ESTIMATE OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO NEW WEAPONS IN 1951 AND 1954.

Created: 2/2/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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1. Vhe following ii an estimate of Soviet capabilities to employbroadly defined, in the ereatajor war's occurringpresent aad

1.1 Moalc.BMBB

The atoaio explosion within the USSR in9 la bell eyed to have been the first Buceaaafal Soviet atonic bomb test. Thla sweat brooght late focna infornatloa not prewlowaly Integrated Into estimated of Soviat atomic capabilities. It ie new estimated, aaatunlng plutonium bombs of roughlyllotons explosive power, that the atowio boas stockpile available to the msSlVill' be:

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Although the DSSB has the baeie facilities for pro toe Ing small awaatltiea ef radiological warfare agents, it ia believed these will not be abetween now and However, theof atomic bombs to neutralise major harbor Installations'by their residual radiations froa an underwater bomb burst mast be poaeidered aa probable.

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The USSR lg obviously Interested ta EV research aad envelopment. BV sabotage la well within present Soviet eapabilltiee. It ie estimated that hulk production ofagents may by now be adeenate for limited military operations.

1.* Chemical

The Soviet Union is now capable of large-scale employment

of standard CM agents. Limited strategic and tactical woe of the

nerve gasesgenta) will be possible ttnlflftflHUHJfll

o-Sarfnag. Ia addition toype alasllee which may be presumed to be in production in the DSSBate depending largely oa the priori troviet missile development has progressed to the pointeapons are being manufactured in at least small It Is possible that th'*ather ernde surface-to-air guided missile ready'for use by1 or possibly Ihey probably would not have more thanach missiles.

r-to-Air. It la not believed that the Soviet-unien will hare any air-te-air guided missiles available for use before

t is believed that the Soviet union has the capability of producing thend theissiles.

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There ia little or no direct Intellicence regarding Soviet development of proxlnltj famea. Germanehe BSSB haveame for guided missile nee. Because of adequate epaoe, printed oirctilto ware not used, bnt Itore complicatedate is In production. American manufacturing technlaiiea are believed to be known to the Soviet a, and the fact that Sveden and other aoropean countries hare developed sophlfltlcated fuzen leads to the conclusion 'that the Soviets probably have developed and produced similar nWV

The Soviets have all information necessary for tbe development of BOM. They have used "window" la the past, and this and elallar reflection devices will almost certalnlj be encountered la the future. In addition, electronic Jamming will, probably be enoowntered at all freeuenolea up to thareglea by

At tba preaent tlae tbe Soviet Dnioa la eagaged laJamming of radio oowaminieatleaa at lower frecnenclee. To date thla jamming baa been confined aleoat entirely: te tha voice ef America broadcaats. However, tha experience gained by tbe Sovietb la tola area, aad particularly tbe facllltlea already eatabllahed, are each that Jamming coulderloaatioa to radio comaunloatlens in general.

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wfyji) The USSR haa established rather erode early warning networks st both Xastern and Western approaches using sowe wlerovaTe eenlpment. Inadequacies in present eeulp-ment may be offset by effective coordination of ths network; such an extensive coordination network has already been established to control the Toice of Awerlea Jamming program. Byt is reasonable to expect effective XV radar coverage at all, except low, altitudes lo the Western approaches with at leaat crude eore rage ln the Bast.

iir'i^tm^Vtiii The OS SBprobably have enoughpparatus toight-fighter airoraft by there haa been little knowledge of use of passive AI equipment, though the possibility cannot be overlooked. These aight fighters can be expected to have tall-varning radar.

flronnfl flentmllfd. Groundadar working with aircraft employing tbe-ilmdn^on^ref-blr: iatereept equipmente mentioned above may-be expected near1 key: -defense areas. Inhowewer, principal reliance will be on visual interception with content eetabllshed.

fit^'flitntwtfi 'swataWJ.. The DSSB is believed to have reeelwed automatlo gen-laying radars throngh lend-leaae together with firs control dlrootore ef the most advanced design for use with them. Thla makee it reasonable to expect limited radar directed antiaircraft fire in defense of key InBtallatlonB

Tho USSB communlcatione facilities are capable ofriIdIdob requirements imposed by war in the western areaUSSR. Host important, they are aaeenate for tbe rapportair defense system la tbe western area. adio system whieh Is well developed andwith tbe wire system. The total facilities arej iji "

while satisfying current nseda of the USSB, the eaetera eystea la not adequate for the fall support of large-scale military aad air defenaa operations and la relatively Insecure.

The development and modernisation of the 'common! eat ions aye-

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teaajor objective of the OSS* technical program bmt bythe eommealeatlons capabilities will mat bava

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It la Improbable that the falter er other elesed-oyoleprocesses will be developed beyond tbe trial atage lat la net probable that tbe Soviets will bare operational submarines with deeper-diving eharacterietlea than tba German typey that date.

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Byhe Sevieta will have available eoplea of allWorld Vmr II German Influence mines. Ia addition, lt le poaaible that any combination of pressors, magnetic, and acoustic actuation systems under development by tbe Germans at tbe end of

tha war may be ln

Brthe Soviets will hare available copies of all operational World War II German torpedoes with pat torn-miming devices, wire-control, actlwe and paaelve homing heads, eto.

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Byydrofoil surface craft will probably not have progressed beyond the prototype improvemeat stag*.

2. The following la an eetlmate of Soviet capabilities to employin the eveatajor war It ehould be notedthe estimates for each weapon are considered to be reasonable,eomo doubt that the total Soviet research, development, andwill permit the estimated performaBce oa all weapons Thus, the eetlmatee preaented below ara prebahly,maximum,;be realised to Tarring degrees depending on tbe priorities ofvhleh are at present largely

2.1

Trtdw'e'^iOT. The Integration of tbo available information in the light of the9 atomic explosion la theocs not produce aaeaalngfal estimate of Soviet atonicas of Bovever. if the BUpioai*'types; ef'mvomie' boaba developing roughlySlotons explosive power are assumed for oaloulatlon, the Soviet atomle bomb stockpile'ine estimated to beoabs.

eaaaroW roVpflvaionfeent. There le oaaentially noon Soviet atonic bomb research, but it le probable that they will have developed an atoalc warhead for guided missiles. The preaent Soviet heavy water program will provide certain essential raw materials for the developmenthermo-nuclear bomb. If this development le prosecuted.vigorously, it la possible that they maybe rmo-nuclear bomb by this time. However, there le no basis cow for estimating tbe nun-ber of the rmo-nuclear bonba, ifhat nay be

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: Tbeill have the baelo facilities for the production of small quantities of radlologianl warfare agents lnad may have the facilities for the production ofaatltieV (teas of eegmcnrlee) of BV agents, depending on.Where the emphaele in placed la the construction af facilities betweenfpbw and

2-3

Sovlete may have expanded their facilities fox

bulk prodnetlon of Be" agents sufficiently to permit large-scale biological warfare. They will probably,have devleed;new: agents and teebniquee for BV sabotage. Soviet developments ln BV detection and defense probably will not have developed far enough to give tbe BBSB effective protection agalnat BV attack from other natlone. Thla eonelderatlon may limit tbe circumstances under which tbe USSH would employ BV.

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Byhounion should bo capable of producing nerve gaeesgente) ln sufficient quantity for large-seale

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Based on extrapolation fron very meager evidence, theeetlaate la Bade of the production of guided missiles lnfor operational uee up to

with greatly'increased accuracy

tf>-iif. Vasserfall-Schmettarling missiles avail-

t able2 with United accuracyuses; imp ro red accuracy* wi th homing head added.

i'p-"in>Srirfnrn. It la possible that

r Various adaptations of the* and

robably will be available? &

but-with peor:

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hare BTallable for operational useimited'scale aa air-to-surface missile with accuracy comparable to similar missiles now under development iu the United Si^te.aV* PmilmltT Inif'i

Tor tbe reasons discussed under1 estimate lat Id reasonable to assume that* the Soviets should havesoobistleated and rugged proximity fusee la quantity produotion.

Bflnio-CmntCI

In addition to thaasing techniques men-tloned lnbove,* electronic Jamming techniques vlll probably have been extended up tomc It la considered likely that theasing of tbe Tolce of America broadcasts mentioned Ine directed ultimately toward eerioua dleruptloc of international radio telecommunications. b, therefore, lt Is possible that the Soviets could aarloualy disruptwithout affecting their own oooaunleatlonfl oyeteme.

lartwwrnlpftibf). Assuming .reasonable pro-greas in the development of mlorowave equipment the-early' waming networke discussed Inhould prov^dm-good. altitude eoverage by

Airtbe.csSB win prebefcly

have active Al equipment operatingand in liriraown 'numbere In quantitlee limited only by aircraft and trainedV ffrrmrinti. rained personnel and equipment will be adequate to permit radar direction of substantially all fighter Fire Oontrol SyntraB. The production of additional copies of the radar fire control equipment mentioned Inay make possible radar directed antiaircraft fire in all areas of military importance

2.9

Olven three ond one-half additional years for derelopment, the conamnieatloaa system vill b'e cooaldarably strengthened in all atural corollary of tbe CSSB's Jamming program, wire communication will have undergone the greatest development andore laportant role, particularly in the west. onsequence, the ontlre systeaAwlll he much noro secure and traffic-handling capacity will be auch increased, but byhe eastern system will still be relatively weak. The system covering Veatern USSR vill be almost fully developed and modernised oa the principal routea.

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.By the trueehould be achieved by USSR through successful completion of ourrant propulsion plant Operating depths and speeds will have Increasedto make the Sovietuch mora difficult'"weapon to combat than at present.

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Byhe current mine development program In the USSR ahould have produced further refinements in actuating ay atame but no fundamental changes la mine design.

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Byoviet torpedoes will be improved ln range, speed, reliability, snd seleotlvity. but faw fundamental changes are

ydrofoil surface craft should hare been developed in the TJSSB to the point of being operationally important.

Original document.

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