V
Contests
Situation Repon
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Lithuanians Make Concession
ryaig To Revitalize the Big Stick
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New Cabinet Shaping Up
New Security and Trade Ministers Named
Traditionalists Gain in Military Shuffle
Georgia Tense
Brief
Analyses
Peace Comes to Beirut. Trouble to South Lebanon
Europe; Winter of Discontent
Gorbachev's Congress Victory Looks Pyrrhic
New UN Security Council
Envoy Meets Saddam
ver
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Make
The Lithuanian legislature yesterdayoncession to Soviet authorities to get negotiations started, but fundamental differences oree ,ground rules and objtctitei an likely to stall any rulks quickly. JWaV
republic legislature agreed to drop its insistenceign<P'pjocol with central authorities before negotiations beginwWmmcalled lor .dentirication of possible topics for referendums by neat June. Lithuanian leaders wanted the protocol to guarantee that negotiations would be directed at independence and conductedtale-to-ataic basts, thereby eaempting the republic
the onerous Soviet secession law. The legislature indicated that
ii Mill expects negoi.auona with the USSR to be iniemate and noi to vi ilatcj^ 'v %
thuaniar resolutiononcession and probabl)ntended both io tesi Gorbachev's willingness to deal and to reduce pressurerackdown in the republic. The call for referendum topics suggests republic leaders may beote on independence, which would be another concession to the center, but the Lithuanians are unlikely to accept the voting procedures of the secession law. which would alack ihe deck against independence. The continued emphasis on the interstate nature of future talks and the need to protect Lithuanian sovereignty, moreover, suggests Jundarr.cntal differences remain.(MaV* L, ^
Gorbachev still does not appear willing to negotiate seriously withhuamans over independence. Their moves are unlikely to deter rum Irom keeping (he pressure on. He could nevertheless agree to begin talks in order toay moratorium on republic legislation pursuant to the Lithuanian declaration of independence: the legislature decided in June that it would declarerearusm when formal talks with thc center begin. aVHflfl*,
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mmin
Tryiag To Rr.iuJue ihc Big Sdck
Tht Inltrior Ministry's nam Ltadtrzhip aaptara committed to boUttrinK thtaw tnfoixtmtnt capabilities andtsponsirt uHloawid*poiict force that could help Gorbackt, rtasitrt ctntral autnariiy. %Wa%Wt
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In hii first interview since succeeding Vadim Bikatin,egain law enforcement prerogatives that had devolved
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POLAND: Net* Cabinet Shaping Up
3mb!jEhu government within
and leader of ihe small
c for pnmetha.iltce. For,,an Affair, Oefrn.,.
iaoverrin1en. will slay in officeegialattyJeTecJion Lois spnng.
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USSR; Traditional is tsilitary Shuttle
Moscow has appointed three hard-hiiung officers to key military posts dunng the past week. Col. Gen. Vladislav Achalov head of thc Airborne Forces for about two years, iteputy minister of
noiesponsibilities in trie new position, which appears to have been created for him; he has said he will be involved wiih implementing thc military's tunsilion to defensive doctrine. Achalov's formerove up to head thc Airborne Forces and Lltor Checheyatov has been named Kiev-Military District commander fj^(fa ^a,
wWaaaaUWAlt:bough ihe ihree nc* appointees are all traditionalists their youth will forestall accuiaiiona by junior officers that top ranks are stagnant. Achalov has had experience that both enables himractical approach to doctrinal reform issues and Qualities
the use of aimed forces to cope with domestic unrest
USSR; Georgia Tense
Internal interethnic and center-republic relations remain tenseGcors-ia.akbinvaliattacked
h<nuteetaliation
fc. Tbrrest of an Osseuan; thc hostage, were released after he
was set free. Yesterday the Georgian Supreme Soviet banned illegal armed formations; the newly created national guard, which has been aubord.nated to the republic MVD. will be supplied with weapon.riiero the
$recently created consultative commission, which was toettlement between the separaiist-minded Osseiiant and Tbilisi, may be in jeopardy. The national guard is intended in pan to suppress the instability created by disgruntled ethnic minorities and radical opponents of the ncwgovernmeni but iucreation defies central authorities vnanaataaaMaaaaut* <A
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In Brief
fcasl Aata
South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan reluming to Seoul tiimorrow from two-yearexilcjafijatAaftatlVatN opposition leader Kim Dae Jung noropposingctignvemrr.ent demcnstraiions poi.blc
Gagauz leader in Soviet Moldova said yesterday his group willing lo comply with presidential decree,ether republicrobably trying to blame Moldovan leaders for an showdown wiih center as Tuesday deadline approaches.
Uteris* rebel Taylor threatentng "peace march" into Monrovia this month .. trying to exploit tension between rival factions, peacekeeping force, interimeeking popular mandate to circumvent cease-Are agreement, seize power. jM
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severely damaged Luanda airport terminal Thursdaygovernment blames. insurgents accuse ruhng-pany dissidents .w UN food relief may hamper next month's peace talks
ioting Moiamblcnn sludents in Cuba arrested this week, one kilted. tsa-ssassas^Bafcayaatf demanding living allowance be paid inore unrest likely as economy deteriorates food supplies decline 0
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Special Analysis
Comes to Beirut, Trouble to South Lebanon
TaW pacification of Beirutaase-fire between tha rival Shia militias Amal and Hizballah in southern Lebanon mean that anacks by Lebanese and Palestinian groups on Israel and ilt Le ban tie proxy the Army of South Lebanon (ASU. are likely to be more freeuttst. In response. Tel Avir probably will increase small-scale operation, outs.de Its sttf-praelatmed security tone, adding to the risk of unintended confrontations with Ihe Lebanese and Syrian Armtei. anonf*.
-Ihe Harawi government's move lo establish control over BeirulLebanese mililia lighters toward southern Lebanon, lhenot occupied by Syrian forces.*
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The governmeni let militias retain their Weapons for aaiviiiesand the ASL. probably encouraging the southwardmajor Chnstian and Muslimthcwhich has longstanding ties toas resistance organ nations.-"
Implications of Cease-Fire
After months of fighting. Amal and Hizballah are abiding byiCaa'iCiiaayoo*orcd'heirPatrons. Syria and
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and Palestinian operations in IVaoaC also
declined during earlier periods of fighting between the Shia militiasincreased fallowing ceatc-nrcsalMHt>
The ceasefire accord provides for Amal and Hizballah to coordinale romance operauons in the security zone and for Hizballah to return to previously held positions in the south. The cease-fire will also open several infiltration routes that had been blocked by the fighting. llowingmen and materiel to move southward from bases in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley morean force from the Lebanese Army that is to deploy lo the south probably will be unwilling or unable to hamper ihis movement and risks inviting guerrilla anacks. aaaaaak.
cominued
"ijiiitll^
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Special Analysis
OPE:
of
2* struggling to develop polecat legtlimocy mnd transform theirinancial crunch, energy shortages, disruption. In food supple,ome area, ana-
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ndrterferrrorra,/,
aJr* hlUhmM produced
m'cl^
uropeanl changeonthconsequence, for Eastern Europe. Barter i. to give waym-hardprices. Equally bad for the
Sovic,,mark"! 0ook to the
thLEurope more
triggerayment.
The end of subsidized Soviet oil supplies will aggravate an"Mndal crunch. cSvcrnmcm, arcgiving residential consumer
Wbtlprovide little solace if distribute networks are
rf imn-^vT'?experience the greatest disruption; both already have reduced fuel supplies to industry
lorcirg rnany firms to slow production or cloieaaaaBBBVaBi *
p ?
l*ocould become severe in the Balkans, wbereulcd ^low-average harvests. The Bulgarians are
r ^and d"'ry exports. In Roman.a. food supplies are less than expected across the board? in
uZB.?JT" "Perceat. Ifimport.do not rill the gap in mTa.snor^
lood of Soviet refugees willsS2Ssupplies and services. East SllES! pcculaie lh"of Soviet emigration restrictions could0 million persons to cross their borders
continued
thC"c Probabl*eS ISmaller rj^gejproblem wouldux the East Europeans' meager resources
Complicating PoliUcal Problems
Shaky East European governments trc struggling with stcadilv worsening political malaise. Many of Ihcir citizens arc frustrated thai ihe ouster of Communial dictatorships has produced calls for even greater sacrifice raihcr than material improvement in (heir lives. They chafe at the retention of discredited Communis! bureaucrats and at petty bickering among the movements that swept thc Communists from powei
Even the relatively well-off Czechoslovak. Hungarian, and Polish governments are likely to face strikes and protests this winier. and
the region the political will to continue reforms may begin lo ebb. Many East European leaden are likely to read Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki's poor electoral showingignal thai political survivalradualist approach to reform. They will noic ihai Walesa and his runoff opponent Tyminski wooed lhe electorate wiih promisesenller transitionarket economy. Slower reform, however, probably will postpone economic gains, prolong suffering, and jeopardize access lo Western assistance.
Massive antigovernmeni demonstrations sparked by shortages have already shaken government* in the Balkans. The Romanian Government, plagued by strikes and demonstrations, will barer, aurvtve thc winter, and Bulgaria's squabbling polittcal parties are only now focusing on urgently needed economic reforms. Clinic nationalism is pulling Yugoslavia apart, and ihclbanian rejtmehas barely survived widespread andemonstrations.
All the East European countries seem likely io greet spring economically weaker and politically more unliable. The seventy of Iheir problems is likely to depend as much on external aa internal events; if the USSR swings toward euher anarchy or renewed authoritarianism, or energy prices surge again,eep recession lakes hold in Ihe West, the poliiical and economic health of ihe region will be ihe more in dangci^ j.
Gorbachev in Charge of tht Soviet System
Under ihe new. poliucal system the Congress of People's Deputies approved this week. Oortsacnev now heads mojl key national Uisutuuons.
His jobs include:
USSR President.
General Secretary of the Communist Party of thc Soviet Union.
Chairman ofthe Council of thc Fcdention.
Ouurman of the Cabinet of Ministers..
Chairman of the Defense Council.
Chairman of the Constitutional Revision Cominittee. .
He probably will chair the new National Security Cooneu, which ia still to be organized and mayew law enforcement body whose duties are still vague Anatoby Luk yenov. who i* Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet,lose Gorbachevand tries to manage the legislature according to Gorbachev's wishes
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Specijjls
ongress Vtciory Looks
Gorbachev mii virtually all he wanted at the fourth Congrats of People's Deputies, but his traditionalist posture and the disarray of reformist forces in the legislature will further polarize lhe country and hasten the anteVllfc? betweentnce-mi,deJ republics and tha center.
Allhough ihe Congressnoi all dear sailing for Gorbachev, he was ableobilize traditionalist deputies from lhe Communist Party and the Soyuz bloc to approve strengthened executive powers and his union treaty concept, Yanayev aa Vice Presidentecond round of voling, and the state inspectorate, even if in altered form. Oorbachevesult willai.Qj.al mandate for his centralizing, more authoritarian course
Some reformers deeply concerned about liability, as well as military and Communist hardliners, gave Gorbachev ihe two-thirds majority his constitutional changes required. Traditionalist constituencies, after losing influenceong time, have both regained Gorbachev's car and reconstituted themselves politically. Allhough some reactionaries expressed disappointment with the Congress, most almost certainly believe the overall irend favors their cauac.<IBM
Gorbachev offered the dcmocraiic reformers little but rhetoric. Alienated and divided, they were unable toounterattack; many simply left the Congress. Reformers probably now believe their battles are best fought in republic and local
Gorbachev's successes ai the Congress have preserved his maatcry of lhe party and the governmeni asscmbliea but do not reestablish his authority or give him control over republic and local developments Moreover, as lhe USSR's crisis develops, hu widened range of responsibilities may correspondingly increase his polilical vulnerability. Populariy elected republic leaders will continue to challenge the center for control of resources and polilical power, as lhe Russian Republic already has done this week. These conflicis are cnngina the center nearerhoice between using force and
thcr devolution of poweronfederal structure
Original document.
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