The Future of SovietMHkary Forces in
A Research Paper
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Tbt Future of Soviet Military Forces in Ccimanv|fB
Summary
Theoviet military aad civilian personnelith ihe Soviet Western Croup ofF) will be
within the next four years in accordance with an agreement
worked out between German Chancellor kohl and Soviet President Gorbachev inlthough Moscow would probably be amenable toibortened timetable. The Soviets and German* both want tbe withdrawal to proceed nnoothly and are taking Kept to minimize teniioni Bonn and Moscow remain worried, however, that declining morale and discipline within the WGF and signs of German public hostility toward the forces could spark aa increasing number of violent incidentsurge in desertions. Tbe manner in which tbe two governments handle thecould have domestic repercussion* in tbe Soviet Unkm. affect German-Soviet bilateral relations, and influence German attitudesontinued US/NATO military pienn<Q|
The problems plaguing (he WGF arc well documented and are receiving increasing attention in the media and high levels of the GermanThey include:
Declining morale and discipline. Soviet force* art surroundedostile population, haveecline in Irving standards since the introduction of the dcutsche markuly, and face the prospect of returning home to even worse conditions
/ncreaied crime. German authoritiesharp increase in the number of criminal acta involving Soviet soldiers, or in which theiruspected Many of the reported cases involve theft of basic necessities, including food.
Black market activities and sales of weapons Some Soviet troops, in aa effort to secure hard currency, are willing to sell almost anything tbey can get their bands on German authorities arc particularly concerned that weapons and ammunition being sold or trussing from inventories -possibly including surface-to-airfall into the hands of terrorists and other political estremista
Dest'lions. Reports on tbe number of deserters from tbe Soviet forces are incomplete, but we believe there were several hundred desertions between January and earlyt* which fewer thanormally
applied for asylum Germanare legally bound to protect asylum seekers until their cues can beUrn number to increaie ibarplyhedulc foreached.
i Attacks by Gtrma* dtitetv. Although the number of larger public demonstrations against tbe presence and activities of the Soviet forcca bai declined since tbe Kohl-Gorbachev agreement last summer, there have been continued sporadic physical attacks against Soviet personnel and facilities. As of late October, however,the number of troops killed probably was still lessfl| H
Despite these negative trends, the Germans and Soviets atill regard tbe existing situation and level of tension as manageable, and both sides are taking actions in an effort to keep things ur.de: control. Tbe German-Soviet treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet forces, signed onctober, will significantly reduce Soviet military activities. Tbe treaty alsooin! coctinissiott to resolve any differences that arise. The Sonets, for tbeir part, have announced stricter regulations for soldiers leaving installations in an effort to minimize criminal activity and desertions. The Soviets willaximum effort from German authorities aad police to ensure the security of Soviet personnel and facilities. Bonn recofnizes and accepts
But things could go wrong. Anti-Soviet sentiment in Germany could be fueled further by mediaof which clearly have beenproblems associated with tbe Soviet forces, or if hitches develop that appear to slow the withdrawal process. The Germans, who face possible tax increasea and economic dislocations stemming from tbe unification process, could also come to reseat the large costs associated with the Soviet withdrawal. Isolated Soviet attacks sgainst German citizens could also occur. Finally, Soviet-German relations would come under serious strain in the less likely event mass desertions do take place and Bonn refuses to return those seeking asylum to Soviet authorities.
esult of the WGPi problems. German auiboriuea assume that tbe Soviets will withdraw well before tbe4 deadline and there is reliable reporting that the two tides are Ulking about ways to speed the process. The main obstaclesuick withdrawal are logistic and infrastructure problems Estimates of the minimum time required vary widely, dependingotherabout whether the Soviets would choose u> leave anything behind, bow quickly facilities in the Soviet Union are readied to receive the personnel and materiel, and the
extent to which Germm and Polish authorities are prepared to allow the traasportatlon Infrastractura to be monopolized to tha detriment, of their economies:
TpmenwrornGeTmany ii
While there are several variables that will influence how rapidly the WOF will withdraw from Germany, we assess that the Soviets believe they can conduct an orderly aad complete withdrawal of all personnel,
itocks in three to four vesriaBSVB^^aBBBBBaBtsMH
ie Soviets could withdraw their personnel and lermany in aboutonths, but only with additional German aulstance and at tbe cost of leaving behind at least some logistic stocks. If, under extreme conditions, the political decision was made that tbe military had to withdrawew months, the WGF could do so, but would have to accept substantial losses in Germany (ia the form of logistic nocks left behind) and in tbe Soviet Union (deterioration of stocks due to inadequate storage facilities).
The housing situation in the Soviet Union, which Soviet military officials have admitted is desperate, hasajor cause of deterioratir morale of officers stationed ir
Germany, the Soviet Union, and tbe United State* alltake in bow smoothly the Soviet withdrawal occurs:
A disorderly, hasty withdrawal could lead to tensions within tbe Soviet military, increased Soviet domestic criticism of Gorbachev's foreign policy, and strained relations with Germany that could jeopardize needed economic and technical assistance.
Tbe Germans, for their Dan. may be forced lo cope with law-and-orderivisive political debate over the asylum policy, andSoviet requests foe money to facilitate theof which could undercut support for Kohl and be exploited by political extremists.
Bad publicity generated by the actions of Soviet forces on such matters as environmental issues could lead to closer German scrutiny of the practices of all military forces, including US forces. And, if German ire directed at the Soviet forces leads to more general antiforeign sentiment, there couldround swell of support for the removal of all foreign force from German soilfl
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German Chancellor Kohl and Soviet Presidentagreed in0 lhaioviet troops now in easternSoviet Western Group of Forces (WObe wiibdrawn within four years after unification. The Soviets and Germans both worry that problems associated with theSovietpublic opposition and internal WGFlead to incident* and tensions that could damage bilateral relations. This Research Paper examines several Issueswith the Soviet presence, including Soviet and German attitudes toward it, sources ol tension, and the new legal basis for tbe Soviet presence, as well as things that could go wrong and their implications for Ihe Soviet Union, Germany, and the United Slates.
German Attitudes Toward thePresence
German officialsransitional Soviet presence as necessary to help Gorbachev deal with domestic Soviet oppositionnited Germany. Politically, the Germans believe that acquiescenceemporary Soviet presence helped Gorbachev swallow German NATO membership by minimizing perceptions thai the Soviets were being "ousted" from the former German Democratic Republic. German officialsmoreover, that it would be physically impos-siWc to move Soviet personnel, equipment's ad,out ol eastern Germany os'cioiclitjMBS.
Tbe sttitude of the eastern German public toward the Soviet presence is difficult to gauge, in part becauseearth of polling data. An overwhelming majority of eastern Germar
_ favored thewilh-drawal of Soviet forces from Easternw
enerally favorable view of the Soviet
'it German i
Union and Gorbachev. Gorbachev, in our view, Is widely crediled by eastern Germans for havingtbe conditions which facilitated Iheof the GDR and German unification. West German press reports at the lime of the revolution in the GDR in tbe Tall9 claimed that many eastern Germans viewed tbe Soviet military presence as having prevented East German security forces from firing on demonstrators.'
Most eastern German public opposition to tbe Soviet presence to far has come in ibe form of petitions and demonstrations against burdens associated withactivities, such as environ menial damage caused by Soviet forces, aircraft noise, and competition prior to unification for scarce goods in tbe marketplace Reports of Incidents indicating popular opposition to the Soviet presence increased in tbe springeSection of the fact that Germans in the then-GDR were for the tint lime free to demonstrate. The number of demonstrations has declined, however, since Kohl and Gorbachev agreed injnidtuenmer that Soviet forces would be i
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Thereumber of indications that anti-Soviet sentiment in eastern Germany may be increasing at the same lime demonstrations against Soviet military activities have dropped off. Physical attacks byGermans against individual Soviets haveaccording io press sad other reporting, as kti other oven niaJufeaUtiOM of ami-SovietTab increased eastern German hostility toward the Soviet presence probablyia response to acuoas of the WGF aad its members, at well as to the emergence of more general xenophobic sentiment- For example, eastern Germans arc beginning to feel the sharp economic pinch from unrhcatioo at the tame time that Germany la beginning to make largeto the Soviet Unli
German officials LncreaaiBgly ere becoming fruit re ted with the Soneu as well.
le Jury an East German Army publication Included aa article entitled "Eonroameoul Crime ia the Colon of the Soviet MilitaryIt called on the Soviet foroea to practice environmental principles ol "civilization and culture."
According to otbcr press reports, senior SocialParty politicians planned toeeting with Gorbachev oneptember to urge aof the Soviet withdrawal "to make sure that the tension between the Germans and Russians docs not become more than it is now."
German officials clearly want to contain tensions between eastern Germans and tbe Soviet forces, as well as discourageisolated shootings of Soviet soldiers by Germancouldoviet
t even anecdotal evidence that some eastern Germans actually feel sorry for the predicament of Soviet soldiers faced with the prospect of returning to tbe Soviet Union-!
Nonetheless, the Soviets will be inviting targets for more extremist elements of German society for the remainder of their stay in eastern Germany. Those Germans willing to physically attack Soviet troops or facilities admittedlyinority. They arehowever, by anti-Soviet or moie generalsentiments and will not necessarily be placated by any actions the Soviets might take to reduce tensions with German citizens. Only effective and determined German taw enforcement efforts are likely to deter attacks on the Soviet forces'.:MMjj
Series and WGFire*
By accepting in principle the eventual pulloul of their troops from eastern Germany, the Soviet leadership has acknowledged that the WGF will no longer be a
tint tine of defense for the USSR.our-year timetable for troop puliout was motivated by political, domestic, and military consid-erations. Politically, Gorbachev found it important toense of balance during the transitionrcpeisual counter to German membership in NATO. At the same time, he needed to avoid sadden dcstabjlization of the European balance of forces in order to give theontinued voice ia major European decisions.ransition period for removing forces allowed time for the Soviet public to adjust to the "loss" of tbe GDR Apart from the purely logistic problems of moving military force* built uptay ofears in eastern Germany, the transition period was also needed to buy time for tbe Soviets to reabsorb their personnel, equipment, and logistic stocksituationby the simultaneous withdrawals of Soviet forces from elsewhere in Eastern Euiopel
Tbe WGF, on tbe other hand,ifferent set of requirements. While Gorbachev') new thinking may have redefined Sovieterms of pobucal factors, eeeeiomknd democratic "lives, it has sot yet beea totally acorptadilitary establishment that is ased to focusing oa training, forward positions, arad war-fighting capabilities.dissatisfied with the "loss" of Easternand of the GDR ineuor military leaders nonetheless have io maintain meiimum militaryavoid aby dellnilion,withdrawal, and ensure that those returning to the USSR, particularly the officers, are boused and employed,
Military leaden, accordingariety of repeating, view the challenges they face from ditTercotaad, to soanc degree. Inconsistently- There arc differences of view, for ciample. on tbe optimum pace of the Soviet withdrawal. Some believe in tbe need toilitary mnston until after NATO forces arc reduced, continue with business as usual, aad delay withdrawal as long a* possible Otherspeeded up* naceatiiy aad view their mruioo as simple control of personnel, with garrisons becoming even mora like prisonsMm
Senior Soviet military leaden objected lo speeding up withdrawal preparation!:
Resistance Tram the military alio showed up inbetween Soviet and German officials on tbe new stationing agreement- Militarywho dominated therecalcitrant onIssues, including German demandspecific timetable lo phase out Soviet forcesplaced on military movements outside garrisons, the handling of deserters, ihe number of military training Bights, and air rights- Despite subsequent agreements on most issues, other Issue* remajt solved, including handling of asylum seekers f
To complicate the issue. Soviet legislators have given notice thai they want greater invotvemeni in foreign policy decision making, particularly with regard to agreements on Germany. The legislators* concern
regarding the treatment of Soviet forces and families in the WGF came out during tbe discussion anddaydraft legislation in theSoviet to rescind5 Sovict-GDR treaty before the formal unification of Germany look placectober. The legislators roundly criticized the Foreign Ministry for failing to keep them adequately informed, neglecting tbe welfare of Soviet forces and their families, getting Inadequate security gturaniees In return for German membership in NATO, and settling the German question "behind the backs" of the Supreme Soviet.
We believe likely developments in Germany will force the Soviets to adjust ihetr mindset. Historically, the Soviets have viewed themselves asew social order and suppressing German fascisties. They have seen their relationship with theas ooe of conqueror and vanquished. Many Soviets almost certainly look on the eastern Germansraitors" who turned their backs on socialism and on the army that liberated them and paid for it in their own blood. Tbey bod il difficult to accept German behavior or tbe right of Germansmpose restrictions on their military
In tbe past, the Soviets' disregard of German concerns bas been evident in their treatment of environ mental issues, an area of particular sensitivity to Germans. Oblivious to Ihe effects of military maneuvers on German land. Soviet troops have often caused fires and major damage to forested areas snd farmlands during exercises. According to diplomatic reporting, Soviet officers balk at criticism for this from the Germans and still root angrily at the mention of German protests against noise and environmental pollution. For example, they have characterizeddemonstralions aa "uncivilized" and theasnd "obooi-lous" and defended the behavior of their soldiers as merely "doing their
Because the Soviet militaryaccustomed to being in command, problems could develop with senior Soviet officers who now are forced to find ways to deal with increasingly assertive German authorities, not just at
the national level, bul alio at ihe local level. They will have to factor (he political real It teaew Germany into their military- planning. The tfmictions in the new itatlontm allotment, moreover, will undoubtedly cramp tbe style of those Soviet commanders who continue to view their mission at guarding against the NATO presence in Germany and Europe. Itabo complicate their abilityngage Soviet troops in training eaercttet and maneuvers, which would help to keep them occupied and distracted from thefacing then ouiiidc their garrisons asas fulfill bask uaituag functions WM
The Soviets are (scgisrnag to recognire the poteatial for increased reseat meat towatd their preaeace aad this probably was the drmng fores for completion of the station.ng agreements They will expect thepolice to be moreaintaining cm) order, controllingndriminal activity outside Soviet garrisons, and ihe Soviets arc likely lo establish more effective workingi pa with the Germans at both sides become more experienced at bilateral liaison Even with tbe stationing agreement completed, however. Soviet forces still And themselves operating Incircumstances and will continue to face many challenges before ihe deadline for lota) wKhdrawal. Nonetheless, we believe they probably will find thisto trnfrnf
Challenges Coafrowiog So'let Forces
The living conditions of Soviet soldiers in easterntraditionallysignificantly in the past severalumber of sources. By highlighting the attractiveness of the West and the bleak prospects of returning home, the declining living standards almost certainly havearallel drop in morale and discipline among many Soviet servicemen:
The danger that plunging morale could pose serious disciplinelready evident in the increase In the number of crimes committed by Soviet soldiers. Poorly paid Soviet conscripts have been suspected in numerous bouse and car break-ins. and even some more serious crimes. Painfully aware of ihe bene fits of Western freedomapitalist market. Soviet soldiers arc frustratedack of hard currencyurchase readily available Western goods. Despite
A Sarin Soldier's Life In Germany: Low Pay, Low Morale
WGF internal force structure contributeshe problems the Soviets art cvrren/ly encountering with their troops in Germany. The Soviet militaryighly autocratic structureUriel divisionsofficers and soldiers; commissioned officers have an almost aristocratic view cf their profetsio
suicide: others gorime spree or desert.art hunted down by members of their own units who are ordtrtd to shoot to kill If necessary. In more
extreme eases, attack helicopters have Joined thew
in Germanyonthiving allowance of DM IS (aboutoviet soldiers serve for two years and cannot take their families with them to Germany. They live In World War ll-vintagedo many NATO forces In Westernmany of the facilitiesby the WGF art deteriorating through lack of maintenance. They bunk IS toer bay area and have little privacy or space for private properly. In the barracks,Juniorare hazed and harassed, not only by their cdficees and NCOs. but alto by senior soldiers or those with different ethnic
Soviet soldiers art confined to their basts, get no leave excepteward for outstandingaid are rarely allowed Into town, and then onlyrouparter NCOunior officer escort. The enttrt group Is responsible foe each member, and collective punishment may befor each member, because of an individual's offense nonetheless, this does not discouragebe "it. bmwls. break*4ns. and poaching, which are common octurrencet
Living conditions and lifestyle in Germany probably exacerbate the generally poor hralih of Soviett. Poor hygiene and lamtmikm and crowded accommodationsariety of diseases, many of which are unknown in most Western armies. Soldiers are provided poor-guality food, and since unification there are reports that ihe quantity of rations has been evi because of skyrocketing costs and various supply problems M
The primary motivation of enlisted troops is to survive iheir term of service and go home. Some cannot endure their term of irrviee. however, and commit
Growing public hostility toward Soviet troops Inhas made life even more difficult for thehave been harassed and even fired atcars while Handing on guard duty at night.asave been killed recently, and all hovelo protect ihamsefves. but according toreporxlng ihe Instructions art confusingtime cemwning to allow foe quick assuranceof aarigee Soviet toldieei are generally told towarming shot before--
uedalrain
When their mettve-duiy term of service of two years is completed, eonjcripti arr rtlurned to the Soviet Union, primarily by air transport They art taken lo processing centers where troop tents are erected some three to four weeks In advance. Once their paperwork is processed, ihe men arerain ticket home and released into the reserve.%
Sovietppear lorivileged class when compared wiih an averagt conscript becaust benefits are highly skewed In their favor Accompanied by their families, who live In Soviet apartment complexes near the garrisons, ihey are posted to Germany for five years and earn an average monthly wage of fOQ rublestationing allowance of approximatelyhe monetary benefits have made assignment to Germany an attractive cmticn Even to. the lack of on experienced and knomrUdgeanie hhCO terms placet heavy burdens on ike Junior officers Junior officers often perform many of the tasks that are done by NCOt in SATO arnrnes Those officers work long, arduous hours. Their auarters art as badly run down as troop billets. Many totally lack hot water, while some have no running water al ^
To supplement their pay, officers' wives often work on the German economy. In at least some WGF units inowever, all
r*
parts.
iSmilitary and localwas discouraged. Many wives kepi working and some families continued iheir private social coniacts with Germans during the nl$ht, despite tht risk of detection and tht thrrat of being returned to the USSR. One officer admliled toigher standard ed living through hli wife's employment and his sole on th* black market of spare vehicle parti furl, and oil appraptiaied from
Soviet officers generally do not socialise with the eastern Germans and rarely marry them; however. In early September, eastern German police reported an increase in the number of Soviet women who were seeking German husbands to avoid returning to the USSR with their WGF spouses, accordingtll-
Tht stature that Soviet officers had in the past has disappeared, both in Germany and at home. Although the Soviet army was never well liked in eastern Germany. Us officers were shown respect, even if it was due to the power they wielded as occupiers. Today, they art ignored, sold poor-auallty food, and treated meanly by local Germa
In spite of their problems in Germany. Soviet officers Still view iheir tourrace period. The conditions facing them in the USSR hold little promiseelter life. Housing remains the most serious problem for returning military and has prompted protests by officers and their wives on several occasions. Career officers receive llltlt help with reintegration into civilianingle paymento ISO rubles is normally provided to cover interim
being restricted to unisons, tbey are none lb el ess finding ways to leave their compounds; once out, they face tae temptation of illegal activities, German hos-Iiliiy. and the likelihood of apprebension.^p^
Statistics and reports on crimes committed by Soviet soldiers are sketch* and episodic;
Then-GDR Disarmament and Defense Minister Ep-pelmann slated in August that crime was up iO percent over tbe previous year.
In the Potsdam area, crimes increasedercent over last year,harges brought against Soviet personnel, according to statistics released in September by tbe bead of the area office of criminal investigation. Two-thirds of these were burglaries of restaurants, shops, and bungalows or thefts ofand spare parts.
In one of many incidents, Soviet soldiers who triad to buri iarue aa electronic store in Wiitstocktheir truckigh-speed chase by German police, spilling grenades, cartridges, and fuel. The soldiers fled on foot into tbe woods, leaving tbe German police behind to prevent the truck from eipfodir
ave also been suspected of selling weapons on the black market. Although senior Soviet officials deny that illegal arms dealingrowing problem, many Soviets arc offering nflcs, pistols, equipment, and explceivea for sale:
Tea Soviet soldiers workingilitary warehouse were arrested in May for selling handgrcnades and ammunition to Germans.
West Berlin divers removedifles, an automatic carbine and barrel, an antitank rocket, aod three fragmentation and five concussionof Sovietthe Teltow Canal in August. These caches were traced to Soviet miHiary supplies.
According to German officials. Sovietjuniorselling assault rifles and
ition for prices tanging7
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Tbe WGF alioroblem with deserters,the number of desertions may be exaggerated. Since unification, Soviet soldiers departing theirenter "sovereign Germanxposed 'o the fruits of Western life and confronting the reality of returning to the Soviet Union, tome wouldtrong incentive to remain io the West, While the possibility for mass desertions exists, we believe it toow probability because of mttaunii tensions in the Soviet military. Some recent claims in tbepress about the number of Soviet deserters may be exaggerated, perhaps to justify changes in German law that would permit an agreement to returnto Soviet control,
abtuntial number of Sovietcould take place in tbe next several months, especially if the Soviets and Germans fail to agree on some arrangements for handling deserters or improv. ing living conditions for Soviet soldiers. Another problem is the increasing number of soldiers who go absent without leave to avoid abusive treatment froeo_ their superiors.)
Attacks by German citizens on Soviet troops and facilities, which have increased since July, are an additional headache for Soviet authorities. As of September, according to Soviet officials, soldiers had been shot or beaten upon at leastccasions by residents ofin August alone. We have several reports that Soviet guards have been told to protect themselves at night by staadlng in tbeIn order to be less visible to German attackers:
A Soviet sentry was shot five times in tbe bsckase iort on tbe Baltic coast northwest ofanother soldier was shot deadentry was also shot and killed at an ammunition dump in Per le berg.
In mid-November, according to press reports,tbe request of tbebegan an investigation into tbe beating death near Potsdam1 -year-old Soviet officer.
In Neuruppin, soldiersilitary patrol had to be hospitalized after an attack by Germans.
In other incidents, according to US diplomaticilitary school was bombarded withpoison gas grenade" (NFT) was thrown at an armyilitary bus was sprayed with gunfire, and shots were fired at military barracksassing *
Does Anyone Knew Hew Many Soviet Destriers aud Asylum Seekers Ton* Hat Beent
Is much confusion about how many Soviets hat dtstrttdrithing the conflicting reporting, we believe that aboutoviet soldiers formally applied for asylum in Germany between January and earlyhere are Other soldiers, howetr, who simplyOL and do not intend to apply for asylum, or who have deserted andsylum with false identification papers, or who hat fled to countries other than Germany, Including returning to the USSR. Somenone of which istht totalof destriers could be in the thousands, but we believe It more likely thai the number Is in the hundred*f
Here are some recent examples of the fragmentary and conflicting reporting on the deserter issue:
Onovitt major general claimed during an inttrview that only aboutoldltrs had deserttd and thai ht did not know whether they had applied for asylum in Germany.
Another German press report on IS October, citing official sources, claimed that ihe number of Soviets seeking political asylum in West Berlin hadto two per day. down fromer day before unificationctober.
Television News, citing WGFreportedctoberesertions had occurred since
Efforts To Mininiit Temlourt
Like Bonn. Moscow wantsvoir] any direct con-rtonUtioni between Soviei forces and easternTreaty negotiators have pressed the Germans to improve the delivery of Western roods and services to Soviet facilities, hoping to preclude forays by the soldiers to the outside, and tbe Soviets have continuedtress the need for an agreement on handling deserters. The restrictions placed by the stationing treaty on military training exercises and air Rights will almost certainly help to reduce some current tensions. The Soviets believe that German assistance in housing construction for Soviet officers returning to the USSR will help to improve the morale of these soldiers and their Tamil
Given the resentment of Soviet commanders toward the change in their status in Germany, tbe Soviet military appears to be unusually compliant to the increasing demands of the Oermaas, probablyof pressure from Moscow to maintain good relations:
Accordingerman forestry official, the Soviets recently were forced by the Germans to repair maneuver damage at the Hundeluft state forest near Rossleu. The Germans claimed that this was not an authorized training area but was taken over "illegally" by the Soviets
The Soviets also have been taking steps to reduce the visibility and annoyance value of their presence, thank* In pan to greater alien lion paid to these problems by German officials and the media. For csample, the Soviets have agreed, under heavyfrom German authorities, to keep major convoys
off Ihe roads in tbe Berlin area during peak civilian traffic hours; they have also imposed restrictions on firing at ranges0 hours. The terms of the German-Soviet stationing agreement further reduce Soviet military activities and give the Germans treat-er authority in determining what can be done when.
At the same time, the Soviets are also attempting to minimize criminal activity and desertions through an apparent tightening of controls over personnel in garrisons:
The Soviets have announced new, stricterfor soldiers leaving installations and onwith German citizens. They also havetighter controls to monitor soldiers dressed as civilians in area* such as railroad stations.
The Soviets are considering organizing excursions into Berlin and across tbe former inner-German border in order to satisfy curiosity about the West Senior officers claim that unauthorized trips are made mainly by warrant officers with access to vehicles who are intensely curious about tbe West; their unfamiliarity with Western traffic laws often results in arrests for traffic vioiatic
Tbe Soviets will probably try to funber restrict travel by soldiers, increase the ponishment for those caught outside Soviet garrisons, and more effectively enforce stricter regulations. They appear to have taken step* in this direction, according to reliable reports. Allied forceseduction in incident* connected with unauthorized travel to West Berlin even beforeunification; in the American sector, for example, apprehensions for crimes (mostly for shoplifting) fell fromn Augustn September. British and French officialsimilar drop In the incident rate in their sectors. We believe this indicates that personnel were being subjected to harsher puatthancot for unauthorized travel and were therefore notminor crimes as frequently. The Sovietswill have only limited success, however, because the officers go out "sightseeing" as well, making, it difficult to curtail overallOLsMMmUm
Moscow is aware thai continued attention Traced on WGF problems couldlee; German and Soviet domestic leoiiment and encourage increased desertions. To counter this, the Soviet military has tried toublic relations campaign that would legitimize the Soviet presence and portray itore favor able light:
also have agreed to accept German sovereignty and full jurisdiction in crimes involving Soviet troops off their bases and have begun close cooperation with German authorities to control Soviet troops outside installation
1 1
To help improve morale and curb discipline problems,willor tbe early completion of German-funded bousinj for troops returning to tbe USSR and will evpect the Oermaritegin early implementation of aa agreed program of vocational training for returning troopa. The Germans arein tbe process of finalizing plans to address both areas.
New Agreements Coieruiog tbe Sonet
Ononn and Moscowransition Tiealy dealing with Ihe financial aspects of the Soviet withdrawal. Tbe DMillion package dead includes fuads to compensate the Soviets for the additional coats of maintaining the WGF stemming from mtrcalitcttoo of ine drutacba mark ia the GDR, finance oarainsctloa of housing In the Soviet Union for returning forces, rstrain Soviet troops for civilian jobs, and help finance in export* txa of Soviet
Daring their dstcwsaioa with German Chancellery officials early ia November, the Sovietsillingness to pull all forces out of Genoa ay before tbe* deadline If the Germans couldadequate bousing by the endhe Germans, who arc equally anxious to see an early withdrawal, have negotiated an agreement with the Soviets to begin housing constructionj| w
components in Germany during tbb winter, the Germans hoped to meet the short construction deadline andelay in withdrawal. Both sides also agreed at that time that tbe new facilities would be built in tbe RussianGermany's desire to have them located as far to the cast asbecause Moscow wasthat the other republics would be reluctant to provide sites for housing the officers and theirwho are primarily Russian.)
At the beginning of December tbe GermanMinistry released plans for an agreement with the Soviets to award contracts on the basis of public bids, with tbo USSR Defense Mlaustar as tbe awarding authority, supportedonsortium of German construction associations. Tbe first notices to tender are expected to appear in Moscow and Use FRG at the beginningccording to the GermanMinistry, theocations will be grouped together into eight toain projects, eachby its own general contractor responsible for overseeing all aspects of tbe construction work in bb
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in the end. agreed only to provide an overallplan and yearly progress reports on the status of withdrawals. Bona hadithdrawalthat would have included specific departure dates for each unit, ashe dates' -lions were to be closed.J
Germans wanted detailed
information on remaining Soviet forces, claimingis required for public safety and notThe Soviets agreed to provide athe total strength of Soviet pcaaanoeivilian and military cUssificatlonsupdate this yearlyhe prtnapalnegotiated was the terms of the Soviets'lr<vm tuiain Oilman, Th* Oceman*(route that allyuil iheby 31
Bv-nn aad Motcow also concluded (be Sutioning aad WitMrawal Treaty oactoberpage treaty creates the legal baala and lets out ground rules (or tb* atatut and actMUet of the Soviet forces remaining ia eastern Germany during tb* transitional perioduring the neeotiatiooa, tb*sought Soviet recognition of maximum Germanlear withdrawal schedule, aad severe rawicoons on ibe miHury aciffiina of retidual Soviet
Significant difference* of view existed over controlGerman airspace and Soviet military'in- fir -ii According to GermanSoviets wanted to continue air operation*inclnding rcseonaibility for air defansefacilities. The Soviets also tried io dictateGermans would provide ait defense venerateformer GDI
Soviets wanted to prevent overoigau oi eastern Germany by any Luftwaffe aircraft, claiming this wouldery demoralising effect oa Soviet troopa sutsceed there. The Germans, for their part, wanted to assert .niurnin control over Orrman alrtpac* and propoaed (he elimination ol all So-vei military rhghu beso* UOO meter<m^
AccordiBg lo ihefymramiie. German and Sm'ru hgbia pkii win be ubjta u> shared air
ante central over *aatain Oaraiany.t ttna -ivapac* wilt ba eoordlnatadwtnt Sovlsa-Oaiman onordinatiaa oCfc* iIL'KO, that will handle alland ambiguities" in the use of air-
For ike Urn two rears, roles for Soviet military Bight* will be similar to those In esc now. Nighttime flying will be limited to threeeek snd0 boars local time, but will vary slightly, elepeading oa ihe season of tbe year and will be reduced starting iahe night-flyingo be agreed on six. months ia advance. Low-level flights will be strictly regulated, with flightseters generally not allowed. Tbe Soviets will provide "provisional, informal" assurances that they willlow-flying rones lo JOO meters over their own territoryetes over other territory
Some air defense issues apparently were left vagueesult of disagreements. In deference to Moscow's cccosltion. Bonn wiD not base any fighters or Western surface-to-air missile systems in eastern Germany until after tbe Soviets withdraw, according to the US defease attache The IVcose Ministry initially planned to remove several squadrons* from NATO uommand and rotate them to aiibasaa In eastern Germany. Carrent plana call for LaftwafTe aircraft deployed at Fasabcrg, an airfield in western Gcrmaay near Ihe former isttra-Gcrmna border, to provide air defense for eastern Germany, although our attache reports that Moscow has oppcaed this move as well. Bonn will aae current Soviet-designed radars and air defense systems in the inventory of the former East German Nationalmy. including SAMs. and former East German Army personnel to providefor austere German)
The suiionlng agreement deals wilh numerous other issues as well-
Criminal fliriidlciion The Soviets have accepted the principle ef German sovereignly. The Germans will have primary jurisdiction exceptommittedoviet facility. Mcseow agreed that no death sentences will be carried out by military authorities in eastern Germany.
Training and fort* mo*emtnij. Bonn was able to restrict the activities cf Soviet forces by limiting tbe size of maneuvers0 soldier* and their military activity to "assignedhat it, barracks, slsooting ranges, and traisuag gtoausda The Soviets must obtain prior approval snd give two
aad ihe Souther*of Force* (SGF) frony Theof Soviet forces from these countries begin in Febrasry sod March, respectively, aad is scheduled to be completed by oeat July,ompanton. tbe WGF has more than twice the na-bar of combat units of the COFaad SGF combined, much larger logistic stocks,uch larger support infrastructsre. Housing the far larger number of personnel and dependents withdrawn from easterno willuch greater problem for Moscow ihan housing those leaving the CGF and
We believe that the complete withdrawal of the WGF from eastern Germany could take from three to four years if Moscow relies principally on rail and road transport and uses only WGF personnel to prepare equipment and other materiel for departure We iocs* thai, under thesehe combat units probably could beI toonths, and an additionaloonths would be required to remove the infrastructure and logink stocks. To speed the removal of the WGF, the Soviets might use some of the growing number of unemployed eastern Germans to supplement substantially their available manpower, bat this would require additional German financial assistance Moscow may alsoto sell Bonn some stocks oror trucks, lortbe Germans may purchase lo hasten tbe Soviet departure Shorter withdrawal timetable could also be attainedreater proportion than is currently allocated ofand Polish Uansport capability were lo beto thebat this would further dbrupt commercial activities '
In addition, substantial quantities of equipment arc being shipped fromBaltic porta to the USSR German authorities received informationthat searoving so efficient for the Soviets that, by November, they hoped to add nine more roUon/toU-off (RO/ROI ships to the fourinhese authorities assessed that the
s an0 tw
fasaa wsmmmf ato carte Alttm ap tl
itaiwnis bam pan*inaoaialii
mlnamai ia im sanflgaj
16
Soviets coutd withdraw iaonths or less. We believe that, with extensive use of maritime shipping, enough carriers arc available to transportquipment and personnel out of Germany in less than two years. This process would be constrained, bow* ever, by the cargo-handling and transshipmentof tbe ports and their availability duringweather ot periods of civil unrestM^^LWtW
Tbe Soviets will undoubtedly expect the Germans to provide assistance with logistic problems during the withdrawal of their forces. The stationing treaty providesoint comorissiori to oversee theprobably similar lo those "ormed in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The commission's composition is still unclear, but its primary function apparently will
Tbe WGF withdrawal, however, faces tbe additional constraint of bow to house the personnel and where to store tbe large quantitieside variety of logistic stocks and pre positioned materiel now stockpiled in eastern Germany. Extensive German assistance with the housing problem willong way tooviet withdrawal la two years or less. Ia addition, logistic storage facilities in the western USSR must be prepared because there is insufficient storage capacity existing to accommodate all of the materiel
likely to ba withdrawn. The conserve lioo of mack of tax equipment wouldurgegfmanpowcrresoui.cs lo perform ilio work
Waal CeaMag*
Carnal Gee man and Soviet authorities will do every-teeag pcaaabk to fsolrtau the Soviet withdrawal from eauerD Germany aad lo avoid incident! that could fuel tension These food intention* not withstand int. in the cominj months pablic opposition could increase and complicate German-Soviet relalioni if:
Media reports grv* itrong publicityaitociated with the Soviethere hare already bee* malar*es where Ibis ba* occurred.
Hitches develop in tbef Sc-net forces, or if tbe withdrawal It slopped or ilowed once it hai begun. Foroviet diploenai load US officials ine October that de^isestieparticular, tbe refusal of some republics to accept troop* returning fromcomplicate Bonn's ability to fulfill its commitmentonstruct houiing.
There arc public reports of environmental damage at Soviet facilities similar to that being found at facilities in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and the Soviets Still demand significant financialfor withdrawals
German resentment develops over the COST ofSoviet fences. Tbe Soviets could serve as convenient scapegoatsime when Gerasaaa ara experiencing disrupt iocs stemming from unification and tha likelihood of tax increases.
German awareness grow* of atrocities ocrrnmitted during aad after World War II ia Soviet-runcamps, several mass graves have'
i*ii' camiahe Su-ial oicupaitoo raas aa
OkM HIITIlew Italia*imka> ol "hum Sia*
number of Soviet soldiers aaakiafl aiylurnsubstantially to several thousand or mora.
Soviet soldiers gala grerwiag notoriety for illegal activities, especially illegal arms dealing
Soviet commanders become dissatisfied thaiauthorities are not doing enoughrevent anti-Sonet incidents, includingof soldiers and destnsetion ef Soviet war memorials
There are any instances of Soviets killing German citizen* that are not ia reaotsonlear German provocation, sasj
laaplkatkeai far the SwrtH Uaaaa
omplex situation with its military presence in Germany The difficulties experienced by the Soviets with their force* In Germany apparently have advanced their withdrawal schedules despite the overwhelming logisticisorderlycould spark Soviet domestic criticism and raise broader ensue* that crush* delay tbend jeopardize Soviet-German retain ni wm
The Sovietsmooth withdrawal of their forces; they can neither face the consequences at homeisorderly departure nor allow Soviet acsdiers lo run amok in Germany and threaten their relations with Bonn. Soviet acquiescence in NATO membershipnified Germany helped to open tbe door to one of Gorbachev's major foreignectivea--theof tbe Soviet Union aa aa equal partner hiew "Europeanhe cost ofuainCation. however, included the dismantlingey piece of the Soviei secuniy system buih up over more thinears. This is proving topainful and difficult" eiperiencs for ihe miliury. as Marshal Akhromeyev admittedecent Interview, and is causing repercussions abroad and at
If the military is slow in implementing the wiihdrswal agreement, and wc judge that this is unlikely,to Soviet forces in Oennany probably would
thaiutkmingagreetnentiac ibis ootid threaten Sovset-Gefuaan rcsaticea. For eaarr-pk.ncident in October. ciUJwrl androletl in tbe ctry of Petkiu against tbe "careless- treat even of tbe natural earriroauntot by Soviet forces ia ibetr trnirirng area and egatrurt notsa from low-flying aircraft and from range firing.demanded on end to miliury maneuvers and threatened to boycott delivery of goods to Soviet barracks- The call to end maneuvers altogether is stronger than previous demands, and. as ihe Germans are well aware, the threat to withhold delivery of goods hits the Sovietsarticularly vulnerable
The Soviet leadership seems willing to speed up Ita pullout, but ia probably rehsetant to antagonise the military or spark debate in tbe USSR on the pacehe
If. however, Moscow decides to accelerate lis soldiers' departure before they can be accommodated in the Soviet Union, it could spark large-scale protests by the Soviet military at home and in Germany. The Soviets' lack of preparation for resettling officers aad their families has alreadyuMtc outcry:
The wivesoviet cancers petitionedKohl ia an open tetter published ia the German pressctober to block piatts by the Soviet aatsstary to send them aad their chuere-aeapCacrBobrT Although the wires mayeen
p naaaarsater report ra1 live Soviet newspaper denied tbe mewej. tear fears indicate the decUae of oontsdence in tbe centra) gevcrnrrieat to look after its dlitrm
In late August, officers and their wiresrotest in eastern Germany against plans to send tbcm to ihe Caucasus. This probably Involvedfromh Guards Tank Division, which probably ia in tbe process of rclocalingjp the Transcaucaaui Military Din rial
- -g1
gjJI
The plight of returning Soviet soldiers hasaior nana in the USSR and has been taken up by conservative Supreme Soviet deputies unhappy with Moscow's acquiescencenited Germany'sin NATO. Gorbachev and Shevardnadteto have unJeraUmated its unpoCatKHo ia tbdr de'caa* of the German settlement- Shevardnadze baa al-.ad, been summoned by the joint seaaion of the Sepeeene Soviet to respond to the deputies' attacks. If Ihe debate becomea more itrideartly anti-German.
cbaJjenge Gcrbaehev's pursuit of no and corrspticateGe. man rcbiJoeo. Although .orariy to aaseat Gorbachev or to forestari bis German policy,ould prove an annoying distraction and ite the troop withdrawal bane even further
lasaucarieea for Germany
uaa)
m
German loaderailemma over the Soviet presence. On tbe one hand, they seek to dampen tension! and guard against incidents lo avoid dUrupt-ing potentially important relations with Mcaonw and to avoid anything (bat couH delay asoviet withdrawal as possible. On tbe other hand, Bonn may believe that growing eeobtems tor the Soviets woak encourage them to get out of Germany faster j
It
elements tucb:
"retreat" in defeat. Bui inch generally couldomestic political price for Kohl, particularly if uU-Soviet sentiment increase*esult of incident* involving the WOT. Such Knuments could weaken Kohl's support base among conservatives and give mote extremist righlwing dements such asew lease on I
Mas*an upsurge in soldiers seekingcreate serious probleras for Kohl. For the moment, tbe lovcrameot and opposition Social Democrats agreeandcannot turn back those seeking asylumroper hearing. This consensus is easy to maintain now because the number of asylum seekers fa low and this issue does not appear toignificant burden on German-Soviet relations. The consensus. In our view, would become much harder to maintain if the number of asylum seekers were to climb into the thousands. Even though Bonn might continue to protect tbe petitioners, the prospective economic and social cost* of integrating formerinto German society could help bringifficult political debate over asylum policy and further fuel anliforeigner sentiment that could be exploited by extremist groups. Under these circumstances, -cBoon would look for ways short of making changes in Gerwanyjsasylum policies to discourage Soviet
ImpBcsdous for the United State*
For tbe United Slates, tbe lingering presence of Soviet forces may in the near term nuke Bonn moreof the US and other Allied military presence, Bui German ire directed at Soviet forces could also weaken tbe public differentiation between the US presence and the Soviet presence. Such mirror unag-ing could make tbe US presence less tenable over time:
Soviet transportation costs, to build moreor to compensate the Soviets for supplies left behind in an effort to speed the withdrawal. His government might also be willing to extend additional credit guarantees to help Gorbachev cushion tbe psychological Wow of the appearancehaotic
If tensions with Soviet soldiers eaaccrbatesentiment, Germans may feel that all foreign forceshreat or infringe on German|
las cvea^ailrearas raajceily ef favors the withdrawal of all foreign forces ftom Gerrriany. aad caslerrideputies make apuarter of th* all-Gerusnn Butou( csected ra December.
Revelations about Soviet environmental abuses could reinforce German perceptions that all military activity ia environmentally hazardous and focus greater attention on limllar problem* at US and NATO facilities Indeed, the left-leaning newt weekly. Drr Sasrgrf, recently ran aa article oa ee<irotuncDtal damage al Soviet and US military facilities in Germany.
Greater public perception thai rubsadizlag the nay and withdrawal of Soviet troops it too costly could spill over to all foreign forces and fuel complaints that the USo too
German authorities, especially at the stats andmay even seek to play the Allies andagainst each other. They ought warn tbeessmple. that their image will be damagedcontinue to do things that the Soviets arcdoing, rucb as coesd acting particular types
Tbe issue of Soviet deserteri also could becomein US-German and US-Soviet relations Ita problem at tbe moment, since anyover to Oerman authorities by USprotected by the Germans. As of latebeen
ases of Soviet aotdiera appearing at US facilities. If Bonn were to agree with Moscow,to begin turning deserters over lo Sovietthe United States might be forced to rethink its current policy if it believes ihe deserteri ahoald receive protection assssarasasss
and Allied activities in Germany and gala access to controlled technologies The Soviets also will have more oppotTuilies to establish contacts with Amcrt-ean servicemen throughout Germany f ^
Finally, in tbe longer term, ptobleau resulting from the Soviet presence oceJd indirectly cccrapbeate US-Sonet relations Worst case scenario, audi as sanous confrontations between eastern Germans and Soviet forces, or the even more remote poaalhillty of the Soviets reneging on their wiihebawal commitment, could lead to heightened bait-West ten*tons. Ptayod to the csueme, the Germans might use military force, or call on NATO to assist, in isolating andremaining Soviet forces Conversely. US-German relat.ons could become strained inituation if Bonn's response lo heightened tensions or Soviet foot-dragging takes the form cf further efforts to appease Moscow,aaiing of Germany's ties to NATO or an offer to order the withdrawal of all from German f
(REVERSE BLANK)
Reverie
Selected Criroodofv
Tbeoorc* crtftecaogy of events sine*he Western Croup of Force* ia Osraaur
aaoldier accidentally wound* East German cltiiaa during target practice
near Witteoburg; dtirene later demanded closure of the i
11thoasand East Germans sign petition for closure of Soviet airbase in
Altenburg to protest aircraft i
22en Soviet soldier crasaes tank into Lb* cornerouse ra tbe East
towa of Crawinkel.
3thousand Bast Germans demonstrate in Grosacnbain against noise from
Soviet aircraft.
eimar against Soviet ucop presence
ast German* petitioned for cioaure of the Soviet airbase at
Demmin-Tuiow because of noba from Soviet aircraft
1*Gorman cerrirocuueatal group writes an open letter to Disarmament and
Defease Minister Eppelmann demanding that Soviet training areas be given back to the forestry rtuttry for cultivation because toil and water have been contaminated with aviation fuel
niens demanding ckaare of Newruppin airbase after a
Soviet plane accidentally dropped three bomb* wail*raining flight.
military captain sutioned in Berlin karea hit unit and goes to tbe Wcateen
sectors of Berlin, probably to apply for political asylum.
German dike master at Reitwein rioted amphibious trailing area to Use
Sovieia because of property damage caused by Soviet troops; blocks convoy of Soviet troops ia the proems
Uof chinas demand cioaure of airhead in Fount, near Leipng. because
of noise from Soviet aircraft.
2*German policeoviet aoMier after beamily hostage.
1>
East German dttarau group pramsonet missile base ia Koeaigsbrueck because (hay thouihi it coaisined chemical weapons; weal sway satisfied tAer they wax allowed to inspect (he baa*.
Demonstrators march through Soviet housing area In Wuensdorf; ark roc* fly wa directed toward Soviet civilian employees competing Ice jobs, bousing, and
Earlylieutenant caughtar for parts in West Germany.
Soviet military captainop lifting in Helmsiedt. West Germany; returned to Soviet authorities.
2presseard incident iaoviet allien was set oa lire by un-
known civilian* while walking la Weal Berlin; could be disinformation on eve of CPSU Congress sine* we have so independent Wart an oouhrmaOo* of this
incident.
of Werneocbeo demanded closure of Soviet military bass because local
orchards were being contaminated with kerosene from th* base.
2*Soviet toMier* stationed in GDR escaped to Federal Republic and asked for
political asylum
30Soviet soldiers stationed In GDR escaped to Lower Saxony and asked for
pobtkaJ axylasn.
Earlyarms dealing between Soviet soldiers and dealers in miliaria broken up In
West Berlin
1military vehicle containing six intoxicated Soviet soldiers stopped by West
Berlin police for -aidaagering motor vehicle trahVublic street. In tbe course of tbe arrest, ihe Over crashed the vehicleolice patrol car. Group detainedest Berlin police station, then handed over to officer from Soviet military authorities in Potsdam
12young Soviet noncommissioned officer requested asylumS military
facility in Frankfurt after deserting from hit unit la eastern Germany.
15Berlin police divert removedifles,toma tic carbine, an automatic
carbine barrel, an antitank rocket, three fragmentation grenades, and five eortcustioa grenades from the Teltow Canal. AH were of Scoet manufacture, and German police felt they were panotsdam trash dump wcapoot cache
Soviet army road march becked by sinking East German erriiians (Soviets were caughtn East German internal affair aad did not caase the incident. |
14toidicr found murdered near Per le berg. Eatt Germany.
7*.
2 Sep M
eptember
crt-T
2 0eicew.
dtuen* fromfft-jp called "Agaiaat Aircraft Nouc" Kl op aloe tantt id tbo etaxtecbea to (be Soviet military airfield ia NeuruppinrotestInst continuing aircraft ttoiso.
A Soviet sentry wu tbot and killed while standing guard at'^ depot near Perteberx. Eait Germany.
Soviet widiennear Magdeburg deaDeautrated ia toe ceater of ta* village against beina icat to the Sovietausaraadtheir laperion ibreeiened them with disciplinary actions.
Soviet forces held an "openerraltling dtiiens to have aootaa to their Bcrlia Brigade.
Soviet vErdicrs tried to rob an East German csaelrcauca store in Whistock. They ea-capedigh-epead police chase. The track they wera tnrued,grenades and btillcti oa tbe autobahn
Local politicians from across the GDR met with the Voltakamme* Committee for Disarmament and Defense to discos* probksns ataoctated with Soviat rorcca.
la the Gsestrowabenachjnegvo was Holes by unidentified casta soldier on guard, ckuncnts of ba tankthe
German police to investigate the iracideat.
A soldier who appeared to be of high rank and his wife contacted authorities in (lessen to request asylum According to tbe Hessian Ministry of the Interior, be wash soldier lUtioned in era tern Germany to have requested asylum in thekn the last two weeks of September
Vyachealav Dashichev advocated the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Germany- H* noted that "there is no lortger any point for our troops to nay In Germany" and that "the devil finds work for idle hands."
Accordingress report citing Soviet military authorities, right-wing extremists were threatening tooviet barracks to celebrate unification.
Soviet acbeeabus was hred
Germans in tbe Tccheatin area.
October
to press reports, tbe Soviet military procurator sought to defend Soviet forces publicly. He claimed that, "Almost all arms sales by Soviet servicemen have been prcvokod by German partners. What Soviet soldier can stand firm at the sightestern car?"
Two Germansoviet gurrd at aa unidentified unit near Muhlhauscn. Germany Guard was ibot ia the leg when he appevbeaded the Germans
Accessing to press reports, diiiooi aad eavirootneoul (roup, ia the PtUss am demonstratedSoviet military activities The citizen* threeto nop deliveries of good* to Soviet fatalities If bring eaercises and iocbb training Bights wanterminated
A yealb-oriented German variety mageiine, Ttmpo, daaexioed it* experience of two of Ka report era -bo claimed they walked unclialleaged Into tbe OtBcers Club
rrununiboe. and .mot roomorOO In Jueterborg. the .eponers auppoaedlyhoulder-fired grenade launcher (RPG-T)elt of antitank grenade* fromorce offtcen for. After cachinghe reporters claim they ksformed lie German pctce of tbe whereabouts of tbe bunod anna.
Soviet and German orficili lign aa agrecaneet oo tbe stationing and withdrawal
of Soviet forenu-
Acooeding to German prea*oviet major applied to Soviet military authorities to leave tbe army and remain ia Garmany. bat was told he wouldave to return to the Soviet Union with hit family. More thearmed Soviet paratroopers surrounded the major's home in OK center of Gotha. The mrsdoff was rcaolvcd when tbe mayor agreed lo return to tbe Soviet Union to apply toand hat family was take* to Kcasca with the tappon of iTmriagian authorities.
Soviet force* cooducted an *ccea bouse" at Weimar. Arxording to Westerti press reports. Soviet aokliers oeenptaiaed to journalists aboat their alleged poorby Soviet military authorities.
A US mtelligence officer traveling with German oiiiiena as partFoer-Wbeel-Drrve Club" outing reported that Sovietthe margtnaraining emu te -approached the citizens for beer and cigarettes. They returned to the German camping site the neat morning wtib items for sale, including wool betaootsadiositers of gasive round* of ammunition reportedly were free.
Sorict soldier found unconscdoui near Potsdam, appeared to have been beaten: died the following day
Tftff appeiutlx Ii Stent Naforn.
Original document.
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