YUGOSLAVIA: BITTERLY DIVIDED SERBIA FACES ELECTIONS (DELETED)

Created: 12/6/1990

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Bitterly Divided Berbi

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Serbia's first post-world war II sulci-party electionsecember almost certainly will exacerbate 'fundamental divisions within the republic and Yugoslavia. Although republic strongman Slobodan Milosevichance of retaining the presidency, nationalist opposition parties appear aolsed to defeat the Communists in parliamentary contests, ARespite Communist efforts to rig them. Regardless of the winner, the election probably will contribute to the centrifugal forces' within Yugoslavia by putting an even more markedly nationalistic* Serbian government in place, aggravating tensions between Commanlsts and anti-CommunisCs in Serbia, and making progressnew confederal errangement which could save Yugoslav unity an evaui more remote possibility. There isossibility that Serbia will see the flrat open effort to nullify anmay try to stir ethnic conflicts or unrest toilitary intervention and overturn the election results if he loses. The elections also will raisa temperatures inlar.ge Albanian majority there plana to boycott the voting.

CONFIDEIlPWL MJ*JRN

DIBCD8SI0M

The Eleotlons

Eloctiona in Serbia and neighboring Montenegroecember (with runoff* in Serbia onecember) will complete the process of selecting the leaders who will have to settle Yugoslavia's fate in coning months. The key race will be in Serbia, where votors will decide ropresentation inoat republic assembly and select the republic president. Voters in Serbia "proper" willelegates while the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina will electndespectively. irst round victory willlurality of at leastercent of registered votersurnout of at leastercentoting district. The number of presidential contendersut only twoist Slobodan Milossvic and Serbian nationalist Vuk Draskovic.

The Contenders

ew of theegistered political parties will figure significantly in the final results. They are:

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). The renamed

Communists are trying to exploit the advantagesuling party but appear Utile, oooular

support,

combines

with appeals to ethnic nationalism. Their best hope is that party head Milosevic remains popular and may have soma coattalls.

The Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM). Led bypopular Vukfor theSRM appealsand anti-Coasniniat sentiments andmust protect its co-nationals in Ittrong federetlon orSerbia ratherooseby Slovenia and Croatia.of support for

to bp building.

The Democratic Party (DP). Formed by intellectuals, the DP combines liberal democratic idealselatively restrained form of nationalism. The DP probably has little appeal for the working man but could poll well among educated Serbs.

- The Peasants* Party (Ppj. pp defends the

Interests of the small-scale farmers whoagriculture. It couldarge shareIn the largely agricultural province

nd

Notably lacking on the election registers are nny offormed bypercent Albanian majority inopposition is boycotting the voting to avoidto Serbia's abolition of Kosovo's autonomousof human rights

it opposes

oalition eight opposition

UJvotllna llifl says it will boycott theeu Serbia's abolition of provincial autonomy.

Two-party Race for the Presidency

The leading contenders in the presidential race areSlobodan Milosevic and SRP leader Vukcombines Serbian nationalism with oppositioneconomic reform and vocal defense ofsuch as job protection. Draskovic also appeals toand anti-Communism, but has no.economic programsupportarket

Draskovic's popularity haB surged and the race appears

increasingly close, but Milosevic still holds many advantages of

incumbancy and has only recently geared up his campaign. Milosevic

gets widespread and positive coverage of his campaign from his

tightly controlled media, which either ignores Draskovic or reoorts negatively on him. ml

Nationalism has been Milosevic's strongestobservers in Belgrade believe that he would be prepared to stir ethnic unrest and violence to rally Serbs to his banner if he believes bis victory is in doubt. This has been effective in the past, but Milosevic has never had to competeealcertainly not one that can claim the nationalist label as well as Milosevic himself. Ifrges victorious, he will berend which has brought notionalists to power elsewhere in Yugoslavia, ammmmmmmmt

'many

He believe that free end fair voting wouldajority of rtHsembly seats from Serbia proper and Vojvodina to Draskovic's SRM and allied anti-Communist parties. Efforts by the Communists to manipulate the campaign already have tainted the election process, however. Milosevic has used his iron grip on thethrough an ongoing series of purges jf irmmaUct^nre-tn smear the opposition parties,

Opposition organizers have rei of harassment by regime officials.

COttp^JEENTXAL

COHFIflp^fcAL

The opposition's successful bid last week to force regime acceptance of multiparty vote monitoring and counting, however, dramatically cuts chances that the Communists can manipulate actual voting. An opposition pledge to boycott the elections and toassive anti-regimemove that Draskovic publicly warned could lead to civil war betweenthe Serbian Assembly to amend the election law to allow multiparty election supervision. The reversaltinging defeat for Milosevic since the Assembly, at his urging, had voted down the aaendments the week

before.

No reliable date exist on voter preferences in SerbiaMilosevic governaent has outlawed publication of Communists have polled no more thanercent of theany of the earlier elections in other republics. Theprobably have lost considerable credibility becauseefforts to rig thetack tried by no otherparty. Most Serbs probably would view ain the legislative race as proof of fraud, andthat could sjr.hraoaintp violent confrontationswould be

implications

Results Probably Will Speed Yugoslav Disintegration. The

Serbian elections are highly unlikely toovernment capable ofargain with the independence-minded Slovenes and Croats saving the Yugoslav federation, no matter who comes out on top. All major Serbian parties reject the loose confederation aodel that Slovenia and Croatia say is tha only alternative to breakup. Slovene leaders now say publicly and privately that they have no common ground with either the Serbian opposition or Communists, and are planning toeferendum on independence by mid-January. Croatia is likely to reach the same conclusions once the elections are over and the victors publicly reiterate their rejection of confederation. adly divided Serbie, for itsIf confronted by aajor post-election unrest inbe so distracted by Internal problems that it would accept with little protest secession by other republics. J ^

Senior Yugoslav military leaders, who have warned publicly that they are prepared to act unilaterally to save Yugoslav unity, probably will viav almost any result as bad news for the country. On balance, the Army likely wouldilosevic victory for president, although various sources suggest the military command dislikes Milosevic's divisive appeals to nationalism. It almost certainly would see an opposition victory for parliament as another step toward Yugoslavia's dissolution but probably would reluctantly accept the results if the streets remain calm. ommunist win, however, if accompanied by popular unrest, could provoke the Army to crack down to maintain peace, as could an Albanian protests against the election results in Kosovo. afe

COl^pTDEKTIAL

CMnt Doawtlo Divisions la sarbia. Regardless of who wins. Serbia itself will emerge from the electioneeper state of Internal divlelon and crisis than that faced by any other republic. The Communists have fought democratization fiercely, and the tough campaign is likely to leave in its wake deep bitterness between the Communists and cost other parties. By contrast, the Communists in Slovenia and Croatia proved relatively gracious losers end have workedodus vivendi with the new rulers.

A divided government--an opposition-controlled legislature and Milosevic asaugur badly for ongoing political stability in Belgrade. The opposition has pledged to rewrite the Milosevic-inspired constitution that gives the president near-dictatorial powers. Including tha right to dissolve the assembly. Milosevic's past record suggests he would resist, and he probably would be tempted to exploit his working class power base toemocratically elected government. Therelim chance, however, thatcraftyhia opposition mightommon program based on Serbian nationalism, iron-fisted control of Kosovo, and the defence of Serb interests in other republics. I B

An SRM sweep in tha presidential contest and the parliamentary race would minimize the chances of conflict between the president on the one side and the parliament and government on the other but could prompt the ousted Communlets to foment worker unrest. Milosevic, for his part, sight refuse to accept the reeults andretext to dec lareofpower granted hii by his new constitution.

And Do Motblng to Deal with Other Problems. The electionunresolved the fundamental and exploaive conflictand Albanians for control of Koaovo. Host Albaniansto accept the legitimacy of Serbian rule no matter whoreins in Belgrede, and the dethe Albanians from the electoral procesa almost certainlytheir alienation. ictory by Draskovic'sparty might drive them to desperation andopular Albanian insurrection in Kosovo,

Serbla'a econoay elao ia in deep trouble and is likely to cause trauma for any new regime. Milosevic baa uaed profligate bailouts, wage increases, and even inter-republic tariffs to maintain his power base among Industrial workers, and the bill is coming due. According to the Serbian Chamber of5 percent of Serbian workera are employed by loss-making firms, and Serbia accounts for mora thanercent or all business losses in Yugoslavia, ir the opposition forms the next government, it will

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Original document.

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