Special Analysis
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Time constraints may be weighing heatily on military leaders astake power im Yugoslavia's republics. The Army maylimited force againstore that probably would hastenandajor confrontation betweenNrWif,]
Defense Secretary Kacujevic saidecent interview that the Army is ready tonecessary byrepublic national guards, which he said are becoming armies. He also called politicians who appeal for foreignclear reference to non-Communist Slovenia andwho will be treated as such.
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The Army's actions are alio becoming sterner, particularly in Slovenia. The Slovenian Defense Minister told Ihe press this week that the Army has ordered Slovenia to surrender control over conscription and will seek republics-held draft-records on Monday.
Slovenia has refused to lupplydraftces foi servi<outside
and Croatia since Scpie inhcrfl B
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military high command is the last bastion of orthodox Communists committed to the federal ideals of Tito's partisan movement. Senior commanders genuinely fear the ethnic war they believe wouldreakup of Yugoslavia and realize there would be little room for them in the armies of nationalist successor states.!
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The commanders appear united; relative moderates, suchdyevic, are delivering the same message as hardliners. There are signs, however, that younger officers are more divided along ethnic lines. The Croalians arc well informed about closed meetings of military officers and appear to be obtaining information from corps-level Croat officers, so ethnic fragmentation may be serious even in these relatively high ranks. Junior officers, lacking the wartime partisan experience that binds theirjenj^rs. almost certainly reflect the divisions of Yugoslav society
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Possible Array Moves
Senior commanders have said the Army would forcibly block secession, and guidance they receivcc! best month from the federal cabinet to take control of the Slovenian and Croatian aitional guards give them authorization to take measured action. Themay try to seize Slovene national guard weapons or draft records soon; any resistance could giveationale to topple the governments in Slovenia and Croatia. The Slovenes arc providing another reason for intcrveDlion in the nearalmost certainlypprove an independence referendum set forecember JBbbbbbI
Senior military commanders probably believe that, to be effective, they will have lo move quickly. Ethnic divisions continue to increase and further undermine conscript reliability. Moreover, lime is on the side of republics trying to shoreup their defenses and win dc facto recognition ^
The commanders do not appear to have coup plans and have nothing to gain from trying to take control of the fairly pliant federal administration. Prime Minister Markovic,roat, indicated this week that he would notimited use of force against republic national guard
Brakes on Intervention
Concerns over international isolation and domestic political repercussions have to weigh in the deliberations of senior military leaders. They also must consider the possibilityimited use of force would cause Slovenia to move toward actual secession quickly and that Croatia would follow,omino effect and bringing about what tbey hoped to prevent. Any Slovene casualties probably would speed the process. The likelihood that conscript forces would fragment on cthrnc^mcs^ridjuecipitatf civil conflict alsotrong deterrent.
Original document.
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