THE EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES OF THE GERMAN RAILWAY SYSTEMS
9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SJMttTffT*'
SUMMARY
capabilities of the German railways have been drastically reducedesult of war damage, toes of equipment, and genera) deterioration. With the-systems operating nearly at capacityerman railway traific amounted to onlyercent of7 tonnage, though It represented approximatelyercent of5 ton-kilometer total. Even at this curtailed level of operations,the railways of Germanyapacity which would considerably exceed thorequirements of the civilian population in an emergency.
The latent excess capacity of the German railroads would be adequate to sustainlarge-scale military movements. The present German rail systemapacity aboutercent greater than that which would be required toolume of trafllc equal to that of the depressionn which the modern German economy probably reached lis lowest prewar level. This surplus In excess2 traffic amounts to atillionomcters annually, oretric tons daily on the ba-is of8 average haul. As almost all of thecapacity would be available in Western Germany, western systems would bo capable ofar greater increase of military traffic at any reduced civilian standard ofthan would the railways of the Soviet Zone.
The most important factor now limiting theapabilities of the German railways Ls their shortage of serviceable rolling slock andpower, the effects of which have beta most severe In the Soviet Zone, whereas the Soviet Zone has leas thanercent of itsfreight car and locomotive Inventories in operation, the Blzone has overercent of Its prewar serviceable inventories available.
The present capabilities of thehole or of any particular zone could be increased by provision of additional rolling stock and motive power. Because ofand general deterioration, however, any considerable and sustained increase In the present traffic of the Soviet Zone wouldconcurrently extensive rehabilitation measures. Since such rehabilitation would be slow, the added military traffic In anwould probably absorb any expansion of rail capacity In the Soviet Zone, leavingcapacity which could be used for building up local industrial traffic. In the Western Zones, on the other hand. It Is probable that with added rolling stock the railways could support notarge-scale increase Intrafficore prolonged period, but might at the same time carry an Increased volume of Industrial traffic.
Note: The Intelligence organization! of the Departments of State. Navy, and the Air Force hove concurred In this report;issent by the Intelligence Division. Department ot the Army, see Enclosure A,his report is based on Information available to CIA as of
Tho German railways transported8 anillion metric tons of freight, an Increase ofercent over the tonnage hauled7 (seef thet is probable that8 performance represented the approximate
level of railway traffic cannot be accurately determined within the scope of this study, it is nevertheless pertinent to examine themodern level in railway traffic on record. In order to estimate the minimum surplus capacity which would be available In an emer-totel capacity of the German rail sys- gency, therefore, the following paragraphs terns with existing equipment and line facill-8 traffic in relation to that of the ties, although they undoubtedly retain depressionn which themall reserve capacity, particularly in Oernian economy probably reached its lowest the Bizonal area. The substantially reduced prewar level and in which tho prewar level of emergency capabilities of the Oerman rati- railway traffic also reached its lowest point, ways arc apparent when8 trade figure Even at that low level, however, the German It related to Germany's rail performance in standard of living was relatively highear of Increasing activityrepsra- pared to many other European countries, and tton for war. The railways carried approxi-
nlUlon metric tons of freightn estimatedercent of this total traffic, however, was hauled over lines In East Prussia and In the area east of the Oder and Nelsse Rivers now under PolishThe traffic in that part of prewarcorresponding to the presenttherefore, amounted toillion
it was appreciably higher than that accorded the German civilian population during the latter stages of World War II.erious emergency Involving large-scale military-movements In Germany within the foreseeable future, the civilian standard of living would probably be reduced by the power or powers controlling the areaevel which would be considerably lower than2 level. Ton-kllometcrs performed over the Oerman
tons In relation to this tonnage, the
8 capacity of the8 (estimatedillion)
ways represents only aboutercent2 performance for the corre-
actlvity inareaillion) by about
Kxpressed In terms of ton-kilometers,percent. Kven If civilian requirements for
ore accurate index of railwaytraffic were not reduced below the vol-
8 was also considerably below7 performance. It is estimated that the ton-kilometers performed by all German railways8 may have totaled as high7 ton-kilometer traffic, again
tivity than tons hauled, German railprevailingherefore, the German
railways would additionally be capable ofatillion ton-kilometersof occupational or military traffic,of the small reserve capacity retained by the railwayshis represents
for territorial losses, amounted toillion for en area comparable to postwar Germany.B performance, therefore, represents aboutercent of the7 traffic.
The present potential reserve capacity of the German railways would he the surplus above the irreducible minimum of civilian Although the minimum civilian
excludingercent of the total to account ghlvmionay which,
on the basis of3 average haul ofilometers, wouldotentialofetric tons dally which could be devoted to Die objectives of theauthorities.
(The following estimate Is advanced merely lo suggest tlie order of magnitude of the call-mated potential surplus railway capacityin this analysis. Xo attempt is made
in this study to evaluate cither tho need for such reserve railway capacity or the ability of the controlling authorities to exploit suchunder any given set of circumstances. Past US experience in the Kuropean theater indicates that an average ofetric tons of supplies per man per day Is necessary to maintain basic divisions and requisiteand air support forces. Itaily railway surplusetric tons, if futly exploited, wouldapacity equivalent to the supplyof about four million basic USand supporting forces, excluding Initial equipment. Tills volume of traffic, however, could undoubtedlyonsiderably larger Soviet force.)
As relatedurthermore, the bulk of this over-all surplus capacity would beavailable in the Blzone. Of the tola!illion ton-kilometer differentialthe two years,illionapply to the Blzone alone, wheretraffic was an estimatedercent greater8 than In the correspondinglont Is not possible to determine from presently available data the proportion of theillion ton-kilometers to be attributed to the French and Soviet Zones, respectively. Their combined Increase2 traffic, however, amounted to only 7It seems reasonable to assume that the pattern of railway traffic In the area nowthe French Zone would have closely approximated in prewar years that of theregion, since the two areas included the great lthtneland industrial complex. Thedisparity, therefore, between Western Germany's capacity in excess2 require- -mcnts and that of Eastern Germany iseven greater than Indicated by thestatistics.
This analysis demonstrates that despite the very substantial reduction of the presentcapacity of tho German railways from normal peacetime levels: (a) thehole are now capable orsufficient traffic to accommodatelarge-scale military movements andtoivilian standard of living above the subsistence level; and (b) the railways of Western Germany are now capable ofar greater volume of military traffic without reducing the standard of living below the subsistence level than ore the railways of Eastern Germany. The latter conclusion Is strengthened by the factarger share o( current railway traffic isalready allocated to militaryIn the Soviet Zone than InGermany, In view ot the greater strength of occupational forces and the large volume of freight mov'ng out o! Germany to the East.
The most Important factor limiting theof all German railways has been their shortage of serviceable rolling stock and locomotives. The effects of this shortage have probably been most severe In the Soviet Zone, where the railways were operating8 with only an estimatedercent oferviceable freight car inventory (seen the Blzone, on the other hand, the serviceable freight car Inventory was restored to almostercent of prewar. With respect to locomotives, the most serious shortage of motive power Is also in the Soviet Zone, where the number of availablefor German requirements Isaboutercent of the prewar inventory (seen contrast, the Buonehad overercent of Its prewar motive power In operation. It Is undoubtedly true that the present ca-
pabilities ot the Oerman railwayshole or of any particular zone could be Increased by the provision of additional locomotives and freight cars. The abUlties of Western and Eastern Oermany's railways to accommodate substantial and sustained increases in the present level of transport requirements,ver, vary considerably. While dismantling and general deterioration ot the Soviet Zone system have reduced its efficiency, It Is still somewhat supe-Ior in relative density to other Eastern Europe in networks. At present, the Soviet Zone railways are undoubtedly capable of easily accommodating and dispatching to any part of the Zone the maximum traffic which can now be handled by the changeof-gaugo transshipment stations on the Polish-Soviet border. Any large-scale military effort by the Soviet Union In Europe whichustained increase In the present railof Eastern Germany, however,
ably could not be supported by the railways of the Soviet Zone without substantial quantities of repair materials, equipment, rolling stock, and locomotives. Moreover, even if thiswere allocated to Eastern Germany, the system probably could not also sustain any significant Industrial activity In the area. In any event, owing to the deteriorated condition of the present Soviet Zone system, aand continued Inciease In its presentcould only be realized by extensivemeasures.
In the Western Zones, the system Is also far below Its prewar capacity and efficiency. The rolling stock situation Is not, however, soas in the Soviet Zone. There has been no extensive postwar dismantling or generaland maintenance and operational standards have been considerably higher.esult, and assuming foreign assistance in materials and rolling stock to meet therequirements of an emergency, It is probable that tbe railways of Westerncould support not only large-scalemovementsore prolonged period, but might also be capable of sustaining ahigher level of industrial traffic than In the case of the Soviet Zone rail system.
ANNEX
HISTORICAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATISTICAL BACKGROUND
Prewar Roll Network.
For many year* prior lo Worldpetssessed on* of tha most complex,and best maintained railroad systems in the world. Because of Its exceptionaland Its central location alongtrunk routes, the German rail system was an Important factor In EuropeanPrewar Germany was traversed byInternational rail routes linking France and the Low Countries with Central Europe and the Balkans on one hand, and Italy and Switzerland with Scandinavia and tho Worth Sea on the other. Despite tho hv_ ternatlonal significance of the Oeimanhowever, the system was primarilyin character. For example, internal freight traffic7 accounted forercent ot total railway freight moved In Germany. Moreover, the Germtin rail system was by far the country's most important transportalthough Germany also possessed hlglily developed Inland waterways andThe German railways carriedercent of all German freight traffic moveds compared to5 percent carried by inland waterwaysercent on highways.
Historically, control Of the German railways was originally separated among the seven constituent States which,egan nationalizing those railways hitherto privately owned.nder the Weimar Republic, the separate State railways wereunder the central government and in4 the Gorman Slate Railway(Deutsche Relchsbahngcselischaft) was constituted with the exclusive right to operate the State railways. With the Incorporation of tho Helchsbahn into the political structure of tho Third Rtfchontrol of thewas further centralized and virtually all German railways were operated by thatuntil the surrender andof Germany.
At the tune of its reorganizationhe Reichsbahn comprised0 route kilometers. The system ranked second in density In all of Europe, withf trackquare kilometers of national territory. Although Berlin was an important center of rail activity, there were several other areas of Oermany. such as the Ruhr Valley, which also had extensive rail net-worksensity seldom found In othercountries except in the Immediateot the various national capitals. Approxl-matelyercent of the Reichsbahn system consisted of double or multiple-track lines andercent of It was electiifted.
In spite of the density of tho German rail network, however, Its extent was little more than that existing at the end of World War I. Apart from double-tracking of existing routes, lessilometers of track on new routes was laid In the Intervening years. On the other hand, for both economicubstantial program ofand modernization of the system had been carried out. Technical Improvements in the permanent way and In the design of steam, electric, and Diesel locomotives resulted in greatly Increased speed and efficiency of operation of the German railways.
Effect of World Wor II.
The German railwixy system bore the major portion of the country's military transport burden and probably reached itshe system was under continual strain from the beginning of the war, however,esult of traffic disruptions caused by military requirements, damage from sporadic air attacks, shortages of criticalexcessive wartime traffic withoutmaintenance, and the decliningof the labor force. Railway operations
3
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rapidly following the beginning ot heavy and continued Allied air attacks latend the consequent disruption of transportationaajor factor In the anal collapse of the German economy.
The region now occupied by the Western rowers suffered particularly severe damage from tho concentrated air attacks on the heavy Industry throughout the area. For In-stance, more thanercent of the railway bridges In Blzonia were completely destroyed or heavily damaged. The capacity of theyards was reduced toercent of normal by the end ofnd to aboutercent by the end of the war. Almost all of the marshalling yards located In the US-UK zones were subjected to heavy andattacks which greatly impeded lhe operation of through rail traffic by the close of the war. The signal and telecommunications systems were In effect inoperative, andopciations In general had been reducedrimitive state.
fn the present Soviet Zone ofajor railway bridges were destroyed. As was the case In Westernkey marshalling yards and traffic cen-ters were high priority targets, although the damage. In general, was neither as severe nor as lasting as in the Bizonal area.
esult of the roregoing, German railway operations had been broughtirtual standstill by the close of the war. Central control of traffic broke down completely and operationsatter of purely localAlthough there had been onlyshortages of locomotives and freight cars early In the war, which wereart of Germany's rolling stock and motive power was dispersed over much of Europeart had been destroyed or damaged, and that equipment remaining in Germany, much of which was of foreignwas In deplorable condition. Therailway system had been reduced by waruperior operating condition to aand deteriorated skeleton unable toadequately even tho vaitlytransport requirements of Germany's immediate postwar economy.
rganiiotion.
With tho end of tlie war In Europe and the division of Germany into four zones ofthe Oerman railway system wasdismembered to conform with the zonal demarcations. This was effectedof existing administrative ordivisions. Furthermore,0 kilometers ot the Pelehsbalin (overercent of the lotal German system) located in the polish-administered areas east of the Oder-Nelsse line and In the portion of East Prussia transferred to the USSR, were severed from the German system and are no longer considered or operated as part of it. (These portion of the former German system are not tncludtd in this study.)
When Germany came under occupational'our-pover Transpoit Directorate was established as part of the Allied Control Council In Berlin. Under Its direction was the over-all German Administration for Transport, which. In turn. Included the ad-rnirustratlvs instrument for operationalof the German railways, the CentralAdministration. Quadripartite control of the railways was only partially elTecllve, however, since each of the occupational powers retained final Jurisdiction over the lines in Its zone. The progressive deterioration of four-power administration of occupied Germany has now resulted In the completely separate operation of the Soviet Zone system. Thehe US and UK Zones are operatedizonal basis and the French Zonewhile Independent, Is coordinated with that of the Elzone.
In the Bi/one. over-all transport policy Is determined by the occupational authorities through Joint transport advisers. Transport activities are under the general supervision of the Bizonal Transportation Administration, which directs the railways In coordination with other forms of surface transport. The Cenltal Railway Administration, which Isto the Transportationmaintains direct operational andcontrol and Is relativelyIn its direction of the subordinateomces or Refchsbahndlrektlonea. Plans have been announced, but not yet
piemen ted, for the merger of the French Zone transport administration withhe Bi-zono to estibltsh Joint direction of ailactivities In Western Germany.
Transportation In the Soviet Zoneimilar fashion. Over-all policy control is exercised by the Soviet Military Ad-minlstraUon (SMA) through the Soviet Transport Administration. All transportare coordinated by the GeneralAdministration and the railways ate operatedthe immediate supervision and direction of the Central RailwayUnlike the Blione, however, ths USoK has stationed militaiy officers throughout the Eastern German rail organization, even In many railway stations. Moreover, all Soviet traffic over the German rail system la moved under direct SMA control by special civilian crews each commandedoviet officer. There arc two types of such units, one including personnel for the operation of trains solely within the Soviet Zoneecond made up of crews used Intraffic outsldo of Oermany. Another agency subordinate toSoviet Transport Administration is the German-SovietCorporationoviet foreign-trade unit with Soviet representatives at all levels to supervise reparations and transit shipment accounts.
Posrwor OccupoiVon Policy ond Rehobilitoiio^.
The immediate railway problem throughout Germany at the end of hostilities was theof operationscale sufficient to provide the minimum transport capacity necessary to discharge occupationaland accommodate reparations andshipments. This required theof serviceable rolling stock and the restorationinimum number of essentia! lines, Instaliatlcns and bridges. Following this Initial restoration. Ihe degree of further rehabilitation of the German railways has. In genera', reflected the policies of thepowers with respect to tho over-allof the German economy.
In the Western Zones, rail rehabilitation started slowly because of the exterulvencss of war damage to the rail network and the early Allied occupation prohibitions which Germany's economic revival. The extent of Western Europe's dependence on the German economy soon became increasingly apparent, however, and over-all Europeauhaveradualof the stringent occupation policies.esult, the railway systems of Westernhavo benefited from an Increasingly favorable rehabilitation policy, which has generally matched the rising level of theeconomy.
The current status of the Bizonal railway system, in terms of equipment, installations, and facilities, is indicated below:"
Rehabilitation of motive power and rolling stock has proceeded slowly because of unie-stored repair installations, shortages of raw materials, undernourishment and low morale of the labor force, and other factors. Aboutercent of the repair installation* have now been restored, however, and substantialIn the repair of freight cars wasoreover, much repair work has been farmed out to neighboring countries. In addition,0 new freight cars have been purchased from othercountries with ECA-authorlzed funds for delivery to the Bizone during the fiscal. The Inauguration of freight car production within the Blzone earlier thanwill probably make availableew cars by the endt that time, the estimated annual rate of production wilJ0 cars, althoughtightness In Investment funds mayonsiderable retarding effect during the year. (Additional data concerningrailway equipment are given in
ailway bridges now remainunserviceable. Ofridges destroyed or heavily damaged during the war.ercent have been rebuilt, although many of these have been restoredemporary basis.
Information roncerMnt; tbe French Zone ijiirm Is Inclosed In the tablet appearing atI of this study.
trifled lines In Cential Germany, the USSR has also removed virtually all of the electric locomotives, equipment, and even the poles. Much of the heavy machinery in the repair shops, as well as signal and other equipment, has also been dismantled and removed from Germany to the East as war booty. The loss of this machinery has greatly retarded the freight car repair program of the Zone.
A second detrimental effect of theupon the railways of Eastern Germanyfrom tho Soviet blockade and thecounter blockade. By cutting off the Eastern railways from their normal supply sources for repair and construction materials in the Western Zones, the blockade severely affected new construction, reconstruction,and even normal replacement programs. Moreover, there has teen no Indication ot a
yards. In general, have been restored to
a fair condition. The highly Industrialized Ruhr area, which containedercent of the marshalling yards of tho Biione, was one of the most heavily bombed districts in all of Germany. The Ruhr yards, however, have now been restored sufficiently to meet allservice requirements.
The signal and telecommunication system has been completely restored, with more thanercentermanent basis. Moreover, the special (Basa) telephoneullydial system for rail operations, is again in opera tier..
ercent of otherrailway Installations In the Blzones Soviet disposition to provide such materialsbeensignificant quantity from its own orImmediate prospect for the rail system lite resources. Even the ncgUglble quantity of
of Western Get many is one of continuing rolling stock produced In the Soviet Zoneimprovement Although the system the war has not teen made available tostill far below its prewar efficiency and ca- Germanas been requisitionedit is generally adequate for the present transferred to the USSR asof the over-all economy ond will not pro- Although the USSR has givena serious bottleneck In any planned or lip service to contemplated ImprovementsGerman reco/eryprograms, particularly under the
Western Germany Is that of the Soviet Zone. The system of Eastern Oermany has suffered extensively from Soviet occupation, in add!-tion to the war damage and wartimeexperienced by all German railways. Principal among the consequences of thein Eastern Germany have been the losses suffered by the railwaysesult of tho drastic dismantling and reparations program conducted by the USSR. For example, the route mileage of the Reichsbahn in the Soviet Zone has been reduced byilometers through Soviet dls-
In marked contrast to the railew of
to have been Implemented. Tacit Sovietof German construction requests Is often negated by failure to provide thematerials. Some restorations, however,
havo been made, or are in progress:
ajor Soviet Zone railway bridges destroyed, aboutercent have beenOnlyercent of tlie repaired bridges, however, have been permanently rc-stcrcd. The balance have been repaired on an emergency basis requiring crossings atspeeds and loads,
A portion of the tall connection between the port; of Rostock-Wainemunde and Berlin
obly now restoredingle-track basis lo expedite movements In this area and to tho south.
estoration cf dismantled second tracks on certain lines running out of Dresden isto be in progress. Althoughof tho entire Berlin-Dresden route to dou-
mantling, and now consists ofilo- whIcIl wag completely dismantled is prob-
meters of primarily single-track lines. (As previously Indicated,0 additional route kilometers were lost to Poland and the USSR throughvar territorialboutercent of the formerly double-track lines in the area have now been reduced to single-track status. From the formerly elec-
ble-track status Is reportedly contemplated, It Is unlikely to be accomplished in thefuture because of shortages ofmaterials.
hort section of line known as the Zossen cut-off is reported to hove beenthus making it unnecessary for Soviet trains approaching Berlin from the south to transit the US Sector.
Because of Soviet indifference to German economic requirements, the railway system of Eastern Germany has been allowed togradually. Its line capacity in terms of permissible weight per train, for example, is estlma'-cd to have been at leastercent below the prevailing capacity in the Western ZonesSoviet Zone trains werelimitedeightons, In contrastons per train In the Westernlthough the system will remain adequate for Soviet economic andrequirements, if they remain attheir present level, It will probably be subject to Increasing strain In order to provide the transport requirements ot even the greatly reduced economic level of Eastern Germany.
TABLE A
RAILWAY FREIOHT TRAFFIC (REICHSBAHN)
Tons /fouled
(million) oftons, excluding only railway service freight and livestock!
Germany Blzone Soviet Zone French Zone
0
Estimated.
trade er.lmated atillion tons1 andillion? hauled over Unci In Cast Prussia and to tha area east ol ihe Oder-Nel&sa line now Pollih-admlnU'.ered.
Ton-A'Uomefers Performed tWUloni ot too-kOometer*)
Germany Bizone Soviet Zone French Zone
6
* Estimated.
traffic climatedillion ten-kilometers1? billion? hauled over lines in Fast Prussia and in the area east of ihe Oder-Neluev PolUh-admloljtered.
Note: Earlyreight ear loadings wereer day in tho Bl/one and an0 per day in the Soviet Zon?
J2
FREIGHT CAR
GujiiiJl
TADLB B
INVENTORY
Of
Soviet French
3'
Probablyotal olprior to the wax.
'Includes East Prussia and the area east of the Oder-Neisse line; approximatelyreight cars were- used In the present Soviet Zone, ot which anere serviceable.of December KMT.ofote: These figures are all estimates, with theof tha Btione statisticsoreign rolling stock In use In the various occupation rones Is included.
TABLE C
locomotives are climated to have been In theSoviet Zone.of January ills.
'As of March there were anocomotives In the Soviet rone. Of these. were completely unserviceable, either because they vera damaged beyond repair or because their repairimpossibleesult of existing conditions (this figureJ foreignere underere usedby Soviet Brigades forere set asideeserve for winter traffic,alance ofocomotivesoreign) to meet Oerman traffic
'As ot
'As othere were anocomotives in the Soviet Zone, ofere completelyereere reserved for Soviet Militaryuse only, andena reserve for emergencyhli lefterviceable locomotives for Oerman requirements.
TABLE D
'
DISTRIBUTION OF REICHSBAHN ROUTE KILO METR AGE
(thousands of
Excluding anilometersbyR.
ilometers Interritory In East Prussia and east of the Oder-Nelsse line,ilometers inEast Prussia.
figures are all estimates, with the exception of the Rl2one statistics
Kast Prussia and the area east of the Oder-Nelsse line; not more0 serviceable
ENCLOSURE A
Although this studysefulof the German civilian economy insofar as the German railway systems are concerned, it appears to be deficient In treatment of the railway operational factors Involved. The lack of adequate basic assumptions, combined with unconvincing statistical support, leads us to the opinion that the study, although excellent in many respects, Is Inadequate for the determination of the potential under emergency conditions, of the German railway systems,
DISSENT BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
In estimating the annual potential capacityillion Ton-Kilometers) of the Oerman railways which could be devoted to theof the military authorities, It appears that the basic traffic analysis contained in this study Is based2 statistics. Wo believeather unrealistic approach to the problem of determining the emergency potential of the Oerman transportationand suggest that possibly an analysis and comparison of conditions7 would more accurately present the relative positions of civilian and military transport capabilities.
Original document.
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