in
Special Analysis
of the Federal Experiment
federal Yugoslavia created by Tito is unraveling; It appearsa loose confederation of self gorern'ing republics. Ethnicsevere economic problemsignificant potential for
The decay of central authority now appears irreversible. Slovenia and Croatia for years have sought to limit federal power and now say they will consideroose confederation as an alternative to independence. They are jointlyreaty that would make republics nearly independent in economic, foreign, and defense policy They plan lo present it to the oiheyeKjuns this fall hut arc threatening to sign it alone if necessaryH
its own it, for
Most of the other republics are willing toonfederation. Even the third major republic Serbia, which fought for years lo strengthen the federation, now increasingly views the federationindrance to its topover Albanian-populated Kosovo Province, Serbia isew constitution of its -that will pave the way for independence. Tne-SrrbiaiLfliesiden example, would have the power to
Several factors are driving the republics apart. Suppressed ethnic grievances have reemerged in the new democratic atmosphere. The first serious ethnic clashes5 have hit Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia proper in recent weeks. Slovenia and Croatia want to regain their places in Europe and believe Serbia's brutal policies in Kosovo make this an impossible goal for Yugoslavia. Ideological differences between non-Communist Slovenia and Croatia and Communist-ruled Serbia alsoole. The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe aooyed the last security rationale for unity in common defense.
Whose Hand on the Tiller?
The republics have taken control of the dissolution process by drafting treaties and constitutions; federal officials are divided and have been unable to reassert influence. Prime Ministerroat, is pushing constitutional amendments that would allow multiparty federal elections. Heeal last month between Slovenia and the Army that may by yearend allow all Slovene recruits -to serve aihewejjractically destroying the Army's Pan-Yugoslav charac 10
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Presidenterb, haslanationwide rrfcrendum this year to choose between federation and confederation.
Outlook
While the disintegration of Yugoslavia appears irreversible, several factors could slow ihe process, perhapsew years. The republics' mutually beneficial economic lies will be difficult to give up abruptly. Yugoslavs also recognizeapid breakup would inneasethc danger of civil conflict; theyloodbath is possible jg y
Federal leaders appear inclined lo negotiate rather than provoke system-busting crises. Western admonitions against secession also have made Slovenia and Croatia more cautious; both arc now using diplomatic contacts with Western governments to explain possible
future moves. The Slovenian-Croatian draft treaty will probably
become the basis for broader negotiations, but neither republic wouldountrywide referendum binding. And both appear to view
a confederation isransitory arrangement on the road to full
independence!
/
events may slip out of control andore explosive outcome. In the next several months. Croatian efforts to deal with militants in the republic's Serb minority could provoke serious clashes. So. too, could the three-way split between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia, which holds an election in November. Serbia's ironfisted policies in Kosovo also have ethnic tension boiling; another eruption there could give Slovenia andretext to
of the speed of dissolution, the process is likely to be messy and marred by ethnic violence. In the face of widespread unrest, the Army might try to assert control and might even
temporarily succeed. But the Army itself is dividederb-dominated officer corps and draftees who reflect the majority non-Serb population: military rule probably would fragment the Army. Moreover, the republics have large, well-armeiLnoDular
militias that they up against thei mj I B
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