The Director of Central InteLGgcr
Warftioston,5
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National0
EXECUTIVE BRIEF
Prospects for Soviet Military Assistance to Cuba
1 Soviet military aid to Cuba is likely io fall substantially, perhaps by someercent below the yearly average for the current five-year, and will decline further
Moscow will probably also reduce the number or its military advisers and technicians In Cuba. However, It will want to retain the Lourdes SIGINT site and the brigade that secures it, although this would not preclude some downsizing of the brigade.
Such reductions will not significantly degrade Cuba's military capabilities because large amounts of Soviet-supplied equipment-including some new systems-are being transferred from Angola to Cuba.
We see little prospect that the Soviets will use reductions In military assistance to Cubaeans to pressure the Castro regime to enact significant reforms. But they are also unlikely to buttress Castro by providing the levels of assistance he desires.
This Executive Brief was requested by BernardAronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, and represents the findings of Intelligence Community represenlathfseeting held ont was produced by the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America and coordinated with representatives of CIA, State/INR, DIA, NSA, and die Services.
All portions
The Current Five-Year Plan
Moscow has generally adhered this year to the provisions of the current five year
8
or military aid to Cuba,will amount toillion by the end of the year, about tbe same ashis is somewhat less than the annual average for the last five years, but consistent with past Soviet practice of front-loading deliveries in tbe first two or three years of five-year plans.
The Soviets continue marginally to upgrade the Cuban armed forces. 1
Other factors could cause even sharper cuts:
Severe economic problems in the USSR might embolden reformers-who want to sharply reduce the burdens of assisting the increasingly isolated and intransigent Castro regime.
The real decline in the volume of equipment received by Havana could be as high asercent if Moscow continues to inflate the ruble cost of its military hardware, as it has over the last few years.
incse aircran win moaesuy improve Cuban air defense capabilities. Other deliveries this year-an anti-submarine warfare patrol ship,2 tanks, additional helicopters, and transport aircraft-provide Cuba with only minor improvements.
In addition, Cuba continues to buttress its arsenal with Soviet-supplied equipment it is bringing back from Angola. The value of those arms will total0 million this year.
Trends Over the Next Two Years
We believe the Soviets intend to reduce their military assistance tn Cuba over the
next two years.
likely to tall by somecicem ueiow the yearly6 billion-for tbe current five-year plan, although no time period was specified. Tbe Soviets have been warning other military aid recipients of surular reductions.
In any event, we believe that cuts beyond tbe anticipatedercent next year will be likelyc cannot, however, estimate their magnitude with any precision.
Soviet Arms Deliveries to
Discussions on future military assistance levels are underway. We believe that the Soviets will concludene or two year agreement, as they have in negotiauons over economic aid. Tbe Soviets' refusal to commit themselvesive-year plan will make long-term
g
anning extremely difficult for the ibans and leaves open the possibility of more drastic cuts orutoff in the future. Moreover, Moscow is unlikely to provide Havana with any major new weaponry, other than thelready inflrflhllbj 1 ,
Havana
will receive only second-hand equipment, the kind of hardware Cuba is now predominantly receiving.
Declining military aid will notramatic impact on Cuban capabilities, at least over the next year or so. Moreover, the effecteduction in Soviet deliveries will continue to be buffered by the transfer of equipment from Angola. If, for instance, Cuba receivesighters it currently bas in Angola-as seems likely-its current inventory ofould be significantly augmented. This wouldreater increase in capability than the eightlready delivered. Moreover, it is also possible that anotherrom Angola now being refurbished in the Soviet Union will be sent to Cuba.
In the near term, Havana's chief military
S
oblem will nol be equipment, but fuel, tere have already been shortfalls in Soviet oil shipments to Cuba, resulting in some cutbacks in military operations. If fuel shortages become severe in the military, reduced training could gradually degrade military proficiency and be reflected, for example, in increased aircraft accidents.
A development which already appears to be underway and would have an adverse impact on the military is the suspension, or sharp reduction, in the training of Cuban military personnel in ihe USSR and the loss of training opportunities in
Eastern Europe. Our information on the Soviet training cuts is limited, but over time such reductions would erode Cuban proficiency, especially if training on high technology systems were reduced.
Soviet Personnel
"SECRGt
brigade provides security for Lourdes, and is likely lo be stationed nearby as long as Moscow maintains an important presence there.
A reduction in the size of the brigadehange in its composition is possible nonetheless. An independently deployed brigade istandard Soviet military unit, and the force in Cuba could be shrunk without undermining its ability to perform its principal mission. ror example, its bridging unils or chemical defense company could be withdrawn.
We have no indications that the Soviets are considering any such changes in the brigade, but some analysts believe thereistinct possibility Moscow could offer to reduce it in return for US concessions on Cuba or, failing that, could reduce it unilaterally.
The Soviet-Cuban Military Relationship
Shrinking Soviet support for the Cuban military, especially in the contextroader estrangement, will undoubtedly exacerbate bilateral tensions. We have seen few manifestations of this, however, and militarv-io-military ties are likely to remain more amicable than political relations. Soviet army chief of staff Moiseycv, who recently visited Cuba, probably endeavored to reassure his
reciprocation for one to Moscow earlier this year by the Cuban chief of staff.
We see little immediate prospect that Moscow will use military assistanceeans of pressuring Havana to implement political and economic reform. It is not clear that the Soviets would in any event regard such leverage as efficacious, and they will probably prefer to maintain reasonably harmonious military ties. But neither do we judge that the Soviets will move to buttress Castro with the levels of military assistance he desires.
Original document.
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