INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS SITUATION REPORT

Created: 1/1/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NOFORN, NOCONTRXCTtGRCON

AMERICA LAST YEAH, BUT PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINING THESE GAINS IN THE FACE CF MOUNTING COSTS, ESCALATING RISKS, AND EXPANDED TRAFFICKING

ARE UNCERTAIN. EXPECTATIONS CF GREATER HEMISPHERIC COOPERATION IN THE DRUG FROM THE CARTAGENA ANTIDRUG SUMMIT IN FEBRUARYTHE SPECTER OF DRUG VIOLENCE SPILLING OVER FROM COLOMBIA PROMPTED VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS TO GIVE HIGHER PRIORITY TO ANTINARCOTICS POLICY LAST YEAR- ALTHOUGH COCNTERKARCOTICS EFFORTS KEPT PARTS OF THE INDUSTRY ON THE DEFENSIVE THROUGH MUCHHEY DID NOTUNDAMENTAL DISRUPTION OF THE TRADE. THE INDUSTRY'S NUMEROUS RESOURCEFUL GROUPS, AS NELL AS ITS OVERALL SIZE, WEALTH, AND INTIMIDATING INFLUENCE WITHIN KEY DRUG SOURCE NATIONS ENABLED IT TO MAINTAIN HIGHF COCAINE DELIVERIES TO THE UNITED STATES WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY EXPANDING OPERATIONS TO EUROPE AND OTHER MARKETS- WITH THE STAKES RISING IS THE DRUG WAR, ALL OF THE ANDEAN GOVERNMENTS ARE REEXAMINING THEIR DRUG CONTROLOVE WHICH WE RELIEVE PORTENDS GROWING DEMANDS ON WASHINGTON IN EXCHANGE FOR THEIR COMMITMENT TO SUSTAIN ANT INARCOTICS EFFORTS. |

INITIATIVES

WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOUTH AMERICAN COCAINE TRADE IS FACING DETERMINED OPPOSITION YET. ALTHOUGH DEVELOPMENTSY BOGOTA'S CONTINUED PRESSURE AGAINST THE TOP ECHELONMEDELLIN ORGANIZATIONS, SOUTH AMERICAN ANTIDRUG FORCES ACROSS ALL FRONTS

WE BELIEVE THE SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG TRADE CONTINUED0 TO FEEL THE EFFECTS OF>ONGARCOTICS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TOP KSDEL1IN TRAFFICKERS. THE OVEPALI. COUTirERNAP.COTICS POLICY, LAUNCHED BY FORMER PRESIDENT BARCO FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATIONRAFFICKERS OF PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANT LUIS CARLOS GALAN IN IS BEING CONTINUED BY BARCO'S SUCCESSOR, CESAR GAVIRIA, WHO TOOK OFFICE IN AUGUST IN OUR JUDGMENT, THIS CAMPAIGN MARKS AN IMPORTANT TACTICAL SHIFT AWAY FFOM PREVIOUS EFFORTS THAT EMPHASIZED PIECEMEAL, POORLY PLANNED INTERDICTION OPERATIONS AGAINST EASILY REPLACED TARGETS. IF SUSTAINED, WE BELIEVE IT HAS TKE POTENTIAL TOUMBER OF TRAFFICKER ADVANTAGES BY FOCUSING ON THE LEAST EXPENDABLE AND MOST CRITICAL ELEMENT IN THE COLOMBIAN TRADE: THE PEOPLE WHO MANAGE AND FINANCE IT. |

ALTHOUGH THE IMPACT OF THIS STRATEGY IS DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY, WE BELIEVE IT IS OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN TO COLOMBIA'S TRAFFICKING ELITE. UNDER BARCO, THF. MILITARIZATION OF SEVERAL MEDELLIN SUBURBS ANO OTHER TRAFFICKER STRONGHOLDS, THE EXTRADITION OF APPROXIMATELYRAFFICKERS TO TBE UNITED STATES, AND THE GOVERNMENT'S UNRELENTING EFFORTS TO LOCATE KINGPIN PABLO ESCOBAR ANC HIS ASSOCIATES CAUSED VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE TOP TRAFFICKERS TO LOWER

OFORN.NOCONTRACT,ORCON

THEIR PROFILES OR GO UNDERGROUND TO AVOID ARREST OR DEATH. HE PELIEVE THIS, IN TURN, CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED COORDINATION AND SECURITY PROBLEMS THROUGHOUT MUCH CF TKE TRAFFICKING CHAIN. UNDERSCORING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT CHALLENGE TO TRAFFICKERS, ESCOBAR SPENT MOST OF THE YEAR CN THE RUN AND ORGANIZING MASSIVE ASSASSINATION, KIDNAPPING, AND PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS AIMED AT UNDERMINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY FORCES AND ERODING SUPPORT FOR TKE CRACKDOWN. HE AND CTHER TOP TRAFFICKERS ARE NOW TRYING TO BRING THISEAR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, WHICH WILL CONVENE IN FEBRUARY WITH

NOFORN

SECftB^^

prf.es

AUTHC ORUAt-COLOP

COCA PROCESSING ACTIVITIES, THOUGH STILL DOMINATED BY COLOMBIANS, PROBABLY EXPANDED LAS? YEAR, INCREASING THE INDUSTRY's OVERALL PRO'J'JCTION CAPACITY AND FLEXIBILITY TO COUNTER ANTIDRUG OPERATIONS. INDEED, THE DISCOVERYOCAINE hcl PROCESSING OPERATION IN LIMA UNDERSCORES THE EFFORTS OF PERUVIAN TRAFFICKERS TO BREAK THEIR OEFF.NDENCE ON COLOMBIAN BROKERS AND DISTRIBUTORS. OVE THAT WE BELIEVE FORESHADOWS A LONG-TERM TREND IN PERU, AT LEAST ONE HEAVILY TARiiETEi: PERUVIAN ORGANIZATION HASLr EXPANDED its OPERATIONS DESr^ITE^INTEHSIFTED ENFORCEMENT

Jit has built an extensive

, "and distribute coca products nsjve networks of corruptctivities. through these efforts, the won the exclusive trust of several derivatives.

SECRET NOFORN,NOCONTRACT,ORCON

CERTAIN COUNTERNARCOTICS DEVELOPMENTSEw

mStmbtING THA'* THE FINANCIAL COST OF LAST YEAR'S ANTINAROOILI.&

THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND INSURGENT PROBLEMS.

HIS SETTING, HE EXPECT THAT THE FRONTLINE ANDEAN STATES

AND POLITIILL DETERS^gS"5

WE BE LI EVE. FOR EXAMPLE, THAT COLOMBIAN; cn^RPNT STO-pCvHIS CONCERN. IT SEEMS AIMED, IN

TO THE GOVERNMENT. |

THE OUTCOME OF COLOMBIA'S CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY,

Sw^ING RVFORMS AIMED AT MAKING COLOMBIA'S LEGAL INSTITUTIONS , 5 o HE ASSEMBLYNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO INSERT WAYS CRIPPLE ANTINARCOTICS INITIATIVES.

NOFORN,NOCONTRACT,ORCON SECRET

SECRET NOFORN,NOCONTRACT,ORCON

pt the militaryacceptance of us military antidrug

SuS iSliIence, training,to be mrntary's primary mission will almost certainli coi..inue b

to such policies as offshore interdiction operations, fflwjzeo in the press as blockades threatening national

sovereignty. |

th- andean states are likely to bolster their defense ofto pe'juce the

demanding increased economic assistance.

NOFORN,NOCONTRACT,ORCON SECRET

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA