Md6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
. C.
9 J
lEtaiAJDUH Speolal Aeeiirtant to the Secretary of
for Reeeerch and
Director of Intelli^jeneo, Oonorel Staff, IB Amy /Director of SanlirectorllgeaM,r Faroe
of tbo Worldt Bala tea to
toe Security of tha Odted
be eaoloeed CU eetlmte, nbloh will be on tbe agenda at tbe fortboxadng aeeti'W of toe BettfrfMl Security
Cornell, le elrottlated bere-xUh forCiafjasa&ati.
FOR THE DDfiETXR OF CEHTHAL JBX&LLmKX i
^ rJEtECRK BABBITTAaaiatant Director
Sparta errl EattaaUo
FOR RELEASE
1 flS*
9
OF TK3HID SiXCuIiCa ftS ITTOSEC3;lTf Q? '2 VJQTSD STATiS
besic security inter-sis of the VS end tho UK eraacit understandingardea top by which aposition it rairtiin^et. "he abilitylsy Haconsidered to be directly reXfited to tin strwigth of itf oati&nol It Js eonsideredo UKlth rosptict ta theixson wry, cosseted tte first ffcaxs ef Us poat-rarsuccess ino.have eossremendousthichurplus for expect. It ia ncchatof this effort nay howt- boen pusaed and that, even thoughhi^h, the capacity of the world xerfcet to absorb thenay be djainiahing. If ao, it *ill be increasingly difficultOK to maintain the eccnonic strength needed to suppcrt its ccr.to carry out its roaponsibilitlos in the cet'erri ofi security.
An unfavorable economic condition nltl Hsd tc the probicn of shifting cere and acre cf the responsibility forcKoa atrctogic Pition fron) the OK to the PS.
poeiticr. of the HiSR in the Cornell of Foreign Ministers aug-
Wote: This reviei/ has not beon coordinated rith the intolliijence orgcci-auticna cf the Oepsrta.ants cl"tyf Navy, end the air Feres. Tho Infcroatlcneroin Je ss of.
g'.uti that the" oriftMl dftadaJon to. bt-Mde ritlt-jd bynrteed: Of reciilt to date in the CsTibo the
3. The ratification of the Atlantic- Feet i- nrocwdlt aor; or lers ta pieimod, except posslbiy in tho ctss of rnlay ir. tho CSfsupporting Military aid Frogre^ is boginr.Jn; to pr educe official BJuExmi irx! public criticismstern Kwopa,
U. In"pence faolrers"tilltrt cut. TboB-tent still spiders to bo effort to shift Ccnnunirt presumes from tha Till-tar/ to the pcliticil field.
Israel continuos to bo iMc-^rociiing ia confereoco. eis having practicaltieol difficulties with its ia.ulgrstion policy,
In the Per Easti tho US position in Jepcn is shcalng sl^n* ofdifficult; the Chinese Comun^ste,into Scutb. China, orethe reonants of the gatloaei?ct Corerpaect,hreat to Kong Kong, an! coming closer to the point where thalr intentions tCftftrdft Southesst Asia will begin to show; in Korea, tbe lopublic has beccoe taxs-chat hysterical ubout thoof CS troops; in Indonesia, Degotleticas are developingood atmoai^iere but have not retched the crucially Irreconcilable issueB; Jn ten, th* CowBorreealth hec gotosition whore it may bo ablo to exert acne affectivein favor of law end order,
7* There are no significant change* in Lut.lri America to report.e dogreo of stability of per*-icuUr gmermcnts BOBUaf t? fluctuate.
REVIEW CF THE LOUD SlTUnTICK aS IT RKUTaS TOSECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
1. Tha United Kinc-don,.
It Is so froquently stated that the United Kin^doa is the raostend laporUnt ally of tho OS, thatof the UK to fill the place unsigned to it in the over-all design of US security tends to bo assorted. xaaination of this assumption is Tory such to the point in Tier* of the faot that the present Council of Foreign Ministerswhatever ooy be its outcooewill inevitablyee- stage in the process of stabilizing the distribution of US and Soviet poner. The strategicof tho US and the UK ln respect to this procoss are nearly The ccanon factor in their security problems is the eatlDBto that Soviet policy and actionrimary threat. Froa this follows thethat no concessions can be cade that would aateri*Uy inprovc the strategic position of tbe USSR with reopect to either. Both parties are beyond question committed for the present to tho naintenenco andof this coeson position.
a discussion of this relationship must Jteop in mind three features of the postwar international scene:
The fact that the US end the USSR roseegree of power greater than the UK could hope to attain.
Tho UK, the Ccexionsealth, and the Empire, though the third strongest oooplex of power in the world, cere loosely organised in compfiri-son with the geographic concentration of US and USSR power, and wereBUsceptible to pieoemeal disintegration.
Sj^o^
1
(3) The balance of power in continental Europo ma no longer of
oajor significance.. The rise of the CS and the USSRhe orionliitioo of continental Europehole liportent, not its internal balance.
These changesevision of ono of the cardinal principles of British foreign policythe support of an laporiel position bya balance of pover in Europe. The new situation celled for separete short and long-torn treabxent. Short-term policy required the ccmtoiiMont of the USSR (identity of strategic interest with the OS) end the recovery of en econoDlc viability that htd been destroyed by the war. The long-term had as its objective the rsorgunlrationstern Europe and its colonial end associated territories under British leadershipenuinelyeleciont between the CS and the CSSR. Those objectives involve notbat ere fundamentally antagonistic to US security interests. Policy directed towards thee cannot be developed, however, except inwith the CS. The British need for DS oconoolc support ia, coope-quently, besic and comprehensive.
The OS need to maintain the strategic positions of the OK, Crjamonwonlth, end Empire is cerrraspc-ndlr.gly basic If the process of bringing potential power to befcr in restraint of Soviet expansion is to be quickly effective. The OS security position, while this process Is going forward, is linked with that of the UK in three vital regions.
Western Europe, where much depends upon thethe OK can exert,
In the Hear and Middle East,
In South and Southeast Asia, where the combined UK-Conmon-
s
wealth Influence la still paramount.
The real Ken oaring roc! of OT-Conaonweelth influence in these regions is not military capabilities but economic strength. The UK defensethough the third best ic the world, is plainly inadequate to its numerous and wldospreod oorataitment38 Its operational readiness is low. Jt has virtually no combat-ready strategic reserve. Furthermore, claims on British economy aro such that there ia virtually no surplus of plant or men-power that cen bo allocated for its expansion. Military reooarch andalone have been shielded free retrenchment.
Tho limitations imposed by those considerations have already impeded the TO in ita policy of assuming leadership in Western Europe and heve forced diplomatic conprcoiiBes in the Hoar East and in South Asia.
In nostern Europe, while the UK took the load ln organising jointand alao supplied important military equipment, economic factors quickly set limits that could not bo passed except in terns of US support and supply. Howevor, political leadership, at which UK policy alao alas,ot simultaneously abandoned as economic and military responsibility shifted to the US. The US does not aspire to such leadership, but itsdoes requiro that Western Europe should be firmly oriented ln the right direction. The TJKroper freo agent for this purpose provided lt is capable of exerting adequate Influence; but economic factors are again interfering. Tha British need to impose sharp trade terms out offor its own recovery has already been costly to this influence. the UK is firmly committedooperative program for the economic recovery of Europe, lt is clear that the Leber Government considers its
not local rscovaiyla bothsuccessful atd torehe methods of eoatineuHi Qtttlca;!. The fact ia that -ihe UK doss no;ho neuessary uurgincnoaic ccn.iousioiis ill order to Motors possible political .ir-s.
In the Wear eni Middle East, idjoVjoects botoasn the US and The 'IT. bov<fl beon made. Strategic interests in the *rea uri completelyolicies arc! actions are being increasinglydinate*. ective has boon defined 1 to refills tho tree in the aostern orbit by aeons ofconocic end cultural invoitaents. gain, econonic capacity lic't the UK contribution.. The nojkness ubich transferred to tho US the rooponsi-fcdllty in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, aty nake still farther transfersat cost if of nothing elsenocessfir". Such, transfers Kill probebly litre to be accepted b/ tho US in tha interest of maintaining tho combined position,,
In India ond the ?er Mat,as sought6 to develop teyi of maintaining its interests nhil': reducing direct charges on the oaticml economy. Frimury otratejio interests have beer, csntarsd in Malaya, ihe Pacific sector hisnquishei to the CS, and Australia and He* Sealcnd have been encouraged to develop Connocnealth Interests in relation to thehanged status for India taa encouraged because tbe means did not oxist for Imposing any other solution or; the nationalistic fervor of the country, and economic ond strategic ties hsvri boon Mint&incd by diplomatic rr.titer than in per lei methods. Tito greatest political trluaph of the CS since ihe end of the war has beer; till) extent toositive decline in global power haa been compensated forsodj'istnunt of relations within theealth and Ejcpiro. Thohas censiated, especially in Asia, of ccn-
vert lug unwilling perts cf on Eapiis to -killing 'teSberscoacnwoaJth, In coaaequenao, while manners ofGaOMTAVMlth ere absolutely froe to develop their oro foreign pcuUoiesp Grxnanwealth solidarity cn essential questionsof which resistance tcinfluocceajor onehas been actually Increased.
India, Pakistan, and Ceylon arc bobrowing share of the task of maintaining the stebility cf the South Asiatic regioo. She hcjo naturally is that the, protection of IfK-Ccwmcm-eolth interests in Southwest Aria will moro end nore dewolvo open these morabora, end that the over-all poeltion of tha DT. Pcwer ooaplex will be protected with less axpenditure af declining US resoiroeo. Thie dev^lopsent is favorable to S3 security interests. Since thereeasonable expectation that it will not ba affected by sodden changes in the erononic position of the UK, itoro favorable olicate for US security than could bave been entloipsted ttfolve months ago.
The US-UK security relationship contains,ajor element of uncertainty! the capacity of tha UK to maintain the economic strengthto aupport, not only the comnitfflenta it has on its own policy account, but tbe position it occupies in the over-all pattern of US security. The relative weakness of tbo UK at the and of the war, instead of beingondition caused by tho war and corrected by tho recoveryay be the result of long-term tronda that fere only momentarily halted. If so, tba weakness which, at the startade Orcooe andSmay develop progressively and call for progressively major adjustments on the part, of tho US.
It lasonQbXy certain that tho UX If approaching tho andirst phesa of itu postwar history., This /fcase can bo described in er led af reorganizing thaon eery in relation to tbo conceptelfare state tnd thootential in relation to found changes in th* international sphere. Tho adjustments called for oara essentiallycononic.argo rteasnre of decocrttic socialist! has quietly revolutionized the net'.coal life of Qreat Britain, Tho Canncn-weolth and the Empire haveajcr political elterationso&Mr-tic kind without any suggestion of collapse, Tho national oc on eery has, vith tremendous effort, beendsptod to the doaandaolfars stato. The speed end success of those adjustments have been no undectVole factor in the derelopoent of tho aiare favorable security position ln which the Cj now stands.
But it is also reasonably certain tho UK Is now wowing into the sscondf its pcatwor history. The basic problems that will be encountered in this phase, though different in charecter, will bo perhaps even mors critical for the long-run than those that have already been dealt with. They will, in any event, require more comprehensive solutions then any yot devised. The central problem can be stctes as followst
a,. The maintenance of foreign trede at tbe high level required to sustain the demands upoo the national economy of the standards of British life, the welfero ocmraitjnentu of democratic socialism, and the international commitments of UK, Commonwealth, and Ic.ptrial policy, and, if this prsvea impossible, as it nay very well do in view of developing trends ln world economy.
f* :'
Jj. The development of alternative ways (other thaneduction of population) of sustaining the national economy,
Since income froo British overseas investments is no longer anitem, tho UK international account con be balanced only by theand sole of en exportable surplus, ense of crisis, in conjunction with government controls over domestic consumptionf ioan-pooer, gradually pushed up the volume of exports until in9 thsyercent8 and resultedomootary balancing of But, oven tills unprecedented volume provided no cushion against the future.
Signs ztoccumulating whioh strongly suggest that ths peak of the Britlah success in this respect may have been reached and that, from this point on, it may not only be impossible to increase the volume of oxports, but evon to maintain thorn at the required level. The signs arc as foil cob:
e. Overseas markets are being lncreosingly satisfied by restored domestic industries and by competitors.
2,. Japanese industry, revived to reduce US occupation coats, implies future serious competition.
c.. German industry, similarly revived, but with its pre-war cutlets ln Eastern Europe still blocked, implies an even severer competition,
d,. Demand in tha US has perceptibly receded and there la no evidence of ita early revival.
Tha approach of these difficulties has been recognised. Propoeals for masting them havo boon under consideration for some tine. The proposals consist ofi evaluation ofeduction of production costs; tbe adjustment of sources of iniporta and to avoid dollar costs;
the -dorvaisssent. ofocrces, nariicnlaxly ir. C* aafrorfca* aVgrfra* ilwie of these jrcpMale1 for tine and cap? taibkIs dc unavnllcblo. Ctfcwraero*jte ts* probi-sM fer M* solved. It is liighly improbable thatcoaplute soluticn evr. 'tit hose linep.
In Africa, south of the Seha.-c,ap3e, the Ito j: term plans for moating itsdifficulties by ths creation of as. re-lources. Thia dependent Eopire, Kith Tast ecd largely astcrpedis being slowly reorgudmed for tho exploitation of its reserves of strategic raw. Ths clene raqrgre,nvestment and con only prcduc;n tba iengrun. Ibaycviip an ietrsdULe cushion, tadhe deafer that their claims ontot', resourcos nay divert for long-toria code jecitcl needed fee* short-1ere par-pocss end thus still further weaken ths ina-rtiete CK pcsitieiu
The awent et whioh the first pcsb-soi*ill gf.vc plsc* to Hit second ennnct be opacified, but it ir balieved close at hand. Carves (ifexportr, eod national icccoe are already losing lr,;lr uyworden they flatten out, tho UK rill bo in fie uecesWi phano, nhether a? not they tern downward depends nainly upon developaenis over which the OK can exercise no control end vtry little influence; bat. If they turn mariouly uornwsrd, the trend will be of fci-^azantsl iapcrtacce to TrS occto-ity.
At this tlic, failing the ccotiauanse. or rerbans cats tba sxpa/uica af US aid, tho consequences of being in the ssc-arJ phase will begin to shcJ in the form of grcdaUly lowered Btfpm, 1occur been of work, dsclinia-
stcndfirds, end toemwi crficifcl controls. Changes of thia sort, fllwlop iog in tho eontiwt ofwaif aro stt to, aro virtually cor to in to lower public oorale aod to cronte jolitical tarsicca. It ie in tho naturo of tho nitm-tion that tha ttitish Ooiwnannt wille pressure to adjust its foreign cooniitaeiitB to its reduces power potential. Spelt out in toms of vC security, this trill rear, cuts in the UK nilitary budget, gradual wita-drswd in cutlylng stretegJc oreaa,inloution cf effective UK support for US pol-cy.
The essential ecnclsalco that can ba drccrt free this analysislvit, insofar as lis security is MnkcdK abilityintsin tacitly egrae!d to develop generally acceptedignificantio created by the feet that this ability seeca to depend almost entirely upon tho maintenance of un unprecedented volume of exports la an increasingly unfavorable acrid market. Tbe general typo of problem likely to arise from this uncertainty wlTl bo one of how to transfer oore and more of the cost, ofombined security position froa the UK to the OS. Thisf ycobiea is most likely to arise in the near future inEurope and tho "aar Hast; for, in South and Southeastreater share of the Inraodiats Jtrsin is in process of being aseu&ed by the Connon-tealtfc.
Tho major device, not for preventing these problems from arising, but for checking their sudden end unexpected appearance will bo the coordination. and OK ecoccuic policies in order to reduce the number of pointo et which responsibi?ity fcrotrjon sacurity interest will tend to shift froa tho OX to the US. ar as the two governments are officially
9 -
helo dsgnoj. except far tho feethants &ayespond to public cressns-esricci wuiohoke vho reconcilistios of their economic objectives ccrtrwxay SiKleoHc ir. the vfc, th? dsaaziselfare state; in tto ?Zt the ^rcip pressures goaerattiO by aecllt-'i-g? prices end tighter carkoto* 2- sZSXZffMl-PA&Pti"
Little basis exists for profltuMc sps-i'll/ilia? about Sovietn the CFM, and no estimate cf Sow*tit intentions ccn be sade theto sudden upset, IVbatavercjvj chsud for dccldles toboutonference, they lave boooturather than less obscure as the conference bas proc3edeca The Sc/iet position in the negotiations has essentially been toturo to the sjotflft osition that is strangaly urtfeelJstic. Tbn USSR has aado no uie of ths Beating forcrposss0
The fallowing suggestion is offered in the absence of aay groundsirm interpretation. It ia that the USiiR medo its decision to roconveaij tho CFU on en estimete of the situation uhich, though it may have appeared valid et the time the nacbinery vas set in motion, turned out, to bementally wrong when the accent srrivjd Cm-o ait. The USSR may have estimated that an epprcsefcirgstijiR would halt, ar at least seriouslyction by the Germanseat German constitutioc. The USSR amy have estimated that it could develop end then (Enlpulato en cverphelraixg German sentiment for unity a On this basis, theay have calculated that it cculd force tho West to ne^otisto under severe pressuro from the
/
Best'irn Garners and that thecrwany unifiedern that would facilitate tho ea^bliabBwot cf ultimate Soviet control.
If such estimates rercr. eocper--iio to conflre. then. Tho prospect" Rssticj; led :vpi<Uy to Uio acceptanceast lornst, constitution and to iters for the 'uraetiocevsmment. Kot orly did the West Germans fail to shew enthyciasEyrraaay unified cn Sonde teres, but the test Gersscj Ehowed political resistance to Soviet dlrtcticn by turningist cf oandidntea limningunity pnd peecs" ticket. In edditioo, tb* speed witlthe ifuUtfm Powersnified and detoirdned jedition with mtpect toas contrary to their previous practice. In short, differences bo twee: provlous estimates and presentey help to explain such curiosities as tha stand-pat position which3 hna taken in the CFH and tbeent Soviet inability toropaganda cacpeign for the German luiiwsce,
Tho preaont fact is thatSRiedeturn to the Potacam Agreement end the re-establishment cT the rrincinlo of unec'noos Fear-Power control, and that this position hae no apped to Genson naticnoliam and no relation to the developments ofest year. Tha area of negotiation has narrowed until it covers little mere than porslble agreement on ocouctiI-relations, though what agreements can grow ic tbe shadow of the present Soviet position is not readily
the ratification of the Atlantic Pact is likely to proceed with little delay except such as may be occesi'-vsed by the li-.tenticn of sow states to wait on US action. Political difficulties mayowever, In the OSmWj
cf Italy; though ultimata approvalxpected. Opinion in Italy mesplit oa tM cniatlco cf ths Pnct, and the Go7oraaantf in ed7oeatiriglinked the Face ln the public Bind with possiblein roo:>aet toormer colonies. The disposition of these cclcniesay satisfactory to Italian opinion becomes steadily lejn liVely.X boo probably blocked anydevelopment by its encouragement of Cyrenuican independence. The Italian reaction has left both De Ciesperi end Sforza open to attack. This roactlon is very likely toocustbe Atlantic Tact is presorted fcr ratification since it cap bohat none of its precised adTfci.tag.is have &oteriell2ed and that, oaends rill bey participation.
The fate of tho supplementry Military Aid Program is, however, beginning to cause public apprehension inropo, and remarks are beginning to appear obout the uncertainties and lock of finnneo3 in DS policy,, Reference is made tohore it was estimateilitary Aid Program was ofmportance in maintaining tho initially favorable peychologiailto tha Atlantic Pacta Specifically, "iiqulprtent and armament from thisill be regardedature! end legitimato Quid rro quo for tho risks undertaken and the compromises. 5trainn willet all possible points in connection with tho practical implementing stageense of Insecurity will probably reeppeoristortingt it possible that these strains ccy now start to develop in coraeeticn with delaya in authorizing the suFp3.omei:tery Program.
Creeps.
Tho situation tilth respect to Sovietguerrilla "peace feci oro"
-
remains fluid. Soviet suggestions cri tho nctler wore Interesting chiefly becBooo theyoviet ability to control guerrilla operetlonsp eal hintedossiblo desire toig-power deal. 3evict strategists, reviewing tho situation in the Salinas generally nay bave concluded that Greek national resistance andare steadily reducing guerrilla eepn-bHitlee. Rooent Communist propep-rda had paved tho wayhift froa guerrilla warfare to political canj signing. Tho main aim of tho diploactic maneuverleaving aside anytion it say have had with the CFKmast have baon to prepare the nay for tho Greek CaEJunlets to eooe bad: into Greek politics. Their olniaua dent-nda. If this caaeuvor waa to beer fruit, would have to be the legalisation of the Cceaunist Fcrty end its freeln subsequent elections. It was atated that the guerrillaseady to make peacoj this roadineso being presontedead from strength cot weakness since they would bo willing to take pert in free elections. was intended was thrown cut of gear by the refusal of the US end UK to nogotiete with the USSR behind the beck of tba Greek Government end outside the UN. It is noted that, In epitc of this elaborate peace strategy, no real evidence has yet come to hand of any intention to end guerrillain Qreeoo except ca conditions favorable to tlie maintenance of Cao mocist pressure cn Greek internal ef Palestine.
Israel has been unoenprecusing in the three eonfereneee that are simultaneously going onot Lausanne, with Syria, and with the Elagdea of Jordan, Tha Israeli have produced new demands and are apparently prepared to have all three talks brook down. Tbe possibility exists that Israel may
be foreseeing adoentager. in having tho issua of its relations with the Arob states thrown back to the Security Qamcil ahose inevitable delays andof implementation Right open the nay for further Israeli extension.
It is becoming inerefi singly clear that tho Israeli Government is^reat difficulty if. carrying out its proaisssaigrsnts. Itss unable to sustain the current rrteor cannumbers be physically absorbedritical triangle of housing, uneaplcy-nont, ond inflation has developed,. At the same time it is cut of the cu.es-tico politically for any Israeli, leader to suggest checking the influx won temporarily,. The stereotype ofreated by years of intensive propaganda, cermet be easily altered,,
Tho disappointment of Turkey at being excluded froa tho Atlantic Pact has been mitigated by reassuring oonversetions with the Turkish Foreign Minister,, Theso reassurances of ctatlnusd US interest, though only verbal, have had weight in Turkey because they have been supported by visible evidence of material aid. However, similar verbal reassurances'to Iron, since they lack at present similar material support, are producing stronger Iranian pressure for direct US aid. The motives behind this pressure areesire to be as favorably placed ?iith respect to tho USSR is the paramount one, bat jealousy of Turkey is also present,
8. Japa.M.
US effart3 to gain forora favorable international position end concurrently to revive Japanese economy, have run into difficulties,
SJJ^l?
Eastern European statee, smibers ol' the For Kflst Coomisaico, turned darnroposals that Japan sho-ildecognised seabar ofodies and be granted most-fcvcred nation privileges in tradeen, In addition, tho US belted further removals of equipment earo^rieJ for reparatiais, there waa bitter criticism of the action eaha action, however, naturally got wide approval in Jspan0 Whatever ray be its long-term economic value, its immediate psychological value wasby the inexpensive Soviet propeeal toapanese peace settlo-ccot. The effect on the Jepsnaso, whose enthusiasm for recoveringovereignty is increasing, forcefully underlined the inflnence which the USSR will be able to caanend in any treaty negotlaticne.
Coumimlet ni liter? advances into Sooth China, though temporarily halted for regrouping, have launched developments which will be intensifisd when the edvance is resumed, nationalist officials are ecatterlng, ecee to Taiwan, scoo to Chungking, some abroad.urther stage has been reached in the process by which the nationalist Governnont ia falling apart. It has lost all its unity and Its contacts with foreign diplomats will gradually disappear also. The implied threat to Hong Kong haeuick reaction. The UK has announced its intention of defending its position and has dispatched reinforcements. It Is unlikely that the Chinese Communists will attempt to resolve the issue by military means exceptast resort, Eong Kong can beiabilityilitary action.art, probable procedure will be the use of psychological and economic pressures in conjunction with negotiations whioh may veil expand to include recognitionommunist regime*.
-
finally, the Carauniat oeeupitico of South GUm will probablyn ecrly clarificotiCB of Camrurist intentions toocrd the countries ofAsia,
The schedulco* start of DS tracpeduced so ouch official, apprehension, publicly ccrr.iuoicctsi, that symptoms of aaaapeored. Unless the Republic assumes an air of confidenceJustifiable at letst for the short-runhysteria can eos.'Jy grow into panic Actually,hu Republics aroad forces are at the least equal in number and superior ecuipsjent to thoserth Korea, en laaodiete test cf strength is not lihsly. Popular panic, stimuletsd by hysterical goveraaent publicity, has reoontly done more to prepare tho ground for tha destruction of the Republic thin hove direct acts of tho Canttuninto. j. Indonesia.
The agreement reached at BaUvia represents no mere than tho first stop in tho process of permanently settling tho Indonesian probleri. It dopends on the ability of the Rop.ibllcan loaders to ao Into in lan and order in their area of authority and to maintain political unity among their followers. It depends also on the doubtful ccoperr-tion of Dutch military authorities. Both sides will eagerly note deflciences in these respects. Even assuming succoss et this stage, the Conference at the Haguenly moveonsideration of fundamentally contradictory positions, Dutch policy is predicated on neutralising tho Republic in order to rataontrolling influence in Indonesia, Republic r. policy seeks to counteract this intent. The position of the Federalists is not yet rleer. ii is difficult to forosse
a favorable end to tlx Baga? Conference urleiz ono of the partiec make?concessions. hat can be said rt present is that thas better than could be (scptcte-. The real issues, however, have not >e^ been approached, e. Burma,
The cost important ccveloprent hae been the decision of the Commonwealth t) extend niiitj.ry and financial aid to the Burmese Goverrifflent. It was unanimously agreed that the first objective of this program was the restoration of law and order. Extremely complex issuei enter into its execution., There ir continual danger that it may becWiv. to the injury of Cowronwealth. influence. o favorable factors arc new prosont. The Burmese Government has lost none of ita "anti-capitalist-lmperielist" phobia and may be weighing the die-advantages of impetuous secession from the Commonwealth against theprosperity and peace that has accompanied tho less doctrinaire coursea of India, PnMetan, end Ceylon, Furthermore, the Coatonwealthoot ln the door of Buirteae affairs and is finallyosition to exert pressure on their conduct. 6, latin America,
Developments affecting the stability cf latin American Governments are nixed, Tho governments of Cuba, Paraguay, and Peru appear to have become stronger. Brazil and Uoxico continue on an even keel, and Venezuela's government still demonstrates firm oontrol* in Bolivia, however, laborby the activity of oppositionbecceie increasingly serious rrcently, and the weak governrj:it
-
1
een forced to take oxtran*o insure its tenure. Inoo, the aOainistration's position has becosjB Increasinglyv grove economic problems remain unsolved and thare is increasing evidence of confusion within tho gsvernrannt.- Other countries which have experienced adverse developments include* Chile, whose government is fearful of this political consequences of falling copper prices; Colombia, whore tho political situationn tense localise of pre-eloction partisan rivalry; and Ecuador, where stability has become much less certain as new polities!
i
ailgnsents haveo upset the fomerly balanced strength of the groups opposed to tho administration.
Coonunist strength in these countries, it would appear, has declined during the month. There is evidence to show that in Colombia tho Party has become rolitlvoly ineffective; that in Uruguay it has lost ground anong labor; thnt pcpulir disapproval of Conounisai seems to have increased in kexies. In Argentina, the government continues its anti-Cormmist
Ho new serious probleus have arisen out of relations between these countries during the months but several lrritqtlng points of difference rrtain^ In the Cbxibhean area, even though no now issues have arisen, the "democracies" and "dictatorships* continue to bo hostile, and there are socio si^ns of renewed activity on the part of the Caribbean Legion. The threat b? Uruguay to Make an issue in the UN of the Venezuela, treat-rant of political prisoners eld not materialize, Uruguay has renewed diplomatic relations with Paraguay, but Uruguay still has not recognised elthor Venezuela or Peru.
1 *
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: