Sunuaary
Preeidant Aylwin hastxategy deetgned to anaart hla authority over tha military and win Itm confidence before addraealng the ardueue teak of reetructurlng the armed foreee along llnee compatible with civilien role. Over hie first el* uonthe in office, he has made good progreee, winning etrortg becking from three ot the service chiefe end holding in check Army chief Pinochet, whose obetructionlmt tectlca Indicate he contlnuee to harbor polltlcel embltlone. Aylwln'e ettorte to menego the emotionally-charged laeue of human righto violations during the Pinochet are have had mixed reevlta, however, the laeue hae caused unaaee within the armed forcee andtumbllngblock to smooth clvll-mllttery relatione. Moreover, the threat ot growing terroriem by the tar left could emerge to complicatS Aylwin'a atratagy it he la compelled to rely more on the miiitery'e raaourcee to counter violence. Further Into hie term Aylwin muet tackle tha mora difficult teeke ot toetering an outlook in the
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iaismantling the tnmtituttonal which inmulataa tba mllttei gemntm it extraordinary prerogatives.'
Aylwin's Strategy
One of Preeldent Aylwin's chief challenges, aademocratically elected leader following naarlyof Military rule*, haa been aeserting hlatha armed aarvlcaa and facilitating theirtha political arana. On tha pluailitary wore anxious than antagonisticrule. officers
wars at least reconciled to,If not euppojtlve of, tha return to democracy and foundolitical moderate, an ecceptable presidential candidate. Nevertheless, thaforces are unaura of tha "rules of the game"ivilian government and wary of any Infringement on the autonomy and broad prerogatives thay have long enjoyed.
Aylwin haaragmatic short-term strategy for dealing with the armed forcee, taking measured steps to asssrt his authority as chief executive and curb military attempts to question his policy initiatives. Recognising the present limits of military tolerance for civilian rule, however, Aylwin has picked his battles carefully apd postponed challenging the Institutional framework.1 Ha probably calculates that the arduous task of reshaping tha military cannot take place until strslns are eased and civilian inatltutlona are strong enough to should* oversight responsibilities.
Upon taking office Aylwin demonstrated his Intention to subordinate the armed forces commanders to civilian rule,enior member of his party as Defense Minister, and appointing civilian defense eubescratsrles for sach service Drench. He wae csrsful, nevertheless, to select politlcsl moderatss who had not previously been hostile toward the srmed forces. Hs also asked the commandsra of the Air end
'To complicate Aylwin's task, Pinochetumber of steps before the democratic trsnsltlon to further Insulate the military from civilian controls, such ss guaranteeing that the military's share of the national budget will not be
jtay on.ublic' pledges to respectl civilian rule endrpvacl civjl-allltary relatione. Thle move prevented Pinochet--who refueee torots being the only commander with experience from the previous regime. Ml the chlefe. except for Pinochet, appear to accept Aylwin ee their Commander-in-Chief end have ibllcly criticizing executive policy Initiative*.
Handling Pinochet
rormor Preeldent Pinochet remalne. not unexpectedly, one of the largeet etumbl lrvgblocks to constructive relatione between the government end the military. From hie current position ae Army Commander, where he la conetitutionelly entitled to serve for the next eight years, Pinochet has tried to continue exerting political Influence, initially flaunting his opposition to the Preeldent through critical statements and absences from government functions-
Tho ewlftneee end fore* with which th* omotlonally-charowd laaue of Pinochet-era huain rights ibUMs Ml tod tha national political etege caught tha now cjovamsaant soevawhat ofl-tjuard. In our view, and hava complicatedtrategy for managing clvll-iallltary ralatlona. Aylwin haataady barraga of dananda from tha far laft. vlctlme* rtlatlvtl, and noma member* of hla own coalition for full Inveetlgatlons and trlala of indlvlduala accuaad of human right* violation*. Tha right and many In tha military, howavar, hava ataadfaatly oppoaad any lnvaatlgatlona that could raault In proaacutlona and daaiaga to tha armed forcaa' raputatlona. Tho Army hlararchy la particularly concerned about th* poealbilityull lnvaatlgatlon of6 murder of Orlando Letelier--Chll*'* forur Poralgnndar th* Allendewould) latpllcatailitary offlclala of tha fonaar regime. I
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Aylwin haa tried to follow a. middle road, allowing thaand th* vlctlnta to air thalrraining from using th* laaua to ehalleng* th* military'* institutional structure and pr*rogativ*a. Th* govrnsaant daeldad *arly on to go public promptly with lnforauttlon on th*f ran gravaa of pareone executed3 coup in th* hop* of giving vent to public fruetratlona, and clearing the leeue from the political atage early in Aylwin'a term. However, the Prealdent haa stated that although the process of national reconciliation demands inquiries Into indlvlduals--not lnatitutlons--ahould be held accountable. He haa alao held out the poaalblllty of granting pardona. recognising that proaeeutlng aanior officera would bay many in th* anted aarvlcee aa an attach on thalr Inetltutlene. Moreover, he haa not challenged8 Amneaty law. which protecte former official* from proaecution for abueee prior
Nevertheless. Aylwin'e pragnatic approach haa failed to sstlsfy crltlce on either end of the political spectrum or to svoid strains In civil-HiUtary relations. Aylwin's creation, lest April of the Rettlg commission, narrowly mandatsd to lnveetlgete abuses of the Pinochet era and compensate victims, ave of public criticism of tha military. The far left, sensing an opportunity to regain soma political stature, has Belied on the human rlghte Issue to press for Pinochet's reaovel and tha repeal of the Amnesty law. and extremists have already made two sssasslnatlon attempts--one successful--against former Pinochet security officiate eccueed of human rights atrocities
The military hierarchy heeait-and-see ettitude toward tbe Rettlg Commlafllon. although the strong public outcry following the first discoveries of msss graves rslssd fears in the armed forcea about the government'scontrol the political impact of the human righta issue.
redirecting tha services toward professional allitary dutlaa. In our view,trategy that encouragee the military to concentrate on external eecurltythrough equipment upgrades. Joint training exercleee, and educational opportunities with other professional allltarles, froa which the Chilean service! have long been leoleted--probably would have the best chance of eucceee. ror example. Aylwin hopes that progress in sddreeslng the Letaller case will prompt Washington to lift thaerkinctaent--which prohibits US military assistance toellow for greater interaction between tha two eountriee' armed forces. At tbe earn* time, the government will need to acknowledge the military's interests In major national policy Issues
Over the remainder of his four year term, Aylwin will also have to dismantle the Institutional and legal framework tbat gives the military autonomy and political authority, and ha will have to strengthen civilian institutions so that they cen assume responsibilities currently held by the allitary. Thie will include!
the military's role lb the Justice eyetem, while enhancing civilian capabllitlea
odifying constitutional provision* granting the
allltsry significant responsibility for internal lew and order and transferrins; Internal security duties. Including dceteetlc-Intelligence activities, to civilian agencieson-military ministry
a professional cadre of civilians to seslst the executive branch in the deeloa end
1aptamentation of national eecurlty policy
legislation giving the military autonomy In matters of budgst end fores structure, end returning these to the executive and to Congress
Original document.
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