Created: 2/3/1950

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Soviet Walkout One major purpose of the Soviet UN walkout was probably to contribute

to the Soviet effort to isolate China from Wesiern in-flucc by making tt as difficult as possible for Ihe US lo reverse Its China policy. The dramatic Soviet boycott of the UN, along with abuses of US officials and property ln China, makes US recognition of the Peiping regime Increasingly difflcul' in the face of opposition ln Ihe US Congress and press The USSR Is, therefore,ituation in which US recognition of the ChineseRegime could be widely construed and propagandized as an outright surrender lo Soviei pressure. The walkout, although ostensibly designed lo force the early unsealing of Nationalist delegales, may actually have delayed the shift lo Communist Chinese representation in ihe UN.

Although Chinese and Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minn (Communist leader in Indochina) is primarily aimed at fostering revolutionary activity in Southeast Asia, this action may also be parts of Ihe Soviet effort to minimize contacts between China and the West. Such Soviet moves which effectively postpone Ihe establishment of US and French relations with China correspond to Ihe general Soviet policy of discouraging Western contacts wilh Ihe Soviet Satellites in Europe.


Mao-Stalin Talks Although no reliable information on

the progress of the Moscow talks between Mao and Stalin is available, the pattern of Sino-Soviet relations suggestsew treaty which will probably strengthen the position of Stalinists in the Chinese Communist Party will be signed in the near future.

Neither Soviet nor Chinese Communist leaders would attempt toransparently "unequal" treaty on the Chinese people, who are openly suspicious of Sino-Sqvietny protocols damaging to Mao's position, such as the joint use and development of Chinese military facilities, will be secret, and the publishedof the treaty will be innocuous. The treaty,eparate agreement, probably will provide for Soviet credits sufficiently extensive to be impressive paper evidence of Soviet aid to China. The number and quantity of commodities to be exchanged between the two nations under the new trade agreement will be increased, and the agreement will appear, superficially, to be mutually beneficial.

Although special political arrangements with Manchuria and Sinkiang and provisions for "joint development" of those areas will bring the border regions further under Sovietthe treaty will camouflage the process by which Soviet influence in China may become Soviet control.


Soviet Pressure The extension of Soviet recognition to the United States of Indonesia and to Ho Chi Minli (Communist leader opposing the Bao Dal Government in Indochina) may presage greatly increased Soviet pressure against the Western position in Southeast Asia. In Indochina, support from the USSR and the Chinese Communists will probably strengthen resistance to Bao Dai and may turn the balance in favor of Ho. Moreover, the extension of Soviet recognition to Hoounteract the expected political impact of Western recognition of Bao Dai:robably increase the reluctance of neighboring countries to follow the Western lead in recognizing Bao Dai. In Indonesia, where political loaders are attempting toeutral position between the US and the USSR, Soviet recognition will arouse little suspicion that the USSR may eventually use Its mission to work with subversive groups. Near the Chinese border in the Burmese hill state of Kengtung, Chinese "Communist" freebooters are creating enough trouble to arouse some apprehension ln Rangoon.


Original document.

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