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DIRECTORATE Of INTELLIGEMCE
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Haiti: ATr*iultlon
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Jean Bertrand Aristide's overwhelming- victory to theecember election givesandate to govern unmatched by any Haitian leader ia this century- Artatide'e adoption ot moderate campaign themes--especlally tha need forand integrity' in government, ia contrast tb him ear liar calla torqvick international recognition ot tha legitimacy ot hie victory should provide tbe new administration with aome breethtng apece from the wary military and hla bitter opponents on the right. Thm Army'a ability to contain the tar right prior to and during the election augpeete chat even hardlinemeat powerful mad stridentunlikely to move against the President-elect unless they believed the military condoned such acticr. gjjfajjpjjh.
Arlatide, nonetheieaa, feces aeveral imposing obstacles, ack of administrative experience among his key advisers, the poaslbilityational Aaeembly lead by the oppoeitioa. roatrate economy. We believe that Arlatide would guickly revert to his leftist rhetoric or
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actions if he is unable to make headway on hla agenda.j Should Artstide try to circumvent roadblocks by, arming him own aecurity /ore* orhe legislature's prerogatives, support for a] military revolt oreamato_topple hla regime would gain momentum.
pr overtures to Cuba.
Arlstida will view US willingness to provide direct aid as an early test] of Washington's good will. If aid is not forthcoming quickly Arlatide, who is deeply auspicious off OS intentiona, alatoat certainly will complain openly that Washington is trying to undermine his government and may decide to signal his displeasure by 'curtailing cooperation on alien interdiction and
rama, or making diplomatic
| Onecenber. riest Jean Sertrandwon an overwhelming majority of the vote to become Haiti'* first freely-elected president since the end of th* Duvalier cm' Arlatide's National Front for Democracy and hange (FNCD) garnered aomeercent of th*the coalition of hi* nearest rival, centrist politician Hare Basin, collected leas than lSipercent." In contrast to the aborted7 election} .in which at leastoters dl*d, th* Haitian Military provided ample aacurity and-th* elections proceeded with]little violence. International observers quickly confirmed that the ballotingenerally free and fair. TheyJ a* well a* Aristlde's raised the military for protecting the process|
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[ W* believe th* magnitude ofin and th* quick International recognition of ita Legitimacy will beoat important assets in the run-up toebruary inauguration and over the early month* of hi* tenure. In our| judgment, tbe sis* of his victoryimandate to govern unmatched by any Haitian leader In this century.nd other reporting indicate that he attracted support all over the country and from most
1 Many legislative and local elections were forced _to runoff that will not be held until,
who;
economic sectors, especially the poor and diddle saw theear-old priest a* the only candidateeal departure from the politics oi! the three-decade long Duvalierurther, Arlstide's strong oratory skills and reputation aa] an honest "man-of-the-people galvanized aupport andarge turnout at tha polls.' Prompt recognition of his victory and congratulatory messages from leaders in Latin America and Europe also have helped convince; opponents to accept Arlstide's victory at leaat for now.
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Moreover, we believe that the voters' endorsement of Arlstide's moderate, unsophisticated campaign themea will give the newair amount of breathing apace as it begins the difficult task of governing. According to pros* reports, most Haitian* are)not expecting an economicooking for the President-elect instead to bring integrity to their government. For example,ally following his victory, crowds in|Port-au-Prince chanted "it's not for money, it's for dignl
political promises, especially removing any influence of the far right in government and arresting or deporting notorious Duvslierlat leaders. Even so, while he has continuedndorse bringing hardline Duvalierists to Justice, Aristidef has publicly urged moderation injdeallng with political extremists.
Little Elae
He expect, however, that the administrative inexperience of Aristide and hie jadvisers and emerging divisions in his coslltion will makeovernment difficult. Aristide has never managed any undertsJtii
2loser look at Arlstide's background and leadership style, see Appendix. aflammmW
WCWj^CT
Apart;ack of qualified personnel, tha yet-to-be selected National Assembly could further complicate Arlatlda'a effort* to develop and Implement policies.3 Tha Haitian Constitution gives tha two-house Assembly significant powers. Including tha ability to override praaidantial vetoeslsapla majority vote ln aach body. Although Arlatide'a FNCD( la likaly to do wall ln tba legislative races, hla coalition'ran candid*taa for loaahan half of tha eeata and ha would neod to ally with another party toajority. Furthermore, tha conatitutlon requires Arlatide ,torimaosition nearly equal in power .tority party in the legislature. Without an alliance in tha asaatbly, Arlatide will not ba able to select the Prime ini star frost among hia own followers, unlaas no othar party or coalitionegislative majority. Ifis own nor another group can form an absolute majority, he' would ba fraa to choose frost any party, after consultingwith Aseeeibly leaders. According to tho conatitutlon. tha; Prima Minister selects tba Cabinet with tba approval ofn- snd is esrpowsrad anxTores tha Republic's Law* ?
Pasting with Rival Power Centers
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In our view,ublic assurances that ha will not undertake aagainst his rivalala claar understanding that tha survival of hlaill hinge on hie management of; tbe military and far right. Wa balleva Arlatlda'a landalida victory and naesiv* popular dsssonstrations in hla favor hava intimidated aoata among tba Armed Forces and tba DuvaTleriats. Nevarthaleas,olitical history ia repleta with exaaaplee of thahrinkingonfrontationmaller, batterorce. In for example, aw dozen Chugs woe* able to halt the eljctlonwithout provoking an] substantial public backlash
Senate and
Thm Aimad lorcm*. Tha Armed Forcaa arm auspicious of Aristlde and hla leftist advlssrs in particular, but they havaait-and-sea poature toward tha new qovatisasut. Concerns are likaly to ba highest within tha Haitian Dafansa Unite and the Haavy Weapons Corps, where many troops hava be-on cloaaly tied to human rights abuses committed under formar President Avrll. For ssasspla, Evana Paul, tha apparent winner of tha Port-au-Prince mayor's racalose Aristlde associate, waaeaten by aoldiera following hia arrest9 for alleged
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HOFfRH
thea*Aristide'b
coup plot concern*,
landelld* victory haaobering affect on prospective coup-plottera in the Military. In addition, moat officera reportedly do not want to provoke the population, damage their growing laage of professionalism, or jeopardize the expected Influx of forelanevlitary aid in the wak*uccessful election, faemmmmma"
Aristide and hla followera have been careful to send raaaaurlng messages to the Araed Forces, but at (the aaae tine are conaidering measures that would put then et odda with ellltary leedera. In our view. Three daya (after the election, the FNCDress relaase congrstulating th* Any for the "positive example" the soldier* set during the balloting. Troopa alao were bolstered by popular display* of gratitude for th* sillitary's efforts; in hi* (victory speech, Arlstid* eaid he would not purge the Araed Force*
them a salary lncrea '
Tho DvvmliwriSta. Although SOB* moderate Duvalierlata slso appear to haveait-and-see attitude toward Aristide. hardliner* appear resolved to prevent hla from taking or staying in offlc*. Presidentialdentified with the moderate right and even rightwingsoger Lefontant have congratulated ArlWtide and
GztvlZh hla government. Evenall Duvalierists fear
that Arlstid*'* follower* will seek vigilante justice against thea. Lafontant. despite hla conciliatory words after the election, publicly vowed before the bellotino t
Ariatide ha* urged his supporters not to seek personal revenge on the far right and called for national! reconciliation, but we believe hla goodwill will|be limited to lav-level official* who worked-for the Duvalier regime. Aria tide ha* Indicated that he is committed to finishing Haiti'* anti-Duvalleristnd daya before the balloting, he promieed that would prosecute
kOcresslngLy aware of th* need -n* tS Haiti.'s'economic capitaallenercent7 election debacle, aa' th* ensuing political turmoil led to cuts In foreigneterrednd impaired effective policymaking. The consequent drop In public Investment over thi* period waa accompanied]all In private Investment, which ha* impaired growth in the promising aasembly-for-export sector. Haiti's manufacturingwaa the faatast-grovlng in ths Caribbean la), but manufactured exports roee alowly followinguster, snd have slidercent over; the last year. Agriculture--which employsercent of th*so ha* performed poorly, although ita problems are more chronic. Deforestation, topaoll runoff, plant | dlaeaae, and inadequate inveatnent have prevented .
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_ jgltlon, corruption';aaim of officialdom and hsa. ^aesj th* efforts of previous governments to develop fiscal policy. mmmmmmaW
- Aristide alao willubstantial nesd for foreign sid. Haiti auffara from food and foreign currency shortagea and public Investment In health, *ducatlon, and lnfraatructur* is scanty. Currency reserve* have nearly hit bottom, falling as low6 million In July, and Haiti can afford oil only because VensxueLs ha* been granting concessional credit terns, meanwhile. USAID hss calculated thet Haiti will need atons of donated cereal throughnd tha World Bank hsa estimated that an7 million i* needed toinimal lnveetment program1 million overdviser a, for their1emanda of other oaf*
productivity from ataylng abreaat of population growth. Export cropa have suffered moat; decline* in coffee and sugar harveete have cut agricultural export earnings by more thanercentnd th* trade deficit haa risen0 million70 million1 Tourism haa alao beenlin*. In addition, ndemic at all levels of officialdom and has seriously hampered the effo_rtsof previous governments to develop fiscal policy. ammmmmmW
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N*>eatlmstsdi needed toinimali-ogrsm1 million over the next tworlstide'e adviser*, for their part, realise that th* demands of other nations and budget constraints will limit
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4 USAID calculates that cereal donations have averaged
about0ear aince the7 election
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tha funda available for Haiti, rallabla aource.
Inward-looking, statiat. and
Arlatlda'a economic prograai. raportadly drafted byttae led by one of hia laftlat adviaera, lajlargaly
al than
progr
work with buel
rant aaya lictie aoout encouraging airports, but calla for prudent fiscal and monetary pollcieairect government role ln agricultural coaaMrca and affirms the need for competition In the domeatic marketplace. Since tha election. Arlatide and hla inner circle havaotably modarata tona. Onelcloaa adviaar haa anphaaizad the need for the new government to
ye economic climate.
Businessmen have been generally receptive to Arlatlda'a
overturaa but remain wary of hla Intention*, Host foreign and local businessmen have reacted cautiously to hla victory and are waiting to see how hla economic programhey are hoping that the re*pon*lbllltiea of power will compel him toodarata couraa and are plaaaed by bia coimnitment to reduce corruption. Nevertheleea, at leaat one foreignSwlae firm preparing- toillion dollarsort au Princewithdrawn since tha election.
A New CouraafM^.j Relations?
atart offlean alati
toward Waahlngtoa. doapite his reputation for anti-US
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trlatide says he recognizee the need for good bilateral relatlona with Washington.^Nonethelees,
Arlatide haa long heldStates responaible for moat .of Haiti'a problema; he blamea Washington for supporting theand contends that7 election couldwithout violence, if the US Government had Moreover, many of his key advlaera
long-time leftists with anti-US ^sentiments. AXtTT^^^
elections, however,
_ thatovernmentcooperative relationship" with Washington.
Although his policies sroTlkaly. to emphasize, the mportance of respect for Haitian sovereignty.and .sympathize with populist causae in ths region,iArlatide has signaled be will not embarkajor opening to leftist reglmae. Arlatide has mentioned Hlcarsgus and Cuba favorably as "models" for his planned massive literacy campaign, but the president-elect claims he will not "act precipitously" in renewing diplomatic relatlona with Havana. Nevertheless. Aristlde hasuban delegation to attend his il
Arlatlda'a moderate tone since the electlona haa probably generated sufficient calm among his opponents and tha vary military to assure his near-term survival and that of his fledgling admlniatration. Based on the military'a recant success In controlling the fsr right, we believe that the hardline Duvalierists--Aristlde'a most powerful and stridentunlikely to move againat him unless they conclude that the Army would condone such action. We judge that if tha Duvsllerist leadership calculates that the military Intends to stand behind the new government, they probably will flee Haiti or go underground and continue plotting. Far right leaders may not be able to control all
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theirowever, end an attack on Ariatide
anxious aid- or low-leva] DuvaLlerlata la poaaible.
Any evidence thet Arlatide is trying to consolidate his power st tha expense of the Armed forces slnoat certainly wouldevolt, in our view.. Por example; military support for Arlatide would quickly erode If hie new government followed through--with or without Cuban aaalatance--on plana to create andarallel eecurity force,ova that *Papa Doc" used to establish hie dictatorship in the. idespread purge of the military or an acenmmndation with Cuba probably wouldlmllar rssponae. tt
In our view, Arlatide's moderate tack la likely to continue at leaat over the next few'months as he works toovernment, but he probably would quickly resortore hardline at arte* if hie agenda ia fruatreted. For example, he is likely to toughen hla atanca toward* th* military should it fsll tootorious rightwing leaders, such aa Lafontant. Inhould Aristide's political opponentsajority in the National Aassmbly, they could slow the pace of land and other reforms vital to hi* constituent*. Under theee conditions, Arlatide probably would be inclined to reeort toction*, auch a* intimidationi*latora. to thwart the Assembly. Any of theee ectlona, however, would provide Arlstide's opponenta, particularly in the military, with an excuse to topple hla government under the guise of protecting the constitution.
graca oerlod '
term economic hardahipa
llotments lowies, lid ij^lSTS**
On the economic front, we expect Arlatide to enjoymore extended grace period. We believe that*
I.wil lnt is *
- nniUM to address
lthough and- Political cllmst.
grievance* first and will giveonger grace periodia th* economy, which is likely to remain sluggish over the nest year. Agricultural e-
N09DRN NCXTOMpAt SECRET
Implication* for the US
Arlatlda'a victory probably will encourage aim to continue to moderate hla tone toward the United States, hla anti-US eentlments are deep-aeatad and ha almoat certainly will not be Inclined to give Washington tha benefit of the doubt if problems arlae ia the Initial atagea of the relationship. Tor Aristlde, an aarly teat of Haahlogton'a sincerity to cooperate with him will be US willingness to provide direct assistance to bia government. In tha absencs of prompt aid. Arlatide almost certainly will complain that Washington was intentionally trying to undermine his government. In the face of growing economic adversity, he might revert to anti-US rhetoric to maintain popular backing, rurthsrmora, ArtstId* might decide to make diplomatic overtures to the Cubans to signal hia discontent, even though such an action wouldacklash from the Haitian Armed Forces.
Aristlde probably else would rethink bilateral cooperation ln other areaa, particularly if aid la slow to develop or if he believed hla government was being preeaured to accord Washington privllegee that other nation, have been unwilling to grant. For eaample, Aristlde haa voiced hla displeasure with the Allen Migrant Interdiction Operation, and he may meek to curtell or eliminate it on the grounds that no other government haa consented to such an agreement. International cooperation on drug trafficking, however, ia more widespread and of greater concern to Arlatide, suggesting that bilateral countarnsrcotlcs programs are less likaly to bo altered. ffaffffSffffm
Look et.Ar'.atida
lean Barntide has Lone/eputation fiery leftiet demagogue, but ainca beginning hla drive for tha presidency, ha aat aaide hla more(strident rhetoric in favorore pragstatlc posture. Ar1stIda's acre Moderate political platform, reassuring messages to tbe Anted Forces, and expressions of gratitude to US officiate for helping ; Baiti coaplota tbe electoral process auggaatven if j hla approsch isactical move, he at least, recognizee ' tha lasportanca ofoderate image. I
Nevertheless, he almost certainly will continue to, rely on hie oratorical skills and the uee of potent ayssbollaev--asid during thasustain popular support forresidency.
The potential disjunction between Arlatlda'aoderate- posture and hia prior- confrontational. eadership suggests, however, that he could be an erratic
r;-aidant, ahlftlna between mora measured efforts ai
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A survivor of numerous assassinationristlde has been attributed arystical powers by his supporters; hlo foiiew himaviour, according to various source*. Nicknamed 'Titld' or 'little Aristlde' thecapitalizes on this aura by af>eaklng la proverbs end parables and using easily understood folk aymboliasi and religious imagery to appeal to tb*
superstitious and Illiterate elements of Haitian eoclety. Aristlde adopted the rooster, with Its implication ots fighting spirit, a* his party's logoj he appeared at
Morula* rfocmg&crr
FuCR QliAUTY PACE
HoratrH NOCOJfTRACT
6 7 B 9 0
Haiti: Economic Indicators
Foreign Exchange Rtserves
200
6 7 B 9
Forelgn Aid
|us
ICO
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. II
11
6 7 9 1!
ol July
Original document.
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