Near East and outh Asia Review tjj^g^
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Near East and South(Asia Review
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Cairo't quest (or Arab partners to help counteract Iraqi aggression is likely to kid to shirts in alliances in the Arab world that will include warmer relations between Egypt and Syria. Closer bilateral cooperation might lead Cairo to be more sensitive to Syrian foreign policy concerns on ihc Arab-lsucJi peace process.
Kabul Searching for Friends. Influence, and A
national reconciliation plan has failed to cipanel griunxxs support for the regime, but it has succeeded in securing increased wtcmauonal recognition. In his quea for International leg iurriacy .President Najibultah has placed particular emphasis on efforts to develop relations with nonaligned nations.(p3
The struggle for political power in India's northeast cctween ihc Congress Party and regional parties often produces short-lived and ineffective state governments. Ihis political upheaval is likely to worsen and prevent state governments from dealing with the region's festering insurgencies, illegal immigrants, and economic*aaaW
:
Keenan'sietory fur Rafsanjani
uppkmcni io today's frar Eail and Soiuh Asia Rrvitw has been published and disseminated in Codeword channels.
Egypt: Counting Eyen More on Syria
policy,
Cairo's quest for. Arab partners io help counteract Iraqi agspcssioa is likelyeadhifisin alliances in ihe Arabjjxirjd lhat will include warmer relaiions between Egypt and Syria. Egypt had begun strengihening its tics to Syria even before Iraq's invasion of Kuwail in an effort to check Baghdad's influence in lite, competition between Cairo and Baghdad for Arab leadership. Wiih both Egypt and Syria having'smsngly condemned Iraq and sent troops to Saudi Arabia as panthc Arab defense force, the two probably will move closer on other foreign policy issues. OoscrbibtcrilcQcrpcraiion and thc removal of the threat of further Iraqi arrrtsjion mighi lead Cairo to be more sensitive to Syrian foreign
on lhc Arab-Israeli peace process.
My Friend."My Enemy, Myistory of Shifting Relations.
Inommon inures! in confronting Israel united Egypt and Syria, while Syrian hostility to Egypt's peace treaty with Israel drtocd them in Ihe. Of all the Arab leaders, we believe Acad felt ihc most personally betrayed by thc peace treaty because it ignored the mteresu of other Arab fromline states and left Damascus alone and poorly defended against Israel. Until theyria benefited in iu drive to isolate Egypt byajor nxipicnt of Sa rnuncial aid and Soviet miliuuy assi
President Asad's visit io Alexandria in July, which was preceded by President Mubarak's trip to Damascus in
By the time Syria agreed last December io resume ful diplomatic relaiions with Egypt. Cairo had recsubUshed rdatibns wiih most Arab stales and Syria had become tsobied. Along with using its txnewed tic* to Egyptejoin Ihe Arab mainstream, we believe Damascus sought to pursue Iu aims regarding ihc Arab-Israeli conflict from within the Arab fold rather than outside it,
Invasion, Likely To Promote Convergence of Inicrests
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has removed one of Egypt's basic concerns about moving top quickly with tturiajcus and.jn our view. Increases ihc possibiliiy of even stronger ties between them over the nest year. Egypi and Syria aracsirenily have concluded thai the challenge from Baghdad threatens their security and have decided to close ranks against Iraq. Muba/ikhas* looked to Asadey ally in his effort io get Saddam back into line. Asad publicly rupported Mubarak's attempt in July to mediate the dispute between Iraq and' Kuwail and his efforts since (he invasionriaushal Arab leaders' support for condemning Iraq and sending Arab forces to Saudi Arabs
Ai the emergency Arab League summit meeting in Cairo in mid-August wherehe resojution creating the pan-Arab fo
Damascus also gpli announced it will pay the expenses of Egyptian workers retiafnirtg home from Iraq and Kuwait while they arc tiaveJlnj-jhrough Syria.
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Egypt and Syria both have strong tactical reasons for banding logeiher to counter Baghdad's uVeax. For Egypt, Iraq *ag>rression poses the most immediate challenge because it threatens to undermine Cairo's fundamental Arab policies of moderation. Sdf-intcrcst undoubtedly is driving Syrianraoon. and Damascus almost certainly expeeis to gain US and Saudi good wiU along with financial benefits foe iu arisistaflce. Iraq's peace initiative with Iran may be giving Syria more cause for concern because Damascus would not want Iran toeutral position toward
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and abandon jolni clloiundermine lbc Iraqi
Personal moc-es also may be ccntnbiiing ic Uie strong ptisiitcrta Muearak and Asad are sabra against SadcUr Asadg hased Saddam, and Iraq's lansaon of Kuwait gives weight to lhe Syrian leader's lortg standing distrust of Saddam's intentions, proviiapost lac to jirsuficiuori lor Syrian support to Iran in thc Iran-Iraq war, and
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Ties Mean Gains and Risks for Mubarak Close cooperation between Egypt and Syria in the Gulf crisis is noi likely to remove Mubarak's basic distrust of Asad. Mubarak, nevertheless, may consider formal poliucal or miliiary alliances wiih Damascus toactical advantage. Syria probably would reciprocate in view cf the current turmoil in thc region.
Wc believe Egypt and Syria will work closely tluough the Arab League on policies of mutual interest and expand economic cooperation J
" " iaasssi
- -i Syria undoubtedly has put aside concerns aboul thc threat from the Arab Coopcraiion Council because Iraq's invasion of Kuwait ha* Uxpcdocd Egyptiancooperation in ihat body.
almost ccruinly would want Syria to broker improved relations with Iran if Mubarak concludespve could help counter Iraq's recent peace in illativeHBgHaaa1at|MlrS>rij already has undertaken some mediation between Cairo and Tehran.
Mubarak undoubtedly hopes Asad will look to Egypt asacliforums. With die
Arab-Israeli dispute eclipsed by ihe Gulf crisis and the Arab-Iaacli peace processajor pointontention between Egypt and Syria has been removed.
For Egypt, the outcome of thc Gulf crisis willajor impact on its drive for regional leadership and iu relations with other Arab stales. Mubarak undoubtedly envisioiB stronger relations with Syria as furthering Egyptian foreign policy objectives. For now. we believe
'tsnc^yrij will focus on containing Iraq
hi
hi
Saddam Husayn be forced to stand down In the Gulf crisis. Asad might press Mubarak to adopt positioris more in keeping with Syrian foreign policy,arder lire toward the Arab-Israeli peaceelieve in these circumstances Cairo would still want to guide the irdaltonjhip but would be readier to listen to Syrian concerns about regional issues.
Reveres Blank
Afghanistan: Kabul Searching for Friends, Influence, and Aid
oncih*ii'
Kabul's national reconciliationn7 as an clfoii to bring peace and tranquility tofailed to cspand grassroots support for the regime, but il has succeeded in securing increased inteinauonal ireogniuoo Important insurgent commanders and resistance political figures have denounced lhe plan Moreover, refugees arc rex reluming borne in sismifscani numbers so part-iipaie in the rjbooalprocess Strce she SovietPresident Najibullah has capanded the basic plan, makingseful propaganda and polnaraJ tool to justify Ihc regime's poUcres and ai uoxs Naj.buUah it tryirrg so soften thc ruling party's image by focusing on Afghan isatioeulam and Islamic principles.
aac (ion
for
Najibullah has left few none' unturned in hisTJuCSi fi irnenurtional kgilimacy. He hai placed particular emphasis on efforts lo develop relations wiih nonaligned nations. Earlier this summer he asked for Soviet help in Obtaining support lor rejoining the Islamic Conference Organiialion. In late July lhe regime lobbiedhared seal with the insurgcnls' interim government at the Islamic Conference Organiialion mecung in Cairo, but delegates to the meeting refused to consider (be prraposal. In recent interview* Naribullah has invited Egypt arfl France,recently reopened its in Kabul,aoliticalastsV
Najibullah ss using appeals to inr*?rruuonal ecooom-insuiupons to enhance the regime's intranational credibility. Faced with bursrejoning budget and iradc dcficiu. depleted foreignapidly ocpreriatjng currency, and high iitfialion, the regime is trying to supplement the Soviet economic aid
Najibullah has also requested UN assistance wiihand reset liemcni of refugees, cstablishmcmaajfJM**
assistance from tbc International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Dcvcloprneni Bank, suggesting thai Najibullahossible reduction or cutoff of Soviet aid
Foreign Minister Wakil mei with UN Coordinator for Afghanisian Sadrirodin Agna Khan in late August In Geneva to gain support for regime efforts to obtain inscrrtauonal economic assistance for Afghanistan Wakil requested SadruddbVs assistance in aoJrciting "ranfulfdkd pledges" at die tacit UN General Assembly session and stressed the impedance of idcniifying new donors. WakJ also asked Sadrueldjn. who declined lhe request.rrange for Najibullaheci with European Community and other poteritial donors lo discuss future
lln m
lobbying for international financial assistance the Kabul
regime is linking thc need for inaeased aid to ihe
repatriation of refugees and the reconstruction of the country. The regime has publiciied lhe return ofmall perceniagc are relumingas evidence thai Afghani support its rational reconciliation initiative and: ion for increased btemaiional economic aid. Kabul would use any increase io interrsaiaonal assistance as further evidence of Its kgilsftiacy and the success of its national reeosidliaiion
Maneuvering Widun the. lasl yeai Presideni Najibullah has made several cosmeuc aticmpti to iricrease the regime's appeal, but he has not convinced any major resistance figurenor the opposition within his own partyto join the rtecinoliaoon campaign Recently the ruling party held its second congress and tanarumously reelected Najibullah as chairman of she renamed Home lard Party. Last spring Najibullah appointed FaaJ Haq rOulsqyar, who docs not belong to the parry, as prune minister and subsequentlyoya jirga (nationalhich gaveote of ecofidenee Thc loya jirga also approved several nationalistic amend menu to the Constitution. Najibullah announced lhat members of (be ruling party no longer had "privileged status" in ihc country and
S/pumbrf
F
lire I
atJoweef to enter regime ccmoot^ cities loeaatives or city bazaars after leaving their weapons ai peritnesei secure, pans to be retrieved when they leave. The regime has taken Usescj)es> primarily in Kandahar. Nimra. Herat, and Gtsaxni Provinces. fJJgp*J> jp ^
Economic Enticements
The regime is continuing iu cITcxis to broaden itsthrough recoisuiKLon rarojects inand by encouraging refugees toThe ntgime has offered to returnpoperty. eaempt refugees from uses andpospooe thcr rmloary sccvccesbligjiion forhat also
maU-scale i.
road PuWi- svorks program is being undertaken in Kauvdahar. and money is being disbursed to diitens seeling to rehabilitate shops, homes, or mosques. Moreover, the regime is offering,ay to cc-snrsreuon workers io utKfcnakeublk works projects. NajibuBah has otTered lo facilitate the United Nations' delivery of reconstruction stssistance to areas controlled by both the Kabul regime and theotocai picjovon in Use country tide
The readme has made varymg claims of the number of refugees returning tinder the aegis of its national reconciliation
Thc regime has charged tha. Iran and PaJustan are presenting refugees from mtsming in an attempt to captain the limited number of returnees. The regime is portraying Ihe United Piaucos1 recently inabaacd pilot rrpainsbon program as part of Kabul'secorKiliauon policy, hoping to tale credit for any rettntces.aJaVaa* L,utlook
Alihough there are opportuniiles to enhance the regime's support tluough its national reconciliation poIsey.-Najibullah lacks the resources to pursue these avenues. liit adept use of propaganda maymall fcsflowing. but the bombing of civile areas probably will continuearden ihe resolve of most I l unaajTfe3
The Kabul regime is unlikely to eniice many refugees to return until theeecuriry siuiation becomes more stable. Refugees regularly ale the conunusuioei of the Kabul regime in power, the fighting in the Afghan countryside, and landmines as major factorsir return. Nevertheless, we believe Kabul will continue to seek help from the United Nations and other foreign donors to fund Iu refugee rescoJcmem plan, hoping to rjroject the appearance of inter national legitimacy and to eitcnd iu slaying power Control over the distribution of lhe relatively small amounts of aid likely to be channeled through Kabul by multilateral organsuiicns win not siswifasndy enhance the regime's servivability or support, bi our view.Lya,
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10
Politics in India's Northeast
and ct
The struggle for poubcal power in Indii'l northeast between die Congress Partv and regional pat tics often producci jfiotvlived and ineffective itate governments unable to conccnirate on solving the area's problems. The Janata Dal is challenging the Congress Party's role as tbe dominant national political party in the northeast, but regional parties are abo powerful and control several stair goverruTvenu, Pobixal crpecrtumim creates new parties and shifting aliiances and coalitions,t poliOcal upheaval is likely to worsen and prevent state governments from dealing with the region's fessering insurgencies, illegal immigrants, and economic uTSdcrde velceanent.
Background
India's northeast comprises the states of AruruKlul Pradesh, Assam. Manipur. Meghalaya. Miioram. Napland, and Tripura. With few members in Parliament, the region and its leaders have bulc natemal political clout Nevertheless, political parties throughout India view theof state elections and the rise and fan of state governments in the regionindicators of how they are fatingational level. Political parries, therefore, put considerable energy and resources into politics in the northeast to bolster their national position
Players in the Northeast The Congress Party is Ihe only national partyignificant presence throughout the northeast. It won allf the region's contested Parliament seats ineads two state gc-emrrscnu svnh an absolute majority, heads another with the supportegional party, andoalition partnerourth. Wc believe the Congress Party's dominance of successive governments in New Delhi, with control over political patronage andof funds in thc northeast, gave it an organ tint to pal advantage over other panics In the region
Other national paniemavcoothold in the northeast The Communist Party of India (Marxist) is powerful in Tripura. which it governed for Two long stretches between5hc Janataleading party in the ruling National Front coalition in
Newseeking to increase its support in ihe area. The opposition People's Party in Arunachal Pradesh transformed itself into the Janata Dal last spring, and an opposilion party in Miroraroosioering merging with the state Janata Dal. In addition, the Janata Dal persuaded the ruling party of Assam, the Asom Gana Parishad, to Join the National Front before last November's parliamentary election.
1 feV
CcatgresiTarty's
The CongntsjTParty'i principal poliiicaland sometimelhe northeast are regional parues. There are overf these panics, many formed along tribal or ethnic lines, such as the Antra Bangali. which promotes ethnic Bengali interests in Tripura. Regional parties control four northeast state, governments Local parties In the same stale often cooperate or even merge at timet. Separate regional parties in the different states do not cooperate, although thee broaderethnic and tribal rights and promoting eeenomic dcvelccxrseiu in thethe same waaaaV 1
Despite its impressive showing in lastelection. Ihe Congress Party hastn the northeast this year. In MeghalayaParty chief minister was forced lo resignwhen the regional party backing hisout, possibly at ttie urging of the Janatathe February
state election inoalition of kxal parues combined to oust the Congress Party, which had ruled the stateecade- Even the Congress Party's vein in Arunachal Pradesh in the Rbruary state election was due to the chief minister's poliucal savvy rather than to
appealPelkulduggery
Politics in several of India's northeast states arc rnarked by regular upheaval. Panics split, coalitions collapse, and alliances shift as individuals and factions seek to obtain power. In9 Meghalaya state election, lhe Congress Party won thc largest bloc of seats in the state assembly bui not enough toovernment on its own. Opportunistic former Chief Minister
h3
overnment lastedaction of the opposilion Hill People's Union intocoalition with the Congress Party, creating the United Meghalaya Parliamentaryngdohigh government position. Two years later Lyngdob engineered thecollapsc of thc state government,ewMeghalayaiTentaryregained tic chief ministership
Political orcoeiirrnsm In Nagatand this spring brouglit down two governments in less than five weeks. In May.ongress Party members of the Legislative Assembly quitmonth-old government and joined with me opposition Nagaland People's Conference to form the United Legislature Front. Alleceived positions in the new state government. Lessonth later.egislators from the National People's Conference withdrew their support from the new government and allied with Die Congress Party to form the Joint LegislMure Pany
ems have I
Even where state governments have teen relatively stable in recent years, poliucal maneuvering continues. Although Ihe Congress Pany chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Gcgong Apang. has held office forecade, former Congress Party Chief Minister Thungon is working to unseal himatJMJHHJBHan' Inhief Minsster Manama expanded his Cabinet this pastup ministers he hi! sacked earlier because ofstrengthen his hand against party rival and then stale I'-mc Minister Phtikan. Phukan resignedugust over the state government's handling of deirrioraiiag law and order to the state,!
Consequences of Political Upheaval Political infighting and opportunism undermine parliamentary politics In the northeast, in our view. Although state leaders revel in political infighting, lhe people of the northeast am weary of it. Even before Nagaland's poliucal upheaval last spring. Nagas were losing interest in statethe latest events probably further alienated them. In Ansnachal Pradesh some People's Party members were dismayed by their party's overnight transformation Into the Janata Dal during0 state
election campaign and refused to run as Janata Dald^le najsjassassssssw
Time, effort, and money committed to political survival prevent leaders and their parties from focusing on the region'side: dend illegal immigration from twighbortng countries. While Chief; Minister Mahanta and Home Minister Phukan maneuvered for poliiical suppon in Assam, the United Ubcsaiioo From of Assam insurgency mushroomed. Low-level insurgencies plague most other northeastern states, and poliiical Isorsetrading tn state capitals probably boosts the appeal of these milium groups. It is difficult for sbortjived governments to implement strategies to boost agricultural or industrial development or handle iftumgraiioo issues, such as" Ihe illegal presence of tens of thousands of Bangladeshis searching for jobs in the northeast.
Outlook
itiuLnunetiw
Political upheaval io India's northeast Is likely to worsen. With the Janau Dal increasingly active in the region and the Congress Pany seeking local victories to reassert itself nationally, sbon-lived state governments could collapse even morequkkly. Assam is the next state in the northeast scheduled, probably this year,ute election. Thc Congress Party recently replaced its state pany leader and is ingood posilion to topple the ruling Asom Gana Parishad. Prime Minister Singh's Janau Dal is likely to campaign extensively for its National Front allyoss In Assam wouldlow to the Janau Dal nationally. With several local and rational parties active in the state, voters may not give anyajority in the legislature and may set in motion the politicaLpianeu vering so common in the nonheast. I
Thc growing inability of northeast state governments to deal with the pressing problems of the region could cause New Delhi io dismiss state governments. New Delhi threatened such action in Assam in mid-August. This could further disillusion the people of the northeast and increase the appeal of insurgent grouf
14
Kecnan'sictory for Rafsanjani
release onugust of Irish hosiage Brian Keenanictory for Iranian Presideni
fTons to resolve ihe problem of lhc tosiages in Lebanon and to improve
economic relations wiih theeirut group colling itself Islamic
a cover nameizballahcrcdii for releasing Keenan. who was
abducted from Wea Beirut ine believe lhe Irish Government's
annoimcement on the day of Kcenan's release that it would send ihe Minister for
Agriculture to Tehran toMVUion beef sale satisfied Tehran's demandsgoodjmj,
The bcatages haveajor obst-fflFte. ending Iran's international isolation and attracting foreign investment. Rafsanjani's ability to get ihem released has depended on dcmcinsirating to Iranian hardliners thai this will bring tangible benefits. (Ic probably soughi so capitalize on Ireland's membership in the European Community as well as the intense domestic pressure on Dublinmereia] ties to Iran lo help revive its-slumping economy, particularly lhc beef exports devastated by ihc intcniational embargo imposed on IraqMm, g>
Thc assertion in thc Iranian prflfthai "the siiuation of European hostages can beiffcrcni" ftom US hostages is probably meant; other Euippcaii reentriesollow the Irish example
conditioned Iran's purchase of beef on the visit to Tehran of the Irish MinisicaToT Agriculture. The Iranian President almost certainly will seek to capitalize on evolving European Community policy to expand Tehran's economic ticsurope.,-
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