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COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN SOUTH KOREA
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COMMUNIST CAPTIES IN SOUTH KOREA
SUMMARY
Communist capabiliLies In South Korea arc nowow level and probably will be further reduced if thc Republic continues Its present trend toward increased stability.
The network of Communist organizations In South Korea is designed to provide control mechanisms for every segment of society and is sufficiently broad to draw new members from all classesevere economic crisis cause popular discontentwing to the left. The number of South Koreans who have consistently braved various degrees of police action to assist the Communist program may, while the total number of Koreans enrolled in Communist front organizations may exceedercent of theiillion population. Underground combat organisations under Communist control and leadership are scattered throughout thc mountain areas of South Korea andontinuing threat to Internal security.
The Communists in South Korea are under thc direct control of Soviet agents in North Korea. Their adherence to the Moscow line has Incurred the hostility and distrust of Korean nationalists, and periodic mass arrests of Communist leaders have forced them to concentrate organisational efforts on rebuilding party channels and strengthening the underground forces. The anti-Communist program undertaken by the Republic of Korea, since its inauguration inas forced manyleaders to flee to the North.
The Communists have failed to control labor and have lost the ability they possessed in6 toeneral strike- They have, however. Improved theirof coordinated sabotage as demonstrated in the anti election campaignhey have devoted considerable effort, with some success, to infiltrating youth groups, political parties, the security forces, and the government on all levels.
Current Communist propaganda is aimed at creating confusion, fear, andin the South. The constant threat of invasion from the North and the susceptibility of the isolated villagers to propaganda can be exploited by theto produce these results in local areas. But thc Communists have lost thc advantage they possessed in the fall8 when it appeared to the Koreans that the US was about to withdraw aU troops, leaving the infant Republic to face alone the combined forces of Communism in the Far East. Favorable UN action on Korea, thc expectancy of continued US aid under ECA, and the moderate success of security forces in suppressing the guerrillas have restored confidence in their future among the people and officials of South Korea.
The mission of the Communist forces in South Korea is to assist in carrying out the Soviet plan for the eventual absorption of South Korea into the Korean Democratic Peoples Republic by undermining popular government support through the creation
he inleUigence organisations ot the Departments of State, Army. Navy, and the Air Force have concurred In this report. The Information herein Ls as of
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of political and economic chaos, dissipating the military strength of the Republic, and developing the conviction that Communist domination Is Inevitable, therebyavorable psychological climate for opportunist "coalition" with the north.
The present Communist strength In South Korea does not appear great enough toustained, country-wide campaign that would accomplish this mission. The limitation of their future potential, however, depends primarily on the ability ofofficials and the people to resolve their personal or parly differences lna united front to the Communists, and on the ability of the government toinimum standard of living for both the farmer and the urban worker.
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN SOUTH KOREA
1. SrzB and Organization op tub Sooth Korean Communist Pahtt. a. Size.
There may be fewer0 Communist Parly card holders In South Korea among an estimated populationut this figure has little significance as an Indication of Communist strength. The number of South Koreans who havebraved various degrees of police action to assist the Communist program may. Through the usual technique of Interlocking directorates, the relatively small group of loyal and experienced Communists control political, social, and cultural organizations whose total membership may exceedercent of thc population. In addition to thc members of thc Communist Front organizations who have generally followed the party line, many more Koreans may be susceptible to Communistand leadership on specific or local Issues.
Communist prestige, based on their leadership of Nationalist resistance to the Japanese, was highest at the time of liberation. In thc absence of other political leadership, the Communists were able to assume leadership of the grass-rootsmovement which found expression in the establishment of the People'sthroughout Korea Inn the following months, however, the Communists, by espousing USSR rather than Nationalist objectives, dissipated aportion of their prestige and Incurred the enmity of significant groups of the population.
Although membership in the Communist Party or its front organization was technically legal during the period of American Military Government, the policeregarded the Communists as rebels and traitors who should be seized, imprisoned, and sometimes shot on thc slightest provocation. All Communist activity was officially outlawed with the passage of thc Law on thc Nation's Public Peace inommunists haveilitant underground force,art of normallife throughout most of South Korea today.
6. Organization.
The Communist organization in South Korea Is designed to provide control mechanisms for every segment of society. It is. Intatetate under the absolute control of USSR-approved leaders. The Communist "front" organizations Include political parties, labor unions, cultural and intellectual societies, farmersand youth groups. In addition, thc Communists have developed under-ground militant organizations to serve as their revolutionary striking force. Theof front organizations is sufficiently broad to allow thc entrance of new members from all classes of societyevere economic crisis or repressive government security measures cause popular discontentwing to thc left.
Relations,
Party policies for the Communist organization in South Korea arcin the North by Soviet personnel and transmitted by messengers, either to the Central Committee In Seoul via thc Haeju office, or, in some cases, directly to local Communist guerrilla units by radio or by messengers traveling south by land or sea. At the present time. Kim Tan Ya, one of the founders of the Korean Communist Partys reported to be the official Korean representative in Moscow. In addition to relations with Moscow through Soviet representatives In North Korea, the South Korean Communists are known to have contacts with the Japan Communist Party through the Communist elements of the League of Koreans Residing in Japan and with the Chinese Communist Party, whose agents have appeared in South Korea on both commercial and intelligence missions.
Front
The Democratic Peoples Front is the all-inclusive Communist front in southern Korea. It was formed in6 under the leadership of theParty to unite all "democratic-social" groups. The Front servedentral control agency through which leaders of the Communist Party, and biter thc South Korean Labor Party, could issue instructions and control the many social and political member organizations.
Korea Labor Party.
The South Korea Labor Party (SKLP) contains the core of Communist organization and discipline in the South. It was formed in6 when Pak Hun Yong. acting on orders from North Korea, technically disbanded thc South Korean Communist Party and formed the SKLP in Its place. The party headquarters Is divided between Seoul and the town of Haeju, located just across thc border in North Korea. The group in Haeju transmits Instructions to Seoul for disseminationthc party network in the South and receives reports Irom the South for transmittal to the North Korean Communist Party and Soviet agents. The party network in thc South extends from the Central Committee in Seoul, through the Provincialthc city, county or district committees, and down to the cells. Cells exist in all factories, mines, villages, shops, schools, military units, and urban residential blocks where there are three or more Communists and permission for the formationell has been obtained from the local committee.
Groups.
The militant Korean Democratic Patriotic Youth Alliance is theorganization for Communist youth. It began as the Communist Youth Alliance, changed its name to the Democratic Youth Alliance, was outlawed by American Military Government for terroristic activities Inut continues to serve undergroundtrong-arm force for the SKLP in all forms of terrorism and propaganda activity.
Front.
Thc Communist effort to organize South Korea's few industrialhas been channeled through the Council of All Korean labor Unions (Chung Pyung).
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The Chung Pyung was discredited by its final failure and violence In the Initially successful general strikes ofince that date, it has failed several times, notably lno Instigate general strikes. The rightist Dai Han Labor League now controls labor in all significant Industries and Communist efforts tothis union have met with limited success.
Front.
The large and underprivileged farm population has been the principal target of Communist propaganda and organizational activity since the Liberation Communist potential to promote disorder and unrest among farmers remains high, but despite great efforts of thc party-line All Korean Farmers Alliance and otheragencies, the farmers have been slow to Join Communist groups. Physically Isolated rural settlements are typical of South Korea. This Isolation, as well as the pervading Confucian influence upon personal relations, promotes unity under the villageunity that extends to unifiedornew ideas. Thus It Is possible to find villages completely dominated by Communist Ideology ln areas generally controlled by extreme rightists. This phenomenon Is explained by the susceptibility ot the peasants to Communist propaganda on the farm tenancy problem, the hostility to the rice collectloo program, and unified reaction to new Ideas, and Is widespread ln Cholla Namdo. Cholla Pukto, Kyongsang Namdo, and Kyongsang Pukto, the principal areas of Communist strength.
Front.
Leftist Influence has also been extended lo many of the Intelligentsia through the Central League of AU Korean Cultural Croups. Allhough government police action has restricted the expansion of the "cultural" fronts in South Korea, they continue to exercise considerable influence upon students. Journalists, writers and scientists
The party line has notajor feature In many of the cultural associations, but they arc Important propaganda vehicles and serveover for Illegal Communist activity.
ilitant Groups.
Underground militant organisations under Communist control andthe most important tools for the USSR's long-range program, are combat groups known collectively as the People's Liberation Army or the Action Vanguard Corps, consisting of separate guerrillailitary Bureau, parallel with theCentral Committee of the SKLP, is responsible for the organization andof the various forces within each province. In some provinces, at least, each town and village Is in turn directly subordinate to the Provincial Bureau, and allemanating from the Bureau are rapidly disseminated to the local units. The existenceentralized coordinating authority higher than the Provincial Bureaus has not been confirmed, nor Is it known lo what extent the SKLP Issues specificto the guerrillas. However, as in South Korean Communist activities in general, it Is known that Important orders originate in Pyongyang and are transmitted to South Korea through agents who crossh parallel dally. Trained organizers
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are dispatched from thc North to assist In planning activities and in teaching guerrilla tactics.
Guerrilla strength fluctuates widely, depending on activities. South Korean groups are being steadily reinforced by special units infiltrating from the North. Casualties during periodic police actions serve to reduce their numbers, and, during periods of inactivity, many non-party guerrillas return to their homes and resume an outward appearance of normal life. During active periods, the guerrillas are likely to gain spot recruits among non-Communists who may bo aroused by police brutality or unpopular government measures such as forced rice collections.
The island of Cheju-Do has longenter of guerrilla strength and activity. Police brutality, the venality of public officials, and the historic clannlsh-ness of the islanders contribute to the discontent which trained Communists have fanned into chronic revolt. Recently, Indiscriminate guerrilla activity against villages has caused many formerly sympathetic civilians to assist security forces In combing the hills, and the first mass surrenders of guerrillas on Cheju-Do have since been reported.
The South Korean guerrillas are estimated to have about half their forces armed only with bamboo spears and the rest with Japanese rifles or carbines's captured from security forces or contributed byew trucks, machine guns, and mortars fell into guerrilla hands during the recent Constabulary revolts. There undoubtedly will be an attempt to Increase thc small-scale flow of arms from North Korea. Other supplies are obtained through forced donations of money, rice, clothing, and miscellaneous equipment. Most of the barren mountain areas where the guerrillas seek refuge are far distantympathetic population.esult, thc guerrillas must resort to raiding hostile lowland areas for food and are then exposed lo police action.
Guerrilla training schools are located in South Korean mountainand in the North. Courses extend from two weeks to six months and includediscipline, sabotage and espionage training, as well as indoctrination in the basic elements of Communism and techniques of propaganda. Discipline In the schools Is strict, and continuous adherence to prescribed rules is enforced. The actiongainst guerrillas in Kwangwon-do, however. Indicated that their morale and training were far below the level expected from Soviet-schooled personnel. Many guerrillas gave in without offering resistance, and their indoctrination In Communism appeared to be superficial.
2. Estimate of Anti-Communist Strength.
Thc old Korean traditions, based on historical continuity, racial and cultural homogeneity, and an intense pride in their past, survived forty years of Japanization and continues io resist both Soviet-sponsored Communism and Western styleIntronger spirit of nationalism developedeaction tooccupation and was further intensified by the liberation. The overwhelming majority of the people in South Korea are anti-Cornmunist. This feeling, however, isevulsion against Communist terrorism and individual Communists, who are patently the agentsoreign power,olitically sophisticated rejection of
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Communist ideology. The long-sufTerlng South Korean farmers, who cornprLseercent of the population, will support the government or party that appears most capable of providing them with land ownership, fertilizer, low taxes, consumer goods,inimum of police brutality.
The small industrial labor class has demonstrated an inability to perform Its theoretical function as the revolutionary vanguard and has generally accepted the leadership of nationalists whose viewsnique Far Eastern blend of social-Ism and capitalism Antifeeling Is especially strong among thoseested Interest In the Republic of Korea. The police, who have been the frequent targets of Communist violence, are generally willing to take action against known or suspected Communists without recourse to Judicial processes. Thc government Is bitterly anti-Communist and Is taking severe measures to curtail all Communist activity.
In thc final analysis, anU-Communlst strength depends on the ability of theto develop politicaliableoyal and efficient security force, and to gain international support. (See. Prospects for Survival of the Republic ofhe Republic has been accorded diplomatic recognition by sev-eral powers Including the United States and Is supported by the UN. The current three-year program of US economic and military assistance will contribute tothe economy, developing efficient security forces, and give Impetus to thc trend toward increased governmental stability and greater anU-Communlst strength.
3. Communist Activities. a. Organising Activity.
There were two factions in thc Korean Communist Party when the Liberation5 permitted the first open Communist activity ln the country. The Nationalist faction (led by Lee Yung) submittederger with the pro-Soviet faction (led by Pak Hun Yung) lnlthough Pak's leadershiptrict Stalinist line has since dominated the party, thc inherent strength of Korean nationalism has, at times, weakened party discipline and has resulted In thc withdrawal of several prominent party members.
arty leaders In South Korea felt that the proletariat was politically too Immature for successful revolution and, lacking the actual presence of USSR forces, the Conununistsnited front of all liberal and leftist elements as the best way to achieve their objectives.
Earlyoviet policies forced the South Korean Communists toro-trusteeship line that incurred the hostility and distrust of Korean nationalists Thc united front movement collapsed, but vigorous organizational activity continued In the attempt to enroll farmers, laborers, youth, and the intelligentsia In groups where they could be indoctrinated in the parly line and used to further Communist objectives. Periodic mass arrests of Communist leaders, particularly sinceave forced them to concentrate on rebuilding party channels and strengthening
the underground forces. The anU-Conimunist program undertaken by theof the Republic of Korea, since its inauguration inas undoubtedly further restricted all types of organizational activity. Several thousand SKXPor suspected Communists have been arrested. Many others have chosen escape to the North rather than the party praise and prestige that would follow Imprisonment for revolutionary activity in the South.
and Sabotage.
Labor strikes and industrial sabotageajor activity of the South Korean Communists. While improving their technique of sabotage, they have lost the ability to call general strikes owing to thc success of thc rightist Dai Han Labor League in gaining control of labor In all significant industries. Inhewith thc assistance of leaders from the North, were able to paralyze South Korea by striking the railroads, shipyards, public utilities, and postal systems, but an attempt to repeat this success in8 resulted only In minor and short-lived work stoppages. On the other hand, the inefficient mass disorder technique used in6 general strike has been refined to the technique of well planned andsabotage demonstrated in the anti-election campaign ofn one night, the Communists damaged forty locomotives, ripped up tracks in three areas, and cut the police lines out of Seoul to every provincial division. Although counter-police action was effective and the Communist violence did not succeed in frustrating the UN-supervised general election In South Korea, It is significant that extraordinary police action was unable to prevent extensive damage to public and private property in the spring
of Government, Security Forces, Political Parties.
The South Korean Communists, aided by trained agents from the North, have devoted considerable effort to infiltrating rightist youth groups and political parties, the security forces, and the government on all levels. The most sensational evidence of their success was presented when forty membersommunist cell inh Constabulary Regimentevolt at Tosu Inince the Yosu revolt, some progress has been made in screening thc security forces and removing Communist and other dissident elements. Previous incidents had confirmed theexistence of Communist cells In municipal and provincial government bureaus, and in the secretarial section of the National Police. Special efforts have been made by the Democratic Youth Alliance to Infiltrate thc various rightist youth groups which form the most Important pool of manpower for thc security forces. The extent of Communist infiltration In rightist political parties Is not known, but it undoubtedly is slight Many of thc small parties, on the other hand, normally defined as moderate or leftist, have been the successful targets ot infiltration.
Propaganda dissemination, to aid In the accomplishment of the ultimate aim of political control. Is closely Integrated with all Communist activity in the South. The Communists have been most efficiently trained and organized for propaganda
work Ihnt Includes not only the usual attacks on the United States and the "pro-Japanese Korean Nationalut "education" and indoctrination of thc masses In thc Communist way of thinking to obtain widespread adherence to the "partyommunist propaganda, primarily directed at the masses. Is not designed torational thinking, but to stir up unreasoned violence and emotions against the United States and the Korean Government.
Current Communist propaganda Is aimed at creating confusion, fear, and defeatism ln the South. Thc Communist victory in China Ls cited to prove theof Communist domination throughout the Far East. Rumors of invasion from the North by an overwhelming force are used to incite fear; distrust of thels created by allegations that President Rhee and other officials a'c permitting the US lo exploit Koreaolonial possession under the guise of the ECA program. The government and thc people became Increasingly susceptible to this propaganda in thc fallS;ebirth of confidence has resulted from UN recognition, the success of the Constabulary In quelling revolts, the extension of the ECA program to Korea, and the announcement of thc withdrawal of Soviet troops. Korea will remain,ertile field for Communist propaganda so long as economicfall lo Improve materially, oppressive security measures arc used by theand the spectre remains of vast Communist armies from Manchuria and North Korea conquering thc South.
4. Communistouth Koiea.
The present Communist strength ln South Korea does not appear great enough toustained country-wide campaign that would seriously dissipate tlicor military resources of the government. The Communistsontinue to receive reinforcements of trained guerrillas from Northssist an open invasion from North Korea by expending all their reserve strengthoordinated, country-wide campaign of sabotage, revolts, assassinations, andffect limited economicontinue to commit isolated and coordinated acts of violence and terrorism against police, government officials, property, andnstigate minor revolts ln thc armed lorces;reate fear and confusion In local areas.
If the Communists in South Korea attempted an all-out campaign against tbe government unsupported by invasion from the north, the major result wouldurther loss of Communist strength and prestige. Although the nature of theprevents the effective scaling of thc border against infiltrating guerrillas from the north, the gain In strength from this source probably will not be sufficient to balance losses attributable to continuing counteraction by government security forces. The recent revolts in the Constabulary have brought some infiltrated Communists into the open, faciUtated thc vigorous government program for screening the security lorces. and reduced Communist capabilities of Inciting further revolts and infiltrating the security forces. Successful field collaboration between the police and Constabulary against the guerrillas has dissipated some of the mutual distrust between these
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ut remaining Communist cells In the Constabulary probably continue to have Uie capability of exploiting such bitter feelings as exist toward the police.
The constant Uueat of invasion from the north and the susceptibility of thevillagers to propaganda can be exploited by the Communists to create fear and confusion in local areas. But the Communists have lost the advantage theyIn the fall8 when lt appeared to the Koreans that the US was about to withdraw all troops, leaving the Infant Republic to face alone the combined forces of the North Koreans, thc Chinese Communists, the Soviets, and the InternalFavorable UN actionon the Republic of Korea, expectancy of continued US aid under EGA, and the moderate success of security forces In suppressing thehave restored confidence in their future among the people and officials of South Korea.
Communist capabilities in South Korea are nowow level and probably will be further reduced if thc economy and security forces continue to beThey stillighly controlled and efficient party network capable of rapid expansion to take advantage of any unrest or disunity that may develop. Thc limitation of their future potential will depend primarily on the ability of theofficials and the people to resolve their personal or party differences Ina united front to the Communists, and on the ability ol the government toinimum standard of living for both the farmer and thc urban worker,
The UN Oeneral Assembly "declares that there has beenawful government (Government of the Republic of Korea! having effecUve control and Jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and ineat majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government Is based on elections whichaUd expression of Ure free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were obsr-rrcd by the Temporary Commission: and that this Is the only such government in Korea."
RRT
Original document.
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