CENTRAL ISTELLIGE'GE AGESTT
MELKRUDuH
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AlignaentB aad Major Psychological Warfare Vulrjorabilitioa in tie Event of Bar before1
meraorandnn was prepared at tbe request of tho Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staffummary estimate of politicaln the assumed ovent of war before1 and aanalysis of salient psychological warfare vulnerabilities, ore compre-bonslvo analysis of psychological warfare factors is in process.
The outbreakeneral Bar before1 Is assumed for ths purposes of this estimate.
In tho assumed ciroinstances, the immediate Soviet purpose into war vould be to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the Western Powers and to ensure the security of tha USSR by militaryof Western Europe and tba Hear
tbe OSSR regards political and psychological warfare as Integral rather than incidental in the waging of war. Rot only wouldoviot capabilitieo in thia respect be eorploitod to the utmost tomilitary operations, but the military operations themselves would be designed to support and facilitate political revolution.
4* In important respects the USSR le itself vulnerable to political and psychological warfare, but those vulnerabilities are latent and could not be exploited fully until the mechanism of Soviet police oontrol had been disrupted and effective allied support of disaffeotod elements was at heal.
5. The allies of the OSSR would be the European Satellite States (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, anduter Mongolia, North Korea, and China. Several of these Soviet allien are vulnerable to psychological warfare, and their proximity to Ooatern base areas increaooe the potentialities for exploitation.
Bote* The intelUgenee erganieatlons of the Departmento of State,and the Air Force hove concurred in this report. ^
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natioos are at preaent and otlUe aligned with the Rest, bat either their fin adherence tola eobject to doubt or their ability to aaintaln their poalUon
la uncertain. CInsurgonta already an noil established In Indochina and Buna. These couatrlea say bo brought under Soviet oontrol beforeeopardising other parts of Southeast lale. Other areaa whose alignment Is comparatively precarious an Yugoslavia, Western Germany, Austria, and Japan.
nations allied or aligned with the united States would bet
j. The north Atlantis treaty States: Canada, Iceland, Borway, Denmark, tho United lingdcm, tho Netherlands, Belgium, Urseobourg, France, Italy, and Portugal, with theirposseaalono.
!>. Other recipients ofilitary aidi Oneee, Turkey, Iran, Southern Korea, and the Phlllpplnea.
a- Other members of the Brltlah CcoDoaeealth, not signatories
of the Berth Atlantic Treaty! South Africa, Ceylon, Australia, and Rev Zealand.
A, The British Arab alii as i Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.
1. The other American republics.
other cations woold probably be initially neutral. Bonesympathetic with the DSSB or likely to Join It in aggression. Mostdisposed to reslat Soviet attack, and would look to the Unitedaid in that ease. ew might eventually bo persuaded to becomeallies of the United States, even If not attacked.
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JOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE VUUIKRADILITIffi IW THB EVENT OP WAR BKPDRB1
THE USSR
The outbreakeneral war before1 Is assumed for tha purposes of this estimate. Such an occurrence' is conceivable only as the result of Soviet initiative. The assumptionoviet decision to resort to war within the period under consideration Implies tha further assumption of conviction on the part of Soviet leaders thati (a) the progressive economic recovery, political coalescence, and military rehabilitation of ffestem Europe, in alliance with the United State's, posed an intolerable threat to the security of the USSR; (b) it hadimperative to act before the relative strength of the nest had been furtherhe trend toward tho strengthening of the Hast could be reversedar envisaged as United in time and scope; and (d) the USSR had sufficient military power to winar0
War
In the assumed circumstances, the in edlate So vie', purpose into war would be to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the Western Powers and to ensure the security of the USSR by mllltnry occupation ofern Europe and the Near East. Corollary objectives would be to Seise and convert to Soviet use the resources of the conquered aroa, thus greatly enchanolng the potential strength of the USSR in relation to that of tho' -surviving capitalist states, and- to reconstruct the states of western iiurope as Satellites on the Eastern European model.
Capabilities for Political and Psychological Warfare.
In the Soviettate of political and psychological warfare is the normal relationship between Coirnuniat and capitalist atatoa. Armed conflict is merely the employment ofana in the conduct of this continuing struggle* Thus, even in the eventesort to military aggression, political and psychological warfare would be regarded as integral and basic rather than incidental to the business of waging, war.
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In conducting political and psychological warfare, the Kremlin has at Its disposal not only the apparatus of the Soviet atate, but alao that of the International Communist movement, in which every disciplined Conrmnlat ia required to pay primary and undeviatlng allegiance to the Interests of the USSR.
The agencies of Soviet propaganda, Soviet diplomacy, and Conmunlat agitation are constantly at work trying to spread diailluaionaent and disaffection in the non-Soviet world, diaoredit non-Soviet governments, create antagonisms among them, and undermine the will and capacity of non-Soviet peoples to resist in tha event of war. Thus the way would haTO been prepared for presenting the USSR in tine of war as the Invincible champion of the peace-loving and oppressed masses, compellad by tha machinations of capitalist warmongers to act in self-defense for theestablishment of peace and democracy. The USSR would seek to paralyse resistance by inciting labor disturbances, desertion, mutiny, and rebelliono Ita particular targets would be industrial labor, tha
idealistic Intelligentsia, aelf-conaeloua minorities, colonial populations, and the armed forces.
The USSR would alao seek to cripple realstance through aabotage of military installations, transportation and conruni cat ions faculties, other public utilities, war industries, and stocks of essential commodities. Communist penetratlco of industrial labor haa been conducted with this end in view and, despite all precautions, woulderious threat.
In areas under direot Soviet stuck the hard core ofonnunistamust also be expected to provide active fifth-column eupport for Soviet military operations. The strongest capabilities ln thla reepeot exist in Italy and Prance.
finally, in the wake of the Soviet advance, the survivingould emerge as collaborators in the establishment of police control and elvll administration. Despite the absolute power of tha USSR as military conqueror, every effort would be cade, aa previously In Eastern Jin-ope, to present conquest as liberation and the resultant Ceramist regime aa the productenuine popular revolution. The purpose would be to convert tee conquered communities into alliee aa quickly as possible through tha familiar device of tha Satellite state.
A. Psyoholopical Readiness for Bar-
The Russian people's recent experience of war has given thea reason to dread it, despite the ultimate triumph of the USSR. They have been
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tau?ht, honever, to expect attack by tha capitalist world and are prepared to reaiat such attack. Yfliatever tho ootual case, the USSR would attribute the war to capitalist aggression, and few Soviet oltlzanr vould beosition to know better. Under the supposition that succesrful prosecution ot the war was eaaontial toional survival, reinforced by tho oo arciva power of their totalitarian state, the Soviet people would support the Soviet war effort.
5. Potential Sourcea of Disaffection.
In addition to tho reluotanoe of the Soviet people to undergo tha rigoreew war, threeases of potential disaffection exist in the USSR:
disillusionment, and resentmentesult ofrepressions, and personal insecurity oharaoterlatic of the Despite the faot that the Russians have never known liberty andto despotism, no other people in modern times have been soand systematically exploited for ao long.
peasanta* reeentaient of collectivization. The German Armythe rural population would supportoreign invader inhe would abolish tha colleotive farms and distribute tho land on aprivate ownership.)
The hostility of minority nationalities toward treatomination. Per instance, resistancestill occur sporadically ln the newly annexed western Ukraine. The main areaa of potential disaffection are the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Soviot Central-Asia.
6. Vulnerability to Paycholoirical Warfares ;. f
Theae potential sourcea of disaffection normally are kopt under effective control through isolation of the Soviet people. Internal propaganda, eoonorale coercion, Co-munist monopoly of political power, and, above all, police terrorism. However, the unrepresentative character of the government, its high decree of contrail tat Ion, and ita ultimate dependence on police coarcIon are specific weaknesses of the 3oviot system. Should the mechanism of close governmental control bo broken, by atomic bombardment for inatance, disintegration would set
So long as Soviet military operations appeared to be aeeting with cceplete success and the internal sec city oechanisa remained Intact, no serious hindrance to the Soviet war effort would result from the latent disaffeotlon wit'.in tha USSR. If Soviet internal propaganda were
proved byIf Allied capabilities provod greater thanecte i, ant* apabilitiesnorale uould be adversely affected, but tne affect would not be declaive. The latent disaffection existing within the USSR could bringrippling disintegration of the Soviet war effort only if the Soviet control meohanisn were thoroughly diarupted and if offootive Allied aupport of diaaffooted groups acre inrediatoly at hand-
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At tho out cot of wt, and so long as Sovlot operations norothe Europeangovernnents rould of necessity aupportR. Wholesale defections fron the Satellite orned forcos eould be tmlikaly to occur in tbece circin.it-trees, but the roll ability of the forces uould be questionable, and their utility vould bo strictly United.
The vast majority of the people of tho Satolllte States, booevsr, are thoroughly hostile too ard tho USSR andanonist regimes inposed on them. Eeny cf toon uould nelcece oar in the hope of eventual liberation. Tbe outbreak of hootilitlee night occasion sporsdio octo of open resistance, ohich could, hoTTovor, bo ruthlessly suppressed. Tn the circumstances, moat popular resistance oould bo passive, consisting of aloodoons, concealment of produce, draft-dodging, and other force of non-cooperation. Active re Distance for tho noot port oould take tbc form of clandestine oountor-propaganda, espionago, eabotago, and acts of terrorism. Substantial guerrilla reelstoneo oould be expected only in Poland,arge security force oould bo required to keep it uithln bounds.
Thia aituetion oould bo radically altered If tho USSR were tobe loelng the war and If advancing Allied forces oereositioneffective support to popular resistance in the .SatelliteSatellite armed forcoo, and even the rank-and-file of Satellitewould become Increasingly unreliable. Defections anduould occur wherever there was prospect of Inoedlateand early liberation by allied armed forces. Tho Satellitesto Allied base areas and to the lines of approach of Alliedbee cms diotinct liabilities rather than assets to the Soviet In the face of tho rising tide of patriotic on^-CceramistSatellite officials oould perceive no future for themselvesthe fortunes of tho USSR and oould accordingly try to nolntalnrooiBtanoo aa long as
3. yuloerpbtlitlflo.
The Sovlot pool tion In the European Satellite States lo vulnerable to psychological warfare aimed at exploiting the deop-rootod roeontaento that exist in varying degrooa throughout tbe Satellite area. First among those is resentment against tho enforced subordination of Satellite nationalto Soviet Interests. Evenrural st circles there Is aomeover tbc forceful transformation of the econooio structure of eastern Europe to fit into Soviet raster-plans, the lowering of standards of living, and the failure of the USSR to meet the industrial needs of the Satellite econorn.es. In addition, there sill be for cany years lasting resentaent on the pert of leaders and members of the various religious organisations (particularly on tho part of tho Catholic Church) currently under attack in the Sovlot canpaign to neutralise roligious influenoe through-
out tho Satellite States.liird form of strong anti-Soviet fooling is tho resentment of the peasantry against tho initial atepa that have been taken and especially against the blueprint for eventual uidespread collectivization of agriculture* All those sources of dissatisfaction uith Soviet domination blend in uith the strong undercurrent of national sentiment that opposoo foroign control simply because It istoocoi^mnGgcd purges oftelllte Comanlst parties indies to the Kremlin's aunroness of tho dangers Inherent in Eastern European natlonalicn, but the basic causes of discontent uill be augmented rather than eradicated In this control-tightening proeoso.upture of Soviet controls,uould permit uideBpread anti-Soviet activities.
Albania, by virtuo of its oxposod geographioal position and theInstability of the present regime, is tho most vulnerable of the Satellite States to Western efforts to loosen the Soviet grip in Eastern Europe. Poland, uithercent of its population Catholic, and uith the raquenchablo nationalism of tho Polish people making itself felt even in the highest cbuneila of the local Comunist Party, probably la moot Vulnerable to psychological pressures and nay uoll be the most enduring source of disaffection in Eastern Europe. On the other side of the scale, Rumania> iihere Soviot control already is virtually oonploto, is least lively to break auay from the Soviet yoke until liberationact ratheropeful pro spectc
9. The Par Bag-tarn Satellites,.
Outer Ibngolia and northern Korea ore proof against anyabort of clearly impending Soviet defeat. Xnn might assert itself, but only under theAllied
The Chinese" Conamiotisosition toonpora-tlvely indopendent policy, but it la fimly aligned uith tho USSR end uouldeliable ally in the event of isfcr.
Hso Tse-tung and his group have come to power mainly by their own effortsrevolutionary situation" (notesult of Soviet military occupation and police control, exoept in Sanohuria). The regime has been able, initially, to capitalise upon the force of Chinese nationalism, and in China proper It still controls the armed farces, the polioe, the media of internal propaganda, and tha machinery of adaini strati on. In sucharose as Manchuria and Slnkiang, however, Soviet Influence le strong. The influx of Soviet technical advisers in time may establish effective Soviet control over tho whole of China. Nevertheless, the prcceeo cannot move too rapidly or too obviously without arousing Chinese nationaland encountering serious reolatanco, including rosiatanoe from the Chinese Communists. Bevertheloss, the Chinedo Comaunisto are genuine
Ccramnlfltfl. They reapeet the rovolirUonary leadership of the Kremlin end tho powerful support of the OSSR. They are pledged by tbe terns of0 troaty of alliance to aupport the USSR In war. In all probability China will remainilling ally of the USSR.
On this basis, tho raaouroea nnd facilities of China uould be freely available to ths ussr ln the event of war, end China vould become the belligerent ally of the ussr if Soviet policy ware to require it. Strictly strategic considerations uould not necessarily lead toequirorwrt, particularly if Soviet strategy in the For East were defensive. Given the nature of Soviet control ln ibnehuria and North Korea, the ussr already holdn an adequate defensive position confronting Japan. Inriendly, non-bol'T.igorent China uould serve to cover an extensive Soviot front,o-belligerent Chine nighttrategic liability.
Despite those considerations, the ussr probably uould require China to enter the uarategorical act of political loyalty. Moreover, the Chinese thotiselves might be tempted to enjjjgo ln imperialistic adventuroo, particularly in Hong Kong, Hoono, and Southeast Asia, sirring to take ad venters of the attenuation of tbe nnti-Ccerasdat military position in the For East that vould probably developesult of unr in Europe.
In this event, the actual benefits the ussr uould gain from Chinese belligerency might be severely Halted by tho vulnerability of the Pelping regime to external propaganda attack, uhloh night veil be supported by internal subversive activities. Tbe most profitable theme .for such an attack on the Pelping regime vould be the contention that China'sin uaresult of the Pciping regime's subjection to foreign oontrol. Popular aooopt&noe of tho Chinese CosBunlst regime[haaibean based in port on the pronlso of peace to an utterly war-wearyhere are already suggestions of dissatisfaction with the degree of- Soviet oontrol in China, particularly In tho Chinese border areas ofongolia, and Slnkiang. The combination of uox-ueeriness and powerful anti-foroign sentiment on the part of the Chinese populooe would constitute'a serious weakness ln the event China found itself at war on tbe side of the USSR. This weokneDS could be exploited effectively to neutralise the Peiplng reglne war effort, especially if, ln the meantime, Soviet eoonoaia relations with China had opera tod Incy as to convince tho Chinose that they were being exploited for the advantage of the USSR.
The facts of eoonanio life ln the ussr and China will stronglytho Kremlin to driveargains, aa it has ln Eastern Europe, and toMill fill Chinese donestle welfare to long-range Soviet plana. At the same tine, the reining regime itself have incurred considerable hoetillty from the peasantry, on which Its strength hitherto
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baa boonf itcriously with Corxciniat Behenco for iriduotidnliBation and the dovoloptrsont of en urban prolotarlato esult of all those factors, Chinald be one of the noat vulnerable elenents in the Soviet oanp in the ovont of war
riATiOHs precariously alighed
H. Southeast Asia.,
The aituation in Southeast Asia Is precarious, particularly ao in Indochina and Burma.omaaniat triuaph in either of those countries uould havo repercussions throughout the region. Conversely, aof the situation in those countries uould have stabilizing Influence eleeuhere0
The situation ia noat critical In Tndonhina,ationalist insurrection under Cccnamlat leadership is troll established. If tho Vietnamese can be convinced that the Boo Dai regime caneel ratherounterfeit Independence, and that the Comnuniotinvolves subacrvienco to the USSR or to China, that situation nay yet be saved. Tha time for action io short, however, and the possibility remains that oil or moat of Indochina will have passed under Connunist control by
In Burna there is complex civil strife verging uponropitious for tne advancement of Comnunian regardless ofin Indochina. Thailand probably will accornodate itself toforce, whether Western or Soviet, but would hesitate toaction involving risk and probably would notn activein any ease. The statuslaya will depend mainly on theBritish power in the area, but police oontrol of the localbecome much more difficult If Comnanlst influence
* powerful poUticolforoo-intSontheast Asia, however, ia not Commmism, but an intense natlonalloQ .dxreowedr initially against European ^rlalisn. Conrmntmn has nourished mainly because of its identification
he same token, were Cotxraniera to become Identified with Chinese inperlalism, or, noro remotely, with Soviet imperialism, tho rorce or nationalism could be turned against Communion.
Turoglov^Qn
The Tito regime in Yugoslavia occupies an awkward and precarious position os tne only Cormunist regime to reject the role of Satellite and survive. In political theory and to some extent in foreign policy,
ITS otwen orthodox Stalinisfc-Qo^unist society and tho capitalist world.
Tho USSR ie seeking actively to overthrow the Tito regime, having bartiored hose in Its propaganda tha these that Tito hasfascist tool" of "Western imperialism." Probably the USSR will be able totho spread of tha Titoiot heresy to other areas within the Soviet sphere, but if defection threetoned to spread, especially in the Satellite area, where the theory ef independent Connunisn uould have consider o. tain appeal, the USSR night resort to extreme measures to dectroy the Tito government. It la noro probable that tbe USSR will atop abort of direct nUltary aggresolon, and that Tito will sucoeed in naintoining andbis position against all subversive efforts*
Even though lt haa becono an anathema to Ifoscov, tho Titotill finds that Ideological conalderatlona prevent open alliance uith the Western Powers. Tito'o anpiration ultinately to estoblieh anCoeasmiatia reflected in recent Yugoslav preoccupation uith the statue of !mo Tse-tung in China and Bo Chi tttnh in Indochina.
In outbreak of general hostilities probably would find Yugoslavia still trying toolioy of neutrality, but Soviet pressure ond Yugoslavia's need for economic assistance probably uould lave brought Titoooperatively close association uith the West. Ir. any event, if attacked by tho USSR, the Yugoslavs uould offer stubborn resistance,,
13* Germany.
The Carton people in general, including thoee in the Soviet sons of Eastern Gemany, ere strongly anti-Coarxinist. fJevertheleea, they are acutely conscious of Uie partition of Oeraany, the subordination of their national Interests in the current great-power conflict, and the exposed position Germany uould occupy in the event of war* Distressed by these clreunutances9 many Germans are inclined to play the USSR and .the. Western Powers off against one another in an effort to reunite Germany, roe tore ita strength, andelatively independent position in international affairs.
Despite the considerable popular appealolioy openly directed towardtrong, independent Germany, tho present West German Government, probLbly because Rhineland-Catbollo influence la dominant ln it, la predisposed to participate fully and cooperatively in the Western European coimnni. Moreover, the rain (Socialist) opposition group alao ia Irrevocably anti-Soviet, Thlainclinationestern alignment is relnforoed by dependence on the United States far dollar aid and for protection against Soviet aggression. Integration uith tiie Vest, however, pro3entn difficult problema, particularly in relation to trench npprohennionsesurgent Germany.. In these mat**racontrol of the Ruhr and the Soar, level of industry, freedom of trade, rearmamentthe Geroans uill demand equality of consideration as free and equnlf the oocEsmity-.
Few Cerrcna have any illusions regarding the puppet character of tho Koet DerEan Government. On that aocouni it cannot eompoto with that of West Germanyoans of achieving national independence. The USSR, however, holds potentially important leverage in ite power to bargaineffectively than the Kent regarding tbe reunification of Germany. It can aleo offer access to former Gorman markets in the East. Fewwould wittingly pay the price of subservience to the USSR in order to gain these benefits. Some, however, are capable of entertaining the Illusioneunited Germany could hold its own in partnership with the USSR. To the extent that the West Germans are frustrated andby their relations with tho West, and are unable to solve proBB-ing economic probleiaa, the nunber willing to take thia'gamble will increase.
Tho fato of Berlin has important bearing on the general situation. So long as the Western Powers remain there, they will retain somewith the concept of Germanyhole. Moreover, their stand in Berlin hasymbol of their will and ability to protectGermany. Regardless of the actual situation, WoBtern withdrawal from Berlin probably would be taken to signify not only that the partition of Gernany was final so far as the West waa concerned but aleo that the West lacked the will or ability to protect even Western Germany. Suchwouldowerful stlmlns toward acoonosdation with the USSR for the sake of personal and loonl security as well as national unity.
In sum, the probability is that tbe West German Government will remain aligned with the West, end the East German Government with the East. The alignment of tbe German people, however, will depend on their confidence Inthe eventual acceptance of Germany into full membership In tbe Western ooiiga.ud.ty and In the power of tbe West to pro teat thorn from the USSR. Gernan opinionhole in the event of war Is likely to be disorganised and oeM-paralyaed in the effort to calculate national end personalunder tho stress of wartime.
CcersnnlomesB effective force in Austria than in Germany. The only serious vulnerability of the fundamental Austrian Inclination toward on open alliance with the Weat would be the considerable sense ofconcerning the possibility of military resistance to the USSH.
apan.
J?or*Japanese, acutely conscious of tho vulnerability of their position, would be forced to look to the United states for protection. If assured of effective support, they would willingly take on active part in the war in the hope of regaining their positionajor power. If deniedole, their attitude night become
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26' The North Atlantic Treaty Statea0
Tbe nations adhering to the North Atlantio Treaty (Canada, Iceland,Denmark, tho Doited Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Fraaee, Italy, and Portugal, with their overseas possessions) would honor their cow-ffiltflontsho ovant of war although moat of tbsm will press the OS to makn ovory reasonable concession to avoid wer0 The effectiveness of their rtsaia-tance would depend upon considerations of morale aa well aa organisation and armament,, The morale factor is likely to be critically week with respect to the continental states direotly exposed to Soviet attack' In force. For the short term under consideration, the means of reslatance availablo to them will be strictly limited, and they will be acutely cons clous of theirheir determination cannot be sustained by promises of eventual liberation and ultimate victory, but will depend on confidence In prompt and decisiveeupparto
Ml lit rat Cossrunict alcaeata in these states must be expeotod toan active fifth column supporting tba Soviet attack. Their strengthatn0 inOO in the Netherlands. Tne numbers who oould be expectedin open, violence, however, would be laaa, and, tmleaa theySoviet sdlitary support, tbsy could probably be controlled. Withto Norway and Denmark, local Communist capabilities are limitedand sporadic In Portugal the Cceaomlot organisationand
Except for Indochina (seehs colonial territories of tho j'<.h' North Atlantic Treaty powers ar* generally secure, although Coamnmistill* activity continues in Uslaya and there is some unrest in French North Africa, British neat Africa, Cyprus, Eritrea, VAdagascar, Uacao, and Bone "
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Other Raolplents of US Military
As recipients of US military aid, Ore see, Turkey, Iran, southern. Eorea, and the Ihlllppincs look to the United States for eupport and protection againat Soviet aggresolcfio In common discretion, however, none would bo willing to take any action on behalf of the United States deemed likely to precipitate an otherwise avoidable Soviet attaok upon itsolf0 Thus, if the USSR chose to direct ito offensure effort elsewhere, each would wish tonon-belligerentc. Ihe Turks, however, who strongly believe in theof Soviet attack or envelopment, oould be expected to be cautiously cooperative with the 5aate In all probability each of these nations (with tho possible exception of the Philippines) would be attacked immediately on
tha outbreak of war, In which case each would defend itself as best It could while calling for US aid. Military weaknesses, not psychological weaknesses, would aetersdns tbe duration of resistance.
other American republics would be aligned with the United States in various degrees of effective cooperation* Tbe Rio Treatymmediate assistance to an American state attacked in tho Westernefined, tba form of assistance to bo whatever each other state deemsonsultation regarding appropriate action in the event of an attack on an American stats outside of the Hemisphere. Thus co-be Ulgerence is not required, aad wide variation nay exist ln the action taken by various states,. Sonsraiil) woold be disposed to accept active military roles, hone of the American republics would favor ths USSR.
Arab States.
The British treaties of alliance with Egypt, Jordan, and Tree, would be operative in tba event of war beforegypt and Iraq, have shown, in tbaisposition to repudiate this alliance^ but in any case, tbe British would utilise their bases and forces actually in tbe three countries as tba occasion required. There might be popularln Egypt and Iraq, hot lt Is probable that those government* could oontrol the Internal situation and that they would render at least passive support to Great Britain. There is no question about Jordan, which Is dependent on tba British for its existence. Saudi Arabia would expect the United States to defend Dhahran and would cooperate to tho If^^r* -extent that Arabian capabilities permitted. Syria and Lebanon are too weak to pursue an independent policy and probably wouldassive role In alignment with the West. The Arab states ln general would provide comparatively little military strength for tba area tinder any circumstances, but they would align themselves with the Best In prof arenas to ths USSR*
th Nations Other than India and
Although the other Cormwnwealth governments are not committed in any way by tba adherence of the United Kingdom and Canada to tho North Atlantic Treaty in the event of Soviet military aggression, prompt belligerent support of the UK probably would be given by Australia, Daw Zealand^ South Africa, and Ceylon*
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India and Pakistan probably would remain non-belligerent for tho time being, although othervioe cooperative. They would expect Common-wealth support if they ahould bo themselves direotly threatened, and would roalat Soviet or Chine oa attack.
Although the eolation wee long delayed and Ita viability baa yot to be tested folly, Indonesia, like India, appears to be workingonstructive solntion of the Asiatic colonial problem. Had Indonesian nationalise been frustrated as in Indochina, Indonesia probably would have been rendered as vulnerable to Communism. Indonesian eopirationa being satisfied, the continued alignment of the area with the Heat is probable, if not assured, Indonesian policy vill probably parallel that of India, for similar reasono rather than because of Indian influence. In both countries, tho fundamental weaknesses ore economic rather than poynhologioal. Tho basic drive la toward an Independent status, wherein tho urgent pro hi eras of national eoononio development can bo worked out.
23- Plained.
The Finnish people are stubbornly anti-Soviet, but Finland ia in no position to defy the USSR. Tho Finnish Ccrermneot, therefore, without repudiating the Soviet-Finnish rartoal assistance treaty^ vould seek, to remain neutral, or at least to avoid Soviet' occupation of Finnish territory. The Firsasjaould ixrtfr^vmisfa- if Soviet forcen entered their territory without express permlsolottj ithey would fight. In any case, Soviet forces entering Finland would be ^inlhosAllo* territorr.
Z** Pthgr Byropean. ffeptralar Swteq. SvlWInnd. Ireland, and Spain.
Sweden and Switzerland aro Ideologically airti^Soviot, but both clingraditional neutrality in the hope of 'avoiding Soviet attack. If attacked, both would resist to their ntooot ability.
The Government and people of Ireland are strongly anti-Soviet Inbat the Government la disposed to make any formal alignment uith the Rorth Atlantio Treaty Powers conditional upon the cession of northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland.
The Franco regime is oonsplnuoualy anti-Soviet, but ia ideologically unacceptable to Western Stoops. In tha event of war, Spain, having no uiah or hope for accommodation with the USSR, would eelse any occasion tofrom loolotlon andefensive alliance vith the Atlantio Powers, but night remain non-belligerent unleaa attacked.
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Original document.
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