ESTIMATE OF POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, IN THE EVENT OF WAR B

Created: 1/20/1950

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CSIXTUL IJ'XELLICSICE ACEIEV .

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UrTEUIGSHCE IKHCRIRICM

SUBJECT: Kotl-ato of Political Factors in tho Strategio Situation, in tho Event of liar Before1

The pTOhlea proa on tod assumes tho outhrookeneral wor ot oono tine beforet is further assumed that this event lould rosult fron dell bore, to Soviet nilltery aggro no ion.

In tho asouned circumstances the Imodlnto politicalof tho USSR tjould be tho occupation of Western Europo and tlio Hoar East ond thoir incorporation in tho Comonlst "oemp."

3- The USSR regards political end psychological warfare aa integral rather than Incidental to tho vaging of uur. Hot only would its considerable capabilities in this respect bo exploited to the utmost to facilitate its cdlitary operations, but tho nllitarythemselves uould bo designed to support and facilitate tho political revolution for the occonpllabzoBt of uhich tho war una being waged.

A. In Important respects the USSR Is itself vulnerable to raUtieel end peyohologicnl uurfere, but these=re latent and could not be effectively exploited until theSoviet police control bad been disrupted by Allied attack and Allied nilltery support use Immediately at hand.

5-. The allies of the uSSRyoald be the European Satellite States (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ihajgary, Rrmania, Bulgaria, anduter rbngolia, forth Korea, and-China. In addition, Cerrxmlst-led insurgents nov hold axtenaive areas in Indochina and Burra, ond thoso countries micht bo brought under Soviet control, beforo.

16. Tho notions allied or aligned with the United States uould hot

fl. The Worth Atlantic Treaty States: Canada, Iceland,

foruay, Denmark, the United Kingdom, tbe Netherlands, '. aombourg, IPronoe, Italy, nnd Portugal, uith their oversees possessions.

fc. Other roolplonfc of TB miitcry old: Qrocco, Turkey, Iran, Korea, and too PrJJlppineo.

o,. Other nonbere of tho British Cosaaanuealthi South Africa, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Australia, and Tfeu Zoralnn-d.

pj, Indonesia, and also Indochina, to tho oxtcnt that it retrained froo of Coszxmlot control.

fl. Tho British Arab allieai Egypt, Jordan, end Iraq.

Tbo other >nerican republics.

The ocoupiod arocoi Veetern OoTBair/ and Austria, Trioste, tho former Italian oolonloo, and Japan.

7. All other notions would probably bo neutral initially. Hone wuld be eyopathotio vith tho DSSR or likely to Join it in aggression. Ibot would bo disposed to resist Soviet attach, and would look to tho united States for old in that cose, ow night eventually be per-ouodod to beooco belligoront elllea of the United States, even if not attacked.

S. :'orc extended discansion of those natters la in the Encloauro.

SXUSURE

POLITICAL FACTQSS

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Io goytpt War fijna.

The rulora of the USSR havo as tholr ulti-nteemsinist world order under their ova domination. The Problemoviet resort to direct Military cegreaslon in pursuit of that objective- Such an event, within the parted under consideration, uould preousnbly remitonviction on ths part of tho Kremlin that tho progressive economic recovery, political coalescence, and military rehabilitation of Western Europe, ia alliance uith tho United States, posed en intolerable threat to the security of tba USSR, that tho trend could bo reversed only by allitaxy force, and that Itecooa Isawrative to act before thestrength of tho West had been further enhanced.

Tho ijiaedlate Soviet objective in rosorting to war, therefore, would ba to sECoh the supposedly hostile alliance of the tfeat and to ensure the security of tho USSR by military occupation of Western Europe and the Wear East. Corollary objectives would be to seise and convert to Soviet ubo the resources cf the conquered area, greatly enhancing tho potential strength of tho USSR in relation to that of the surviving capitalist statoa, and to reconstruct the states of Western Europe sa Satellites on tho Eastern European model.

2. Sovlot Caoabllltlee for Political and PavrJ^rtyfl fttfrofc-

Zn tho Soviettate of political ond psychological tor-fare is the normal relationship between the Ccraaunist ond capitalist armed confliet la aerely the ecniloynent of additional mcena In the conduct of thlo continuing struggle. Thus, even in the ovontesort to military aggression, political and psychological warfare would be regarded as integral and basic rather than incidental to the business of waging war.

In conducting polltioal and paychologicol warfare the Kremlin boo at its disposal not only the apparatus of the Soviet state, but also that of the international Comnunist aovenent,rirjery and undeviat-ing allegiance to the USSR la required of every disciplined Coananlat, the world over.

Today ond every day tlio Qgoncles of Soviet propaganda and dlp-looaoy, and of Cooaoniat agitation, arc constantly at work seeking to spread disillusionment and disaffection in the noa-Soviot world, to

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discredit non-Soviet govomnontt) and to create untoronisms among then, and In every uay to undermine the till ond capacity to rooiot in tho ovont of war. Tho way will hava been prepared for presenting the USSR aa tho invincible champion of tho peocoloving and oppressedcompelled by the naehinationa of capitalist larnongers to act in solf-defenso for tho see are establishment of peace andcracy. By such propaganda tho BSSR vould seek to paralyse resistance by inciting pacifies, labor dloturbances, desertion, mutiny, and rebellion. Its particular targets vould bo Industrial labor, the idoalietio intelligentsia, Bolf-conoclonc minorities, colonial populations, ond the armed forces.

Tho BSSR uould also sock to cripple resistance through sabotage of rdlitery installations, transportation andat ions facilities, other public utilities, uar industries, and stocks of essential ooo-codltles. Cormurdst penotration of industrial labor has boon conducted uith thia end in view and, doepite ell precautions, woulderious threat*

In areas under direct Soviot attack tho hard core of militant Concnnists mast also bo expected to provide ootlv? fifth column support for Soviot cdlitary operations. Tho strongest capabilities in this respect exist In Italy and France.

finally. In tbe uaka of the Soviet advance, the survivingwould emerge as collaborators la tho establishment of police control end olvil administration.Despite the absolute power of the BSSR-no military conqueror, every effort vould be made, as previously In Fa stem Europe, to present conquest as liberation and tho resultant Communist regime as tho productenuine popular revolution. The purpose would be to convert the conquered cccssanlties into allies as quickly as possible through the familiar device of the Satellite state.

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3. Rascjaj Psychological Pyadlness fop ArSffd AfifTMBJon,.

The Russian people have on occasion rallied oagnlficontly to expel foreign Invaders fron their soil, but have never yet succeeded in armed aggressionajdr power. Their recent exporienco of uar has given them reason to oread it, despite tho ultimate triucph of the OSSR. They hevo boon taught to oxpoot atteck by tbe capitalist world aad are probably prepared to resist italthough their rulers have recently been under spparent necessity to reassure then that such an attack nay not be lailnent. They havo not been prepared to support military aggressionIn contrast to the Germans, who for generations havo been convinced of tho necessity to defend tho Reich beyond Ite own frontiers, or to tba Frenchho were tho roughly Indoctrinated In the spirit of tbe attack. The Soviet Russians arc conditioned to think in terms of

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revolutionary aggression, but solitary defense. Even to. the armed forces, strategic doctrine Is defensivet to roceivo the initial shock of invauion, glvo ground, ond achieve ultimate victory by counterattack upon an overextended enamy. Thus the Sovlot people ond oraed forces ore psycholocically unprepared for military aggression, and the Sovietfor reasons of domestic aa well ae foreign propaganda, would find it naceoDsry to ba able to attribute tbe war to capitalist aggression.

.TI*of coarse, be repreGented as essential to national

rrarvivnl, and feu Soviet citizens would beosition to know better, unaer tne coercion of the circumstances, and particularly of the absolute power of their totalitarian state, tbe Soviet people would eupport the war effort, albeit without enthusiasm.

A. Political Volnerobilltv of the DSSg.

,, addition to the reluctance of. the Soviet people to undergo the rigorsew tar, three principal bases of potentialexist In tho USSR:

S- General diaUluaionsent, and rooontmeat of the oxaotions, repressions, and personal insecurity characteristic of the Soviet state. Although tho Russians have never known liberty and aro inured to despotism, no peoplo in nodorn tinea have been bo cloaely controlled and systematically exploited for so long as they.

ThaSntonso roaontnent of collectivisation. Tba German ^rqy found^that the rural populationarge majority) would supportoreign invader so long as it was believed that ha would abolish the collective farms and distribute the landasis of private ownsrshlp,

. :' The hostility of minority nationalities toward Groat The Ckranians are moat notable in this respecti resistance etlll exists in the newly annexed western Ukraine.Baltic States, the Caucasus,

. Km^lfW disaffection is normally kept under offectivo

control through isolation Of the Soviet peoplo, internal propaganda, economic coercion, Coiaaunist aonopoly of political power, and, above all, police terrorism. however, the unrepresentative characterhe govern-oont, its high degroo of centralisation, and Its ultimate dependence on police coercion aro specific weaknesses of tho Soviet system. Should the mechanism of close police control be broken, disintegration uould

So long as Soviet cdlitary operatic no net uith cue coon and tho internal security mechanism remained intact, no serious hindrnnoe to the Soviot uar offort vould result from tho latent disaffection within tho USSR. If Soviet internal propopanda varo disproved by eventsIf Allied capabilities proved greater than expected, and Soviot capnbilltioo leoaoviet norale vould bo adversely affected, but not decisively no. Tho disaffection existing within tho USSR could bringiolntegration of regie tance only if Allied attack succeeded in dloruptlng the Soviet control ocohanlsn and Allied support uoro lmaodiatoly at hand.

At tbe outset, and so long ae Soviet operations vera proceedingtbe European Satellite gorernrienta weald of necessity support tbe USSR. The Satellite arrad forces, however, could sot bo regarded aa reliable. Although no wholesale defections night occur in tho circumstancos, their utility would bo otriotly limited.

Tbe vast majority of the people of the Satellite State* are thoroughly disaffected toward tbe USSB ead the Ccmaenlet regimes inpooed on than. They would Kelcone wax ln tho hope of eventual liberation. Tha outbreak ofitiea ui^ht oeoaalen aporodio acta.of open resistance, which would be ratal oasly suppressed. In tba circuoatoocos. popular resistance would be predominantly passive: elowdovns. concealment of produce, draft-dodging, and other force of con-cooperation. Active resistance would bo ealnly clandestine: counter-propaganda, espionage, sabotage, snd acta of terrorism. Substantial guerrilla roaietanco eenld ba expected only la Poland, and there would not oxoeed the ability of security forces to keep it within bounds.

Thle situation would be radically altered if3 wore tobe loelng tbe war and If advancing Allied forces were In arendor affective support to popular resistance in the SatolllteSatellite arced forces. and even the rank-and-file ofmould becoae increasingly unreliable. Defections andvould occur wherever there woe prodpect of immediateand early liberation. In the coat favorableelements ln Satellite governments might attenptatitolat character, .butitbe probability la that, lnof the rising tide of patriotic reoction,-neat 'Satellite officlslsperceive no future for toeMelves apart- from; tJM' fortunes of thewould . -

^.resistance.

Ito considerable problea;of rellability arises in relation to Outer Mongolia and Borth Keren, abort* of impending Soviet defeat. Ia tost situation, Koreann night assert itself, but only under the protection of Allied forces.

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7. pylHon qfChina..

The Chineoe Conmunlot regime laosition to pursue an independent policy, but la firmly alljaKd with the USSlt and wouldilling ally In the event of war.

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te at leanto that of flito before hie break: with the Kremlin. Like Tito, it has come to power by lto own effortsenuine "revolutionarynotesult of Soviet nilltery occupation and police control, oxooot It is supportedtho psychological force of Chinese nationrliam, and In Chine proper It controls tho arced forces, tho police, the nedln of Internal propaganda, and the nachlnory of administration. Such outlying areas as Hnnehuila and Slnkiang, however, are already In effoct under Soviot oontrol, sad there Is on evident possibility that the Influx of Soviet technical advisors nay produce the same result with respect to tbe whole of China.

In any oase. thsnanists are genuine Communiats who regard with respect tho world revolutionary leadership of the Kremlin and tho powerful support of the DSSR. They are publicly pledged to support the OSSR la any war with the Vest, oud on explicit treuty of alliance is now presusably under negotiation. Aa in tho case of Tito, only the USSR Itself could force tba Chinese Communists to abaodoa thio policy end adopt an attitude or defiance, end it is too each to expect that the Kremlin vould so conduct its relatione vith China as to produce that result. In all probability, therefore, China will remainatellite,illing ally of tho USSR.

On this basis, tho resources ond facilities of China would be freely available to the OSSR In the event of war, and China would become ths belligerent ally of tba OSSR If Soviet policy were to require It. Strictly strategic considerations would aot necessarily lead toequireoent, particularly ir Soviet strategy ia the Tar East were defensive. Given the nature of Soviet control ia Heacharia and North. Xoresi, no more vould befor an adequate position confronting. Japan. riendly, but non-belligerent, China would serve to cover aa extensive front,o-belligerent China mighttrategic liability. Am important fact ia popular acceptance of the Cotrcnmlat regime is tbe promise of peace to aa utterly war weary people. The actual value of Chinese belligerency would have to be weighed against ths vulnerability of the regime to external attack and internal subversion If it wero to involve the country in war on behalforeign intoroot. Despite those considerations, however, the probability is that tho USSR would reruire China to enter the warategorical act of political adherence.

Apart fron Soviet requirements, war in Europe vould probably so attenuate the cmtl-Coamwndst military position ia tho far Bast as to tempt the Chinese themselves to engage in imperialistic adventures, particularly as regardo Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.

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off *gtflPr Ceronist greens Ion. lQSu-ffl,

Apart rrom nopping up in Cnina (including Kbmosa, Hainan, and ribotj. Southeast Aula ia the only area in which mere ia any likelihoodurther expansion of Coraunlon by *enno short of wax before Tho situation ia precariouo in IndochlnQ, where Comnunlot-led nationalisto have long controlled moot of Vietnam, and in Burma, vhere Comnuniet insurgonto control extensive oreaeeneral dlointceratlon approaching anarchy. It ia rendered critical by tbe arrival of the Chinese Coanunista on the frontiers of those countries.

Tho moat powerful political force in Southeast ABla. however, is not CorrranitB.esurgent nationalism directed Initially against Scrcpean Imperiallen. Cooteunian hns flourished only in identification with this force. By the aaae token, were Ccrmmlan to becooewith Chinese imperialism, the force of nationalIon could be turned eftalnat it.

AHD ASSOC 1ATSD POVEJS

9. The Horth Atlantic Treaty BjBfcamj

The nations adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty would honor their cossitaenta io the event of war. The effectivenessheir resistance, bowtver, would depend upon cons Ida rat Ions of morale aa well as organisation and armament. The morale factor la likely to be critical with respect to "the continental states directly exposed to Soviet ocas attack. Tor the abort-tern under consideration tbe means of resistance available to' then will: be Strictly patted, and tbey will be acutelyrfeulnerablllty.heir idateralnation eaas,'. not be sustained by.proniaeelcf^eventual libomtidn(and ultimate ^!

i^ut dLe-clslve: amxrport>..

Militant Cenmunlat elemental in-these states Oust ibei expected to serveifth column in support of any Soviet attack. Theiractive strength la estinated asen and wonen inn0 in Belgian,n the Betnerlanda. Tho number* who could be expected to engage ln open violence, however, would bit much less. sad. unlese tney received prompt Soviet military support, they could probably be controlled. In tbe case of Iceland, the internal dangar iaatter of Cons-ranist strength thenoCJC of effective neon* of control. With respect to Berws.v. Denmark, tne united Kingdon, and Portugal, local Conntmlat capabilities are United to espionage and sporadic sabotago.

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Except for Indochinabove andelow) tho colonlnl territories of the north Atlantic Treaty powers ere generally secure, although Ceeocnlst guerrilla sctlTlty continues in Kalaya and there is sone unreot in French North Africa, British Vast Africa, Cyprus, Eritrea, Madagascar, end Bong Ron** Unrestdevelop in Italian SonAllland when tbe Italians return to that area.

LtatPJ^afll pfselaaeaT. MA.

Aa recipients of*OS military aid, Croece. Turkey. Iran, Korea, sndhilippines look to tha united States for support and proteotion against Soviet aggression, tn common discretion, howevor, none would bo willing to take any action oa behalf of the united Stats* deseed likely to precipitate aa otherwise avoidable Soviet attack upon Itself. Thus, IfK chose to direct its offensive effort elaeucere, each would -remain non-belligerent. In all probability, however, each (except tha Philippines) would boeed lately on the outbreak of war, ln which case each would defend Itself as beat It could while calling for US aid.

British Cen^awealth.

Although tha other Commonwealth governments are not committedadherence of the bolted Kingdon and Canada to the Northit is probable that Australia, Hew Zealand. Sooth Africa,would render prompt belligerent support in the event of Soviet aggression. India and Pakistan would probably resalnlice rent for tbe time being* although, otherwise cooperative. expect Coscenwealth support If they should be thenselves directlyand vouldoviet

Although the', eolutloajwas' long delayedits"'visibility has .'yat;! be tested, it appearsIthat Indonesia like India, willrims" example of constructive isolation of the colonial problem. Bad Indonesian natlonsllsn been' frustrated, as la tne caee ln Indochina, the area would have bean rendered as vulnerable to CoEsnunlso. Indonesian aspirations being satisfied, the continued alipnceat of toe area wltn the West le probable, if not assured. Indonesian policy will probably parallel that of India, for olotlor reasons rather than because of Indian Influence.

A slall.u- solution haa long been the only real hope for Indochina and it appears tnat tne French are at last beginninf: to appreciate that fact, their concessions may prove to be too little and too late. If the

/iotnanoeo can. ue convinced tnat the Boo Dal regime coneal rattierounterfeit independence, and that the Comnunist alternative involves subservience to the USSH or to China, the situation nay yet be saved, In which case Indochina would he aligned vith tho Vest in tbe earns sense as India and Indonesia, Tbe probability, however, is that1 all or east of Indochina will have passed under Communist control.

British Arab Allies.

The British treaties of alliance with Bfsypt, Jordan, and Iraq, would be operative la the assoned clrcaostancec. Egypt and Iraq nave shown, in theisposition to repudiate this alliance, but in any case, the British would utillso their'bases und forces actually in the three countries as the occasion required. There ml^ht be popular disturbances in Zgypt andut it Is probable that tnose coveranente could control the internal situation and that they uould render at loaot passive support to Great Britain. There is no question about Jordan, which is dependant on the British for its existence.

American HeoubUco.

Tba other Asjerican republics would be aligned with tbe united States in various degrees of effective cooperation. The Bio Treatymmediate assistance to an American state attacked la the Western Ramisphere aa defined, the form of assistance to be whatever each other atate deensonsultation regarding appropriate action ln the event of an' attack; on en American statece of thehusis'not required, end vide variation mar exist inction taken by various states. If the" USSR were to-attack .the United';tates within the Hemisphere, most of the' American republics wouldassive co-belligerents. Someeuld^jdlsnosed toctive military roles.' If too attack were to occur elsewhere In 'the world; tho result would probably be essentially the sane, but in aome' esses action wild be slower; iof tbe American republics would favor tbe USSR. '

ccupied,

The continued Western military occupation of Western Germany and Austria, Trieste, the former Italian colonies, and Japan would assure at least Initial Western control of those areas.

The Gorman people generally are otrongly anti-Communist, although

potential Communist fifth colupn of0 men end women exists in Western Oeraany. Tho internal danger to Western interests lies not In -the appeal of Communism, but in tbat of anGerman nationalism disposed to take opportunistic advantego of East-WoBt competition. All Germans are acutoly sensitive to the partition of their country, the subordination of its interests, and tbe extreme vulnerability of Its position ln the event of war. Continued denial of free and equal vest

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P ** Wefllerawill trad to etrengthea tho those.who contend that Csrnony can attain national unity

faUanco ulth the event of war,

carman opinion is likely to he paralysed by confusion in the cnlculation ot national as well as perBonal intereata.

I^iSVen le" effective force in Austria than in"atinent against open alliance with the West vould

ceriveense of the hopelessness of resisting the USSR.

"*acutely conscious of the osition, would look to the United States for fnll assured of effective support, they would willingly take_sn active part in their own defense, in the hope of rehabilitation

^mTLP ?Iln Eftet ABla- lt denled 9Ucn

a.titnde could become at leaat passive, and possibly hostile.

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j.*w Wan^th people are stubbornly aatl-Sovlet. but Flnlaad ia ln no position to r? . . ; innish Government, therefore, without repudiating the Soviet-Mnnish mutual assistance treaty, would seek to renaia neutral, or at least to avoid iRfle occupation of Finnish. territory. The linns would not willingly assist tho

orc6Btheir territory without express permission,right. Ia any caco. any Soviet forces entering Finland would be in i'-'fr'

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countriesi are' ideolo'gleally; aati^Sovleoth; cling toaeutrolity;ln the .hope of avoiding Soviet-attack. r,ii:;

oth would-resist to their utmost.

anti-Soy let inut. die-'it-jjo.osed to nake the cession of Hdfthern:reconditioa!ormal allgnaent with the Weat^f'Eventually, it would probablyelligerent ally of "the Atlantic Powers.'

19. Spain.

Em Franco rsglne is conspicuously anti-Soviet, but is ideologically' unacceptable to Westernn the event of war, Spain, having noaccomnodationwith the USSH.seize the occasion to escape from isolation Into defensive alliance with the Atlantic Powers, but would probably re-ialn non-belligerent unless attacked.

20- Iwwslavin^

The Tito regiue is anathema to the USSR, which is actively seeking to overthrow it by any ccao* short of open military aggression. At the same time, ideological considerations prevent its open alliance with the West. These circumstances would Indicate ain the event of war. If attacked, however, the Yugoslavs vouldtubborn resistance.

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21. Israeli

osition io one of deliberate neutrality between the East and Vest. Western ties are actually predominant, however, ond, if compelled to take aides, lerael would oUrd. itself with the West.

22.

These states are too weak to pursue an indooondent policy. Their passive allgnmont with the West Is probable.

23.

Iba Sand would eipect tbe Uoltod States to defend Chohran. and would do what he could to cooperate.

2fe.

In dangerous proximity to tho USSH and remote from succor. Afghanistan would remain neutral unless attacked. :

25. Burma..

In Ita present anarchical condition, Burna would be Incapable of taking effective part on either side. If the government, ahould regain control, with Commonwealth aid. It would presumably honor passivelyita military commitments to Great Britain. If tbe Coavsunlsts shouldgain the ascendancy, they would be too remote from-.Soviet orupport to be able to provoke tfeetern intervention with

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W>by; interxua and external- Chinese Communist pressures,-or bribed by the fulfillment of territorial aspirations with: respect; to the Shan States, Laos. Cambodia, or Malaya, but would take no action involving risk and would be unlikely to become an active belligerent ln any case.

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