YUGOSLAVIA: END OF A NATION-BUILDING EXPERIMENT (DELETED)

Created: 9/21/1990

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

cwurtry'* republics hold doalnant po- In virtually all spheres but Cheis unlikely to act by itse^^orc verse the advanced deterioration of central authority,

"Yugoslavia" Noriority

"Yugoslavia" has alwaysotional concept, forcibly binding together peoples divided by language, culture, and religion and united by little more than geography. ombination of factors is now convincing Yugoslavia's aialnparticularly Slovenia and Croatia, but also increasinglythat there is no economic, ideological, or security rational* that justifies the economic sacrifices and political coaproaises required to hold together the "land of the south Slavs."

Yugoslavia has failed to deliver European levels of prosperity; the EC and unified European market are acting as an increasingly powerful magnet to the Yugoslav republics. Slovenie has gone so far as toe facto embassy in Brussels, and Croatian leaders openly advertise their hopes for association with the EC.

The Communist ideology that Titowith political repression into thesupport his version of pan-Yugoslavlsa has lost its credibility and undercut one of the few elements of cohesion. The republic Communist parties themselves have become in many cases separatist and nationalist in hopes of surviving politically.

Forty-five years of Communist rule have not ended the bitter hatreds between Yugoslavia's ethnic groups; democratimation is allowing tensions suppressed under Coanaunisa to resurfaceengoance. Croatia and Bosnle-Hercegovlna, for example, in tbe past month have witnessed their first serious ethnic clashes

gone

With the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the last credible external threat to Yugoslavia is

Slovenie and Croatia,: Democracy sod the Vast

Host of the republics are finding their domestic interests increasingly in conflict with those of the federation. Slovenia and Croatiaost of reasons for parting ways with Yugoslavia. Above all, they want to regain what they see as their historical place in Western Europe. They realize that no countryecord of persistent human rights violations will be acceptedartner by the West, and are convinced that the federation cannot restrainironf isted policies against ethnic Albanians In Kosovo. M W

Political differences have added to thoir resolve. Both republics are ruled by non-Communist governments while theall thestill in the hands of old party men. Croatian leaders especially appear convinced that noce federal authorities are conniving with Serbia to overthrow them. These suspicions were reinforced when Yugoslav President Jovicerb) and army elements showed sympathy for armed Serb nationalists whoroatian ban toeferendum on autonomy in August. Mm

: Kosovo Debar Alles

The leaders of Serbia, the most populous and historically dominant republic and the traditional champion of the federation, apparently have concluded that pursuing their aims in Kosovo may not be compatible with tho preservation of Yugoslavia. Regaining "control" over Kosovo from the province's Albanian majority is the most salient political question in the minds of most Serbs whorowing ethnic hysteria. They now believe they cannot count on the federation to back their hardline policies> Ion hob Sloven in and Croatia (as well as the

he republic's Communist boss, Slobodan Milosevic, and (who have relabeled themselves Socialists) with Serbian nationalism as the best way toagainst the anti-communist tide. They havenationalist policies inpolitical rights from thoestablish There is little prospect this will change. parties are, if anything, more rabidlythe Kosovo question UiaaJJiljisevic. Some of them uroeof Albanians.

Tha otherai Sovereignty as Define,

Defenseless Macedonia and multi-ethniothemselves a. potential prey for the more Macedonians fear being dismembered byGreece, and Albania, all of which haveon their territory. The ruling Communist partyonfederation if other republics so desired,two largest oppositionnationalist MovementAction (HAAK) and theacedonia witharmy and foreign policy.

In Bosnia, tho ruling Communists say the republicovereign state toloodbath amongSerb, Croat, and Moslem ethnic groups. It maytoo late as new ethnic Serb and Croat political partiessympathy for -mother republics."

CONFIJtfaTVlAL

Tiny Kontenegropecial case. Montenegrins are ethnic Serbs, butenturies-old identityeparate state, and they now are bitterly divided over their relationship with Serbia. white" faction advocates joining Serbiagreen" faction champion- aaovei-eign Kontenegro, preferablyugoslav state. M B

Architecture of Dissolution

Tho big threeCroatia, and slovenia-'ara taking concrete steps toward ending the old federal order.

Slovenia has declared itself sovereign, and this month plans to annul federal laws it sees as in conflict with its own. Zt isew constitution that will create an independent Slovenia if agreementonfederation is not reached. In some ways, it is already behavingovereignhas announced that it will keep all Slovene military draftees at home after November, and has begun opening de facto diplomatic missions abroad.

Croatia also has declared itself sovereign and isew constitution. So far, republic president Franjo Tudjman hasore gradual approach thanauthority, 'A'Mm Croatian attitthe disturbances Involving Croatia's Serb minority.

Serbia is in the last stages ofew constitution, which could serve as the basis of an independent state. The president, for example, will have tho power to declare war.

Slovenia and Croatie are taking the initiative in crafting the confederation they Insist is the only alternative to independence. They areoint "proposal Tor confederation" that they say they will present soon to the other regions. Based on public statements by their political leaders, we believe the document willYugoslav community" customs union; monetary union with the right to withdrawal; Independent republic foreign policies with some coordination at tho confederal level; and republic armies unitodoluntary alliance.

Will Yugoslavia Gohimper

we believe that the disintegrative forces in Yugoslavia are irreversible, but that several factors could slow the process:

-- Inertia has alwaysowerful force in Yugoslav affairs.

-- All of tho republics get economic benefits from the union that will prove hard to give up abruptly, The developed republics of Slovenia and Croatia gain markets for some goods not competitive abroad and domestic sources of raw materials and. electricity. The lesser-developed regions can buy industrial goods without spending scarce foreign exchange.

Most people genuinely realizeudden breakup would increase the danger of civil conflict andloodbath.

Federal leaders, particularly the collective presidency and Premier Markovic, appear inclined to try toew order rather than draw lines in the dirt. After many dire warnings, for example, the federal government appears to have accepted Slovenia's stand on draftees serving at hoce and Federal President Jovic hasation-wide referendum this year to decide between Federation and Confederation.

Western admonitions against secession appear to have made Slovenian and Croatian leaders somewhat more cautious. Leaders in both republics have dropped secessionist rhetoric in their talks with Western officials, and both have started extensive bilateral diplomatic contacts with Westernto assure prior backing for any steps toward secession..

Given these political circumstances, the Slovenian and Croatian proposal for confederation will likely become the basis for negotiations. Two relatively benign outcomes are possible, although neither appears to have the capacity to resuscitate the Yugoslav state:

-- The republics continue to usurp more power from the center as talks drag on.

Most or all of the republics agree to a

confederation, presumably one thatike an alliance of statesountry.

In either scenario, the Yugoslavs almost certainly would face repeated confrontations and mini-crises over various ethnic

or economic Issues. The process would be messy and under

constant threat of breakdown. In fact, we believe neither can leadtable compromise. Either system would likely break up

conpletely once tho rr-mbcrs. felt that ties had unraveled to the

point of no return.

nqjporn

r With a Dang?

Wr judge, however, that the chancesote explosive outcome are high, with ethnic passions rising, we see several flashpoints that could explode within the next several months:

-- Any Croatian attempt to punish its rebellious Serbs or to disarm the Serb population could lead to fighting and provoke an intervention by Serbia.

Ethnically-mlxed Bosnia has already seen minor ethnic violence in recent weeks and has much tinder for more serious trouble. Elections scheduled for November will pit Moslem, Serb, and Croat parties against each other and raise the prospect of fighting that could draw in Serbia and Croatia, as well as involving Moslems.

Increased violence in Kosovo could further polarize relations among the republics. Slovenia and Croatia could use massive Serbian repressionretext for secession. 6erbia itself couldreakup off denied support in its "holy war.1

Any violent breakup would probablyast ditch effort by the army to reassert control. He believe such an effort ultimately would split the army on ethnic lines, even if discipline Initially held in some units and permitted the army to assert its authority temporarily. The amy is split between an officer corps dominated by ethnic Serbs and draftees who reflect the country's demographicone third Serb. There are no "reliable" Serbsuch time as draftees serve in their home republics, all army units will be ethnically mixed.

Implications for the n&

Yugoslavia will present the United States and Western Europe with serious challenges over the comingin the area of human rights. Yet us interlocutors at the federal level, such as Markovic, will have little or no influence over events in the strife tarnin the Serbian province of Kosovo.

orse case, US security interests could be caught up in the collapse of the Yugoslav state. Inter-ethnic violencearge scale could breed terrorism at home and abroad and threaten US citizens in Yugoslavia directly. More broadly, Yugoslavia's breakup couldew clash of international territorial

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