Near East and
South Asia ReviewBB y3
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Near East and South Asia Revi
Readying thc Terrorist Opliou
appears lo be prepared to launch terrorist attacks against Western and nxxlerate Arab iwereiis in the Middle East.and Europe hi the event of hostilities in Die Persian Gulf. L'aqi officials have collected ccserauocol inielhgence andenrsrist plans with several Palestinian
POOPS, nfl^ }
Ea^-Sc^Asb: Economic Impact ofthe Gulf Crisis-fLf ^
The sharp increase in world oil pricesesult of Iraq's seizure of Kuwait willramatic financial and ecovomic impact on countries in the Middle Bast and South Asia. Sustained higher prices will weaken Ihe resolve of man, poorer countries in the region lo adhere to UN sane Dons against Iraq, and iheirtability will he putat Isuaeased nsk.<JHfi 3
Policy In Lebanon: Strategy and Prospects I
Asadix of political and diplomatie tools, ifitclligencc operations, and miliiary cceacieo to pursue hit strategic goals of restoring order to Lebanon andovernrnetu in Beuul sympsttheiic to his iniercsLs. ln the near term Asad rrobably wilf rely on potiocal means io influence events in, ^)
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Pakistan's Religions Dirtrshj: SttrmbBngblockNational Idtnli
In tho years since indcpenckiKe Islamabad haskistan's religious diversilj through legal, political, and economic dlsctimmation raiher than seeking toutional identity. Religious tensions between the Islamic tecis and religious miisonues have been/ as (he government has striven to developIslamic stat
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Near East and South Asia Review!
Articles
Iraq: Readying the Terrorist Option WlM /O
Iraq appears lo be prepared la Liiinch terrorist taxis against Western aad moderate Arab interests in the Middle East and Europe in the event ot hostilities in lhe
i and moderate Arab faculties and personnel worldwide have received numerous threats of retaliation for the-ofeesieran^
Tbe Danger Prom Freelancers In addition to actions directly encouraged by Baghdad. Palestinian and Islamic fundamenttUst groups have made their own preparations to attack Western and moderate Arab targets. Most groups have linked implementation of their terrorist plans to an outbreak of ^tses bc^tween Iraq and Western forces in the Gulf.
Iraq's actions and the mtervervoon of US forces have prompted hardline Palestinian groups to rally to Saddam, lending additional impetus for farelaitce terrain attacks by ihesc groups. Radical fervre among Palejunian groups is likely to outlast the current crisis. Even if Saddara is defeated, many Palestinians will view him as Uie only Arab leader willing lo stand up to lhe United Sjates and Israel ia defense of Arab mieresis.
Saddam's alksjations that the introduction of US military forces into the Middle East has defiled Muhammad's birthplace could give rise to potential self-moovated terrorists. Radical Palestinian and islamic fundamentalist leaders are calling for Arabs to aaack Western and moderate Arab tare
Iraqorldwide network that could be used toerrorist attack. Baghdad has used civilian and military mielb'gence officers, diplomatic facilities. Iraqi Airways offices, and Iraqi cultural ecu ten so support tutnserous terroristIraninii. Syrian, and dissident |
rruroerous means are avaihtble for jxttrltiaJ anacks. Radical Palestinian groupa supported by Iraq haveide array of capabilities in Essrope and lhe Middle East andistory of carrying cot assassinairline hijackings, airport attacks, bombings, seabomejoperati-iris. and cross border
Outlook
A military ccojsrjrstadcn.In the Ctilf would aim on ceruunly Bigger an outbreak of terrorism igainst ibe United States and its allies- In the eventmiied US military action perceived as provocative byclitabling of an oil tanker, forwould be more likely lo respond with lemxtism than with convrasiional military moans, which he wostkj fear could
drag himarger war he probably wants toeither case Saddam ia likely to use all means alto wreak havoc on the United Sours, androups would be eager to3
In the absencehooing war. Saddam is likely lo keep the senorist option in reserve while international diplomatic initiatives are under way. lie probablyhat terrorist anacks at this point would only crenxthen iaernatrtna] sentiment against him and could be used by theand its allies to amtiate military IVistiiiues^B
An atiackestern target probably ismhcrueaeveral lerrorist ajOapa.are poised lo atiack Wtsaem and aodcease Arab interests lo reosest the presence of Wertem fcrces In the region and the support provided by moderate Arab Rate* Radxal Psdealiiuan groups may corsdnct aiUscks at any tinse, Terrw it. groups not sponsored by Iraq, such as the PFLP-GC and the Paacstmian Islami: Jihad, also may rapsoct tub -US aeruiment to attack US Intrmsu. la addition,ll be vulnerable io sporadic
ji sympathizers iltroughout tbe Middle
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East-Soulh Asia: Ecnioinic Impact of the Gulf CrisisfJI
Thc sharp increase In world oil pricesesult of Iraq's seizure of Kuwait williramatjc financial and eeonomic impact on countries in the Middle East and South Asia. If price increases are sustained, oil ejponrrs such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, and Iran willceinticiabk wlnctfalLW-impttriiiigpcxeer Arabl ihe Indian subcontinent--willeavy financial blow from higher oil prices. SeveralCTpcatenUpff of remittance income irom KuwaitI^oiHK o3
Unless significant financial assistance is forthcoming, poorer eotmtries in ihe region will have to reduce ctl imports, bitioering economic growth. Sustaitsrd higher prices wiO. weaken the resolve of many of these stales lo adhere io UN SSncricm against bj:;ajjjfj^ ^3
The polilical stability pf several countries in ihcinbe pot at increased risk as inflation and unemplcrymentharp economic downium could unseal xhe shakycrverrarient in% 3
Winners and losers Among OH Fa porters We cstimflieSaucU Arabia. Iran. Syria, the United Arab Eruirates. and Algeria would receive additional annual revenue ranging0 million fee Syriaaiioo for Saudi Arabia if oil prices stabilize iner barrel range;
* In Saudi Arabia acWiiional revenues will help fund increased defense sjerving. meet some of the eaprmdinxres of the Gulf multinational force, aid those governments sur>porting Saudi Arabia, cover rising refu^ costs, and strengthen foreign exchange
Moreover, purposed production increases could increase ptojeoed annual earnings by an2 billion in Saudi Arabia,6 billion In the Uniied Arab Emi
Revenue gains willoong boost to financially weak Syria and Algeria, enabling both countries to retire debt and build up reserves.
Al lhc same lime, the Gulf crisis has disrupted financial, markets in the region, shattered businessapita! flight. tgg*gsVRHiHHt*lM
l in the Gulf have hnd to deplete iheir reserves and sell assets lo meel ihc ccmands of depositors for foreign currency. If thc crisis escalates. Gulf firuuxial systems will faceJ,
t confidence in the region, wm'ch bad begun to snow signs of recovery alter lhc Iraa-iraq war. has plummeted, wiih ocw investment and consrnxiionJandsitUf 3
Sanctions will deny cash^pped Iraq much of the economic bcncfus aa.niing io other producers in lhc region. Ils oil exports are now estimated at lessarrels per daypcrceoi rediieaion from preinvasicei levels. If oil prices settle iner barrel range,stimate sanctions will cost
ear in lost revenues.
Egypt and Yemen, although oil exporters, are likely lo be worse off financially as aGulf crisis. Oil priceser barrel would provide0 million and0 million arurually in actional oilyptsains, htrwever. wiU probably not offset the drop in remittances firm Kuwait and Iraq-anuuon-and.ucbon in lhcUlion Cairo earned from Suez Canal iraffic revenues and lourism. Expatriate workers* renounces are Yemen's main source of foreignapid ret um borne of expatriate workers from the Gulf would aggravate luready high levels of imemptoyment in both! evere Ecooomic Blow to OH Importers Higher prices and the cutoff in supplies from Iraq and Kuwait will hit such oil importers as Morocco, India, Pakistan, and Jordan especially hard. Morocco and India importedndercent, irapcctively. of their oil and petroleum needs from Iraq and Kuwait. Pakistan imported overercent of its petroleum producis from
llStpirnbtr IPX
KuwaiL Jordan sQU receives overercaii of ItsIraq. These countries will probably exhaustforeign exchange reserves if (hey attemptup crude oil and product losses through3
Strapped for foreign exchange and with few opportunities to increase exports in (he short run. most oil importers probably will reduce energy imports, hindering economic growth. In tho first oil shock, India cot the volume of its petroleum imports .and duringststsp in oil i
etroleum imports and consumption will probably lead to reduced agricultural and industrial production, while higher average oilabc-itercent above last year'scontinue to fuel inflation. aftBaa"
The Gulf crisis will hurt those oilIonian, Paaistan, Qangladesh, andrely on worker remittances to bolster their foreign exchange earnings. We estimate India stands to lose0 mion and Jordan np0 millioa annually In Kuwaiti remittances alette. Bangladesh and Pakistan expect so5 million0 rniUioo, respectively, in remittance earnings, according lo Embassy reporting. Sudan's fragile economy depends0 mlllioQ in annual remittanceharp cut would further deepen Khartoum's current fmiiiciaJ crisis. Palestinians in the West Bank eapect to
Implications
Many nations in tie hliddle East and SouthEgypt. Pakistan. Jordan. Morocco, Sudan, andpress for increased financial support from Washington, other Industrial countries, and
MuVIm VSt
Middle East-South Asia: Additional Annual Rett ours and Expenditures Retailing From OH Price Increases *
tlx porters
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revenoe
Arabia
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capendihires
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international financial institutions to cushion ihe impact higher
"HEeypthasi pledges of large-scale financial support from Japan and ihc Arab Gulf states. Morocco. Pakistan, and Bangladesh will press for more aid from lhe Gulf states, while Jordan and Sudan are likely to face cuts in assistance because of their pro-Iraqi Stance. Tbesc countries are likely to rccfucst the Jnsernational Monetary Fundnd World Bank to temporarily relax loan conditions and ease repayment terms. WC expect New Delhi to expand its comrnercial borrowing a.k short-term IMF suppon to cover oH imparts.
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India.n) n. Sudan, and Yemen arc likely to press ihetocompensate or esempt them from lhe full range of ecxxromle aancoons againsj Lraq. These countries will aK Ionian '1 rreeip* of UN laappon for cenrjensation under Article SO aa precedem forurnt1 If they cannot gain cxempcions or pledges of ccmpcrisatxri. these oaXMos' comrnicixru to UN eecoom.t; iani;iiont is bkely k) weakenA 3
Ii large-scale hoHiiices ensue and prices jump to overonrl, cheneorters away from the (oteoOal Gulf warAlgeria, andlikely to reap agmTrcani gains. In [he Gulf there wouldigh risk for damage to oil facilities and eeorxmi: causae. Priced out of the oil market, poorer regional importers, such as India, Pakistan, and Morocco, would
have to significantly stash oil imports and consumption.
u 3
If the crisis dragi oo and oil prices remain high, inflation and slowerll threaten Ihe ecomxnk: and political stability of several Arab cosmtrlejtie reason. JcarJaa'a fragile political system will be strained by the addataonal pressures of high inflation, ux rraseil unemployment. tM thedrri of sanctions. Rising unr mptoymcnt and inflation also will increase domestic opposition to Cairo's participation in the multinational force. Elsewhere. India'a shaky polilical coalition government Is highly vulnerable to opposiver rising price* and employment Issues.
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Syrian Policy in Lebanon: , d
SyntaxaJUsadis of polnaral and dipsMvatic toots, LoteUigence operations, and military coercion to pursue bis strategic goals of restoring order to Lebanon andovesrimeni in Bcin* sympeslhetie to his interests. In the near term Asad probably wiD rely on political rneani to Influence eventsin Ubanon because clcvesoproenii there during the past year have bren favorable (or Damascus. Combat ccemoos or cisnocgine ar^viuea^iajainst lebaoon'i sects are unsskely in the sbon term unless Syria's political position in Lebanon cesrrioraiei Over the longer terra we doubt that any roll of foreign policy tools will enable Asad,to achieve his strategic objectives
The Ways and Manna oficy AsauTs suaatgy In Lebanon has not changed significantly since he fint sent Syrian troopske tries to rhaeniam eouibcer jn among the various Ubanese sects, preventing any one of them frombersusara political or miliury pxMiuno. To rhii end, he play* the Ubanesc against each other and shifts alliances as necessary. We believe Asad calculatesalance of power among several weak and competing groups stands the best chance of forcing all of mesheconcile and u>ationalfrom amenable lo Syria's) 3
rotttkal Ugtrdesnasn. In peasurt of hburrent policy is to supportof President Harawi and the AccordPeccKKibation adopted by LebaneseAt Ta'if. Saudi Arabia, last Orirsber. Thethe accord because il isby theand backs Syria's continued miliiary presenceIt outlines ccnstiuakxial arvi otheradvocated by Damascus, including lheI chaiv.iuuaa. creationf^'ar
ofa Christian-Median balance pending additional reforms lhat svould end sectarianism in the pcalaical system and the
Syria's Obltgatraas Under tbe At Ta'ifyrian troopi wHI graciously assist Ugltimaie Lebanese force to tsund the aushoriry of the Lebanese stateimited period of lime noi cstccettlng twofter the ratification of the auaslamg' accord document, the election ef the preodenj of the repmbiie. the formation ofa national accord government, and the corftrmaiton of polldcol reforms in the Constitution
"Al Ihr end of this period, the Syrian Government and the Lebanese Gownment^will decide oa the redeploynttni of Syrian troops in the Bekaa region and the entry to the western Bekaa at Dahr aJ-Boydar to the line At htudoynj- 'Ayn Darah. or if need be at other points to be determinedoint Lebanese-Syrian military committee The two governments will also agntt to eettrinine the number ofopt so be &epiojed in the afenrmenticmed areas and to define the nature of the relationship between these troops and lhe aiiihetrUies of the lebanese stale la the areas where they
Eiccpt for ihotorical support and limited efforts by Syrian troops lo maintain coder in Muslim Wesi Beirut. Damascus hai done Utile so bolster ItarawL Thc Syrians have not oflered economic or military assistance, and theyeddle politically Syria's ambivalence, an our view, ursderscorts Its perception of llarawi's weak political standing and the growing scrami within the Christian and Shia communities, the two largest cordessiceuubanon. Both cemmurxioes are rcluctani to fully back ilieii"'i nnd llarawi'i governmeni in part becausering suspicions that Harawiyrian
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Of the two hristian miliiias, Samir Jaja'i Ubaeseae recce* gives coly lopid arapport to otc Ai Ta'if aayeeracnt. wh rr.-cgSLJe General Mxhd Awn and his Lebanese From cexnlyit Both groups (ougbt each otherloody standoff over niptemacyhristian enclave between January and May. The Shia Amal militia reluctantly supports the Al Tat'lf accord and HUballah is oppojcd. but they have eiprnded most
^Jiefret
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In contrast lo pas aliempu to stop Shiau is maintain ingto* profile toward toe
Am.ll Ili.-lvalLih CUSptlte
Syrian media have given little atunuonnd Damascus haa not calledeaa: lireptions >reroops areyed In Ac aooth because of the high risk thaiove would provoke Israel to irxrease iu presence In South Lebanon Intervention, moreover, would risk further strains in Syria's troubled relations with Iran, which
tpto^yrtan A
. has refused entjeasties from Daenascui ko nop the fighting and to join with Amal in supporting die Lebanese reform program. Damascus blames Hizballah's intransigence on the Influence of Iranian radicals over segments of the
Lhplo**Uic tfiintrrryU. lost as Asad endeavors lo influence ihe internal politics of Lebanon, ho attempts to control ihe involvement of foreign governments and organisations them. Asad does not intend to yield Syria't dominant political position In Lebanon io any state or institution. For example Asad resisted efforts last year by tie Arab League Tripartite Coenmjoee on Lebanon toolitical settlement, suspecting ihat the come wouldolution amenable to Asm and Iraq Lurrvs-eus'j nance earned it aa cnusual public rebuke from the Arabfterwards Asadote corscahasory artiUade towardfforts, all the while nocrlng the organizationolution more in line withktetciU. Earlier this year Asad maneuvered to subvert Vatican and French initiatives to break the fxjlllical stalemate In Ixbanon because hc concluded they would have bolstered Awn and
I
The Curved Fin. Asad has used military force in lebarvon ouring the pasears, ben be has yetlow lobanese group. The Syrian Army has been used primarily to intervene In outbreaks of liiiercommisnal violence, to prevent bids by one group to dominate the ethers, and to reapond to foreignihreaien Syrian mtr
Last year's aetiUcry ciashes between Syrian troops and Awn'i forces illustrated Assad's selective use of military force In lebanon. Awn openly defied Syria,war of liberation" againsi Damascus, and tried tolockade against the Syrian-backed Muslimmi nrnt in Be rut. Both Awn andally in the Tight against Syria at theavid from Iraa, which tried to ship weapons to the Christian warlords and publicly sided with them against Damascus. In response. Asadand blockade against ihc Christian enclave in coopenatjon with elements of the Lebanese Army and the Druse and Amal militias allied wuh Damascus and returned Ann's artillery rue. Damascus eventuallyaval bacchade and bclicopsc/ operations ofTbane se conn to shterdict weapons shipments from Iraq, stepped up its aerial reconnaissance of the enclave, supplied unHso the Druie and Amal, and sponsored what proved to be an tisssuccessful ground attack by Iu Lebanese allies against Awn'seirut sn August
Following ihe assassination last November uf Pre sident Muawad, the lira Lebanese President elected alter conclusion of the At Ta'if accord.'
Asadimited number of troops from Lebanon as pan of die Syrian contingent deployed to Saudi Arabia following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but he will probablytrong military presence around theenclave as long as Awn continues lo oppose the legitimate Lebanese Government, lie will also support sxrengrhening dve capabilities of the reorganized Lebanese Army. Nevertheless, we believe Asadolitical solution to the Awnjtrcblem.
A full-scale assault on the Quistian enclave entails considerable risks. It would unite Uie fractious Christian community and prompt it to turn lo Israel. Iraq,estern state for aid. It would also result in high Syrian casualties, given the mountainous terrain of the Christian enclave and thc determination of Christians to protect their homeland*
Outlook for Damascus
In our view. Asad's strategy in Lebanon win not enable itim to dominate Lebanon completely during theone or two years. Political divisions in Lebanon remain wide, in pan becauseria's policies, and the prospects for Intercommunal itconciliaticri are remote. None of Damascus'smaneuvering, military muscle-flesing, oradequate for lhe task even if they are more forcefully applied. Asad has the capacity to remove Awn, to compel squabbling* Muslims to cooperate, and lo limit bloodshed and helpodicum of unity. But Uie threat of Syrian
Sytti
Secrtl^
force has not been enough to make ihc aecis compromise wiih each other, and over tbe longer term Syrian tactics risk strengthening anti-Syrian attitudes in Lebanon. Tbe resulting Stalemate ensures the likelihood of renewed international criticism of Syria and its role th LebasionaflJBJ} 3
Despite the dismal prospects for achieving its overall goals, thereood chance the Syrians can attain rnore limited objectives.)
Al thc same time, we believe Asad wiU not dramatically Increasetakes in Lebanon or take rigtiificandy .greater risks. Caution generally has served Asad well in Lebanon, and he has little reason to intervene rnore fcwcefully rtulitarily or poulicatlly as long as foreign stales are reluctant to challenge Syria'a role in Lebanon and tbe llarawt government retains international
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PaitisUn'B Rdigious Divcrxilv: StumblinEblockatiotial Identitypik
the years since rndeceaidence Islamabad has reinforced Psudstan'i religious diversity through legal, political, and economic discrimination rather than seeking to foslernational identity. Religious tcaasioas bet*eai the Islamic sects and religious mbaorifjc* have been Iteighiraed rather than muted ns the govemmeoi has sorveoully Islamic state- Pakistan has struggled toalance ansong lis Muslim seers,
continue as the debase over Islamuation reemcrges after national and provincial assembly ejections in October. The noo-Moalim eoramuauties lace special problems overk of legal and jrjlrtiral recognition inIslamic ceJnnc that rronsioers them srxcmdclass
y
Followers of Islam: Tie* Do Not Bind
Islam has not provided tbe glue lo hold together Palastan'j cusjsirBle Islamic crxrmtmiues despite the country's establisruncmomeland far Muslims. Violence between the Sunni end Shia roromumties is routine. The assassination of radical Sunni leader Maulana Haq Nawaz Jnarigvi ooebruaryetween Sunnis andunjab for weeks.
.Violencettacks on worshippingrisen msitrxHy7 when coops began lo be ^eotoyed to troubled areas during religious festivals*^
The Sunni community,0 percent of die poraulation, is not content with ruimerical domiriance but is trying loBripihc minority Shias of legitimacy through lhe promotion of pro-Sunni kgislalion. Tbc Shariah Oslamk law) blU, mtrcduced by Presadcni Ziaas intended to unify the nation under the banner of Islam bul has divided thc Islamic cemmuniiies. Based oo Sunni religious doctrine,ariah bill rcpresenis the religious law revered by the majority of PalcUan's Muslims. Thc bill would eslcnd ihai law to all of Paiist-n. Although ibere are two clauses referring to the autonomy of personal laws of non-Muslims, final decisions on all;matters would rest with the Shariah courtb >
Progress of the Shariah Bill
0 SaxOfpasmZlafsShariaht*Uwithtight
asxJmmi Bill nwX bt patted by the
Mumbl, withir, 9Cia}l.
6 Auxuo 1WO; Prelim CKulam Id%aa /tfcenlAc iVatsWAisemhry. Shariah ixil penred by thromrj mJ.
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Tbe mtrmtions of the Shariah bill are clear and drastic, to our judgment. Under stria mirajiretation of Islamic law, Shia ctuzerts could be labeled ts iwrUbeOevers. opening the door for legally sanctioned I
relegation to second-class citiKrrihip. IsJaroacLaw would grant overriding power io Sunni religious leaders, eiTectivcJy nullifying lhco developafaWBUpder strict inicrprciaionaw no female! would be permitted toarameed by lhe Pakistani Ccetsrituaoo.
Tbc implementation of the Shariah bill has been called into question by tecent events. Thc dissolution of the National Assembly in earlyfas part by the escalating violence between Sunni and Shialhe Shariah bill for this session. ThebtU rausi be reinoocluced and passed by lhc Senate before il can go lo Ihearicrnal Assembly, to be elacted In ,
Poutkians worry thai too much authority would be panted lo religious feaders by lhc bill. For ibeir pan. religious leaders have called oppcrsiiiOn to the billangerous label for politicians who prefer to appear atipprmiveM/gg have demanded that Benarar BhiiDi be beheaded for ho "anti-Maraic" com menu and orecnBcioo to the
eptember0
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Minorities: Beyond Ibe Pale
Although the Shariahrirnarily an artcropi by lhe majority Sunni Muslims toontrol and cJomiriance over the Shias, itattern of rruuglnaliaaiion of minorities la Pakistan, Islamabad has rarely legally declared minoritiee second-class citizens or denied ccaistil rationally guaranteed rights, but the dominant Muslim community has used political and eeonomic policies and MD'msdstion to krxpminorjiiciisadvantage, in our
Political Protection. Islamabad guarantees poliiical leprcsvsntation of rninorities through the Caistituiion. but this only rnargiralires them further. Representation in theJegisUttae is restrictedired number of seats.
e believe mainstream ideal parties do not find it necessary to court the rnincrities' votes. |Neither is it in their totcrestepresent muinciiy viewpoints in the legislature. Mirxxiiies who are reprrsenacd cjp not have the numbers to net on iheir
The Ahmadis. who corrslituiicinaJly are not ccetsidercd Muslims, have refused to accept "separate but equal" poUtical representation because, they argue, to do so would be tacit acceptance of their minority sums. Thefollow the teachings of Ghulam Ahmad ss well as those of Mihammad -profess themselveselegiumate division of Warn, but Islamabad has declared Ihem unbelievers4 Use National Assembly under the^lireerion csfL Btvtino passed legislation later incorporated into the COnstiiuUon that declared lhe Ahmadis non-Muslim. The govartmeni maderimi nal offense for Ahmadisrofess being Muslim, as well as for Ahmadis to proselytize. The ordinance prohibits aD Ahmadisjn participaiing in any Islamic religious practices.'
Unority group. Christiansuaranteed rights but do not have parity with the Islamic population. Christians enyoy representation in the legislature, although individuals elected to office are "required to affirm that they will strive to preserve Islamiclamic punishments are applied to non-Muslims, making ii almost Impossible for themvail themselves of practices acceptable tofor instance. Christians are already subject to the Cnristian Divorce Acthich permits divorce only If adultery is proven. This,
however, eaposes the defendant to prosecution under Islamic law, according to which adultery Is pwashafale by death by Horuhg. The problem fa cornplicated by the Evidence Aatuch maidatwon-Muslim fa notar with Muslims hi giving evidence in cotin.nJJhaj^
Hindus Increasingly are marginalized politically and socially in Pakistan.. Islamabad introduced separate electorates, resulting to increased harassment of Hindus by Muslims. With Hindu votes for Muslim political leaders no longer necessary, iheir protection from threats has ceased. As wirh the Cnrisfearis. Hindus are subject to jjhtmtc punfchments ordered by them b
Education and Employment. The Government of Pakistan has done little to enhance the education and employment opportunities available to its musority population. Discrimination against minority group; al,cr^LC5thcntfnwnl^dastaniscciety.
Ostracired by Pakistan's Islamic society, the Ahmadi population, thrown on its own resources, has become better educated and more resented.ystem of financialand tong-termAhmadis have raised iheir educational level snd their prosperity. Their success incites lhe jealousy df Other groups,ycle of animosity directed against the Ahmadis.arties ciploit an ti-Ahmadi sentimenL la9 political and religiousipped up opposition suppoit by accusing thc Bhutto goverrsment of appealing an Ahmadi as chief secretary of Sindh.
As non-Muslims. Christians are prevented by law from holding influential positions. They have been banned from major poliiical offsur view, there are banrierj to risingigh level in lhe public service and public corpotattens. With few exceptions (most of (hose being wealthy Muslimhristians fail to rise beyond the lowest levels of Pakistani society and are continently found in tow-lesel jobs in municipal services or aj bonccd labcrcrc.
Education, histcocally the way out for (Groans, is no longer openInAliational izedll educational insti nations in
46
Ss*fei
Including those owned and, Chrloiitris. Private sponsorship and financial tuppori by the churches of deserving but Imroveruhed Christian nixknts are no longer possible under the present fovemrneo* dlmlaaring vw possibility for social
slvan-i'i'i I.jQ ?
DLscrimifiasioo agnmst lluulus In employment is widespreaaL Moatof the Hindu pojadation is relegated lo jot* assumed by the.casus of the religion.
r. theyauUary workers or bonded laborers. Hindus are not admitud Mo the raamsrj Array. although there is ao legal bar to thcihaoreptance by tse miliiary. while wtdnn (he legal arena noas risen above the level ofJtJtUaieassistance Isindus, virtually eliminating the possibility of tgroving shear living ccesdicions and edacaoonal levees.
fanadiaooa. Violence and other forms of intimidation influence and subdue the religious minorities snore effectively rhan any other form of suppression devised by Islamabad. In our view;
Anti-Ahmadi violence has been cited In the past four US human rights rrparti on Pakistan, although the charges of government ar gleet of the aijuation have beenrpeatcdly denied by Islamabadi> Ahmadis are killed and ihcir bojnes and property destroyed by orthodox
Muslims, and die police response haa been to eanel the Ahmadi community.
Complaints of discriminatory practices by otTtcials
Christians facei memoes so tuud on new cburcb sites. In and Islamabad authorities automatically allot fro land for mosques, while Christiana must purchase church si ics at marixt rates.
ace the inevitable accusal ion that ihey am "Indianbis has led to restrictions on their
travel to India and. during wars, their relocaiioa to detention camps. Violence against the community is place, bs the shootings Id Hyderabadost of theeople killed were Hindus.
Out too*
The eknclorracisiaasonal ideritiry for Pakistan has become sectodary in importance so the creation of an Lttasmc suae oocnoussed by Sunru rrJojious doctrine, in our view. Reugksus aenssons, am woraected by Islamabad's policies of blamiaaason ofsment and its reinforcement of them Oiven lhe leligious fervor irsaKd by the Shariah bill and the recent tspheatval fai Pakj Stan's political affairs, the probability ofreccccihation among Pakistan's religious groups is
must
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