Created: 9/7/1950

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central intelligence agency


his copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's office who require the Information for the performance of their official duties. Further dissemination elsewhere In the department to other offices which require thefor the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for the Department of State

irector of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department o. the Army

Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Ah* Force

of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission.

eputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination

g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

DISTRIBUTION; OKlee of the President National Security Council National Security Resources BoardDeparlmenl of Slate Office of Secretary of Defense Department of Uie Army Department of the Navy* Department of the Air Force Joint Chiefs of Staff Atomic Energy Commission Research and Development Board




estimate Chinese Communist capabilities lor an Invasion of Indochina, the attitudes of the Vietnamese that would affect their will to resist such an invasion, and pertinent aspectsrogram of foreign aid that would beto stimulate the will of the Vietnamese lo resist an Invasion.


the eventhinese Communistof Indochina under presentIt is almost certain that theforces under the French would soon lose all of Vietnam except Cochlnchlna. So long as present political and military conditions continue unaltered, US material aid alonedecisively improve this prospect.

hinese Communist troops are presently deployed near enough to theborder to makehinesewithout appreciabledditional Chinesetroops could arrive at tho border In support ol an invasion within ten days. Some reinforcements might be moved by sea lo rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast. It is also within Chinese Communist capabilities to fur nish air support for an invasion

0 Viet Minh regulars and0 irregulars that make up the rebel forces of Ho Chi Minh possess significant capabilities for expanding their guerrilla operations and thereby increasing the present cost in troops and equipment borne by the opposing French Aid now being provided from Communist

China, moreover. Is giving Ho's army ancapability for an early large-scaleagainst the Frencheveloping potential for conventional warfare.

The operations of the French Armyegulars)ack ofand are In part handicapped by aof adequate material. The most that French ground forces, who receive some sup. port from weak Indigenous forces0 men, can presently accomplish Is the destruction of enemy supplies and thetemporary postponementiet Minh offensive. The French Air Force In Indochina is weak and Its limited capabilities are severely strained by action against the Viet Minh. Tho French Navy possesses forces adequate forof the army in limited amphibiousbut is incapable of maintaining ablockade against the smuggling of arms In balancing the capabilities of theseforces, it becomes apparent that, under presenthinese Communist invasion, which in all probability would be supported by the Vict Minh. could easily pene-uatc French border defenses In Tonkin and

This estimate concerning Chinese Communist capabilities Ishe ibrhtmi',

a.LmeoU of state. Army. Navy, im th. Uto ciact s


withdrawal of defending forces to the south. The strategic Tonkin plain would probably be overrun within six weeks and the retentionrench foothold in the Saigon area would depend upon the provision offrom abroad. If Chineseassistance to the Viet Minh were increased, while foreign aid for the French remained only at the level presently programmed, and the French were unable to develop the support of the Vietnamese people. Ho could eventually drive the French out of Indochina without the direct support of Invading Chinese Communist forces.

In analyzing the probable Vietnam reactionhinese Communist invasion,must be given to the fact that theare in general apathetic towardand antipathetic toward the French. Forced to choose between present tangible French control and the contingency ofby International Communism, even some of those Vietnamese who have someof the nature of Communismwould risk the change In tho Interest of early achievement o( national identity.the Vietnamese dislike the Chinese,of theirapid Chinese Communist occupation of Vietnam would not arouse active popular resistance or widespread rallying to the French or Bao Dai. It might well be met with resignation or opportunistic cooperation.

The overriding preoccupation of Vietnamese intellectuals and common people alike Is tbe issue of independence. The effect of foreign aid on Vietnam will to resist Chineseencroachments must therefore be viewed against this background of Intenseaspirations. If the French should make satisfactory concessions to the spirit of Vietnameserogram ofassistance in Vietnam offering visible improvement in the lot of the common people, combined with military aid sufficient not only to maintain French forces but also to develop an effective national army, could be expected to stimulate the Vietnamese will to resist. The channeling of such aid through thethemselves, subjectertaindegree of French Influence, wouldthe problems of supply but would have the advantage of encouraging Vietnameseto defend the country. Theof such an aid program would be more effective if ithinese Communist invasion. In any event, the effectiveness of the announcement would be seriously lessened iF it were not precededeclaration ofFrench concessions and followed by the prompt and subntantial delivery of such aid.



Under present political and militaryInhinese CommunistIn force would quickly overrun Tonkin and severely threaten the maintenance ofrench foothold in the south. US material aid alone cannot decisively change this

in the event of an invasion, effectiveopposition will depend at least as much on substantial modification of the present anti-French attitude of the Vietnamese people, as on the French Army or foreign assistance. French guarantees of independence, iffollowed by the expansion andof an indigenous army, would stimulate some Vietnamese will to resist. Evenappropriate French concessions to Vietna-rnese nationalism, however, successfulopposition to the Chinese Communists would depend on the amount of time available toopularly supported Indigenous regime and on the speed with which effective Vietnamese forces could be created.

ommunist Military Capabilities.

Any invasion of Indochina by the Chinese Communists would probably be undertaken in cooperation with the forces of Ho Chi Minh. Sizable Chinese Communist military forces are in position to intervene in Indochinareports of actual and scheduledmovements of certain Chinesefield forces,roops remain deployed along the Indochinese border. These units could launch an Invasion ofwithout appreciable forewarning. reliable reports do not indicate the presence of armored units on the Indochinaivision of armored cars, plus aof tanks attached to the Fourth Field Army, are stationed in South Chinailes of the frontier. dditional Chinese Communist

troops could arrive at the Indochina border within ten days to bolster Initial invading forces. Even in the eventimultaneous assault on Taiwan, these reinforcements would be available and would bring the potentialforceotal of atroops. In view of the Chinese Communists' improving capability for water lift, it Isthat some invasion forces might be moved by sea to Viet Minh-held sections of thecoast. There is no evidence, however, of Chinese Communist preparations forove

Although there have been no Indications of any significant build-up of ChineseAh Force strength In Southwest China and although this air force has not yetin combat, theperational combat types (Including fighters and light bombers) In the Chinese Communist Air Force could furnish effective air support to operations In Indochina. There are sixin Chinailes of the Tonkin border. In addition, construction of newand tbe restoration of others InChina are reportedly In progress in the Tonkin-Kwangsl border area and on Hainan Island.

Vicl Minh Military Capabilities.

The forces of Ho Chi Minh, which have been engaged in resistance activities against the French sincere capable of expanding their operations. Ho'scommonly known as the "Vietossesses0 regular troops and anrregulars. The Viet Minh forceshmer Issaraks in Cambodiassaraks in Laos.

The Viet Minh forces are geared primarily for guerrilla warfare. Theew task forces, each totaling as many as three to Ave thousand men and equipped with adequate infantry weapons and some artillery, pointseveloping capabil-

ity foe more conventional warfare. Under present circumstances, the Viet Minh should have little difficulty In maintaining relative freedom of action throughout most ofwhile simultaneously supportingof resistance within French-occupiedand continuing to harass French lines of communication. In addition, the Viet Minh is capable of seizing ono or more French border outposts and holding themhort time at least.

Following the de jure recognition of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" byChina and theeneral plan for closer collaboration between the Chineseand the Viet Minh probably was formulated. As many asohousand Viet Minh troops are being trained inChina. There Is evidence that the Chinese Communists have supplied the Viet Minh with significant quantities of materiel, probably confined to small arms, ammunition, mortars, and light artillery. Access tofacilities In Communist China, theof routes and facilities for supply, and the possibility of accelerating recruitment give the Viet Minh the potential capabilities forarge-scale offensive against the French at an early date.

Capabilities of French-Controlled Forces.

French ground, naval and air forces Inare under the operational control oi OHQ. Armed Forces in the Far Eastsrench regular ground forces totalleden. roops In the armies of theStates, although subject to the nominal political control of these states, are under FAEO operational control. In addition thereuasi-military and miscellaneous indigenous troops under over-all FAEO Of these local forces, only thearmy, at present weak and Ineffective, has the potential for developing into aforce. French ground forces areof penetrating the Viet Mlnh-held areas of Indochina bul at the expense of garrison strength engaged in pacification duties The French haveack of aggressiveness. The French-controlled ground forcesualof the Viet Minh forces and the de fense of the China border. Indications an that current emphasis is an the former. Un der these circunurtarices, the most they car hope to achieve In the Immediate future Is tht destruction of enemy supply caches and the consequent postponementarge-scale Viet Minh offensive.

The strength of the French Ah- Force to Indochina, which Is severely strained by its actions against Viet Minh forces, presentlyighters and fighter-reconnaissance aircraft.ransports andiaison planes. The level of serviceability of fighter aircraft, now aboutercent, will probably continue to drop as maintenance shortages become more acute Many of the French airfew tn number and generally in poorvulnerable to sabotage and some even to direct Vlot Minh attack.

French naval forces are adequate forthe army In small-scale amphibious operations and lor conducting raids against the rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast. Their inability toompleteof the coast is demonstrated by the extent of over-water arms smuggling now in progress. French Naval Forces, Far East, stationed in Indochina, consistmall craft and ships, andircraft mannedersonnel Vessels In the most important categoriesstationed In Indochina waters include one old cruiser,leet minesweepers, two LSTs. nine submarine chasers of various typesumber of supporting service andcraft. Naval aircraft include nine patrol bombers andeconnaissance aircraft.

Compof ison ol Opposing Forces.

A Chinese Communist invasion coulddifficulty penetrate the extended French perimeter in Tonkin and rapidly overcome Ihe defending forces. Although the French Air Force would be capable of limited defensive action in the event of an Invasion, thererave risk of Its being overwhelmed if the Chinese Communists committed their air force in support of the attack. On the ground, only in the coastal border area of the strategic Tonkin plain, where the French are orgonlzed



in some depth, could effective resistancehinese assault be axpected and even In this area inferior front line strength and the lack of reserves would inevitablya withdrawal It Is estimated that aCommunis: forceo ISO thousand could overrun the whole Tonkin plain within six weeks, but that the French couldemporary beachhead in the vicinity ofA successful second-phaso Chinese Communist drive further to the south would take longer and require additional troops. In this circumstance, French maintenanceirm foothold around Saigon would depend upon the provision of military reinforcements from abroad.

Although French forces in Indochina are at presentrench offensive inwith considerable outside aid, probably could carry through to the border and might even effectively Isolate tbe Viet Minh from overland Chinese Communist aid. However, such an offensive probably would not result In the destruction of the Viet Minh forces. If Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minhtoseemsif the French receive no more foreign assistance than Is now programmed and are unable to develop the support of the Vietnamese people, the Vict Minh could eventually defeat tbe French In Indochina without the help of an overt Chinese Invasion.

Key Vietnamese Attitudes.

Key Vietnamese attitudes which would largely determine their conduct In the eventhinese Communist Invasion are their views concerning: international Communism, the local Chinese, Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, and the French.

The Vietnamese people,hole, know little about international Communism. The opposite poles of political attraction inare represented by the Vlot Minh and the French-Vietnamese regime- The fact that the Viet Minh is an Instrument of International Communism causes the average Vietnamese little or no concern. Although most educated Vietnamese arc aware that the espousal of Communism entails the risk of Soviet control, it is probableto choose between actual French control and hypothetical SovietVietnamese Intellectuals would be willing to grantrial.

Among ali classes of the Vietnamesethe local Chinese, who compose the majority of Uie small merchant group, are generally disliked. The memory of previous Vietnamese wars of liberation against Chinese overlords and the Chinese occupationainful. To thethe Chinese are unpopular, regardless of their Ideology.

Ho Chi Minh's Viet Mmh Is widely regarded by all classes of the Vietnamese population as the potential liberator of Vietnam from the French yoke. Most Vietnamese Intellectuals, even some of those who are in Uie Bao Dal Government, regard armed opposition to Uie French as Justifiable and, to this extant, ap-prove of the Viet Minna activities. Although in some areas of Tonkin where the Viet Minh has used scorrtied-earth tactics, the peasantry has reportedly become bitter, such hostility (if measured In terms of popularity of the Bao Dal Government) has failed to produceresults.

The French ara tha targets of historical Vietnamese antipathy, rooted In decades of colonial rule. Postwar French policy has dona lltUo to diminish this antipathy and the desire for independence has grown progressively sUonger. The French today ore regarded by almost all Vietnamese as Uie prime obstacle to Uie attainment of these intense nationalistic aspirations.

Proboblo Conduct in the Event of Invosion.

In allhinese Communistof Tonkin would be rapidly accomplished.esult, the Tonklnese Intelligentsia, most of whom would be basically opposed to Uie enlry of Chinese troops, would have lltUeto manifest opposition in anand effective manner. Those now In Ho's camp probably would continue loyal to him; the rest could be expected to make themselves as inconspicuous as possible while awaiting developments.

Elsewhere in Vietnam, Uie attitude ofIntellectuals would be largely affected by the determined nature of Uie Frenchand by Uie prospects for US intervenUon, cither locally or as part of general US-Com-

China, hostilities. Absence of strong defensive action by the French or lack of US Interest In the conflict would probably force those Vietnamese,fearful ofsee the futility of solitary resistance, to accept Communist rule.

In contrast to the Intelligentsia, the mass of the Vietnamesethe absence of eflec live and popular an tl-Communis',would accept the burden of Chinese occupation much as they haveIt In the past.act with Communist China which offered Ho ostensible controlost invasion Vietnamese government, would probably be welcomed, at least at the outset, by the vast majority of Vietnamese. Even evidences of Chinese Imperialism subsequent to the Invasion probably would be rationalized by the majority so long as the Ho government did not actively oppose such actions.

Foreign Aid and the Vietnamese Will to Resist Invasion.

All problems connected with theof the Indigenous will tohinese Communist invasion of Indochina by means of foreign aid inevitably arc related to the Issue of nationalism.hole, both Vietnamese Intelligentsia and the mass of tbe people are preoccupied with the problem of their

The character of whatever aid Is granted In the immediate future will have little effect on the Vietnamese because of the presentof mutual Franco-Vietnamese distrust. So long as French monopolization of the key elements of administrative and military power continues, the Vietnamese are likely to view foreign mililary aidevice actuallyto strengthen French hegemony and would probably either be apathetic to aCommunist invasion or would welcome the invading forces. Economic health, agriculture, transportation, andengender some gratitude but, If the allocation of such aid were subject lo French control, its effect on tho Vietnamese will tohinese Communist invasion would be minimized.

If. instead. It were assumed that aof the difficulties arising !rcmFranco-Vietnamese distrust had been achieved, the character of foreign old required to stimulate the will of the Vietnamese people tohinese Communist invasion could be estimated asrogram ofassistance which. In the manner of the Orlffln Mission proposals, would offer visible Improvement In the lot of the common people;ilitary aid beyond that necessary to maintain French forces In the area andto permit the developmentizable and adequately equipped national army. It Is recognized that the development of anVietnam armyong-range task made difficulthortage of trained personnel and by the fears of the French authorities that they may not be able totrong native army. Nevertheless, theand the rapid Implementation of plans to createorce would at once stimulate the spirit of Vietnamese resistance toand lessen antipathy toward the French.

The utilization of French managerialis essential to efficient administration of foreign aid In Vietnam. However, as earlier discussion has shown, Vietnamese suspicions are such that unless the indigenousgovernment Is clearly recognized as the authority through which aid Is dispensed, the local reaction will be unfavorable. In this connection, It Is probable that If the French were willing to make full concessions inof form, the Vietnamese would be willing to concede much In matters of substance these circumstances, French participation (possibly with third-party or UNs paid advisors and techniciansubstantial managerial function within the framework of the Vietnamese government, might well prove toatisfactoryformula. The device of channeling aid through the Vietnamese, subject toegree of French influence, would do much to develop respect for the Bao Dai regime and concomitantly toietnameseto aid in defense of their country

A final factor in stimulating the will cf Uie Vietnamese to resist Invasion is that of timing, which although subsidiary In importance to the French attitude toward grantingIs nevertheless significant. If what-


ever aid lhat may be offered Isunless the announcement of aid Is

subsequent to, rather than prior to, anin the light of practicable delivery dates,

sion by the Chinese Communists, thea promise of assistance made against the

on the Vietnamese will to resist will beof French guarantees of lndc-

regardicss of other factors which mayden ce will be followed by disillusionment

terizc the timing of the announcement. disappointment.



Introduction and Conclusion!.

Communist China at present possesses the capabilityuccessful Invasion ofIf Communist China,articipant In the world Communist movement, were called upon to invade Indochina. It couldbe persuaded to Initiate such anChinese Communist militaryelsewhere would not necessarilyagainst an Invasion of Indochina because the Chinese Communists possess the forces necessary for militaryorIndochina, Korea, Taiwan, Tibet. Hong Kong, and Macao.

Despite this general capability and despite the existence of Chinese Communist military concentrations along the Indochina border, adequate for the task, it is estimated that an open Chinese Communistand capable of being launched with little or no preliminaryImprobable0 because considerations (from theof Ho Chi Minh, the Chineseand International Communism) favoring such action appear to be outweighed byopposing It It ts highly probable, however, that the Chineseill coniinue to expand military assistance to the Viet Minh Torccs (by measures short of open invasion)cale sufficient to provide thaw forces with the capability ofil ted, objectives0 and. assuming that the French receive no more aid than is presently programmed, of eventually expelling the French without the aid of aCommunist invasion.

2. Types of Chinese Communist Action.

The two maior courses of action open to the Chinese Communists In support of the Viet Minh are: (a) overt intervention in the form of an Invasion; or (b) assistance short of open Invasion.

a. Overtndicator!:

Recent Chinese Communist activity in the two border provinces of Kwongsl andconstruction and Improvement of roods, railroads, and airbe construed as positive Indicators of anInvasion. It Is equally valid, however, to Interpret these activities as indicators of an Increase in the flow of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh and its subsidiary move merit In Laos and Cambodia.

The presence ofhinesetroops In the Indochina borderthoy could launch an invasion without appreciablealso be construedositive indicator. Theof these troops, however, can be explained tn part by the need for "pacification" forces in Southwest China, where thousands of anti-Communist guerrillas have been operating. It Is also noteworthy that the present strength of Chinese Communist troops In the Indochina border area is only one-third of that reported in May of this year.

actors Favoring Intervention;

The following factorshineseinvasion of Indochina

hinese Communist invasion ofwould be the most rapid means of build-

This estimate was prepared under urgent procedures upon the request of the, Dwrtmentlalc'ecause of the limited Umc available It was not feasible to integrate It withhich was already in process of coordination.

The intelligence oreanltations of Uie Departments of State. Navy, and the Air Force have concurred In Mm report; lor the dissent of the Intelligence Organisation ol the Department of the Army, ace Enclosure A.

Ing up the military strength of the anti-French forces.

(b) Moreover. Undoubtful that the French will be able to provide large-scaleto their forces in Indochina in sufficient tune to oppose such an Invasion

(e) Further, decisive Communist action in Indochina0 would expel the French and bring that area under Communist controlany appreciable build-up in the military strength of the western Woe could be achieved.

(d) In addition, the fall of Vietnam to the Communists would hasten the accommodation of Burma and Thailand to Communist power.

(a) On Uie other hand,hinese Communist invasion of Indochina0 not be Immediately decisive, and should US or other western forces subsequently Intervene, the invasion would serve to containmilitary strength of the western bloc in inconclusive peripheral warfare tn the Far East.

actors Opposing Intervention: The foUowlng factors appear to reduce the prospects for an invasion under present

Without major external assistance to the French and their supporters. Communist "liberation" of Indochina would beultimately without resort to overtCommunistn order to achieve his obJecUve of expelling Uie French, Ho Chiat present Is estimated to0 regularrregulars, and extensive manpowerand probably prefers materiel and technical-advisory assistance rather than direct Chinese Communist intervention.

The presence of Chinese Communist troops inaddition to weakening the nationalistic appeal to the Viet Minharouse local anti-Chineseanderious source of command conflict between Peiping and the Viet Minh leadership.

World Communism thus far has sought to present Communist aggression under the guise of indigenous "civil wars."

'Sec coneluiion ot.

ommunist invasion would havenegaUve effects on the presentlystates of Asia, particularly India.

(e) Communist China's prospects forin Uie UN and UN-sponsoredwould be eliminated and thefor Uie establishment of diplomaticwith non-orbit powers would be

he USSR may hesitate to urge ora Chinese Communist Invasion ofbecause to do so would risk Uie possible substitution of Peiping's influence, backed by Communist forces in "occupation" of Vietnam, for Us own present remote control over Uie Ho Chi Minh regime.

(g) In addition to tbe specific factorsabove, an open Communist invasion of Indochina would greatly Increase the risk of global war.

b. Assutance Short of Open Invasion.

A second general course of action open to the Chinese Coimnunlsts In support of Ho Chi Minh Is the expansion of mUltary assistance short of open Intervention. The Chineseduring Uie past six to eight months have provided substantial assistance to the Viet Mtnh in Uie form of materiel, technical-advisory aid, training, and personnel. They have Uie capability of greatly Increasing this assistance.

ateriel is now reported to be flowing into Indochina In Increasing amounts, not only across the border but also from Chinese coastal ports via Hainan. Communications in Southwest China and in Tonkin are being improved and Uie Chinese Communists have secured control of many former Nationalist-held islands off the south China coast Both these developments greatly facilitate theof materiel Into Indochina. The Viet Minh has been short of heavy equipment, particularly artillery, and although Uie present volume is unknown, considerable quantities of such materiel probably will be forthcoming from the Chinese Communists in the future.

echnical-advisory aid could andwill be greatly expandod by Increasing the number of persons detailed to Indochina


by enlarging tbe already substantial jalnlng program for Indocblnese within rhlna.

a lo personnel, "volunteer" soldiers are believed to have already Inconspicuously Joined the Viet Minh forces tn small numbers. Although Individual "volunteers" probably will be further encouraged, such reinforcement Is not likely to attain extensive proportions since the language problem, among others, willa limiting factor. Problems entailed in utilizing "volunteers" can and probably wui be partly overcome by Integrating small units of Chinese Communists Into the Viet Minh forces, operating under Viet Minh command. Those elements most acceptable to the Viet Minh probably would bepecializedsuch as artillery, tank, mortar, engineer, signal, and medical units, capable of providing support and services now limited orlo the Viet Minh. It is Improbable that units larger than battalions would befor fear of exposing direct Chinese Communist Involvement and because of the increased applicability of those considerations which reduce the prospects of open Chinese Communist Invasionbove).

3. Prospects for Success of Chinese Communist Courses of Action.

If the Chinese Communists openly Invade Indochina under present circumstances. It is almost certain lhat defending forces under the French would soon lose all of Vietnam excepthinese Communist forceould probably overrun llie Tonkin plain during the first six weeks of operation, leducing the French position in the northemporary beachhead In the vicinity of Haiphong.econd-phaseCommunist drive further to the south would lake longer and require additional troops. Peiping Is capable of providing the forces required from areas south of tbe Yangtze River without Immediate jeopardy to other possible operations.

Available information does not permit firm quantitative estimates of either materielIn the hands of tbe Viet Minh forces or of present or future rates of flow from China. Supply from China Is presently confined to transport over secondary overland routes and by coastal smuggling, with French tOKCMpositions on the main overland supply routes. In addition, Viet Minh forces up to now have shown no Indicationapability for orthodox warfarecale approaching that essential If French forces are to befrom Tonkin. Although thesedo not rule out the possibility that the Viet Minh may already be equipped and trained in the use of heavy arms on ascale, with Its presently estimatedthe Viet Minh probably could notustained offensive capable of driving the French from Indochina

Nevertheless, It Is estimated that during the autumn0 the Viet Minh will beaunching the Initial phase of such anwhich could result In the seizure or destruction of several key French border posts. Neutralizing these French strongholds, into further reducing French strength through atttltlonal warfare, would permit the flow of heavy equipment from China to the Viet Minh in greatly increased quantity. of this equipment, assuming that the French receive no more aid than isprogrammed, would enable the Viet Minh toreponderance of force over the Frenchatter of months Meanwhile, the earliest reliable teal of the actual military strength of the Viet Minh forces will be their showing in the campaigns of limited objectives which it Is anticipated they will undertake in the coming weeks.





Office ol the Assistant Chief of, dissents for the following reason:

Page, second paragraph, lastas neverroop strength figure higheror the area of South and Southwest China (Yunnan and westhis area includes more territory than the border region defined in page, second paragraph, first sentence, as nowhinese Communist troops.igure for the larger area was carriednut troop strength ba the border region as denned above was approximately the same in0 as it Is now, that.


fully accepts the accuracy ofroop strength figures. The discrepancy in CIAiews arisesifference in the definition of "border area" The "border area" referred to in this paper onecond paragraph, last sentence,trip of land approximatelyiles in uniform depth along the Indochina border from Mcngtxu to the Gulf of Tonkin (see enclosedborderowever, appears on the one hand to exclude the Kwangtung coastal strip adjacent toand on the other to include the Kunming areailes from the border. The conclusions of the paper are not affected by this difference in definition.

Original document.

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