NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW (DELETED)

Created: 11/30/1990

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Near East

South Asia3

Special Issue: Islamic Fundamentalists and the Gulf Crisis H

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East and .South Asia Review djW

ut: Islamic Fundamentalists arid ibe Gulf Casts

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Fimdaroeatalisu have lakcnTheTead in articulating ihe general Muslim distress over ihe prospcel of war between Muslim nates anl. even more unsechng, presence cfUS and olher Western forces near lbs Muslim Wyntet They are likely to become itxaeasmgly aptated as thc crisis fiowinucs and fceVres^

- Fonda 'orj|

As proponentse rum idt^ore 'authentic" Islam as the soletion lo society's ills, fundarnenulifls arc bansfceraing Ibe politics of virtually all states with siiable Maslim populations The outcome of lhe Gulf crisis will in pan determine whether mainstream activists coniinue to dorntnaie | Islamic fundm* rial ism or more radical clentenu come to lhe fore. Tj

Jandamenlallirs Caughtikmroi9

Most leading Egyptian fundamentalists condemn ihe Injgi invasion of Kuwait bul denounce si lean at strongly Ihe US troop presence eS Saudi Arabia The finvlarneatalisu will react even asorc negatively if lhe Uniied Slavs launches miliary operaboos in the Galf. artcTrnorc radical nrndarnenuUstiprovoke denxmstraUoiu ihatcould turn viok-nl gfjgj

Fundamentalists' IVo-SaeleUoi Senlii

increase

Jordan* Islamic fundamrnub'sts are exploiting the Gulf crisis lo theastrength and visfciliiy. Establishnwii Maslim leaden provided bale guidance by King Hussein, are trying to balance popular supjon for Iraq against interna-iona! pressure to adhenTto UN sanctions and have iaken_.dvunL.gr of iheir looser tether to hop on ihc Baghdad bandwagon. JtM. 1

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Radical Palcsdnian and Lebanese ftn^damentaiio groups welcome Saddam Husayn's linkage of the Gulf crisis lo the Arab-Israeli conflict and his harsh aaactacn tne United Slates. The radicals arc using the crisis lo strengthen ties to Iraq, increase their, influence over the Palestinian movement, and justify future terrorism against lhe United States and its Arab I

The Muslim Rnxh&hood .tits lo exploit public disapproval cf President Asad'i cooperationihe Wen in lhe Gulf crisis It sympathizes with Iraq's ouster of the Kuwaiti monarchy and opposes ihe presence of non-Arab trcops in Saudi Arabia, and it and ocher fundamentalist elements

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The Gulf crisis has grveJTulc furrfamcnoiist-doetunaied Welfare Pany aa opportunity to attract suppon from devout Muslims and perhapsarger role fat Turkish politics. The Welfare Party has sror.Riy protested US involvement In lhe crisis, and, if President Oaal's support for the West backfires. Uie pany could win scats in the legislature.

Iran:

The Shia furvdamentaJiit reXirBeThat rules Iran fears Iraqi dwninauon of the region and wants to sec Iraq's occupation of Kuwait reversed. Lacking tiic miliiary power to contain Iraq, Iran has had toormula io voleme the largest deployment of US forces to the Middle East5 without compromising Iran's revolutionary linage among Muslim militants. M

Senior Saudi religious authorities suppon King Hand's decisioncci Weston militaryhe GuJi* crisis. Nonetheless, they are uncomfortableon-Muslim military presence, fearing it will up*

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ndamenial ist leaders in Algeria and Tunisia have been unable toonsensus on the Gulf crisis. The fundamenuJisu am likely to try to keep their focus on domestic issues, but. if hostilities break out in the Gulf, they am likely to side with popular sentimeni in protesting againsi thc war.^

indamentaUst groups oppose King Hassan's support for Saudi Arabia and the United States in the Gulf crisis. buUhey are too small and disorganized to challenge thc monarch directly. Evenajor Gulf war erupts. Hassan should be abfeio use his security services, personal standing, and religious appeals to keep fundajnentalist oppoaiuon off balance.

Reverse Blank

Near East and South Asia Review

Issue: Islamicnd the Gulf Crisis M

Fundamentalists

and tlsv GulfAVjF

Sincenvasion of Kovakugust, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has consjorrely irfejjUdamic rtietoric and symbols to mobilize support for Baghdad's cause rhroughout the Muslim world. Saddam's rnesage skillfully employs themes that hit home particularly with Islamic fwidameotalists, who represent ihc most dynamic political and sodal trend in the Muslim world loday:

Saddam and Iraqi cierics calloly war to oust the Westerners from Islam's heartland. Iraqi propaganda is filled with references lo depraved behavior by infidel Western troops in lhc holy places of Saudi Arabia.

In his new guise, Saddam hasenerous patron of Islamic cause* Since theuccession of prominent Islamic personages, including fundamentalist leaden, has trooped through Baghdad, and the Iraqi media nave Uumpetcd theu endorsements of Saddam.

FuneameTtsarXhave taken thenicuLaring the general distress throughout the Muslim world over the

prospect of war between Muslim states and, even more unsettling, the presence of US and otber Western forcesibe holy sites. Fundanvotnlists have led oesnortstraiioas to Jordan. Pakistan, and elsewhere against lhe Western presence. TTirje.howc*ej. hai been no reactionatch the outbursts in response to the scirure of Ihe Grand Mosque In Meccahen rumors thai the United Slates was involved resulted In violent ormcaisraions. Including the burning of ihe US Embassy in Islamabad. Many leading fundamentalisu

appear to be straddling the Gulf issue, crjnof ansing. at.

least by implication, tUe Iraqi invasion oo Islamic grounds, while reserving their heaviest fine for the western presence in the Gull. eaajjj

There arc several likely reasons for the relaovety passi ve tespoose ofndamentalisu and ihe laiger Islamic public lo the Western buildup:

Saddam is widely perceived by fundamentalist leadersecular thugynically nuuiipataiing Islamic symbols to Justify Ihe invasion of Kuwait.

Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab Gulf states over lhc ycarsoavc bankrolled Islamic programs and causes throughout lhc Muslim world and in Muslim communities in tbe West. Wealthy Saudis have contributed generously to fundamentalist political groups and their leaders. Fundamentalist leaders are

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lknaic their bene latum, and. while denouncingrereree of Western miliury forces in ihe kingdom, ihey carefully retrain from rebuking KingFaM.

- Funeaimencalitu belongyriad of organi tat ions that tend to focos cet national and local ivtoes. No Muslin clerical leader has the nature of an Ayatollah Khomeini, around whom Muslims can rally either for or against Saddam.

Sectarian rivalries continueivide foodameniakoi Shia Muslims appear lorn between enmity tor the United States and for Saddam's Sunni-baaed regime Despite us rhetoric. Tehran i. turning aside calls by Iranian and other Shia Muslim radicals for action against Western farces, preferringail the resolution of the crisis before deciding whether to confront the United States.

Tbe absence of hosulinesand continuing inteaiiaodnal interesteaceful reaoluoonail-and-see atttude. Haa

Fundamenialisu in the Arab Middk Last and else where in ihc Muslim world arc likely to become increasingly agitated as lhe crisis continues aed the Western military presence grows. Even arefaconservatire Saudi religious police hare icoteuly led ami-US cVmjnsciadons. Tenaaoos fanned by Iraqi propaganda could bod over with the approach erf thc islamic holy reason that begins in March with the monthlong fast of Ramadan and concludes wiih (he hajj or pilgrimage infttf

In our view, Muslim fundamentalists standain influence no nufierhow die Gulf crisis brcaol red.emise, citherecant of US-led military action or an internal coup, probably would be portrayed as one more defeat that Islam must avenge. Fundamentalist Ideologues could portray Saddams secularism as ihc seed of his defeat and* present this as an object lesson for Muslims. If Saddam is perceived as having prevailed. fundamental jis almost certainly would proclaim thisictory for Islam, ajpk Mj^Lw

ggjeavy casualties among Iraqi and Arab coalition faces almost certainly would increase criticism of the United Stales and lis Arab allies. The outcry would become even more intense if Israel becomes involved in military actions. Fundanv-cealist leaden would charge that Tel A- iv and Washington acted matonccrt. We believe that, even In Egypt, violence led by fundamenialisu and Others wouldigh risk to US citizen] and property, terrorist attacks by Islamic and secular radicals against US, Western, and Israeli interests would meet wish widespread approval ihreiiighout the Muslim

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There would also be protests if the war were short and thc West perceived *sdecisive winner. These probably would laper off fairly quickly, with lhe Arab-Israeli Issue almost certainly returning lo the forefront of fundamentalist and Arab Muslim concerns FundamereaJiH leaders throughout lhe Muslim world would continue to press for the eail of Western miliiary forces from Saudi AraHa and the Gulf region.

n Ideology for^ QZ?

rurtdamcnulism is the most dynamic social and polilical force in ihe Muilim world, generally eclipsing otherArab nationalism, and Da'Uusm (Arabits appealhe Muslim masses: iTrndamenialiEs. proponentseturnore 'authentic" Islam as the solution to society's ills, six transforming LSe politics of vinually al! states with liable Muslim populations. Their ihetorictrongly anti-Western tone. aHg|

fundamentalism's momentum and force vary" (ram one Muslim country to another, arid no one religious or polilical figure speaks for the movementhole. Mainstreamwilling to work wiihin Iheir countries' politicalscored impressive political gains in thc last several years in severalJordan,we expect this tendontinue through. The outcome of the Gulf crisis and the severity of economic problems in most Muslim states probably will determine whether mainstream activists continueominate Islamic fundamentalism or more radical elements comehe fn

Fundamentalism's Roots

Islamic fundamentalists are the most politically assertive componentarge and broad Islamic revival lhat has been developing since early in this centuryrThe revival iseactionhe legacy of Western colonialism. It also respondservasive sense among Muslims lhal secular leaders of the Islamic world have failed to meet lhe continuing challenge from

For most fijndamcnulisfj uk explanation for ihe Muslim world's failureis the Westivinewithdrew His favor as Muslims strayed from hum's true path. Many fundamentalists trace iheir "conversion"ore political Islam to Israel's defeat of ihe combined armies of Egypt Syria, and Jordann event that sent shock waves

throughout the Muslim 'workt New recruits over ihe Intervening decades have come mainly from young, urban, educated Muslims in countries lhal have been wracked by continuing social and economic ^

The Fundamentalist Agenda FuJidamcnulists assert ihc primacy of Islamic concerns over narrow national interests and reject Arabsinsm, and Ba'lhism as bankrupt ideologies based on Western models. Centralheir world view Is the coricept of lhe Inviolability ofIslam, the lerrilorjcs that historically have been won for Islam and, as such, are heldrust from God, no portion of which may behis conviction accounts in large measure for fundamentalist opposition to the Western miliiary presence in Saudi Arabia andossible US-led military attack on Iraq. It also, for example, makes HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, tat less amenable than lhe secular Palestine Liberation _Organiiationossible compromise wiih Israel on territorial issues.3 Fundamental isi demands are simple andof Islamic law as the basis for lhc legal systems of all Muslim countries, the purging of Western influences from Muslim societies. and the development of specifically Islamic solutions lo political, social, and economic problems. The rhetoric of even mainstream fundamentalist organizations such

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Many fundameiuaiisu have rejected "ofltcUrreligious establishment thai in most Muslim countries stalTi |ovemment-(iinded moio.net and Islamic ed jcauonal and judicialirtreasuigly arc patronizing mosques and Itlamic crrganreabons ihai are bviependeni of goierniuov control In ihcir new. thcof them salaried stare employee* help perpetuate secular itate Innnudons that are based on Western and alien models.

Piths to Power

The appeal of fundamentalits firm roots in indigenous Islam isallowed iu advocates to outpace secularisu in many Musbra countries in mobilir.ing public support and shaping social and poliiical behavior. Although fundamentalists share common goals, (heir leadership, particularly In ihc majority Sunni sect of Islam, tends to be fragmented, reflecting ihe diverse philosophical coemauoos. tactical approaches, and often intense political and personal rivalries wuhm ihc movement in each Mushm country:

- Most fundamentalists assert that society must be reformed according lo Islamic principlesstablishing an Islamic stale and order. They generally avoid poliucal activity and work toward iheir goal by building insuiuuons at UK grassrootsoriented charitable, educational, and welfare societies independent of government control. These groups* programs are often of belter quality and lower cost than comparable government-run Programs.

More pcsitacaGy afore fur^arnentalats arc buodmg broad based Islamic networks but push for change inside the poliiical system Mainstream

organ nations such as ihc Muslim Brotherhood seek

toiable political opposiooo while avoiding conf mettaiion with the government 1

.Radical fundamentalists assert that change from widun is impossible and lhal it must be imposedheocratic, ougarchieal dictatorship. Democracy is ana ihe ma because it substitutes the rule of man foe that of Cod.i and dividedf crgaiutauons andcommuted to violent overthrow of the eMbliihed order.

Radicals Ascendant. During thcnd. Islamic radicals riveted international attention with dramatic acts--thc establishment of clerical rotetrr Iran. Use assassination of Egyptian President Sadat, and guerrilla warfare by the Iranian-aponsored Hiiballah sgains. Israeli forces in Lebanon.!

As the decade wore on. thc vanguard positionby Ayatollah Khomeini and like-minded Islamic radicals elsewhere began to erode Tehran's effortsiport its rooiuLosfrustrated by

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Mutual ami pain, and suspicion between Sunns and Shia Muslims.

Irm'tuncompromlsi.ig stance to the eight.year Iran Iraq war that pined Muslim against Muslim.

Rcvulsaon ai the excesses of ihc Imusn rcvotuuonary regime Muslims generally viewed the violent dcmoiistraiions oiiiiidfcaird by Tehran during the hajj7 thai resulted in heavy loss of life,asecralion of Islam's holiest site, i

Mainilream Fundamentaliiis Cam. By mid decade tne threat from the radicals appeared io be receding. Mainstream ruMameniaJist leader* -those willing to work withm thescoring gains in their push for Islamic reforms and access lo positions of influence in government:

*8 the new Ben Ali regime in Tunisia reuued curbs on fundamentatstffpolibcal activity. In

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inundamentalisis, running as independents, loo* up loerceni of lhend more thanercent in the capital.

Fundamentalists did even better ininningfeats in the new legislaoarc. They have since picked up additional strength,ember of lhe Muslim Brotherhood is now Speaker of the House of Representatives.

In their biggest gains to date, fundamentalists in Algeria outpolled the National Liberation Front, the secular ruling party, in local and provincial dec'kasa. in Algeria last June. fgJ/gX- V,

Radicals may

Developments in the Gulf crisis and on the economic front could well determine whether mainstream or more radical leaden wiU dominate fimdamentalis! movements in the coming decade.

increasingell if mainstream fundamental bis. arehare of poliucal power.

So far. the threat to Muslim regimes from radical imdansentalists has been largely internal,egxriwide fundamental io surge could be triggered by actions by Muslims that caaitU be perceiveda or vSoUtion of Islam Such aCOons could include tr. at*acahrine such mi Jcntsalem'i Temple Moum_ considered by Muslims to be Islam's third-holiest sac. after the rnosques in Mecca and Medina, as well as by military action against an islamic-oriented regime

So far, no leader frith the charismatic qualitieshomeini and his Skill in manipulating hlamic symbols has arisen aroundegion wide Sunni fundamental tame

Fundamentalists Caughtilemma

Islamic fuivJanicnialisu'potential u> influence large segments of Egypt's tower and middle classes makes their continued acquiescence to governmeni policy crucial to President Mubarak's opposition to lhe Iraq) invasion of Kuwail- Islamic fundamentalism in Egyptotent force thai poses seriousterm challenges (or ihe fejune and (cr Egvjiian^ fc> 3

So far, most leading Egyptian fundamentalistscondemn Iraqi aggression. Bui ihey denounce atstrongly the US troop presence in Saudi Aiahla.believe lhe fiuuUnienialisuwiu react evenif the United States launch*in the Gulf. If Israel become*thelrnost certainlyMubarak. More radical fundamental isuto provoke dcroceistrations that could turnscenario Is likely to cause popular tupporiGuU policy lo

What the Fundamentalists

Fundamental ism'* increasing appeal Id Egypt's lower and middle classes womes tbe government Cairo fears thai detenooung rxonornie condiuons will provide the fundamentalists wiih lhc purpose and support to topple lhc regimeopular uprising. The fundamentalists already have brought about considerable social change in Egypt ihai hat both subtle and direct influence on Egyptian policies, flfeft fa ^

The fi^di-nenulus. sJihough from di-erse social -baea^rrwnds. generally favor common goals These

include reduced Western mlluence on their ux.ny. implementation of Islamk law. the creaiionore equitable economic order, and stricter separation of men and women in public places. (nW| jj|

Egyptian fundamental lit* have no common straiegy ornd theynifying leader. Mainstream groups like theear-old Muslim Brotherhoodwnvkaent, gradual evolution toward pohucal change, whOe extremists such a* the AJ-Gama'a allslamiyya (Islamic Group) advocate violence to bnngubarak's overthrow. 0maW

CouDlcriBg Iraq's Islamic Media War Wc believe the Egyptian Government's longstanding fear of the fjndarnentaltst threat has been heightened by Baghdad's use of Islamk theme* and Ils appeal fhave eiors ia its propaganda To coaxer this. Cairo has nurtured popular sentiment against Iraqi Presideni Saddam Husayn through an intense media campaign Huii vi far has beentestimonials geared toward the Egyptian "everyman" feature tearful Egyptian escapee* from "Saddam's hell* Ai the same ume, raainsaeam Islamic leaden rising Friday fccrmxvs rail against Saddam's efforts io justify the Invasion ofoly war. The two most important religious leaden of establishmentthe Grandpublicly condemned Imq'i aggression and have -demanded thai it withdraw from Kuwait, gftftm4

Some fundamenulist leaders charge Iraq with treachery and aggression, but they are increasingly balancing their remarks with anti-US cnocisra. They view the large US troop buildup with unease, calling ii "another crusaders'mma

Kerplng Ihe Udon Fund am en In Us

lince ihe assassination of President Sadat ciposed lhe potential dangen from the fundamentalists, Mubarak has worked to bring moderates like tbe Muslralargest and most influential fundamentalistthe political system and so sever their Ues lo smaller, more violent Islamic extremist groups. He has allowed the brotherhood to participate in legislative elections sincenotoliticalhas given official sanction to Islamic programs. These include scheduling more religious programs on television, spoaainng Koranic conferences andecca, rjromoting greater public segregation of Ihe iocs, and placing curbs on akohol and "immoral" films.

The governmcni has cracked down harshly on Islamic extremists since the assassination in October of People's Assembly Speaker Mahgoub. Security forces have engagedassive sweep of radical fundamentalist cellsrush lhe Al-Gama'a aJ-lslamiyya. which has been blamed for the killing. Although available evidence indicates the assassination is not directly linked to Mubarak's Gulf policy, the government is worried that the extremists are trying to embarrass the regime and stir up populargm L, ^7

We believe the government's longstanding effort to suppress Islamic extremists has isolated them from mainstream funaamentausLs and stemmed potential widespread unrest.

Tr evocations" in the Gulf Might Incense Funds me ota lists

We believe the EgyptaV fundamentalists'both to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and US intervention inJkeqis them from uniting andtronger position against Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherlscod. In particular,ilemma over whether to undertake more forceful actions that could jeopardize the poliiical legitimacy and respectability it has gained in recent years. Younger, impatient members of the brotherhood appear more prcte to radicalism, butorganisation's senior leaders are counseling restraint.

The mainstream fundamentalists' acceptance of lhe government's Gulf policy could change. Mubarak's close association with the United States has stirred some

fundamentalist opposition, and ihc continuing US buildup bi.ihe Gulf could trigger even sharper criticism.

arak's policy andlieveisr|tl sTObct

A prolonged militaryn the Gull* involving heavy Egyptian casualties is certam toegative reaction from the fundamentalists and make ii Increasingly harder for Mubarak to sustainstrong Gull* commitment. On the other hand, if the nurmaucoal coalition fails to force Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, we believe the fundamentalists woukl ridicule Mubarak's policy and try to tarn popular opinion ageinsi

Wc believe tsr^Tflrect involvement in the Gulf crisis would seriously, perhapsMubarak's lough Gulf policy. FundamentalistsrtJonly

would gal van ue strong and widespread publtc opposition. Mubarak would have to consider lhe conseot/ences of staying thehis popular suppon swiftlydrawing back,|

Even Egypt's cmerfeacc from the Gulf ensu aslhe mtcrnatJonal coahtion prcvaumgIncrease the fundamentalists'if theyewardteefuiearxoce to Mubarak's policy, la addition,fails lo me Cairo's recent economicclose the gap between Egypt's haves andalmost certainly will step up criticthe regime for its lack of commitment tofecial change.dBkssV .

Rtvtrie BlarJ:

Jordan: Fundamentalists' Pro-Saddam Scnfiment

ndareeiiEalistt are exploiting (he Gulf cruupopular cpposiuon to the Western presence io Saudiincrease their domestic strength and visibility. The Muslim flrtxlserhood. lhe leading mai annumroup, is trying to capiat local suppon for Iraqi President Saddam Husayn toreater role ia policymaking in Amman Radical Islamic groups also are ridinga>i'o increase their membership and gain more widespread acceptance of iheir agendaumtamenialiso an thc govegamcnL pnncipaJly in the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, hare been provided luuc guidance by King Hussein and Prime Minister Bsdran. who arc trying to balance popular suppon for Iraq against international pressure on Ionian to adhere to UN sanctions. These fundamentalists have taken advantage of their loosened tether to hop oa the Baghdad bandwagon.

Looming Threat

Ionian's security services have repeatedly contended in receni years that Islamic fundamentalists constitute Use most serious teng-ierm threat toashemi te monarchy. King Hussein's political liberalaaiion drive during ihe lastriots in9 over the dettrvoraiingmost of these groups more operating room in exchange for an impueil_ agreement not to contest regime policies too vigorously.

gGroups lhal advocated violence against the regime, like the Islamic Liberation Party and lhe Jordanian-based factions of the Palestinian islamic Jihad, were repressed

Tht Muslim Brotherhood KeaeheT^tVfise Brass Ring Jordanuslim Brotherhood, which is the largest and most influential of the fundamentalist groups, is oploiting popular pro-Iraqi sentiments to obtain a

Islamic Fundamentalist Groups in Jordan Muslim Brrjlbcrhood

After Egyptian President Nasii drove out die Muslim Brotherhood. King Hussein offered il saneiuary. This earned Hussein the brotherhoods tacit support Lt eou/ueruiyCAnJZengei le> *uThe brotherhood draws its memberi from upper clasi

student! and businesispue ihc brother hood

pro-Palestinian ideology, there are only two PaJcsanians

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Islamic Liberation Party

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Islamic Liberation Parry members oppose Arab nationalism, believing that the Islamic world should be unitedaliph. Their opposilion to the monarchy and state preclude^ their participation in the legislative

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Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Muhanna faction, uriknown

Tht Palestinianihad is thegrbup most dedicated toof she Israeli occupied West Bona and CosaIslam The Muhanna faction hascross-border infiltrations Into Israel.espouse tht some sort of extremist lilamicas the lilormc Liberation Party L. j

Islamic Resistance Movement in the Wen Bant and Coxa Strip has focused in foedan on garnering support for the Palestinian uprising. HAMAS has been paralyted during the Gulf crisis, its leadership split over whether to suppori Saudi Arabia or Iraq

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tJordanian. perceived the organkaiiononglomeration of (reflective pobtical hacks, unable to capitalize on iheir legislativevictories in

lhe brotherhood's efforts at linkage

wereoost by the tilling ofakatirasru by Israeli police on the Temple Mount an Jerusalemctober. The brotherhood has harped on the presence o( Western troops in Saudi Arabia as an insult io Muslims. It has been careful to emphasize thai ri lupporu Saddam Husayn for his defense of Islam against the West, not ha secular

visiok it

This approach has yielded visibfe results. Most important, ihe Muslimraeased popularity stemming from the Gulf crisis is allowing it. to wield more clout in the legislature and to eiert

oalition large enough torixherhood member. Abd al-Latlf Arabiyat, as Speaker of the House of Representatives. The coalition conuolseats inmember body.'

The Muslim Brc*herhood is gaining other important concessions from ihe government because of the crisis. In early November an agreement extracted from the Prime Minister drastically increased the sue of the"Peoplesembers of this force are given

rudimeniary small weapons training as partombination of work-study employment and national, service designed to assist students from lower-income families with college costs.

jpXOturned opt for letehejhocd sporisored rallies.have jpeni avjch of thenan ami nnn-US Fundamentalists Enter theIslamic fundamentalist gnxaps alsofrom the Gulf crisis Unlike thethese groups are unwilling toreligious issues or to cease their violent oppositionHussein. They have begun in advertiseand to gather followers, usingto reduce domestic tensions over the crisisrestrictions cr speech Due to theorefusal to nan for die kgislature, and tenuousthese groups probably will not be able tocrisis as well as the much larger andslamic Uberation Party probably hasamong lhe radical fundamentalist groups.two weeks after the invasion of Kuwait, theit ka operate openly in Jordan for theean Thc group's first kgal act was topro-Iraq and anu-mtrx>tnuonist stance duringBroCherhood sponsored rally. Theited Saddam's unwdlingncss to promulgatein Iraq buted its support for hit efforts to

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bring

F.vubtishmKTFuedsmentahsls Muddle Through Establishment Muslimof *hom are employees of the Ministry of Islamicbeen left io fuvd their way through the Gulf crisis with

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no guidance from (he King and Prime Minister. Many have followed lhc Muslim Brotherhood's lead. Many mosque preachers, for example, have echoed brotherticod posilions.'

These preachers have muroxed the brotherhood's reticence about embracing Saddam wholeheartedly.

independent mainstream fundamentalisis in the legislature, who arc few in number and in the past deferred to lhe regime, are jumping on the pro-Iraq bandwagon.-Most of thc independents have joined the Muslim Broiberhood-led majoritye believe many have been impelled

esire to counter the growing influence of secular, leflisi groups since live beginning of lhe crisissjMku* Xj'wt

CoouuilnjJfit Fundamentalists

He will continue

y to split the antiregime coalition in thc legislature by playing leftists against thc fundamentalists, as be did when he sjxxisorcd the lefdsi Jordanian Arabemocratic Alliance conference in Amman in September. Moreover, regime officiais have reneged on iheir agreement to legalize the islamic UbcJaiion Party. Security forces have begunrrest party members for handing outavsmphleis and giving provocative speeches. MaNVMMpaVUaVtfaVRHu^iiA could dissolve tlic legisUture. Because this would probably provoke

nationwide protests and possibly violence, he

presumably would take this step onlyast resort.

13

Over tile long term. Hussein nuy try to usenew national charter In limit fundamentalist influence on society, lie prsjposed theby moderates whom heprovide an agenda and guidelines for hi: boeralizattM ptcgram after the riots inhe draft charter's statement of [utitrealtwears designed to constrain the fundamentalists by requiring leconjiiuon of the primacy of the monarchy on all mounts of church and stale; denying participation to groups that receive fisnding and support fromuch as the Muslim Brotherhood; and stipulatingroups can no longer use mosques for polibcal *

Fundamentalists PorseBTo Cause Trouble If hostilities break out in the Gulf, radical groups will almost certainly launch atucks in Jordan against Western inieecsu and probably cross-bonier si lacks Inst Israel

'The Islamic

UbcraUon Partyyeartrntory of assassination attempts and coup plotting againsi the King, and it might renew such activity if war breaks out and/or Hussein turns away from

Even sn the absence of war. if popular support for Saddam persists and Hussein'i subjects perceivehas swung too far from Baghdad, radical fundanxnialists will probably take to tbe streets. Fundamental ia leaders might try to take sdvantage ofurn of events to topple theissolution of the kgislaoarc might provoke iK fundamental ins to try toons: Hussein Short of tuch events, the regime probably will condnoe to compromise with the fundamentalnu and play ihem agsunst the secular opposition, aatstjass ^

14

Palestiniananese Fundamentalists Eaploit Gulf Crisis

Radical Palestinian and Lcbxncx fundamentalist group* are luspicioui of Iraqi President Saddamslamic credentials but welcome his linkage of the Gulf crisis to the Arab Israeli conflict anil hit harsh atlacks on the UnOTO" Stales The radicals are using the Gulf crisis to strengthen tics to Iraq, increase their influence over the Palestuuan rno*eancnt. focus world arjenoon on the Palestinian nsxe. and. in some cases. luCirjtecirc terrorism against the United States and its Arab allies in ihe Gulf crisis

Separata Agendas

The Gulf crisis has fueled soong anti-US sentiment among radical fundamentalist groups, but iheir support for Iraq ha* been limited largely to propaganda. Islamic group! agree with Baghdad's charges that the US troop presence serves US interests lhal are antithetical io those ofcontrol of the region's oil supplies, supporting Arab monarchi and awocrau, and backing Israel and Ms occupation of Arab lands.

These groups have had to balance their suspicions of Saddamslamic credentials against his popular imagetrong Arab leader willingtand up to ihe Uniied Suics and Israel. HAMAS has in the pasi rebuked Saddam for un-UIamk behavior. Shaykh Fadlallah, lhe spiritual leader of ihe lebanesc HiibalUh organisation, has publicly attacked Saddam for trying to "weaken cSe IsSanuehile odva Hisballah officials have^denounced tbe Iraqi leader for presenting false Islamic credential*.!

HAM AS Attacks Western Troop Presence In both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. HAMAS has emphasized the perceived threat to Islam posed by the Intervention of Western forte* in the region to generate greater popular Palestinian support tor its goals HAMAS leaders charge dial ihe intervention Is pan of an imperialist plot involving Israel to destroy Islam and control Arab resources and have calledoly war against the Western forces and Israel JH0">

By touting the threat to Islam they hope lo cui inn ihc strength of Ihe secular-ocicnied Palestine Ubenuion Organization (PLO).

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Hizballah Weighs la

Leaden ol the tackeal Lebanese Shia Hizballah condemned the Iraqi invasajn of Kuwaiteek of the attack but uage since focused the it public criticism on the US troop presence in thc region. Both spiritual leader Shaykh Fadlallah and Hiiballah Secretary General Tofayli have stated that Iraq never threatened Saudi Arabia or other Arab Gulf states and have suggested that thc Uoaed States look advantage of the Iraqi move to carryremeditated plan to dominate the Golf.

rbaJlah mightterrorist operation on its own against US or alliedand hope that Saddam receives the blame.of such af^acltjincrease, in

judgment, rnf hcnuliucs in the Gulf WaV Iniplkabons

-We believe radical PalcsOnitn and Lebanese Islamic groups will continue to try to ciploii the groundswe ll of popular Arab sympathy for Saddam Husayn's standthe United States and Israel to build suppon (or' their anti-US and ami-Israel programs. Both the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMASood chance of cutting into PLO strength in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

is

US attack againsi Iraq would altnoa certain ly spark terrorist incidents by radical Piltflinian and Lebanese fundamentalist groups againsi the Uniied Slates. Israel, and the Arab states opposing I

Despite its hostile rhetoric, HAMAS probablyeaceful Arab solution to the crisis, hoping this will speed the departure of foreign forces and preventfcfilcmciu* of Islamic heMy irtcs. With the possible exception of liiibauah. we suspect Palestinian and

Lebanese fundamentalists want lo see Iraq retain its military and strategic capabilitiesegional counterweight lo Israel Becaim these groups generally represent ihe poorer, disfranchised elements in the region that have toog resented the luxurious lifestyles of the Gulf state elites, we believe theyeturn lo the status quo ante in Kuwait. Regardless of the outcome of the Gulf crisis, Ihe radical fundamentalists will retain their anti-US, anti-Israel agenda. Some have little interest in regional stability because. If tensions died down, they could be eclipsed by mainstream fundamentalist groupsider political role.

Syrian Fundamentalists: Hoping

To Exploit the Gulf Cris'si

The Muslim BioUierhood, the principal fundamentalist group In Syria, want) lo exploit widespread disapproval of President Asad's policy of coopeiaaon with the West in the Gulf crisis. The brotherhood, like the Syrian pa*Jh, sympathizes with Iraq's critter of the Kowaiu (nonarrhy and opposes the presence of non-Arab coops in Saudi Arabia. The group has not trumpeted iu sympathies In Syria, probably to avoid provokjag the Asad regime. Exiled brotherhoodwith Iraqiexpressed more open support for Baghdad The Muslim BrotSeehood does not threatenule, but it and Other subversive fundamentalist elements are likely to seek more opportunities to hurt the regime as ihe crisis in the Gulf Continues.

They have little sympathy formonarchy because of its corrupt reputationSting mess toward Syria and other poorThey believe Baghdad is champaoningcause more boldly and effectively than

The Muslim Brotherhood has distributed pamphlets bl Syria criticizing Asad's Gulf policy, stressing the bereocal naure of the ruling Syrian leadership and ejuestmning. on religious grounds.The goverismeni's qualifications to send Hoops to guard the Muslim hoi;-

y

Tbeilea have backed Iraq openly in lhe current crisis.cable lo Iraqi President SackSaro Husayn in August asserting thai then cegaruxation stood "by the sons of the Iraqi people in one trench" and callingoly war against the foreign military presence in the Gulf. The Jordanianimitar suiemcnc presumably released in Amman by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood at mid-August. Thai pronouncementcooefcmned the policies of Arab governments aligned with the Uniied Stales and called on all Arab and Islamic governments io prepareoly war against the foreignttacks against Damascus have been noticeably absent in these communiques^^PBt

Damascus '* CouDterpropagaada

The government launched an anti-US campaign in the media in late October, in our view, to pa distance between Damascus and the West and to cater to the

Outlook

Vr> believe opposition activities by Sunni fundsmentalists in Syria will increase as lhe crisis in the Gulf drags oo.'TbjMusJim BnxhenSood in parucular willandits operational carobilitics in Syria. It will appeal to Baghdad for greater assistance.'

h3

Syrian fundamentalists probably wouldrotracted standoff in the Gull as proof of Western ijYcntJons to perrnanenuy occupy Saudiincluding the Muslim holyIhey would grow increasingly critical of Asad'i perceived collusion wirh [he West They probably wouldegotiated settlement of thc Gulf crisis to avoid bloodshed and facilitate thc removal of the Western military presence, but they probaWy^rould not favor Saddam's overthrow We suspectwould oppose Syria's involvementilitary confrontation between Western forces and Iraq.

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Fundamentalist

Thc Gulf crisis has fio/sitnaifscandy sided the Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey, who strongly oppose President Oxali pro-Western ecrjnomk policy and Turkey's secular order. The crisis, however, has riven the small, fundamental ist-dominaied Welfare Party an opportunity to attract greater support from devout Muslims and perhapsarger role in Turkish politics. The party is not currently representedthe legislature. Although most Turks condemnnvasion of Kuwait, the Welfare Pany bas strongly "pretested US in vol vernent in the crisis and Riyadh sIfuppon fo* the West backfues. particularlyegotiated setuernent leaves Turkeytrong and vengeful Saddam Husayn, fundamentalist leaders of the Welfare Party probably could woo enough voters from the religious wing cf Oral's ruling Motherland Party to win seats in the next legL'lative election, scheduled for|_

Islam ic Teoderjcies in Secularist Turkey *

Turkey hasecular state since Kama! Ataturk founded Ihe republiche Constitution bars* political parties that advocate Islamk rule President Oral and some of his ministers, devout Muslims, have tried to exploit Islam foe political gain. The vast majority of Turks consider ihemsclves Muslim but accept secular principles. Ferventintellectuals, military otTicers. and esub'uhed. Westernizeda relatively small but influential pan of Turkish society and polili

Religiously oriented political parties, even at their peakever exceededercent of the vote. The Welfare Party receivedercent of the vote in7 national election--short of theercent needed to win represenurion in the legislature.

I shunolitical force appears lobe on the rise-President Oral and many of his ministers con tend that Islam does not necessarilyeturn to backwardness and jusiify their Openness u> religion as an expression of free speech and the defense of necessary moral values. Secularists anrue, however.

Muslim Divisions in Turkey

Turkey is approximatelyercent Muslim,abouter ecru

of the population art practicing Muslims. Aboui three-auarters of the latter go to Friday prayer services and eat no pork. They want moderate Islamic practices

to become an established pan of Turkish life.

Fundame ntalists represent probably less thanercent of ihe voters, divided among Sunni, Shia, and Alcviheir theological and political positions varystrong bar to cooperaiion. Ankarafundamentalist groups that abstain from political activity

im Mailimi. tm Ok tlmw.

jhatand hisrc closets

closet tu

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to function as lon/vs they pose no threat to the secular order amm

Outlook

Given the current low standing of the Motherlandcrisis, lhc

We If an Party probably will be able to win scats in thc

nest kgtslative election, scheduled to be held by the fallbe Gulf crisis should girt the Welfarelight boost- To the ulcraotthodos. the presence of Western troops in Saudi Arabia confirmsllcgaiions of Saudi "mtcinaiionalism* andhis may increase the resonance of the Welfare Party's IcflKsuntling^ano-USarrfanfi-lixacl;

IPC

If the Motherland Party tail) tooiLuon gen^ntrnewbe the Ideeoutcome, with lhe Welfareiable coalition partner Iu demands for an 'Islamic common market" rather Ulan -Turklih memucrdiip in the European Community and in opposition to land would coeapticaaclora to keep Turkey firmly in the Wcctern camp. fjja> zal will almoat certainly continue his pro- Western Gulf policy as long as he perceives Weateen resolve to be acadfag. but, even if Ankara does notn acove role In possible hostilities against Iraq, he is likely nw face increasingly vocal fundaraenialist criticism and an escalation of terroristWestern vksory over Saddam wnh Turkish parttcrpation probably would improve OzaJ's surdi.ig among secularists and even most prstclicang Muslims because il would makeakx international player. It would probably alienate

(undameatalists even further and possibly boost Iraniannan-jnsj*red Islamk terrorism

Most religious Turks would prefernegotiated settlement. Oral would ctVncTtader fare from establishment Islam and from secularists for failing toengeful Saddam Husayn from Turkey's borders aad for atxreasang Torkey's vulnerability to Iraqi-supjioned Kurdish insurgent actions. Rtridarisentalists, wc judge, wouldtcgouated seetlementicaary over she United Slates and Zirmism.

A protracteda likely weakening of

traarrooonal. especially Arab, sotadarity ^owkl

give fundameniaJiit groups additional time to try to erode the govtmmentls strong suppon for Washangtoo. possibly mcluiliagjpme low-level lemma activity.

Rtvt'ie Slunk

Del

Iran: Parrying Saddam's New Challenge ajjgt jyjj

The Shia fursdarnentalisi regime ihat rules Iran fears Iraqi domination of (he region and wants lo see Iraq's oeeupouon of Kuwait reversed. Thislates Tehranard position, parallel io ihe Arab Gulfthe Uruled States, which Nun its claim to be ihc leading revolutionary Muslim power reaming the West lascaang the military power to coo tarn Iraq by itself, Iran has had toormula to tolerateargest deployment of US forces lo the Middle East5 without compromising Iran's revobtioruuy image among Muslim militantlague on Both Your Houses Tehran has officially dervMjrred bou. Iraq and lhe United States for their mumtry actions in the Persian Gulf. Ccsncerned over Iraqind seeking to improve diplomatic and economic relations with the West and the Arab Gulf states, Iran has condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and called for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Foreign Minister Velayad lias officially declared Iran's suppon for all UN resolutions against Iraq,*

lenged US

motives In deploying to lhe Gulf and calledapid withdrawal of Western forces upon resolution of die crisis. In September. Supreme Leader Khamenei eferred i- US "bullying" ia thc region, declaring thai anyone who dies fighting US aggressionartyr. President Rafsanjani. however, has implied publicly thai Iran will tolerate the Western military pretence until the crisis I

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To Undermine Iraq io the Golf-.

The Iranian Domestic Response to Ibe Gulfihc bitter eight-year war wiih Iraq and inof President Rafsanjani s'calculatedpolicyGulf ceuii. Ihcre are elements In Iranwith ihe Wat over ia presence in Thru harditnt revolutionaries orr Rafsanjanitotal enact ond rypicodlj oppose many ofWe be hey* their criticism ofof ihe crisis is motivated by bath ideology andto weakenT}"$

tifl0ff-ejngaja^ raffWH*' prominent legislators as Ali Akbar Mohiashemi-Pue and Sadeqmore an expression of ami-US passion lhan sympathy for Baghdad. MohiashenuPur. who as recently as luty had condemned as 'cowardly' Rafsaryani's willingness to negotiate dtrtaty with Iraq, in September called for immediate preparationsoly war otomst th* Vniscd States Host radical criticism has focused on the presence of US

fortes in Saudi Arabia near the Mutton holy tilts in Mecca and Medina and on the threat ihey btlitve US

forces pose to Iran and the lilamic world.

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Rafsanjani's radical opponents do not Stem to have generated much suppori for their confrontational positions. Tlfcadicals have tritd to stage ami-USally tht public, b'dktUBtVnWthese have lacked convicadn and ipomantily and art poorly attended Radical criticism almost ctrusinty helped prompt Khamenei's calloty war against USccloraaon iubitqutruly endorsedajority of deputies in the Iranian legislature. On balance, we doubt that ihe radicals will by themselves mavejranian policy from the course set by Rafsanjani. WkuW iag^K

JO0

The Iranian! ateuluvaung better relationsArab Gulf stales. In the week following theForeign Minister Veaayau visitedlhe United Arab Emirates, and Oman, aid heSaudi Foreign Minister at the Uniied Nalions

While Playing on Anti-US Themes Else-hrrr Iran is providing publicity and propaganda support lo fundamentalist elements in the Middle East- Iranian Government media have broadcast stories highbghiing the opposition o< Turkish. Egyptian, and euled Saodi religious militants to the Western military deployments to the Persian Gulf. During the last week of September, lhc Iranian Governmentelegation of prominent Arab,nd Malaysian fundamentalisu who argued Iraq's case and condemned US and Western actions. That same week, Iran's Islamic Propagation Organuaoon called for worldwide demonstrations against lhe Uniied Stales

In our judgment, these activities primarily reflect longstanding liBruan tipgxxtition to the US global role and do notew or ccxjcertcdgainst the United States. The Iranians probably have seircd the chance lo make inroads with local Muslims In 'selected communities by eiploitoig ihe GuJ/crisis.

Outlook

We believe Iran will continue to see its interests best served by the clefeat of Iraq. We do not eapect Iran to take practicalmilitary, orthe West lis propaganda will be aimed mainly at preserving Iran's ideological and religious legitimacy with Muslim, especially Shia.

communities. Nonetheless. Iran will criticite Western.

partkularly US, pobey" end iriacnoons. and the stridency

of thii cnocism almost certainly will increase if military

operations commence"fc^S

Events of great emotional and ideological importance to

Iran and Shia Muslims mighthange of outlook in Tehran. Such events as aa Israeli preemptive aa aci on Iraq, massive Israeli operations against Lebaneseraconian suppression of Palestinian unreal, US strikes on such Shia holy sites in Iraq as An Najaf and Karbaia. oriolent crackdown In Saudi Arabia on the Sbis minority probably would force Iranian leaders to attemptrotect their legitimacy as_ revolutionary Muslims by vigorously anacking Western action in the Gulf.

However the Gulf crisis Is resolved. Iran Is likely to escalate iu eecourigemeM of furdamcavtalist and Shia Muslim activism Following an Iraqi withdrawal or military defeat. Tehran is likely to support Shia agitation for greater political participationerated Kuwait. Iran almost certainly will do the same with the Shia majority in Iraq should the crisis seriously weaken or topple Saddams regane. Iran will be sure to promote Muslim protest againsi the United Stales to bolster its demandimely US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Should the Iranians believe the United States warns to prt>loeg its miliury deploymentshe Gulf, they may well support terrorism by their Shia and Palestinian cliesA againsi US DerSjQQpeL facilities, and iiis

Revttst Want

Saudi Arabia: Juggling Fundaroen talis! and Security Concerns flaaV

audi religiousper lisps lhc most rigidly fundamental!it religious ethic in the MuilimKing Fahd's decision to seek Western military help in the Gulf crisis becameear Iraqi expansionist designs go beyond Kuwait. Soneincless. they anr uncorru'onableon-Muslimpresence, even one largely limited to the lias tern province, far from ihc holy cities of Mecca anaa-Medina in western Saudi Arabia The religious authorities fear that soestein presence wiU upset trad; bona! Saudi life, andthey are desermined to confront legal, pobdcal, or social reforms lhat appearenfbc! with strict Islamic

Fund*mentalist lo th* Core Saudi citiaens liveociety permeated by an IsUmic fgnflarnentalis ethic. Government and lefapon have been virtually inseparable since the founding of the kingdom in. Saudi Arabiaodel for many fundamental is is. Islam it the state rebgion, the Koran is procli-med as ihe aauMn's consul coon, and religious law is the civil law erf thc land The Mutawwi'un, religious police, (irmly enforce public morality, uicludtne flrtci;

Clerical Rtaeflous to Iraq's Thecal

King Fahd's decision to Invite US and other non-Muslim troopsaudi Arabia in0

Most Saudi ciuzerts adhere willingly to lhe strict moral teachings ofa highly coriscavau've interoreiaijon of Sunni Islam, and accord the Saudi monarch respecteligious leader in hi* role as "custodian* of ihe holy sites in Mecca and Medina. The alliance of the Al Sa'ud family and Wahhabi religious leaders dates to the mid-lgih century and haslose relationship between Islam and the Saudi stale.

appear* to have been made wifhoontroad consultation, and only thc imminent Iraqi military threw made Saudi religious le-aers accerv. the deeirioti. Some may have questionedact rust, explainosture but appear to have been even more irritated by Saddamaiiempi to wrap himself in the mantle of Islam. When Iraqi dene* endorsed Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in earty August. Saudi clerics respoaaaaj quickly and vocally in favor of Fahd.

An Insportant factor in the religious authorities' positive response it the absence of foreign force* from Huax. where (he holy cices of Mecca and Medina are located. Few non Muslim forces are deployed outside Eastern Province. There arc smxll elements in the Riyadh arc* and none in Al-QasymWahhabi heartland. This deploymenl pattern has reduced the danger of friction between conservative Saudis and iioo-Ma*lim troppssjgBfc

Saudi Sensitivity to* the Western Presence

Despite support from prominent clerics and Ihe vutuai absence of popular criticism of Ihc royal family's Gulfrowing disquiet among religious conservatives, particularly In urban areas; about the effect* of lhe Western presence on traditional Saudiemonstration in mid -November by someaudi women demanding die right to drive has crystal bred

I Onn*iM. AWnih mo*atV^dm. IiavofIm* wiW saponin*

FiM-

md-

k>iH*an'iin oHinisi Hit nttamauol ohir niiavMi-n ihr

JO0

these concerns. Religious zealots no* only saw ihe women's actioneileciion ot* Western influence but blamed the US Embassy for instigating the Cicmonstraboa Thc Saudi regime also condemned the women's action. Two ocmoflstraiioos were staged in Riyadh against "Western lenaencics" by the Saudi teligious police. Tbereear riot outside the offices of the Governor of Ris

The Governor of Riyadh, accompanied by religious leader Abd al-Aziz bin Baz. has threatened the religious police with crackdowns unless they bring VMaa_M' Th:religious zealots are unlikely to be quelled easily. Religious police have been more visible throughout Riyadh since the women's dernonstraUon, even near die rear gate of the US Embassy^ which is supposed lo be off limits to them.

Male and female university students have denounced lhc women drivers by circulating petitions and boycotting classes, bul (hey have not been critical of

oy western-si

**b3

Saudi Gulf policies. For the most part. Saudi students arc politically passive, attracted neither by Western-style democracy nor leftist ideologies.

The Sbia Factor

Most of SaudiO0 Shia Muslimalmost enurtly in Easternlo btbacling Fahd in the peesem

aVaaa* Shia volunieers for miliary service have been

Miii ithg International Muslim Suppori For years Riyadh hai used Islam as an important foreign policy toot Suppon for Islam has been an important underpinning of the kingdom'i siapport to the Afghan insurgents as welleterminant in ils relations with the Communist world, stjaa

When Iraqi President Saddam liusayiichallcnged Fahd'i Islamic credentials aad craxtred his deusaociao invite non-Muslim troops into Saudi Arabia. Riyadh

uttered ituemational Islamic suppon. In early September the Muslim World Leagueeference of prominent Islamic scholars from Arab and Muslim countries in Mecca. The confereeseries of and-Iraqi, pro-Saudi resoluteaaajBsttVasVai' One resolution endorsed Riyadh's request for foreign military assistance, saying It was permissible under Islami: law as long as non-Muslim forces departed once Iraq withdrew from Kuwait. Another resolution called for the establishmentermanent Islamic force to deal with future disputes between Islamic countries, lhe Saudis wield strong influence in

Outlook

la return for their loyalty during the crisis. Saudi clones probably will eipect Fahd to defer plans to reform the kingdom's legal

Fahd has acquiesced to influential religious leaders by canceling implementation of new laws on civil court prcccedingsuiSaodiArabia. He.however.probably will proceed with recently announced plant for modest poliiical reforms that are unlikely to conflict with Islamic precepts fgW

met

Anxieties about thc Westernsenec in ihe kingdom probably will increase In the coming weeks. Thc prospectS tolchen celebrating Christian and Jewish holidays in the Muslim holy Land will grate on local litigious sensitivities and provide substantial grist for Baghdad's prtpaganda milL Riyadh win be wiBing to tokiate some ocsntcatic religious cribcism as long as it remains low key. hoping that anti-Western rhetoric will actelease valve. It probably would crack down only if such criticism gets cut of hand, fftipjr-

Neai year's Islamk holyin March with Ramadan and ending in June withritical time for Riyadh if Western troops are still in the kingdom. Religious conservatives in the kingdom on likely toeemingly open-ended Western

Scsfrtt

Pakistan-Bangladesh: Muted Fundamentalist Reaction to Gulf* 4Maa>

,rises

Thereaction in Pafanin and Banatadesh to the Gulf eniii hai been eclipsed by domestic political developments. Fervent and-US reacnon toie Gulf has been confined to small. Islamk: oriented political panics. Tne ties oflami. die most influential conservative Islamic party In Pakistan and Bang Udesh, in Saudi Arabia inhibit strong he presence of US troops in the Gulf. Despite the apoarent low-keyar in lhe Gulf or increased Israeli mvnlfemeni in the cnsti wouldharp outcry from fundamenulitts at well at the larger Muslim comnnmitj Us both Pikuuan and BangladestLa Regional Perspective South Asian Muslims see themselves as an mirgraJ pan of the world Islamic community. Perceived threats io lilam and Islamic holy sites elicit strong responses. Concern over the presence of US troops anywhere near the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia is almost universal. Iduslim fundamental lata burned the US Embassy in Islamabad following rumors of US complicity in the seiiurc of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Fundamentalists attacked US offices in Pakistan in IvSv after Khomeini's death sentence agamst Salman Rushdie for his publication of

Responding to tbe Gulf

Risking the wrath of fundamentalist groups. Dhaka and Islamabad moved swiftly last August lo align their foreign policies, both militarily and diplomatically, with the multinational consensus opposedie Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Both countries have deployed military task forces to Saudi Arabia and have called for unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait aaaaaj.

Conservative Islamic reaction in Pakistan and Bangladesh to ihe Gulfa few small furtdamcaialUJ partiesbeen prtmaruv duecku against thc US role rather than in support of Iraqi action. Religious leaders in both countries have demanded the withdrawal of US forces and thru

Fundamentalist Media Comment oo Ihe Gulf Crisis

Fundamentalist concern over US poops in Saudi Arabia has been colored by misinformation- Extremist Islamic newspapers i* Pakistan and Bangladesh have portrayed Uaai President Saddam Husayn as the protector of the hety cities efhiecca and Medina against an assault by VSetter addressed to the IIS Ambassador so Pakistan charged. Ton pig eaters have desecrated the holy land by sending your troops infected with AIDS and venereal disease to be stationed in Saudi Arabia. Your unwilling mercenary troops are nowogltng at Muslim women with evil.Theenerally pro-Iranian newspaper, charged that ihe United Susies esaiterated the threat us Saudi Arabia because US pobeymnkers see the crisisotential boon mt ihe US economy According to this line of reasoning. US involvement in the Gulf crisi' is motivatedesire to sell military eqtiipmenl to the Gulf stales, ensure continued supplies of peijvteum. and gel lhe Saudis to

pay for it all.

"imperialist agents" from Saudi. gBjaafjajawgasj Fundamentalist leaflets have played c.

acep-sealed suspicions of foreign designs on the Islamic

world and its-oil to bolster iheir arguments. There have

been several irnaTt ckmcxistrabons against

mstalUdons in both Pakistan and

rupnammm

Set

late October by Hindu fundamentalists bent onntoa Hindu temple. uiuJansenUlists in Dhaka, for caampte. btiroed hundreds of Hindu homes and several Hindu temples, .*

Muslims in V'skisew and Bangladesh haveon the economic impact of the Gulf crisis.

nf most Bangladeshis early in the crisis eased wiihesaful repatriation ofangladeshi expatriate workers from Iraq and Kuwait.from higher petroleum

reservations about involvement in what isportrayed as an essentially Arab dispute. fflHfr<

islamic groups critical of the USiD findlarger auchence in Pakistan andfor street demciutrstiorts and .ii oes break out. Ccaiservafjve religious groupsand aatu-Ziomsm. In our view, ifoccur or If Israel is clragged into the crisis,fragile balance will be tusdonc.

36

Algeria -Tunisia: Fundamentalists Caught in lhe Middleasfl^

ic^wr^ess

Islamic fundamentalist leaders in Algeria and Tun&ii have been unable toonsensus on the Gulf crisis The leadership is divided both between moderate and hardline elements and over the conflicting demands of pn>Iraqi CCXttlJtiiencies and Gulf benefactors Thc furdamcnuUisu are likely to try to keep their focus on domesticas the impending national election in Algeria and ihe kgalirau'on of Tunisia's aa, fundamentalist movement. Should hostil iiies break out In the Gulf, fundamentalisu are likely to side with -popular sentiment in processing against the war. US personnel in Algeria and,esser extent, Tunisia would face the threat of vkitence from IslamicZ Rising Religious Attl'tsnT" Islamic fundamental iim has become the most conspicuous and potential! ydangerout vehicle foi poliueaJ eipecssion In Tunisia and Algeria. Discredited official ideologies, growing economic and social ineenrabues. high expectations, culoaral disorientation, and uncertain prospects for the future have led to growing religious activism, particularly among the young who make up about two- thirds of the population in Tunisia arid Algeria. Fundamentalismanacea for the ills of modern life and has become the most popular meant of expressing social and poliucal discontent.

Islamic fundamentalist pouUcal gams have seriously challenged Uie legitimacy and authority of secularlgeria and Tunisia. Tbe victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in local Algerian elections in0 and the potential for another victory during the national legislative election scheduled for1 make this furtdaYrtcntaiisiajor force in Algerian politics. In Tunisia. Islamic fundamentalnm represents the most serious long-term challenge to the Ben Ali regime. Tunisian furvdamenuUsis.alTdutedpnmanly with Anuruetognuted pouueal party during Useincreased the* political strength ai the eipcnse of all other political forces. They arc demanding thai lhe government grant their

group legal scat us Both groupsemcsnscraied capability to mobalire young people for regimc-threatcnuig street-agitation Morcexircmc fundamental bt groupsadvocating oveithrow of secular regimes through violentthey have small followings in boih counoies and haSa dZ

Reaction to tbe Gulf

Islamic fimdarncnialists in Algeria and Tunisia have failed toonsensus within their respective groups orlear policy oa the Gulf crisis despise pro-Iraqi sentiment among their cctreaatuencies and thejoveral population.

An-Nahda leader Rachid Ghanncochi.-Vho is in self-imposed exile, urged Muslims toholy war" againsi all foreign

bi

bl

b3

in thcGulf in mid-September. Oihcr key figures hive criticized Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Tunisian opposition leaders for leaping on the Iraqi bandwa*

In Algeria .HstkenK Salvation Front leaders Abbasi Madani and All Bclhadj have issued contradictory statements during the Gulf crisis.wing through Iraq and Saudi Arabia Last August. Madanird as saying that the presence of foreign troopsirect consequence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait1 and that Saudi Arabia had the right to request foreign assistance. Baghdad Radio Liter quoted Madani as condemning the US intervention. Ali lie!old Algerian journalists in late October thai Iraq's invasion of Kuwait "was aggression; there are nout) you cannot turn to infidels to make war onF)

Embassy hasath ofobscure Islamic earremtnititheGulf^isgafJas

Tunisian and Algerian officials have followed widely divergentachieving varying degrees ofdealing with the rue of fundamentalism In Algeria. President Bcnd/edid's commitment io

d-mccrjiir-uiioei has created lhe possibilityundamentalist-run national government and accelerated the diserextiting of the long-dominant National Liberation Point.

In dealing with thc GuU crisis. North African leaders have adoptgd,policies that conform with public opinion in part to lower the risk of fundamentalist-inspired agitation. Tunisia's President Ben All initiallytrong public position againsi foreign intervention in the Gulf out of concernundamentaltrcd popular backlash and to throw fundamentalist critics off

guard. Algeria's neutral pubic stand on the If crisis also was designed to show Sfauitivity io publictensions over economic hardsii ips have been high in recenito prevent the Islamic Sal vaiioo Prom from nutarig the Gulfcampaign issue during Ihe national legislative election scheduled for "

We believe lherf vMwi among fcadttrs erf mainstream fundamentalist movements will pmvent ihem from challenging Nonh African regimes oft die Gulf crisis ta (heterm. The growing political influence of fundamentalin groups has brought to (he fan; Ideological differences that will hamper Iheir effectiveness In the absence of hentiljtiei. mainstreamuixkussentalra leaders are likely k> focus on key

domestic issues such as lhe impending electionnd legal ttatus for Tunbaa'a furelanvntaJiaavoid choosing between their pro-Iraqi cexiraawmcieS andGulf beitfac^ors.F) Islamicill look for oopceiuailies to press Iheir damestic political and ideological agendas- Shouldbreak out. (hey -tKikl undoubtedly abandon tieshe Gulf states to capkni popular tentiment in the unlikely event (heir governments adopted policies mat deviated significantly. from public opinion, such as sending troops io the multinational force. US personnel wouldenons threat of violence from fundamentalist ejiremisu_and an angry pcipalationin Algeria and.easer nieot,

r-av=B3 ^

Reverie Blank

Morocco's FundamenlalisU: New Opportunities, but Still No Challenge lo the Regime

Islamicncrj.'si in MoroccoOppose King

Hassan's suppori for Saudi Arabia and tbe United States In uie Gulf crisis, but (hey are too small and

disorganized to challenge the mooarch directly, livensjo/^uU war erupts, Hassan should be able-ontinue to use his security ssuvsoea. personal standing, and religious appeals to seep fundamentalist ocpotinon off balance. Fcrvdafrventalist groups will try tbcapton the popularfavorseapand dieir following and bOueoce In Moroccan society, but theyare unlikely to have much success until theyore dynamic leadership Over the longevere economic downturn would help their prospects fjaaav

da me itiLst Issues aad Groups

Islamic fundamentalist groups are atTracting increasing suppon from scculax-nunded Moroccans disgruntled with lUlsan'i handling of social and economic problems and

The government-supported religious establishment, which rarely criticizes Hassan, appears divided on the Gulf crisis. An "independent" giotrp os* noncstablishment Moroccan clerics criticized Saudi Arabia for seeking thc assistance of non-Muslims and argued that the multinational forces in the Gulf represent the "continuation of the Western crusade against Islam."

How Hassan Copes

Hassan generally fends off challenges from fundamentalist groups byarrot and nickreligious leaders through palace patronage .paying great outward respect to Islam, and using Morocco's security services lo intimidate religious extremists We believe be uses effectively thend ceremonies of his spiritual and pobocal heritage to control the rpread of political Islam Hassan, as a

XN^embtrlPPO

descendant of Muhammad, serves at spiritual as well as secular Vealer and holds lhc title of "Caomandcr ol" Ihe

In dealing with ihe fallout from (he Gulf Cains. Hassan has countered Saddam's popular appeal in Morocco by softening his initially strong support for the Gulf states and playing to public opinion. As pan of this effort. Hassan has quoted liberally from the Koran, minimized thc role of Moroccan troops sera; to serve with the multinational force, andonciliatory tone toward Baghdad..

i was

host to an Islamic crsntercnce beginning in lateincluded such fundamentalist leaders asfrom Tunisia and AbbasJ Madamto burnish his Islamic credentialsfundamentalists across the

Islamic extremists in Morocco are loo divided and disorganized b> Uneaten Hassan's regime for al least die

near term. Olher religious leaders in the countryelatively docile and conservative group. They lack known political ambitions and arc unlikely to act against tbe King over his Gulf policy. Hassan, however, will watcb for signs of social stress and will instruct his security services to hold opposition activity in check. As long as he employs an Arab League cover, we believe he can successfully balance his support for US policy In tbe Gulf with his need to stay in step with Moroccan public opinion. "aid tjfc-'

aswOver the longer term Islamic fundamciualiEs coulderious challenge lo the monarchy, ixsnScailarly if (heyore dynamic leadership and if the domestic economy runs into more trouble. Kindred

" "groups In Northas An-Nahda in Tunisia and the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, both of which are seeking to challenge ihe authority and legitimacy of secularwould encourage fundamentalist activities in Morocco, j

Near East and South Asia Review

An Islamic CI

Calipb. Succcssot to Muhammad as head of ihc uramah. en Islamic community. The tide implies reugmus and poliucal wjertimy over all Muslim peoples, bui the position, lasl held by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, is now defunct. Some Muslim fundamentalisu call for lesiontton of thc caliphate.

oimal legal decision or opinion issuedrestigwus mufti in response to questions from officials,privaie individualsoint of Islamic law.'

Imam. Leader of rnosquenrayersome cases, the leaderuslim commumty. Among Sunni Muslims, any rerrowned religious scholar or aodsority might be called fcagstsj Mainstream Shias ideoiifyusaxic imams in the line of so^esaion toheerj of the Muslimpecial powers of aTsowledge and revelaaoo.

Jihad (literally -striving in use way ofhe daily moraleeled of toy good Muslim. II may alsoholy- or "rust" war thai maty be waged agsuhst unbel' -vers and may or may not Involve miliary action. Most Islamic religious authorities assert that jihad in this sense can be imdertaten onlyefensive measure. Radical fundamcnulitu raise jihad to the statusillar of Islam, equivalent to the five pillars enjoined on allof faith, daily prayer, fasting, alms giving, and pilgrimage. Some mainstream religious aulhoriuex denounce the auawion of Jihadiiih pillar of Islam as heresy.

earned cponem of Islamk religvcws taw who is roughly equivalent w canon ta-)er of vxrse Christian

Sbaria (luera-'I, "the path leasing so the wateringhe Islamic religious law that historically has served as the civd law of Muslim cotsiagunitics. Based on the Koran and the Sunnah. it encompasses every aspectuslims spiritual, physical, social, economic, and poliucal life. The legal systems olmon Muslim countries today are based on Western legal codes dating from the colonial period, with sharia largely relegated to family law. Fundamentalists press for full implmeniaiion ol sharia as the basic for the legal systems of all Muslim countries

Shajkb (literally "oldn honorific OUe appliedrestigious religious leader or scholar as well asubal chief.

Shia Islam. Shu Islam is based on ihe belief ihat rhe legicunaic leadership of the Islamic eommufury rests delusively among the descendants of Mohammad's son-in law Ali. ihe fouih Imam Shus are heaercdot. and over ume disputes over ihe Une of succession and doctrine iporred the formation of many saibsects- the Zaydis of YenSeh. the Ismail it of Pakistan and East Africa, the Bshais of Iran, and the Alawises and Dtuie of the Le^mnt-that espouse highly diverse and esoteric ooctrtnes. Most Shias belong to the mainstream lihna

Ashariya sect, ihe so-called Twelven.domiiuac in Iran. Iraq, and Bahrain andlurality in Lebanon. They believeh Imam (hencecmidivine personage who diiapce^rrd ut is alive but hidden and will return to lead Islam. Ayatollah Khomeinis view thai the clergy must establish and lead an islamic governmeni in preparation forh Imam's return probablyinorityjjosiliooamong Shia theologians.

S'lfi-.d. Islamicistinct strand of Muslim devotion tharcultivaics the inner attitudes with which the believer performs his outward obfagatioru. Many fundamentalists, especially Wahhsbis. are extremely hostile to snfism. particularly its emphasis on the verseration ofractice ihey deavjunce as idolatry.

Sunnah. Second only to lhe Koran as an authoritative soiree for (slam and the sharia. Il collectively provides the sayiflS. deeds, and unspoken approval of Muhammad. The Sunnah is composed of many hadilhs or specific reportsaying or deed. Mainstream Islamic scholars accuse radical fundamentalists suchay man alUlaybi, the leader of iheGrand Mosque in Meccaf tiling spuriousustttyThero of violence for pobucal cads.

Sunni Islam. More thanercent of all Muslims belong to the Sunni or orthodox wingSunnis consider the Koran lo be God's final revelation and reject clericalGod and (he individual Muslim. Sunnis accept no central authority forof islamic law. Instead, four schools ofHanafi,Ma Liu, all dating from lhe eighth and ninthconsidered equally valid,Sunni Muslim may follow any one of

Sunnis generally hold lhat the leader of the Islamic community need not be in the line of Muhammad's immediate family, although descent from his tribe, the Quraysh,pecial cacheL

Ulama (singular,earned men, particularly those learned in Islamic legal and religious studies. Many of the clergy in Muslim countries can be considered ulama, but we use the term lo designate only thc most senior scholars and religious authorities.

Umaaah. The islamic community or nation that bansfjends ethnic or political divisions. Among Sunni Muslims, the consensus of the ummahegitimizing principle in the iiiterpeeiaiJon and arxjlicaiion otihe sharia.

WabhabL Fundamentalist interpretation of blam that originated in thc Najd region of lhe Arabian Peninsula in lheh century with the alliance of thc Saudi royal family's progenitor and Muhammad binuritanical religious reformer. It calls for strict interpretation of Ihe Koran and Sunnah, obligatory prayer, and rigorous enforcement of the penalties of the sharia. Muslims often refer lo fundamentalist groups associated with Saudi missionaries or funded by the Saudis as Wahhabis.

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