikely that the revised targetons will be met. Indeed, the Burmese Government will be fortunate to export as muchons
Other important segments of the Burmese economy feel the effect of internal unrest Teak production, an important source of revenue for Burma, as the leading exporter. Is practicallytandstill What litUe teak is logged often is kept from the sawmills by Insurgent activities Mining operations are negligible asto former levels Little petroleum has been produced since the end of the war. In respect lo the Inst three, dissident activities haveontributing factor only, the principal causes being heavy war damage, difficulty of securing replacements Bnd spares An even grculer handicap lies In lhe fact that these enterprises are almost entirely
British-owned. There is natural British reluctance lo expedite rehabilitation until the Burmese Government clearly defines its nationalization policy. In thc case of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, the British owners are dissatisfied with government offers of compensation following nationalization The Burmah Oil Companyhichear-monopoly of petroleum production and sales before the war. has suspended most of its oilfield reconstruction and threatens to close down entirely unless thcgives the company certain guarantees, particularly that of tenure Similarly, the government, in conformity with its nationalization policy, is refusing to renew expiring mining leases, thus discouraging reconstruction investments
The government, faced with increased military expenditures and decreasedfinds its financial position seriously weakened. The failure to achieve the target for the export of rice alone will amountoss of betweenther export and internal revenues, especially land taxes revenue, are far below normal, and the state Is losing money on the operation of public utilities, particularly railroads and inland water transportation.udget, which was to have been balanced,eficit ofillion, lt is believed that the final deficitill amount toillion, If not more Although the government has taken steps to forestall immediate economic collapse by doubling the export duty on rice, increasing tariffs, and levying new taxes on business, such measures are only stopgaps. It Is also attempting to raise the local price of rice, and has reduced the cost-of-living allowances of government workers in the face of rising prices. This latter action resultederious strike by government clerks
Widespread unrest is the major contributing factor to an unbalanced budget and unfavorable balance of payments which In turn are creating inflationary conditions that will tend to cause further unrest and Instability. Indeed, the economic difficulties created by the current disordersreater threat to the government than thepurely military operations. Although thc Burmese economy may avoid collapse even though present trends continue, it is In danger of deteriorating to the subsistence level, as it did during the Japanese occupation.
The government's economic policy reflects the extreme leftist tendencies now in vogue among Burmese politicians The government has attempted to bring about drastic reforms and the removal of foreign economic interests through sweepingcontrol of the economy. Imports and exports are rigidly controlled, land and property legislation amounts to confiscation; and. as has beenrogram of nationalization has already been partly implemented. An ambitious Two-Year Plan has been drawn up, designed to restore Burma's economy to lis prewar level. Its objective is "lo lay the foundationslanned economy" and "to transform Burmaountry where thc welfare of the common man constitutes the main motive of the State'sven under favorable conditions of peace and tranquillity, the plan is optimistic, and its authors admit that "some details" are lacking. In addition to the obvious impediment of unsettled conditions, the Two-Year Plan fails to consider Burma's increased population and resultant increased consumption, the difficulties in procurement of materials, and the extremely serious shortage ol qualified managerial and technical perhonnel
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5. True Ml LIT AMY Situation.
To meet the numerous challenges to lis authority, the Burmese Government hadotal military and civil police force ofn army0 men,iniscule air force and navy. Karen and PVO defections, however, and the immobilization of some Karen unitsesult of Karen-Burman olrile has reduced these regular army and police figures. Thc army and military police arc organized along British lines and are supplied with British equipment Thc Anglo-Burmese Treaty provides for British military advisers who. however, have not had much success in developing the Burmese army into an efficient and effective force. There are no tactical units higherattalion, and no heavy weapons. Most army troops are scattered about the country in small garrisons, and the police are even more thinly distributed. Thc government has. during the last sis months, undertaken to raise five new army battalions, through revival of the prewar Burma Auxiliary Force,from all races in Burma. Enlistment has been slow, owing to popular apathy and the absence of strong government support.
In addition, and by contrast, the government has vigorously recruited at0 auxiliary police drawn from every part of Burma, but composed of followers of the Socialist Party. The government has more recently pressed hastily armed civilians into service. These forces were raised despite strong objections from both the Burmese Army Commander in Chief and the head of the British Military Mission, who feared that the levies wouldrivate army of thc Socialist Party, designed to suppress all political opposition. Recruitment, command, and training of these levies are under the direction of Socialistact that seems to Justify these fears, even though at least some of the Auxiliary Union Military Police (AUMP) are under the command of thc armed forces Commander In Chief. Thc larger number are under Homeivil) control. Recent disappearances of government funds arc believed to be connected with support of the auxiliary police force. The total military strength of army, police, and auxiliaries Is believed to be sufficient to maintain the government in power, at least for the present, but Inadequate toeasonable degree of law and order ln the foreseeable future.
A little less than one half of the Burmese Army is composed of Karens. Chins, and Kachins These troops, primarily interested in military careers, are the most effective personnel In the military forces. They have been and will be the backbone of practically all government offensive operations except where their own people are Involved. Purely Burman units, In contrast, arc subject to political influences in varying degrees and possess little martial spirit. They have been used chiefly for garrison duty In relatively quiescent areas
The extent of politics in the armed forces is Indicated by lhe assignment of top posts. Lt Oen Smitharen, until recently Supreme Commander of theforces,airly competent administrator who cooperated closely with the British Military Mission. Maj Gen Bo Nc Win. who replaced himurman with little military experience is deeply involved in Socialist Party politics, and hasignored the British.
Military operations, except those engagements against Karen forces, presently consist ot an endless series ol skirmishes between government forces, and guerrillas, never involving moreew hundred people. Some of the engagements between government forces and the Karens have beenuch larger scale, and occasionally have resulted In heavy casualties. The government always claims victories, but the fighting goes on The main immediate objectives of the insurgents are thc capture of arms, money, food, and supplies, rather than the seizure and administration ofThe government's minimum objectives are the holding of Rangoon and other important towns, and maintenance of commmunicalions. Operating from these urban strongholds, the government expects to bring the dissidents progressively under control.
The outbreak of Karen-Burman fighting caused many Karens to desert, and others have followed since the departure of Smith Dun. Under existing circumstances, no Karen in the government armed forces can be regarded as completely reliable. There istrong possibility that the Chins and Kachins will not show much enthusiasm in fighting Karens. The government will therefore have to rely more and more upon strictly Burman manpower much of which is half-trained or untrained, undisciplined, subject to political influences, and united only in opposition to the Karens. Thcmay be able to maintain itself withorce so long as there are sufficient numbers of Karens to fight and so long as it can capitalize on the fear of "capitalistt has approached both the US and UK, asking for large quantities of arms and other military equipment needed lo bring its campaignuccessfulThe UK promised toart of thc requirement, and has0 rifles but has recently delayed shipments0 more in view of conditions. The government is also attempting to secure arms on the open market. No matter what it attempts, its military position, and thereby its very existence, will be shaky
G. Foreign AvpaiRS.
Burma's internal disordershortage ot qualified diplomatic personnel have restricted its foreign relations. Embassies are maintained in the US, UK. China, India, and Pakistan; and Burmaember of the UN. The implementation of agreements to exchange ambassadors with Siam and the USSR have been delayed.
Relations with the US and UK have been relatively cordial, although normaltransactions are rendered difficult because of Burmese inexperience and thcof the US and UK. in thc minds ot many Burmese leaders, as "capitalist, imperialist" nations. US negotiationsonsular Convention, air agreements, and the purchase of real estate have been painfully slow, while British efforts to secure fair compensation for nationalized properties have been far from satisfactory. On the other hand. Burma has depended, and will continue to depend, on the UK for military and economic assistance, and SO must attempt to maintain friendly relations. Burma Is now attempting to raise the price ot rice (much o! which is contracted for by the UK for India, Ceylon, and Malaya) and also to obtain another loan from the UK. The British have refused to pay as much as Is demanded for the rice and may not extend the loan because the British Embassy suspects that it would be used for military pur-
f rice expor.s
TCRET
Burrna and India are.onsiderable degree. Interdependent since India needs rice and Burma needs manufactured goods, particularly textiles. Burma is alsoin an Indian loan, but ln view of the existing situation in Burma, India will probably move slowly in granting one. There are, however, certain matters which could easily strain friendly relations. Among these the most important are thcIn which the Burmese Government has handled Indian Immigration, attainment of Burmese citizenship by domiciled Indians, and disposition of the huge Indian assets tn Burma, especially land. The Burmese have rejected all Indian protests, and the problems are now dormant ulbeit vexatious and unsolved. Since both countries are primarily concerned with their respective internal affairs at the moment, no significant developments are expected in the near future.
Relations with China have been quiet. Although there has been recurrent talk about efforts to settle the long-standing problem of the undefined portion of the Sino-Bunnose border, nothing has been done. This matter may assume much greater proportions if Yunnan falls under thc dominationtrong Chinese Communist Government, as It could serveeans to exert pressure upon the Burmese
Burma's strong sympathy for the hidependence movements of colonial peoples in Southeast Asia prompted Prime Minister Thakin Nu to urge Prime Minister Nehru to call the recent Asian Conference In Delhi in protest to the Dutch "police action" In Indonesia. In this respect. Burma, along with India. Pakistan and Ceylon has denied the use of its port and airfield facilities to the Dutch Providingovernment exists which can claim to represent all of Burma, the nation may be expected to Join in, and to support any future undertakingsimilar nature andarty to any regional grouping of Asian countries resulting therefrom.
Original document.
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