Seizing the Day: Iran's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
t
Directorate of Intelligence
Seizing the Day: Iran's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
Seizing the Day: Iran's Response lo the Persian Culf Crisis (u)
Judgments
at at*m ihli report.
Islamic leaders of Iran probably see the Gulf crisis as an opportunity to regain what they regard as Iran's traditional position of primacy in the Persian Gulf. As the crisis unfolds, Iran will probably try to maximize tts gainsolicy of calculated ambiguity aimed at extracting concessions from both Iraq and the international coalition opposing it Tehran desires the weakening or ultimate destruction of Saddam Husayn's regime and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from thc region, leaving Iran the preeminent political and military power in the PersianJvr*
The crisis has clearly benefited Iran Higher oil prices mean Iran earns about SI billion in unanticipated revenue for every month its oil remainser barrel. Saddam's need to remove the potential threat from Iran has prompted him to wiihdraw his forces from Iranian territory and implicitly to accept the validity5 Algiersgiving Iran much of what it could not protect in eight years on the battlefield. In addition. Tehran hai exploited international revulsion with Iraq to expand its relations with the Arab Gulf states and Western Europe. These developments have boosted President Rafsanjani at home and may allow him to consolidate his domestic politicaltPl
To consolidate these gains over the long term, Tehran wilt have to balance its desire for near-term benefits with efforts to prevent the emergenceictorious Iraqrolonged US presence in the Gulf. Iran fears the prospect of Iraqi regional dominance, but its profound distrust of US intentions makes it uncomfortable *ith the deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia President Rafsanjani's current policy is to criticize lhc deployment of US forces but to tolerate their presence as long as they are aimed at Iraq and quickly withdrawn upon resolution of the crisis. At thc same time, Tehran is keeping its tines open to Baghdad in pursuit of apeace agreement with Iraq on Iranian terms. jj*^)
If Iran is forced to choose between massive assistance to Iraq or support to thc coalition opposing it. Tehran would probably choose the international community To produce movement in the peace negotiations with Iraq, the Iranian Government is tacitlyradually expanding illicit trade with Iraq in food, medicine, and other goods by privateand rice inreaching Iraq from Iran, but no massive violations of international sanctions, such as reexporting Iraqi oil. have occurred-
Allhough unlikely, changes in ihe course of ihe Gulf crisis could cause Iran to support Iraq. Events that threaten to undermine the ideologicalof Iran's clericalI^m
thai increase Iranian tu-.picion ol LS intertill
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makehange Even in these instances. Iran is not likely to engage in hostilities on Iraq's side. Instead. Tehran probably would more actively assist Iraq to evade sanctionseans of forcing the West to adjust its policy to suit Iran.
iv
Contents
Judgments
Windfall
nt::ei
Bonanza
Political Impact
io Iran
Danger of Eipanding War in the Gulf
; ofi-.ici LS
Threatictorious Iraq
Response
Toward Key Players
Gulf Cooperaiion Council
Western Coalition
|
Withdraw* From Kuwait, but Hit Political and Miliury Power Remains Inuct
Stalemate or Western Containment of Iraq
Wins
Seizing ihe Day: Iran's Response Io ihe Persian Gulf Crisis (u)
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait cameimeTehran sorelyiplomatic and financial boost On thc eve of thc crisis Iran wai trying to recoverecade of *ar and revolution The eight-year war with Iraq killed an0 Iranians and cost Iran more thanillion. Years of mismanagement and neglect had eroded the social and economic infrastructure even as greater demandsbeing put oa itopulation growing at tbc rateillion persons every seven months.ost Iranians were weary of continued economic austerity and impatient for an improved standard of Irving. (SjglPi
President Rafsanjani came to officeo alleviate these problems, but hc nude only slow progress. Efforts to attract foreign investment to Iran were hampered by Western diplomatic and economic sanctions and by domestic opposition from hardlineFalling oil revenues threatened to undermine Rafsanjani's plans for reconstruction. Even peace with Iraq was elusive because Baghdad's victories in thc lasi year of thc war gave it link incentive to negotiate on Iranian terms
The immediate aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait has presented Rafsanjani with an opportunity to strengthen his domestic position and advance toward longstanding goals. Whether Rafsanjani will turn these opportunities into permanent gains for Iran depends on the evolution of the crtsrs. Rafsaniani will have tolexible policy in order tobalance Iran's near-term interests with in long-term aspirations while maintaining his domestic(SjjJ?)
Iran's Windfall
The Persian Culf crisis ha* both accelerated the pace of political change in Iran and slowed tbeof thc economy. It has provided Rafsanjani with an opening to achievewith littlegoals that before the crisis seemed attainable only by gradual effort and lengthy negotiation Higher oil
revenues may allow him to relieve consumer shortages and promote reconstruction, goals that only recently" seemed out of reach, (sj
Diplomatic Opportunities. The internationalto isolate Iraq has highlighted the importance of Iran as apotentialthc cordon around Iraq Public statements by Iranian leaders show that they recognize this advantage, andis trying toUie crisis to achievediplomatic goals at the lowest possible cost The Arab Gulf stales, which had preferred to keep Iran at arm's length, have been more willing to cooperate with Tehran on political, economic, and even security issues since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Also, after August. Tehran's death edict againsi British author Sjlman Rushdie became less of an obstacle to Iran's effort toeipand relations with the Europeanthan it had been before thc crisis.
Thc most dramatic result of Iran's enhancedwas Saddam Husayn's peace offer of IS August Since Iran's reluctant acceptance ofthe UN-sponsored cease-fire with Iraq inthe late Ayatollah Khomeini compared to "drinkingbad made little progress in negotiating an acceptable peace agreement with Iraq Secret talks begun in the spring0 had achieved no concrete results. Saddam's announcement two weeks after the invasion of Kuwait that Iraq would withdraw from Iranian territory, as well as his implied acceptance of Algiers accord, essentially gave Iran what it had been unable to protect on thc battlefield or by nctotiation. allowing Tehran to portray itself as the final victor.'
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Of perhaps equal satisfaction to Tehran is its eclipse by Iraq as the perceived mam threat to regional stability. Iranian leaders have smugly suggested tn their public comments that Saddam would not have dared invade Kuwait had thc international communi-ty resolutely opposed his invasion of Iran0 Tehran similarly argues lhat thc failure of exclusively Arab regionalas the GulfCouncil--to prevent Iraqi aggressionthe need to replace Arab nationalism with Muslim solidarity, which would include Iran but noi the West, asan organizing principle for regional security jafWf)
Over the long term. wC believe Rafsanjani sees an opportunity to build on these temporary advantages to shed Iran's pariah status in the international community. Rafsanjani has sought toupport for UN resolutions against Iraq as evidence of its "responsible" and "principled"If Tehran can continue to demonstrateafter the crisis. Rafsanjani may be able to turn Iran's temporary cooperation with thc Gulf Arabs and Western Europeore durable relationship. Uffn)
Fimamcial Bonamzm. The jump in ol prices resulting from thc Gulf crisis is giving Iran an enormous, desperately needed financial boost. The price ofoil hat skyrocketed, as compared with the low levels of latend states lhat embargoed Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude oil are turning to alternative suppliers, including Iran, to meet their energy needs We estimate that, at current production levels, Iran will earn SI billion in unanticipated revenues every month the price of its oil remainser barrel. Every additional SI increasehc barrel price addsillion to monthly revenues. Wc estimate toul monthly earnings now topoubling of Iran's monthly averageundamental production constraints limit Iran's ability to sustain during the next year an increase of an additional0 barrels per day beyond its current outputillion barrels per day. Even this enodestwould generateillion each month at current price levels In addition to revenue boosts resulting from higher oil prices. Iran will probably earn at least SSOO million from selling exitting oil
stocksIranian
stocks in June amounted to ai lean SO million barrels, much of it stored in Rotterdam.*
The oil earnings windfall could not have been more timely for Rafsanjani. In0 ail prices were the lowest in four years and Iranian revenues were slipping below levels needed to finance reconstruction. That sameassive earthquake struckIran, leaving hundreds of thousands homelesseed ol government assisunce. Allhoughanacea, surging oil revenues will allow Rafsanjani io increase consumer imports and push forward on major reconstruction projects without resorting ioforeign loans lhat are anathema to his radical opoorenu. This unanticipated income also givesthe flexibility to meet unanticipated economic challenges, Such at that posed by another earthquake in November that0 homeless in southern Iran. Iran still faces daunting long-term economicgrowth of atercent per year is among theinimum (he economic effects of the Gulf crisisivenhance to address these problems and strengthen bis conirol over domestic pdicyaV^ajfPt
Domestic Political Impact. The combined diplomatic and economic benefits of tbc Gulf crisis giveihc opportunity todomestic political position Saddam's peaceportrayed as an Iranian victory in the Tehranvindicated Rafsanjani's precrisis willingness to open direct ulks with theolicy criticized at the time by his hardline opponent*
the general public reaction to Saddam's
offer was exubcrani. although soon tempered by suspicion over hity/pj
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disorganized, poorly trained, and undcrarmcd.air and naval forces alsooor - reporting
indicate IranhastHen delivery ol new Sovietthat willeeded boost to Iran's air defenses. We judge Iran could notredible groundless an offensiveagainst Iraq3 at the earliest.
Perceived Threat af an Expanded US Pretence.worries thai, even if war is averted or leaves Iranictorious United States may convert some or all of iu expeditionary forces into amilitary presence in the Gulf. In August. Deputy Foreign Ministernormally associated withewspaper article that the United States had precipitated the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait toretest for occupying the southern Persian Gulf. An increased US military presence in the region would run counter to Iran's longstanding goal of eliminating foreign influence in the Gulf and reduce Tehran's value as ato Baghdad Seen fromlear-cm US victory would at best make Iran's role in ihe Gulf irrelevant and at wont would facilitate increased US pressure on
Strategic Threatieiaeiemi /rats. At theIran fears that failure to reverse Iraq'sof Kuwait would leave Iranirncultin thc Gulf. Iran could not easily orwith thc combined military andoi Iraq and occupied KuwaitIranian leaders worry that, onceconsolidated his conquest of Kuwait, he mayon "-
Iran's Rmswwm
dcni Rafsanjani hasji emp.'ia-sizes flexibility and deception, tactics that arewith thc ambivalence Iranian leaders fedwhether Iraq or the United States poses thc greater danger. Within this pattern of flexibility are evident several conns ujs^^
Iran 's fink-III MMay Lateollar Short
the last year of the *jr with Iran. Iran '1 ability taredible offensive military threat to Baghdad
was virtually eliminated Probably because ofconstraints. Tehran waited until the summer ofyeart after iht cease-fire withbefore rearming itself in earnest It will take several years for Iranian fortesbiorb new equipment, some of which has not yet been delivered.
rchran probably beliefs Iraqi use of chemical wetp. OAS -at an important factor in determining the outcome of the war and has decided that reaching Poruvwiih Iraq in such weaponsop priority
procurement at eontent.onal arms declined noticeably after the ctate-firt with8 Tehran's pace ma, haveesire ia choose its military suppliers more carefully, as welt as an attempt to eniict potential exporters to provide more advanced weaponry ai lower prices. This year Tehran concluded an important arms deal withIn September. Iran displayed newly acquiredircrafth
arms agreement procurementurjace-to-surfacc missilesircraft, as well as tank coproduciion. are among ihe deals Torkan could haw concluded with the Chinese. In our judgment. It will be months, if not years, before ihe Iranians can train their personnel on the new equipment, and incorporate it into their forcefpKs,
ffortsrocure unconventional weapons did net slacken after tht cease-fire
Iran has made little progress tn improving thtstructure, adm.msirauon. and organization of us miliiary establishment. The merger9 af the Ministries of Defense and thea,or step towardappears to have invoked only minor change! in the admmisiraiion of the logistic support provided lhe armed forces and to have had slight impact on serious inierservice antagonisms. Training practicesajoris little combined vms training *tth the Airthe logistic tystem is in desperate need of reform. {t> fdh t^rYJ)
^ Iranifficult task in rebuilding ut military, and. unless it quickens ihc pace of rearmamentthe Iraqi military machine Otn combat with US-ledwill remain militarily inferior to Iraq well intoQ<
stimate
tai Tehran wminimumlnvestment of SJS billion and an additional iwo years to rebuild us forces sufficiently toredible defense againsi
Tehran hope*it claimsulf
importanceapable of standing upegional balance of powerehran insists this role be recognized by other
5
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suggest that Iran's hid for by three obiectives:
reversal af ihe Iraqi annexation of Kuwait and lhe weakening of Iraq, power Iran has consistently opposed the Iraq, anBc.at.on of Kuwait and. al-
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some Iranian orhcialse chaos that would follow Saddam's removal, we believe the Iranian leadership would welcome (he crippling of Iraqi power
US withdrawal from ihe Persian Gulf.Leader Khamenei has calledoly war agaotsi US interestshe Un.ted Stateseize permanent control of the Gulf, allhough Rjf-sanjan, has implied publicly that Iran willerrrporary US presence prodded troops withdraw after the crisis
' Any regional settlement of the cmts mustIranian interests Even before the crisis. Iran maintained thai Gulf security required that Iran be included m
BBUfaJTran mustan of any lasting solution to the
In pursuit of its objectives. Iran hasolicy of playing Iraq against its opponents. We believe this policy in part reflecu Tehran's efforts to hedte its bets and preserve its freedom of action-
deception
orneous polKr calculatednhance Iran'* role in thc region and extract concessions rrom al
Policies Toward Key Playen Tehran's balancing aci hasuch moreialoguethe parties to the
con fron tat ion than Rafsanjani's gradual and cautious efforu had produced before ihc Iraqi invasion These discussions focus principally on thc Gulf crisis and the attempts by Iraq and us opponents to gain allies, but Tehran almost certainly seeks lo establish more permanent relationships out of some of them. Ijj-JF)
l'*nian policy appears most equivocal io-ard Iraq Tehran's immediate goal is ioeace 3grccmeni with Iraq based on UNnd5 Algiers accord, thus slrengifiening its pofiii-cal and strategic position .isa-vts Iraq Ai the same time. Tehran wanu to join the international consensus against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As aTehran, with some success, has tried to separate the peace negotiations with Baghdad from its policy toward K-
Iran's most important lever is its potential io help Iraq evade sanctions. Tehran has repeatedly announced us support for UN sanctions aea^nstlr^^
Iran is not enforcing the embargo on food and IiCsne. almost certainly io avoid jeopardisingwith Baghdad;
September some Iranianappearing on the shelves of Iraqi siores.
J Iran was supplying Iraq wiih
foodstuffsatter of policy to gain Iraqi acceptance of Iranian demands in bilateral peace talks.
Tehran's tacit acceptance of smuggling almostit resultingteady expansion of private Jrarwanefforts to profit from commerce with Iraq.
'Tehran probably believes such trade is not egregious enough to damage its relations with the Arab Gulf states and the West. and. if challenged, it would probably argue that it is not capable of stem-ming private smuggling..
anctions by sending small amounts of key non military items if it believed doing so wouldatisfactory peace agreement with BaghdadH)
Although Tehran is unlikely to risk its political opening to the West to assist Saddam more actively
by buying Iraqi oil or shipping large quantities of strategic goods, it will dangle the prospect of trade to obtain concessioni At peace talks in Tehran inwhich included the Iraqi Oil Minister. Iraqi Foreign Minister Aria proposed supplying oil to Iran, possibly as "warn return for food and
Iran's tactics have worked fairly well. Since the crisis began. Tehran has obtained important concessioni from Iraq, including:
Withdrawal of Iraqi troop* from virtually allinside Iran
Repaination of most Iranian prisoners of war held byopular development
Saddam's at least implicit acceptance of the Algiers accord.
Iraqi agreement to allow Iranian pilgrims to visit the Shia Muslim holy sites in An Najaf and Karba-la in Iraq. This agreement is likely to be popular in Iran, especially among clerics.:
Tough negotiations almost certainly lie ahead before Jranandlraq settle theirinal peace agreement rruisHncTuue"
ormal reaffirmation of the validity of the
i^^MSJWSSSSsr 31
of October. Iran refused to release0 Iraqi prisoners of war until Baghdad accounted for0 Iranian captives that Iranstill in Iraqi hands After Foreign Minister Veiayati visited Baghdad in November.agreed to beginraqiay. but the Iranians could halt this flow at any time to put additional pressure on Saddam Thc initiative appears to be with Iran. In October the Iraqisthat Iran was "dragging its feet" in the
ne
ti'i subsequent visit to Iraq does noi seem to have moved the process much further along
in acetern-
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Gulf Cooperation Council, Tie Gulf CfisilRifurmm to makeprogressforeign policyoftbe Gulf Cooperation Council inciudi- jIninter-
national conference on the Persian Gulf thatthe necessity for cooperationiran e members of tbeconomic,nd securrty tpaeres. but little progress hadt jtadeeek of Iraq's occupation :t" Xtr-ait, Iranian Foreign Ministeris.tsdfce United Vib Emirates. Bahrain, ind Qatariscuss
cor cocperas-er.ess;theca| and rehs-cus enmity dicing ichrands. Scti Saudi andKi -mS ery'i interest in restoring diplomaticons and resciving the icitgs-jflding dispute over fcaaiia panic ipation inai Muslim piigrjnajt to Mecca.
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Iran's Shia Muslim Assets in the Iraqi Opposition
Saddam Husayn's regime is dominated by Sunni Muslims, but approximatelyercent of lhe Irani populaiton ts Shia. Tehran has long viewed this politically disadvantaged ma/oriiyotential pool of support, but Iran's efforts to stimulate Shia unrest during the war with Iraq fa,led. Nonetheless,
Iran hopes to use Us current bargainingh Saddam to force him to end repression of the Sh.as. and this may indicate Tehran still views the Iraqi Shias.aj.aj, avenue for expanding Iranian influence
om client organization of Iraqi dissidents is the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq Created by Iran2 to coordinate Shia opposition to Iraq, the assembly is an umbrella organization for most Shia andsidem groups. It is based in lean and headed by Savvid Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim. an Iraqi Shia cleric of Iranian descent.
the
Iraq, invasion of Kuwait, the Iranian media have publicised statements by Hakim critical of Iraq
make funher progress, however. Rafsanjani and King Fahd will have to invest considerable polilical capital toompromise on ihe contentious issue of Iranian participation in the hajj. Vdavati'sh the Saudi Foreign Minister while US troops were deploying in the kingdom suggests lhat Rafsanjani can surmount domestic opposition to renewedwith Saudi Arabia. If so. Tehran will have largely achieved its goal of forging important new relationships in ihe region.^grfT
The Western Coalition. Rafsan,ani has accelerated his cautious policy of improving relations with theest. especially the West Europeans. Iran's chief
objective in this regard was thc lifting of all European Community sanctions placed on Iran and thcexpansion of relations, especially commercial ties. Although Iranian rhetoric has been critical of *cstcrnsupporr^or Iraq during its war with Iran.
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Impact of the Galf Crisis aa Western Hostages in Lebanon
Iraq and Ibe coalition opposing it, Iran probably would align wiih ihc international community. We believe Iran would not want to sacrifice the gains it has made with the Gulf states and Western Europe for ihc uncertain benefits of peace wiih Saddam, especially given his past abrogation or thc Algiers sccord and his invasion of Iran. Nforeover. Tehran has no interest in helpingstablish Iraq as thcpower in the Gulf. Should Iran be forced to withdraw from the peace talks to demonstrate its support to the coalition. Tehran will be certain io
demand compensation from the West, citing the precedent of interaaiionaLaid gacn Egypt andfor confronting Iraq.
Iran's sensitivity over the deploymenl of US forces to lhe Persian Gulf reflects noi only its suspicion of US intentions bul also its respect for US capabilities. Iran has in lhc past sought to avoid the engagement of LS
miliury power in ifs dispute, wjih the United Stales and will be careful to avoid provoking Washington while Urge US forces are deployed ul the region Similarly, we believe the risk that the UN embargo could be applied to Iran ha* been an important factor limiting Iran'* willingness to help Iraq evade sanC' uons Iranian policy calculaiiom regarding the ensis will continue to be affected by Tehranperception of the potential US military reaction lha: unhelpful Iran aciionin-i
Iran it unlikely to directlyS-'ed military operation aimed ai liberating Kuwait, although, to maintain iu standing with militant Muslims, itwould condemn US ground operations against Iraq proper as well as massive airstrikes near civilian or religious centers in Iraq. Iranian criticism would diminish if tbc forces opposing Saddam were placed under UN command or if :be atuck was authorized by the Untied Nations. Thc perceived unseemliness of fighting alongside US forces as well a* thedeficiencies of the Iranian armed forces almost certainly preclude direct Iranian participation in military operations against Iraq. If, however, it became apparent that Iraq was losing, Tehran might activate thc Kurdish and dissident [rati irregulars it has been grooming. In thc event that UN forces inflict casualties on Iraqi forces serious enough to require Baghdad to further weaken its defenses along the Iranian border, Tehran might be tempted to seize small ptcces of Iraqias ihe oil-ncs Majnoonforce additional concessions from Baghdad and io ensureeat at the final peace settlement. Iran's tempution would grow if it believed other countries intended to grab slices of Iraq.^sjsffT
Although it seems most likely that Iranai best passively support international efforu to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, its policy is flexible. Iran will adapt lis policy to iu perception of the possible outcomes of the crisis We believe that in most scenarios Rafsanjani will retain control of foreign policy and will continue to pursue to the best of his ability- thc goal of securing Iran's regional primacy.
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Saddtim Ii OustedMilitary Actio*iliimry Comp Prompted by US Sanctions. Once Iraqi forces are out of Kuwait. Tehran is certain lo agitateapid withdrawal of US forces. Iran probably wouldiplomatic campaign among Islamic and Third World nations toS withdrawal,ight refloat ths suggestion that Western amis be replaced with forces drawn eielu-sively from Islamic countries. Ifelieved LSto the region would be prolonged. Tehran might encourage anti-LSie Culf and other Muslim commui rorii
ran would also mobilize its Shia clients in Iraq and Kuwait toreater role injhe posicnsis governments of Iraq and Kuwait."
Saddam Withdraws From Kuwait, but HisMilitary Power Rcmaims Intact. Thisa dilemma for Iran On the one hand,reason for lhe deployment oi" UShave been removed, and Iran logically shouldthe rapid removal of US forces. On theRafsanjani probably knows that theis the only force able to hold an angrycheck. He will also worry that having lostSaddam will revert io his former trucutence Iran -g
We believe the need to appear to beJj Islamic principles will force Tehran in this scenario to call for thc withdrawal of LS ground forces, although perhaps not too energetically. Iran would step up iu efforts to cooperate with tbe Gulf CooperaiionTurkey, and Syria to try to contain Iraq. Tehran almosi certainly would not admit it publicly, but it mightontinued small presence of West European troops in tbe regionunher deterrent to Iraqi aggression.
: l
facet of ihu cooperation alrnoai certainly would lake the form of renewed Iranian es ti for Western miliary equioment. An Iranian newspaper hascalled for France to resume military sales io Iran. At the same lime. Iran might press thc West and the Soviets to continue to embargo military sales io Iraq as an additional means of containing Saddam (sjaaktarfLXI
Proitacltd Sialemait ot Wtiitrn CoataimmentShould Iraq appear to be weathering theand Iran perceive thc West to bemount offensive operations to expel SaddamIran may more actively involve itsdfolitical solution. In this instance.and policies would be similar to thewhich Saddam withdraws but remains incalculating Ihategotiatedwill weaken Saddam, and wantingorestallsolution" that excludes Iran. Rafsanjanitoeace plan to effect an
Iranian policy would follow much thc same course of more active diplomacyelieved tbe West hadtrategy of permancni containment of Iraq In this case. Tehran would increasingly suspect thai US intentions were toermanent military foothold in the Gulf. Rafsanjani's domestic opponents might also challenge his handling of the crisis.onsequence. Iran would be much more critical of US policy and probably would agitate for placing the multinational forces under direct UN command.probably would also push for atimited withdrawal ofnot other
Saddam Wins. Any resolution to the crisis that leaves Iraq in possession or Kuwait would seriously affect the thrust of Iranian policy. It would weaken Rafsanjani's
domesticthose hardline Iranians who have argued for supporting Iraq since US forces deployed to Saudi Arabia. As soon as it became apparent ihat ihc Iraqi conquest was noi likely to be reversed. Tehranwould seek to retain Saddam's good will by more actively helping him evade sanctions. At the same time, Tehran almost certainly would accelerate efforts to rearm and would try to strengihen relations with Syria and Turkey to help protect it against aggression Toictorious Iraq from eclipsing Iran as the leader of Middle Eastern defiance of the West. Tehran probably would become more strident toward the West and would more aggressively suppon radical Islamic and Palestinian movements. If the stability of thc Gulf Cooperation Council states is shaken by an Iraqi victory. Iran might increase suppon to the Shia movements in tbe Gulfeans of maintaining its influence in the*
As time passes, ihe likelihood that Iran will alignis diminishing. The price Iran would pay withthe Gulf Cooperation Council, andopinion in general probably would exceed the Tehran may hopebtain from Baghdad .base this judgment on several atsumpiiont:
considerations of Iranian nationalhave priority over ideological goals inpolicy calculations.
Most Iranian leadersowerful and aggressive Saddam Husaynreater danger to Iran than to ihe United Stales.
Iranian leadership gives economica high priority and believes better relationsith
" thc West are necessary us achieve thishe Rafsanjani-Khamenei alliance remains strong and secure In its conlrol of the government
Although unlikely, the Gulfhassome incongruous political
upset some or all of these assumptions. We cannot ruleeversal of Iran's stance that leads it to tilt toward Iraq. Despite their deep enmity. Iran and Iraq share certainas opposition io the
14
f'lt*rr S. Kkamnvi end Mojtan,am letrisisahe
brirfitsran. I
Events of cance
United Suie* and Israel, disdain foresire for higher oilmightasis for cooperation. We believe several developments would have to occur to cause Iran to reassess its interests in this way:
emotional and Ideological sigmfi-
Iranian leaders to emphasize ideological interests to protect iheir legitimacy as revolutionary Muslims,
Growing suspicion that US policyreater dangerran than Iraqi adventurism. Possible triggers mightS diplomatic effort perceived in Tehran as aimed atormal alliance in the Culf excluding Iran or securing permanent
access rights to Gulfelief that the Wen was actively considering dismembering Iraq (Tehran fears Turkish irredentism toward northern Iraqi;erceived pattern of accidental clashes between US and Iranian forces in thc Gulf.
Tehran believes ihe United Stales is losing. If military operations against Iraq became bogged down and/or the coalition againsi SaddamTehran might decide it was in its interest to side with the winner.
lust one of these events probably would not be sumcicnt to cause Tehran to reverse its current policy Even so. we would not expect Iran to deploy iu military alongside Iraq's or to engage in overtagainst lhe US-led coalition. Iran would be more likely to actively help Iraq lo evade sanctions,those on oil and other goods, which would both gain it good will with Baghdad and signal thc United States that the embargo of Iraq will not succeed unless US policy is made more acceptable to Iran.
tetania)
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