Created: 9/27/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

; iiJKaaiGSJCs

; TheoryPractice of Ccmnniat cJiibvorsion



xABIS of coinsjirswiotrAL coiiajinsr partes

iferhorchip, Ilocmitnont, and

2> CcBTOnist Party

3, Organisation for Jocrot andctivitioo

U- Auxiliary31

H. U1HST TACTICS (General)


Subversion in tho Anaod t'orcoa and tho Polico. 60

mi!cauuirrsr tacjics (Revolutionary-;


hoory.*ofractiob of novoluticnary Action.

:;HO CHMOEJ^JdlasaajD;|

DDA Meco, 4iAprUth:^

Motet Thie neaoronduB has not been coordinated with the intelligence organlzatione of the Departoents of State, Amy, Navy, and tho Air Force.


1. ccreitricnt. and.>crjlilp. ' Claea.-

ilrient position accorded tho prolotnrint (induotrlil norhcrs) in Uiurx, Lenin, and3 not Jtoan that in everyoirJl CortunitA Tarty the industrial oor:wra conatitutoin forco. In Csina end recently In ooutliom Italy the acar.ts have Uoiinatcd Conxjiici, activities. On tho otlwr hand, in auch.industrirJiaod nntionc as Bol^iw.and Gonirjiy, tlio proletariat hoc tnlnn tho rocitico uaeliTiod to It by the Sovlut doctrinarians, 'Iioi<ivor, uhotlior tho .miority of thoupportoro arc industrial-Aior!:oro,or landlcao 'toaaants,;tho,I*

djo's,re^entJtiio' iiritoroi;t


Joniri'oAlan. lTho'hao 'earned"on'flesrito thoojTHnist dofonta ijiich have uftun reunited inossbn of ncfAwrofcip.

Tho global norJ>orahip, nliicli, according to Conrcuniot Tarty neabershiys cstinatcd to bo bJtuoonndrillion, ie no jj indication of thoactual strength. These figures do not toolndo tlie .aany fronttihich tlie rational partios influonco or control, nor do


ndLcatod discipline of tho Tarty,ikoa it laichi'foctive than way dKMZuUe orcarJaatlona ofalso.

trvncUi is not onlyron crganiood Trent"

rcuie oronc! th" youth, ica-i, an! labor but nlao froii tho foilovSns un-;or-ard^od olorunta:

(a) liors; i (bj fc-Uou-trovelors nho support tho Co'raniot program


r t * Hi' fvtire'f Hl#ji

viddo liot 'irtln'iofrtncicorH* i': 'fi'^ I

nf) itizens nho are deceivedorfamist

jtocr. itrtunt Is .latterirx intoroat -nd nla&nios to the 3'

bocuuac (i)s ai.oxco and strorcth arcn ^u'jdo agrjnst au. proocion;lctury offluctuations ond periodic

;urr.o: r'r thouoyootcd eloaanto roquiroo etnet ntorloa;;co, Tim unsolocfced ntrttan other portico arriver.ttrin inx';rt innuciKO arecd in the CPilitani wrbcrchlpo jcovldo iendavohln for the rxtooco. cidof ricdiui for ro-enntvntla slanted to foster doubt In Uienttn socioty ami to build uj- Uie iwliof thatnicn villi cilfc-dnatoy oi the aoi.Iralions cf tho Ylw Co;', preea sonrs, postura, iloyMi, or^ evenhtiiv; have mwl toer/ec- ve .lait oi*rospects successful actJTceticn, as irLiac-ivy bOlkHa^anf rcsr:it.-tnt

(i) Contacts.

Cooti clubs aup;*acdly dovotod tc such oubjeeteoreign affaire or sriorts rrc .ctuaUy. eaders of clubs tra^oit at devbagr of "arx. lordii, end It is :ro tionsi ofubon, nj; thottrdot


lha peer;

oarccEiSV^s-c) hose "syirlt of eottrcjliction rnhc:etf!

Ui be ,i

no-jliji^le but uhuoc ocbiticnc for are by tha Party;

(o) viitha liking for tho oonopiratorial aUijo'pliora of


Cornunisn, its uocroey and reckless disregard for lifo;

(f) idealists lured by Ctxviuilsn's religious character. (This rcfaro to its secular scri; turcs, hierarchy, idssicnorios, ox-ccxanication for ho rosy, publicins, central authority,for cocrifico, and promise of an eartliy poroUiae.)

(2) Indoctrination

choose for rocruito thoso persona found suscoptible to tho


Cociwnifll ideology and procrar:. Thosenthodical indoctrination uhichtudy of solect

: v

roc it

ji;; Caution is taaen.npt to reveal


. c, Training. .

ature and organized Corxainist Parties hovo Integrated

educational and trainincui designed tooU-di3olpllnod or-

Cai-izaticn ca;xsblo of siiecific duties, tl) Discipline.

Tiio Coriiuniot Party obBberinid discipline quitesjcvji toocr.-tic Ones thendodtst nil-Tito no deviation, llot only are thooo In tho public ejo forbidden to dissent, but even the looete aecbero iust accept in detail the ruling :of;thor be suhjoctod to roprinand, sucponsion, or ej.pulaion. The active Ocnaunlot riust adhere to conspiratorial rules nliich affoct hie vJiol* life. Ho

.matter hoc rxfch opportuni3G, athrc!ou.unlet, tho alroncortopian solution .for every, poll'

taint of vie...

'to: aohpecoiit -this' ri^id die iihoJleso hon ri ferlticlsn ofhis viou^but isenenioe11are any peroons not i

(2) Ceneral Trrinlnr:. ;

All aonbors rocoivo fsaacral'tr:ininf. vl(ich in sono countries idftlic

only effortrine political oducation,iased, to tho names

.Idle :nrxiot dectrino, Ooviot propaganda, and an international pointrc

the bneda of this Instruction, Oomwrlgii as applied in tho particairrit

apodal techniques to lw used there arc orjhaoized. lyriads

dealingdo ranco of subjectsiterature, history, sciences,




of the masses" by working long hours on tho legitimate

prograns of tho groups. They take any job, attend ali the meetings.

out-wait the opposition in order to pass resolutions after the

majority goes hms, introduce party campaigns, and keep at it until

CocsMnlst control of the organization is gained. Conferences held

prior to scheduled neetinjs rrork out in great detail the- tactics to be

used. These trainees become acquainted uith tlie or ionizations, and make

themselves familiar with ovary phase of their operation in order to

be ready for quick, decisive action at themoment the party asks

for it. They are oftento tlie staffs of liigh officials or sent

on international missions while developing iiastcryir Jobs, Good

leaders can use their groups'.for denonojarataonsi,^picketing, recruiting*-;

new leaders for the CP pr,ess,rispreadh^nropasanda.k'^i

tutdioiial: Trainlfigtji

.ItosVtopVflicht Co&Ust

t * SSR lai some time. Each' national party "at: one' time wasuota

former Comintern which paid the. traveling expenseecean, a

hard."to'.gain tho coh&dencehof^ their!

I llllll

eadorrs" attend schbb S:

a -qubtt Party; since-that

f oh now perform ed probably by thaS^ovi



to fomor studentsscu xeTt tha .arty,Coxiittco of each national Party chose tho ir/Jividualo-'oviyb schoolsiionboro nlio had been active

in ttior at ioact five years and had an olcruaitaiy Imowlcdce ofHisory.. Althoughof tho informationond curricula cZ U'.sae schoolscd before World -iar Xlj it can be projuaxl that tliis iipcrtent'nothou for indoctrination and

of Ccminists still exists* changed thair naocs and coy nor;rief description .of the -rest

Idle iheco schools nay toveifferent phases ofones before. rdll bo

courses .ncre,

ilXiaryjnature,', railed .1

.linortoht of tho Soviot isciicol for political

or Uio Theid to huvo had priority in tho disposition of thocio students and coijccrrnod itsolf Tiith part of their

Zha courooc iraro taivjht in fiveoieh,Gonxm, and hucsian, an- dolt in political,oy subjects, stripped to Uio utilit xinn objoctivoo of raya and noana of attalnioj the party's joals aixl providing it with loodcrdiip-

j ." "

Political oourooadleoof the norla of thru.Ljnin, and Staling nlCh cono attention to thoseor; othar Coctiiniot uritoro., There DOTC coursou; on dto official Iiiotory of tho Bolslievi> Pirty, but naat concontrutod on basic ideological concepts.,

. . . j ' I

Courses in political txurfaro includod todmiquoc cf other partloq jand ,

- . .i-i

iwthodo of corficUdation of pouor. foriaSriiCortcin tod

of Consjaisa thloh havo booh -succ^&iW

horoforo thoir >JoU.bao' lilitary oouraoo twro'aanyection of tlio Lonin inotituto can bos^ pa doscribod in .tho in of anonuistare'.

isotlior ocivool in any port ofrld tJat.


^ivoshorough, ^ull-rouodod training in the nathcdo of iotion&ins

rovolutioUi jiinircattin;ictators!lip, ond liandlinj tho

forces of opposition* During the throeo student romins there

he is drilled and trained in nilitary scionco,orli and cabotage*

Tho ccurjo includes organisation of coiibat groups, how to induct poopla

into thairand the training techniques thich oust bo ueed0n

(b) Far Eastern University (Tho Cormiiist University for tho

iloridng People cf tho Eoiit)0

uis;tag oonnonly callbd the Stalin University and nas

founded in li>lp in IJos'cbWo It was reported that9 Stalin ldn-

eelf toijht couraos1 there on Questions of Leniniso and colonial iiroblensa

Both Soviet citicons and foreigners of oriental doacont toto

*it jfy ti is here-coxopt the^^nopp tho aticnddd:tho^Sun Xatvdroityy?


. t

- 'ma -atrictlvkor: intollnetuals a


fron.tho elite of i

^aa jhiio! ycara-:

* -'tjl-

University. 3iecre foraed Into special 3eden enrolled and ireretho bust military courses the Party had to offer, with eaphasis on juorrilla fijhtlnc-


ain school for training the 3oldiora of tlio it ia said to havep octal sabotage division for cnrefUUy ecreoiiodGotminicts.

:'id-TAiro;>oan University.

This school catcrcl to Cecminists frou thopecified nuabero.-c, tho UC, andCost-

aunists sent mnjr negroes thcro. Ittudent body ofontrunlsts and'was well known an Stalin's pothere holaying plansan-Slavic bloc of Oonnunist nations as early aa

2, Comiunist .Party

;i *.; iff

The Conainist Party seeks toell-disciplined, hi yily-trained

elite corps of revolutionaries who attempt to -rainintain!controi'M<

ofcvernrcnt through either legal and parliamentary, or subversive

and revolutionary nethods.

The Comuniat Party is"vancuard",detachnont" of.

1lio proletariate? purpose io. systenwtic and organized

leadoraliip intrug^La of the .ortcim: class." It recognizes no

authority other than its own. 'i'ivls conceptingle, all-powerful

party is the negationarty instcrn dcoocratic, pariL.vacntiry

senso of the Dutonainist state only tlx? party of I'arx, lenin



si ess society of tho' future.


Stalin is fit to forge the way to tho

Tile Party can fulfill its various tasks only,

if it is organized in tho iost centralized xtuincr, only if iron discipline bordering on 'jilitary discipline prevails in it, and if its Party centerowerful and authoritative organ,de powers, and enjoying tlie universal confidence of thoofrty.n (Lenin, 2)

ouiunist parties, therefore, adhere to strict discipline and

follov; certain basic principles ef organization,ro.

forth by Lenin and interpreted by

2* Principles of Organization.

DcQocratlc Centralism."

Tho cardinal principl according to which the. Party is -.

organized is described officially as "democraticil-iii^-"

little siiiilar' ty,rt by;nestern parties.j: The decision of ^the^raajoritefifrfpr

ongress is binding upon-all,.hp^cue'ctii

no ivocal'

Lbos theo be.

! doctrine emphasized, the necessity for centralized control hi The} |j

'"DaaocratdC: liovrover, bears .little,

.'ntertainod.ecision has boon .

'oraittod. Tlio Central Cocxaittoc ^rescril

cod in alcctibns, end usually restricts the votingingle

of "approvod" noninoes, oven .Ln the election" by thooffhers of Uie Central Corosittee.


It 13


apparent that any "doixeraeyl'. within tho liy the personal contrui of its leadersbycso of this centr;ilization has;*s '" *

In order to function properly ond to ruidcsss

ic-'illy, the Parlyo or^unizede princi'le

of centralisn,ne act of rules una unlforni Psrty

iiiscijiiriu, one leadingParly Con toss, and in .

tho intervals botiveonventral Co:rj_itteo of

the Party, the rinority rust to thethe various organizatiens nuat to the centre, and loner .organizations to higher hese conditions,rty of emmete.-il party ar;ri cannot carry out it3 tajhv in puldinr tlie class.



.scli:linc. rr'es^npses iccnscicy 'ii--'isubiiia'sloK. for onlv ccnsclouii'diacioline ;cl;n.

'Atl-btiihcVicV'liror. ciociinexiLerJjJ [sColinJ!v *tf<'ft

. censca .

j*'for onlyiscipline,'ter contest of ii inion has. beenfterwt exhausted decision hasrrived at, unit" ofitlon of allbersl'aro the necyssarj- coixitioii'.hithont nhlcjri-oHjJiur the

If "Ironotf.ctlons would develop,nthep of Uie unityill, tlie ucakenin- and disintegration


of tht* dictatorship."

Discipline ionlntnined by leans of sjeeific punloh-onts for [Articular infractions of tartyirectives. For such breaches, for ncc-pavnent of dues, riiahanJlinj; of funds, or for conductdversely cm therbor itoy be punished by reprimand, ausfonsion fror! cfflee or urbership, or by expulsion.

The executive authority of tho organizations, buterethe next rirher echelon.

Only the Central Cocxdttee can order exj-ulsicn; its decision nay Iappealed tc th< Central Cccaission or to the Cor-cress.

More leportant and alto-ether corn persuasive is tho

linitry influence exerted by th cf'all tho

p.cncies tlritin





of all xeirbers, constituted'Vartv organs



The Cadre irinclile,'

One cf the .restalia of the Co.-jcunist Pnrty is to


l^ .trained and reliable icodro. cadrerall nucleus of fully indoctrinated, trustedonopoly of policy-iMkinp and or^iinlaational direction. Although thisramework" Is





fcrcongressbuttubly the

Jttoo iseb lass frequent. (Tho last All-Union Conyress of the CFSU mat

(2) The Controlttoo* is the Icadinr of the Party In tho Jrtervals between Coti-russeu* Nunberini; betweenndashers, plus alter, lea (or candidates)aveonsultative vote only, the CC is res:or.iibl* for the elaboration of Urn Party policy, tlie cnforco-ient oftatutes, and the execution of then short, for the thcle operation of the Party. It directs its political ond crcaniiaticnsl *ork, contrcis its finances, and represents the I'arty in its dealingsnon-

addition to Its conoral; poUcy-nayjv; and executive functioi the CC convokes national concrocsos an^feonforancoa and oubnita to those congresses thoai which the Politburo has drafted. I'inally,a

n ay .ilso be called the "nationals it is in Uio US and Brazil.

recpcTsible 'or the rAlntenance of 'discipline and the dcci:ion to expel any Party narner. UMt of the *ork pat out In tho uuws of the Central Comlttee isnone by Other bodies such ns the Politburo, Secretariat, and Orgburo.

(3) fie Political Uureau fclitburc- (so'-it ires called Executivettee, Directorate, Rational Donrd) constate offuv. topirect tho Party-

Speclficlally, the Politburo is.charged by the CC with the direction of party affairs in the intervals betweenfr-er body. It Iscr the [reparation and suiervision of the lolitical line. Venbers of the iolltburo habitually assure direct supervision over the rost important.adr-lnlstrative dej-artcehts cf tlte secretariat. Occasionally, s In Chlnn, Japan, end TuQasltvla,-enaller-pr^jnisatioiial units have been

* 1'


tl *rJltPVT ' Igb.f.

OX'sts (

ind Italy

' '* r i'* i


the C


- Confsittee. It is responsible :for the'el* Oration andof the Party's organizational policies. Themoat important function of the Orp.buro Is to supervise the selection, training/ and asai^nr^mt of functionaries throughout the Party

!'any notional Coasunist parties apparently onit the Orgburo.


In that case, policiesr^anlz tier, aro probably determined by Politburo, and the current business of organization is handled by tlie Organisation Department of the Secretariat,

o' Voie'riof the Central'

Inay,be charged merely


(5) Tlie Central Controls elected in cost ccunlrius by the National Con-ress, and supervises tho maintenance of discipline andxecution of the party line. Its iieporUnce is traditionally very rreat. InPSU the Control Con-lesion operates through boards on the top levels of illL PartyvenLxental interects; itonps for heavy induutry, li;ht industry, naval affairs, food und trade, edaoation and publicoreign relations, andthers. Tho boards ensure the erforcsrr.ent of Party decisions, investigate the work of all Party organizations, end prose rite those! accused cf violations of Party statutesaand discipline.*j

Italy, jit'aiparcntly Miiijin anv event, bjjico thebicn of^securjioy


of tin Controi;Co;misslon la alMSyi earoaufln^ed.

' ' 'i'i*';

>naistaecretary General and one

cretarieff elected by the National Concresa. It "directs the current'.'1 odrinlatratlve business of the Party*

For the administration of specific areas cf Party Interest, the

Saerelarlat italnlains various derartrwnts,fall broadly into -ti these concerned with the internal affairs of the Party, such as finatica arhese which sdrlr.ieter hart; affairs touehlnc Uie life cf tho country, such labor, agricUtureivla.


The, became of his close supervision of all ty activities, is wrfltjt jower.'ul of Up leaders, atalln dre* his Initial authorityhis oouroe. The Secretary,ll as tlie heads of thi; rest iispcrbantnistivativeao.rhor cf the

(7) The .Vfcnnistrative De,nrtinonts core ofton referred to as the Control Ccrcdttoo "Apparatus" wliich aro most obviounly ooscntial to the operation of the party machine and tho achievonont of its political profiran aro:


lore- DejxirtKohti1



the Organization Depnrtront also handles personnel ratters.

miters involve not onlyrty itself, jjj: fciitrths structure^nd Activities of auxiliaries, fronts, raU'frdslionKi*$iJ|lj The Croanixaticr. uerartivint !uet woritlosely attt othernifttrtUve detartr.entsouth, Aonen*ef labor.hich are !

ith various Party Kront and auxiliaryh order to cur out the Partynd u.s runy synjathizers into theC3jible -

(b; Caere.

Although everyunist Tart; has its cadre, rost parties have no separate cadre derortrent. one exists, it haageneralt ia responsible Cor tho collection 3nd collation of personnel statistics of theart in tho selection,nd promotion of funotionories in the maintenance of partyc) Agitation andtproo

Thia dcartront iu responsible for the preparation and

: -

itprop -atari

ational ac:le (such

f*ther airlniHtrutivoldoparti;.cnts"oFfeiColonial rtffairo, Finance, Touth, and

v'f^ ^Subordinate to the central dlrectin-hachinery are rof.U

andjcell'organisations. Tho:terrltorlal pr^uiitation reflectsthat of therty.




force oust be conco;ilcU, neto irevwiL IcnWledge of the oxte tohese activities leako non-Tartybut uleo to.ll.ini*.'. Part; renhere.

O) Fronttitiona.

Tlie of the activitiesoerur.lsl party to Its front and auxiliary : .niratlons is in rany *ays parallel to tlieof the cadre to the party. Both relationshipsighly trainedoup, *hu through this trainiri.'the use of secrecyn control over the rcsjeetive larger organization; oi/unist party Iconstantly directs its. srall units of party ra^lera, intonistrganisations inttorpt to rain control of the organisation, fin all these cases of penetration tlie najor. problcn is to

iirtijii'- i




conceal Party control and inf;uu:ice over .the fronts,-fractions, sm

. ;Co3run.lst parties ore an org .nic frcsthe party's otter

It is thus apparent ;tl

org ,nic part fpi< wj pt to maintain internal; corivSiliTaotirtf"convert


of the jnarses to Corjiunism nitliout actually preaching fit.

b. Organisation for Underground Activities

orxioinist Party prefers to oporateefliljpolitical partyrderit nayrry on propaganda and recruitment. It will, there fore, ftrht desperatelyn tain its legul status, and, once drivenHill nake every effort to regain lerilinacy. -hen it is out Used, however, it is not particularly handicapped because the saee Torn of

organisation serves for both legal and illegal conditions and because the cadres can bs trusted to underr.rounJacirli'ta 'tnd Security.

Ihe maintenance of discipline and security by special ('arty crpans (Control Cocurlosion, Cadre Coixiission, and otlior specialized secticns)raditional feature of Party organization- which can be conveniently adapted to undurground conditions, (The sain factor ehicl endangers the successful preservation of discipline and security in tho Party undorr,round is that, in the course of extrer-ely severe police cction, sorale cay disintegrate and result in factionalism, nass defections, and penetrations.)

Discipline under illegal conditions iteuns not onlydherence-to the political and organizationalO,centerv;butj,ij also rigorous.conformity.with undereround security rules;goycrniivIonspiratorial behavior of cadre and militants.'functionary who.jhaafbertj


ed .Party secrets under severe police pressure'is punished; oy, too cci|>etent* organs of the PartyreacheUeciplinc.wIth no regard for extenuating circumstances.

(2) Cell System.

Systematic exploitation of the cell Berber's normalcontacts for propaganda and rocruit.Tent piu'poses is an all-lmportnnt task then the Party is underground, Tho importance or illegal coll activity is intensified by the fact tint intermediate echelons are usually reduced to



skeletons; hence, for practical purposes the Party underground" often coraltts only of the co ter and tlie numerous "front line" cell organizations..

(3) jpcrlence.

Through the Corrdntorn, the Cowoinist Party of the Soviet Union has shiied the organisational policy of all foreign Corjnunist Parties, iind hue passed on its oun considerable exierience in underground work. Throu^tout the years of its existence, tho Co:Jjitcrr. exhorted and obli'ed its auctions to preparo.tely for periods of illegality.

c. Organizational Prcblcns: Adjustment to Illegal Conditions.

The party Pfiirv. underground must find neans of carrying on naxirun activities withoutxposure to the police. To thiseorganisation .of the bureaucratic apparatus is necessary.

(1) Reduction of Party Apparatus, i .The extent of reorganisation ia detercinoS;by the size of tho (Bpai-Partv. theaetion'uuonVitw^dy.en'era

be drastically reduced; a'ross'Portyiiaay find it necessary to run the risk of preserving an extensive organisation, iiithin the lixits of such

consideratienn, action ray be take alon; the following lines:

{2) Consolidation of Territorial Organizations.

The territorial organization of the Party, particularlyirge country, can be conveniently consolidated and reduced. Staff' then be utilized iiith greater economy, and theonce Urate on corminications with the center. All levels cf territorialregion, district, sub-district and section) rcoy be reducedhrough unification of tlie various staffnd the combining

of tli3ir criminal areas of jurisdiction,

The Party center niay be less affected by tho process of

consolidation,argo Party ntayarge central organization.

Cncell level, consolidation is not jractical; although for security

:>i' VI'^i*tf'ii?

reasons, cells nust be broken up intoivsiisll hihits if they ore to escape


policj attention. Hence, at the sansc:tlfie ithat .territorial' organizations:T; EjBjj..dasrease inmober orrj jtljeelV^Tfi^lj^ tions in the Partv undergrbuhdlMySfir-;-


(3) .Seduction of

In addition to the ccnsolidation^of territorial organiza-

tions, the nuafcer of staff positions throughout the Party is usuallyuccl in the underground. The;localfl'e'rty'cbrmiCiees Sre apparently strsn-ly affected hy thi3. Accordingomintern instruction, the cc.'turltbees of illegal Parties should,ule, consist ofre than


bureau. In pructice, the composition of illegal Party comtltteea apF to be core elastic, depending on prevailing conditions.' are eliminated entirely and tho actual organisational and political work ;ia assisted to the executivc-adninistretive apparatus.

(it) The Cora-^nd Function: Theivetea.

hork, 6Jid raintainlAg

tter capacity tlio triads represent


bility vertijil liaise.*



ii'e ciiuin triads have cor


of territorial organizations and reduction cf ettiff personnel can, in sano coses, ba combinedpecialor thofunction observable only in underground Parties.j|v;o syster, -roups of three functionaries nay be established at all echelons,he national don to the cell level, Kith the two-fold

nr and directinr the i'ai


jRhiheyer observed J]


The tri;


howevor/do not necessarily replace!

es Merely

it til*', l

other Party organizations nay roir/iin effective. They are son super!Tposed on-tlie illegal Party machinery in order to directriads at;natlonalrjlal ieveis have been,knoan to direct^th^jMM of tVo various adrinistritiva Bad executive depHrtrenta and coaoisslons of the tarty. However, it cannot be clearly detersined st present to whatnational triady combine executive ceir.-and with poliey-nakinc

functions. Theoretically itrer-tins responsible to theu^4n


factiy hpcoiro" the actual leadership of Uie Party. The triad principle /nay bi-jn be applied to cell organisation. Cells can be constituted as three nan gr-tips, each cimbar recruit in; and directing another "roup of three whoell .iticbers end hho comprise .sub-cell basic units,

Th'j triad represents an effective concentration of thefunction in the handsomparatively few individuals- It penalte greaterat ion and ccir.partrwntuii aatat icn, '


[Maintenance of tightrealization is onind security problen of the first order, since it is necessary tothe police fron learning too rauch when Party -embers or functionaries, are arrested.CorapartTientalization;ied *to i'a

WiWtpiffl HHjiiljHfffHH

military. oraeniflation, the lattorts

oib the Party's political nechanisn. The two structures nerely coordinate

on pirficy andrecrUitirent problems at their highest echelons.

Jul [I'V-it'silfly-Hi

j'jParty :andront) Organizations.

As in legal periods, various Party auxiliaries reTain

connected -fcith the Party through interlockiiig staff [crsonnal only They

r. as independsntly as poasible.

Party and Auxiliary Illegalff

Party organisations, or tears for the performanceuch specialized tasksionaee, sabotage, clandestine penetration*f| of police and other government agencies,'iuidation androups, are established as largely independent and self-contained groups even in legal periods. Thoy are maintained on this basis in tr-es ofille/.jlity,

(d) Internal Party Cofrpartnwntallaatlon .

within the political Esekonisrc of the Party proper, theffect can bo achieved by the following measures:

(i) fcl ruination of horizontal liaison. No cell and no territorial organization is icrmittediaintuln contact with any other

Party, organ operating on the same level, liaison -ia;


vertically nith the designated functionary of the su{

^organization,iwhose task it is to direct the loweri

it?tt 'l*Tf*<* >

ij 'Sill 'fcr*iHS!Bf y'ls*

H r(ii) estriction of contacts. ewer co.trsdes'


functionarynd igvets in the course of his nork, the better.

iii) Functional restrictionsJ An attempt.isefine closely'the ,iob of each functionary and tv prevent hin'f ro* ;leai arything pertaining directly to his alection cf Party Cq^ttees-

The reorganisation ai plied to the Illegal Party organization rr.iyliwys bo fjxtcusivw, and theof tho Party nay actually

ho hands of the national and territorial cDixdtteesatrative organs, hun this is tho cai-e, the election of Party cairn Utees represents an organizational problem-. The .' advised itsrr.ber Parties that in au undergroundrty elections should take place in restricted conferences andonducted inay that even the conference jneiLbers would not know who was elected

cf Central Coaritteeo.

Conference abroad is one way of circiitventingaws. Anot'ier possible way isitall'ir national conference,

Party Committees Electoral CoitPiissions,

... There is sono evidence that special electoral coemiscions

: Parffi'Organizations Abroad,

ion repressive measures becoiae severe, tho central Party organu and special support centers often are established abroad and workhe outside into the "illegal" territory, Tho types of central

org&i'.zations transferred to, or aet up on, foreign soil are:(a) Central Committee and Central Departments.

The Central Cosunittee and Its administrative-executive apparatus (Politburo, Secretariat, Dspartnents, Control Corrdssion) may be pirtially or completely transforred. The central organs abroad cuot perf iva notoivrand function butalso provide the Party at homopropaganda and indoctrination material, printing oquipnunt, fundi, specialists in undergroundentral repository for files and archi/es, training facilities for the cadre, communication services, arms and assmunition, safe haven, and financial support for exiled Party workers In siort, the central Party organisation abroad becomes the chief

the home P

> (It mu

frequently create nett types of auxiliary :andiadministrativeoreign"li-(i

tihis i3 a

.'charged with, the direction of support ffunctionajsuch' 'as cownuhicatiohsV

production, and distribution of press propaganda. lle,upervision of the Foreign fturoau 'rests with the Centraler5 have been cases there the Bureaus'have been the real directing



or printed materials and their distribution via specialcosmatr1 cation routes may have to be entrusted to'a. separate organization.

referred toechnical Service or Apparatus.


liations,the1| it j

Ar- auxiliaryorganisation is one nhose control by.the Party ie usually disguised by placing prodnejit noa-Coxmniats, orho scrupulously disguise theirns of leadership. j]ij Ct^nunis* auxiliary organizations

urther. iCo^.'Liunifjt .hii

it tc ri-pui




in the party. In'

HlsHr -







t a'strong party/-the front be elected to rarlint'j


printing ofoiAgsnda, i


It has bewie inereasln-Jy dlf cult.for the Cccasunists


y at least the-fell


heir control of thesefiThe public is'now ma'-better acquainted with the Corr.xunt JproJ'rari imd oun identify at le;

prominent Cocoiunist loaders. The' uiefrliiess for Cocrunist purpojes, bos- -



TradeInternational organizations of Rnrkers by craftsS| while the British T'JC has discontinued its affiliationtheTJ continues; to attempt to establish contact with ftritiah labor through arniiationrpftal workers,rkcrs, und othersithjj'ij approprjaU; "International tradeurthereveiepiaonV of tho -PTO is indicated by tho establishmenternvnrari|-j| liaiscn presently in Peiping, to facilitate Corrunist penetration intofthe


wist. I

' b, Intellect

ill m


International Federation of penocratlothe International

groups* are-r 1

TICS (General)

15 Political,.

For, tha Ccn-unlsta, as for the Nazis* Darticipntlonreely

' - r **

elected pa?iiasart has always been primarily Tor tha Durpoaa ofdemocratic governments In pro-Hitlerite Germany tht- Communists often combined with the Naais in the Keichstag nnd.the Prussiano causa Jeituationa which would discredit the parliamentary system and


haotenite.diaruptiono At the sane time they used the oarlisnentary

'liuif.i:.';roatrun;rincipal stage from which to advertise, their flails

Qrlyvafter Pro.rfdent bones had warned .ifc&n'thet he would sign no decreeseptember,,

Their attitude1parliamentary elections wae dono-strated



on the eve of tho firat nostwar election which ivaa heldor the purpose of intimin>ting the electorateeainder of Soviet power tohey were partylan to permit the movementgo body of Had Army troops across Czechoslovakia from Austria to Germany onay* The plan did not succeed because Pre of dent Be nopon learning of it, acted firmly to cancel ite Cosmunisi umrilUngneao to acquiesce In the free trend of the electorate waa otiU more strnigly demonstrated in thei8 coup, which found much of its loaedi;>te motivation in an anticipated decline ofuniat strength in the imnlnentdevelopment which the

coup forestalled,.

During the two-year life of parliamentary government


tha. Coaounieta often attempted to use?nd extra-parlianentary maana to force;the:-adoption of legislative measures which would strengt'

j ii)Siii


oyer fanaers:and;pave 'the way-for collectivization. Knowing that thesev^ff 1

' ifilli' It ' ' ' -ji'- 'T'jW'i^f

decrees would be blocked by the non-^Joomunist parties, the Ministry

distributed drafts: of there to localn trolled branches

'.tiwmiii*iim&t'* fflMH

United Farwrs' Aisoclatlon before introducing than In thessembly, in order to generatemssum for their adoption

. their hold fon-the' country eAh example of this wns the attempt ofajthe


At that tine the3 still powerful enough to defy such Co^raunlat tactics, and Its Agricultural Committee refusedaldor thed censured the Minister for resorting toaction*" Thereupon, at tho instigation of theBTiuiiiet-dcminated farcers" commissions made protests to the Assembly in person in an attempt to force the latter to reverse ita> United Front Tactics,,

i Ifehlnd which to outmsnauWr arid eventually sum

alao Ufled ifc as an apparatus-*

Postwar Czechoslovakian history sisdlarly. jOlustrPtes Ceeaunist united front tactics* The Czechoslovak united front waaionmua'.st creation, though tho other parties agreed to Creation Ofront was insisted upon by tho Czech Communist leaders in itoacow 'at'.tho time of President Benea1 first the' in December;when the groundwork was laid of [both the Moscow and London emigregroup aim in insistingnited front waa>tha

thoy could force their own minority demands upon;f^U

organizations. On the international level, it viae first proposed at the Third Congress of the Comintern during the siuxicrtfion it had become apparent tbat those Hs?ontaneou3 revolutions" in Europe, ciiich hadpredicted by "inoviev, would not icateriuliae in tho irjrxdiatcgainst fierceLenin insistedevoIutIonary tactics to -raya of winning over the icajority oi' the workers nithoub force. The

J'Conjires32 worked out the technique of Uie "united labornd <atithe^

Ceyonth Conjress in the sttwjr"united' ^Oat'| policy, which jhadjal-:'



stage tho united front tactic aa applied to ^ovdrnacnt iu butte of tho Jinit.'xi front tactic aa previously applied to the party. In Uiellcctws'.on of the united Cront tactic, therefore, noll bo ilravaiio urdtcd fronti the unite;', front 'jovcrawnti

'Tlie application of united front tac!-iC3 varies with local conditions .'aid the degree of Oor.-iunist control of the country, rovorthcleas, there are certain basic principles in Uioionnited front and in its development toward absolute Cowwnist rile which.can le conveniently divided into four successive stops.iiH-Ai,

iieobtainontrol, ^tiirougu penetration, of


as'of-socialist and oUicr non-

socialist and -



. .to.,.


Con-ranis tparties. I'ooiiv: as .champions ofrderso' roMcdy alifevaiiccs, ;Uid;Ca;3iuhdata. seclc cooperation


jnrae^teri sties cu?j; jrj ee, proportionate to theirront. Thearty i3 then


to exert creator pressure on the non-Coaministinc part/ elements. e Jure position in the coalition, the Socialist and loft-wing ele-aents noe any actual voice and the unitedug ran no* changes gradually to an undisguised Coveumst platfom. In the third step, the Ccasminist Party expells unreliable left-wing groups and individuals, and absorbs those individuals who tho parti1 line. At the saao tico, it luidertafces an extensive purge of all questionable olemnts In tho Fonts, jaa weil; its own anks. Onco tim Coimuniato have successfully purged their ovm ranksontinuing process of purification and consolidation, the ultinito goalonoliUiic, elite party has Iwm realized. In thisfourth mi final-stage, tlie front groups art dot'.chod jnnd becone Party ^'auxiliaries. They sorvo as rocruitaont-


carrylnc out of i'artyit in Party,,

nis waa accompllshet 'the uniied frontionalon^


duoed tho 5oclal Democrats and the National Socialists (the latteriberal centrist party) to Join with thenarrower coalition called the Socialist Bloc of Workers. Owing to the betrayal of social-democracy by the left-wing Socialist leaders, headed by Fierlingor, the Social Democratic Party bo cane completely subservient to tho Communists, who were thereby able to outvote the Nationalj in the Socialist Bloc<> The decisions of the Bloc (actuallyjflsecisions) could, then be presented to the other parties as tha decisions' of the dominant bloc, so that the Ccenronists wereosition to force their acceptance as part of the program of the entire National Pronto '; This .Btratogy aucoaadad only part of tho tlmaB and In Koyombdr vl,


(unions tfit nely ou th'.

tars' union, and thehis proposal: was vetoed at that ij Ml


by.the^other partieso

c0 Coalition Tactical T t,

Since the war Communist tactics in participating in coalition


rcovorirwuito hnvo been determined by tho Intornal situationivennd by tho status of Soviet-lies tern relations,, Durlnj; and immediately following: tho war, Conrninlst policy, roflacttnc Soviot-nastem amity, called fcr collaboratlon'with Other parties in coalition gororvwwita. As tension between the Kast and Vast has mounted. Ceo-reuiiists In countriea outalde the Soriat orbit have been forced out of the ciTemments ond into increasingly bitter oppoaitlonj within the

orbit, thay have gradually dropped the fiction of coalition govemmonta ond turn taken over more diraot and exclusive control of these countrlos-

The Coomuniate in many European countries directly after tha war participated in conion governmanta0 ong-range objective they hoped to ^in enough atrength to wrest control frofn the other parties* abort of that objective rovernaontal participation offered then an opportunity to influence both internal and foreign policies to increase their prestige and thus increase thair mass support,. At thi same timefc hOPSHItho Cerr-unlets boloteredositionor and front organiiJitions rnd sometimes used extra-parliamentary pressure srnlnst the govertoante in which they participated,. These tactics, along wi th tha lncro-Mngtension, oventually forced tho Cooauntata out ofjrovarmont in Western Europe*

In orbit countries where thay have beeninority, the Ccramuniota have need bogus con Lit Inns as the means to take^ control of ell branches of the rovernaent, eliminate political opponents9 tranefora th* social endecononlo structures of the countries, build up nor-governmental structures to facilitate their control, and force extrensly pjr-Soviet andpolicies upon all other parties* dc Marker of Partioa, Blocs.

The ultimate poal of Corouniats ia thestate undar Comnuniet ruloj elimination of competing pertlea ia therefore of first The refills used vary fron simply declaring all other parties abolished (as ln ihissUo various tricks for getting other parties to rexouno^ uheir oan independent functiona (aa has happened in nost ofc

. ii".

of thelaBa novement0 In the resultant monolithic

iMi ; f

party, tha fcmer Socialists are thereafter eliminated ae unreliable


(which they are, insofar aa they represent In part tha patriotic into mate of their country in contmst to the CocBninlats* Invariable eubonilnatioa of national Interests to the roqairanante of the powsr politics of thend the party leadership becomes. In pracfcleo, completely Comnuniet*

which raaultsd in ccerpleta absorption of the party and relegation

This pattern cf poab-liberation relations between thond the Social Democrats was followed most clearly In tho easePolecd, whore the Communists found the left-wing Socialist loadsilling allies inU and inveigled tha latter Into boooalnj partooranited front for electoral purposes in, Than, in, aided by the capitulation of the weak Socialist

loader CyrankiewieB against the wishes of the majority of his party,


gntlon'of ttifj


theaneuvered the Socialists into an agreement to

h'ss 'Action*

ts rely on the support of large nasbara of the pcpulstaonjl

who are either n

there or relatively untrained party membersof pLrylng laadlng roles In the insurrection,, Tne technique of making

roit of its leaders to tn Important peel tl :

use of those elements to further Communist ends is known as mass action


action may be both legal and illegal, end In addition to tho positive* objective of promoting the Coomunist cruse, it aleo has the negative aim of demoralising sizeable segmonta of the population In order to neutralise what Cottronista tern the "counter-revolutionary forces*,"

Tbe types of nasa action which Communists employ aro extremely varied^ ranging from the simple distribution of propaganda leaflets to organization of squads of armed otraet fightero directed totrategic objective in tho case of an armed insurrection,! Types of mass action are grouped


the following broad categorlost Ccraunlot-sponsored Congresses

(Peace, fouth,oaouniat propaemonstrations and picketing;

both politicaleneral strikes; street fighting?nd preparatory technique* for .'the armed uprising,,*

and enthusiastically make -use'-of th

The theory of mass aetibh'was developed lnv detail'by Lenin, and has;!

Seldom do'.anyypoo of mass action occurt

bean tha sublet of Comarunist studios everha* Sixth World;Congress';of tha Third'Ihtarnationalforalled forparty to lead the naseeerontal attack against the bourgeois



by tho organisation of coos action. "Such mesa action includaatrlkas in connection with demonstrations, strikes in connection with armed demonstrations, and, finally, the generel atrike combined with the anted rising against the rovernment authority of the bourgeoleieon a0 ramaonatrnticESo

Cocamunlats regard doaonatrntionaes en opportunity to call public attention to their program, to train Party members ln tbe discipline of demonstration and in the technique of influencing large groups ofnd alsoorola builder for the Party members, giving them the Ifiproarlon that the Party ia an active, fighting organization,, Since all Co-nunist parties (with tha exception of the Titolsts and the Trotskyites) are subservient to the Soviet union, moat of the large-scale deHonatrationB are staged primarily in eupport of soma Sovietf Itonarut tret ion activated by purely local conditions, the scope

'. tii"'-

of the grievance Is usally broadened to include 'eupport of the DSSK0


all areas'where tho Conmunists have sufficient strength' to organ!', or (a) internationally, such as international "peace" deronstrations. Once it has been decidedemonstration hill occur and its scope has

been Jeterrdncd, details such as slogans, posters, speechos, and literature are selected by the Colitburo of the respective CPs. Thesee :iade knonn to Party functionaries in the regionalin the various labor unions, and an front ;roup factions, Tiie decisions can be contnunicated by special nailed instructions, byeither legal orr by publication"in; Uio party;

Instructions for the annual Kay Day deia>nstratlehs, for exanple,f

lit : i'M| n ,f'ho Part" Journala several days. befor^ the^of

issue1 or;snstibetdeciaebljid, the! type (parade, indoor'or outdoorhe;dktep;fleeted toeveSntsj-vil^llliVi* e arall roust be rented; if it is to be an outside de.7orstrat.loneruit trust be secured front the proper police authorities. Then, efforts tiust be divided between the careful financing


and planning of the affair and the recruiting of -ness" attei.dince. Both of these oust be successfully accocrlished if the deronatratlon is to be successful. The former includes the developmenteil-balanced program of speakers, pusic, or entertainment; the planning of decorations 'jfS for indoor gatherings; the preparation of slogan placardu to be hung on tiio nails or carried In the jarade. imagination and a'uenue ofjre necessary for affective mas* appeal, fcvery available channel ofind ear rust be [Ut to work to recruit an audience froc as rainy

as possible; not only must the party be thoroughly aroused to action

but also the affiliated organizations must be stimulated into participation.

If the affair la to be successful, attendance rust be good, and every rart of 'the programithe'speakers, the cerer.ony, the color, and; tho entire staging bf the" drastic [perforfiF-hce. iUK^'it" R w

it raters


J. In theirhey Villf provide 'suf ficient* Corcunist


I.J- ivf'- ii ; '' *lil'flrf*r-

literature and placards.' The demonstrators nill assemble and then parade

through tho central part of the city. arge number of organizations.participate, their places in tho parade'lino will hava been* There are, of course, nany adaptations of this technique dictated by local conditions. In countries where the Conrunist Party Is weak, there '.


Is usually not core thanesignated gathering center.



Local conditions may allow tlie CooEunists'.to'staget!ia police. If trouble ia expected, Conffiunista organize "defensesually consisting of five nen strategically placed either ;irrong ther at its edge. Thoir assignment is to take advantage of the action of the police, or to start fights with individual police officers with the objective of urging the mas3 to overv.helm the.police. This occurs -Test often after incendiary speeches have aroused the anger of the Aiaasnit and prepared then for such action..

In such cases, instructions call for the disarming and disabling of the police* The "defense groups" usually carry concealed light arcs

as load

blackjacks, spiked sticks,'or'sxall firearms. They

ailed- tci ttfrfd Uticks*



have; been known to throw narbles under ;the horses" *if-the1 counted; and tb slash the horses with tiny, concealed^knives;wAillicit .placards carried by derionstrators are'^nailed acaaJist- the police Jniot 'o 1: The following:exat^es jtypify!:

- Toupa:

"Members of the Defense Corps in .action atperrons trat ions must be divided into croups to surround thee'rsi -the defense corps; members roust face outward as they surround the speakers in order to be more effeo-ive in cor.batting the action of police officers trying to -et to the

"Members fanil lar with the use of clubs and brickbats are tond other blunt weapons but all ranters not experienced in the use of such he^pons arc not to attempt to an;but to use their fists instead and should try to take the clubsos. the police officers and use tlten on the police*


"Under no circumstances ara club3 to be used in anterroristic runner.1 Their sole use is for the defense of<

en the atonbers are hoisting the speakers to their shoulders, they stoild see that they are closeail or soim backgrounduld leave one sice less to .defend, Also, the defense merriiers are instructed ,ly to divide' thense^esne directly circling thespeaker,he other' circlinc'iaro'und tha speakers :at"^

t^iw ^efenie;sroupS; as*l

oup of police .'consistingof, say, six officers, makes an attackpeaker, a'oor,don-of workersla supposed to stop:the police groups'; by getting thee sandwiched in between defense corps members."

- ft) -co]i'LS:rriAL

b. J"

Picketing is frequently used by the Comcunistsass action technique, particularly in the crowded urban areas of the United States. If Co.Tjauniots seticket line, the objective is chiefly propagandatoegment of the population with the question at issue and to present forcefully the Coomainist point of view, sotting up of picket lines also providea experience inaction for local Conoiunist organizersexperience which amy be useful in core disorderly situations" later!

Attempts are made to establish picket lines in the most

- k ;'y-

j he .local Coamuniat press us


onmunists usually attempt to keep their picketing orderly and only'in rare instances doW vi'olehee^oCcinv'

Street Fighting.

Communist paramilitary forces ordinarily are not adequately armed tocut large-scale street fighting. Therefore, in order to achieve



their objectives ih tho face of forcoa possessing superior arns, they: must retort to deceptive stratage^s^

Communist planning for street fighting takes into account the fact that the Corrjnunist groups probably cannot achieve superiority innd equipment, at least not at the outset of the insurrection. The entire Coarcunist paramilitary apparatus is organised so that ams nay be procured and hidden secretly. Preparation and training for street fighting an take place under the guise of other organisational For example-


Ju-jits- ,

clubjj will be organized which will engage in calisthenics, shooting, crossrj^jfjj

rching, map reading, or siiailar paramilitary activities. Under'

the cov.jr of the club functions, lectures are given on the use of

, .SiiiliMl

handgronadea, bombs, nines, and ga3. The calisthenic clubs,teach Ju-^iitsuxffilOT?

Cf, III,,,

rganized; for specific tactical work in'ipa{jjexan)ple, in Germany, in the latter rarthere were:suchsignaled asroups. roups entered hostile organizations.*tmill J':|to'rain irifornatioh and influence from within.

was <jsed to plan attacks on opposition party nestings andfU'j


(terroristic) noro given aabotajo rdscions. They noroluiito of fivo nan uho nore to taho tho initiatlvo in stroatiraro specialists in Iiit and run tactics designed to disruptf'

Tiiero aaoacnod opocial dutios in stroot fljits* In ono instance, thoyjainst police interventiontroot battle uaa in orcyrooa against tho liaaiso In onothor caso, they '

lasi par ado routai': |

thenocauco of tho security;!

tion inliuMo/jH'H^lfsi contrfij. supply dunps0 Aa the nocont forinsurrection approaches, CccKond^ts ray raid jovarnneot supplyn an effort to obtain omarxintSu


ore oxtrenely ir^onicuo ih naliirn amo

iorialco In Goruany.Kra found to bo ineffective, Comuniots uood obtainable chenicals,icrjj rraro to pouroniun chloride, sulphuric acid, orintLicalo on tha police' an they jurpod fron cars. Bottles filledonsolo, or other inflarnablo liquids ware tiirocn intoco cars. Gasuline-ccafced burningoto also .thronu intoa .V; the police cars attempted to bovo out of the area, Bio re-suitiii; 'Iraf ts fanced the 'floncs^ Pf^rftwifyvi rri'lT-'^ two used to ^rosc! .corabu'stdbles inaido of police stations, oiinicipal buildinja, and is* 'Oils Uind of tactics reqiiircs careful advanco placomnt of

I orison arp;usi

'J* iihoptx^lQ'furictioniivj; of tho*a;

iphjiJigijiCfSand drive-.theina


ho streets Riotso

e proper

nt<- If any diotincticn axiots it is contained in these criteria:

rioti my bo loss violeni Jiaa ctroctoaiy Not necessarily mie firoaras;s often rjoro localized

^ baforo tho riot, tho loading nesfcoro of the juruguaynh'ii


t thoix

hat? tho tulsturbancoito,take placentax

mjhiiteghiijvi, ihv'uiis

tjatllQlitSm ppBDunaat-ledibri^jadootoUieatrolard Mien :iaro,td|concentratb"dii|^agreed:hour,, Othor Coriiurdstn:noretiniiIlJiof*'l^r

bo^an uhon uooo of tho si

r j

tanatratUQly bad odor. AtTO woriah[anajpmjit, nan loft thear soats in tho fourth roc of the lerar orcheotxa and hurriod cutaido. ills ins tho signal ajrood upon* Alcoet Lixxliatoly noro than


. jd persona iSio :iad stationed Uionsolvcs ln front of thoc.itod slogans like "UooiSanteoLong liveoviotnd "UococracyYosj FascisnLo*"

fori of tho group inside the theatre created disordor and confusion; spectators byavily on tho floor, and shouting and loudly* 'TicLronisod nith oicalar action outsido the thca-iv- 've nobnto tho auditorial and rushod Uirough tha: -mldng and gesticulating violently. Doforo tho police mroX Uio riot, the glass panels on tho doors at tlie entrance ad boon broken, nany soat3 had been darogod, tlio rugs liad boon burnodid, and tha scroon had boon destroyedail of pitch riiich

Kioto require theof;

Viliihcrcforo, an especially vigilant poll' '

';:o, for otartplo, during [the.

mo tJioap againstBon oath the chaixs of tha'fourth ron the polico later fottnd sovoral snail glass,hjco^^

i-vont thodo*'

quita offactive against Conoinist agi^torov: whore, nollco' iraasures are expocu-.i, Cambists try to conceal ths factargo group of pooplo

goin, to

area, striving at precisely uio soma

Spontaneous riots, of course, cannot be stoppedanures0 on iflMitant Cccnuniats coniiglily chargodiot, Uenco, in spito af lilgliJy vigilant police forces,

Commmjato of ton succeed Inob disorder*

Comnuntst tactics aro highly flexibloo This is especially true in their instigation of riots <. 2ieroforo, no attempt has been nado to exhaust the situations vhich night lead to Camunist exploitation of potential mob

o. Bio Anaed Uprising.

A Ccaainiat-inspired arneU uprlsinc; my bo carried out eitherpcndorily by Cozxaniot parties Tdth little or no outside help, or as an aid to, or in consequence of, an advancing Red Amy# .

In tho ISmdst interpretation, arned uprising is tho rorolt of the aassQveactionary regiina, aired at seizure of pouor by thaoluti<*rary It is, also, the first phaso of civilifferon-


tiatifff. must bomdabetween arnsd rarolt aixl'civil.WwASW^

Lino ,df idoiarcation botnoca'-liba

ijjj-ticnarios, and their opponents., voluticsary groupslaraanont


f 'supply, arear better poaitidriji Ciltnc^otherivil war


'^Jttho fronts aro noro clearly drawn, both politically andseizing pov:cr, the revolutionary elements do not prepare for

ivil ^ar but for ar:nc' revolt, Arnod revolt is not :ioroly the strur.clo bctecon

tvro oiganlsod arnlos Tdiich aro Isolated fron tlia root of Oiobut Ieiglit batwoon Ujo oognonts of tho ontlro population in vMch there aro noll aro povticipantc: ovon txtian,nd cnildron>

In liis treatise on "Involution and'turn ojt ferth tia folloulng rules for amod revolt!

An uprising alwuld now bo ottorptod unices there ia firo rosclva to onluro all its oonaaquancoa,

Once tJiarovolt haa jtartod, tlio offensive uust bo udam and action oist bo rpaoluto* Defensive action ia tlto death

of any'ornod uprising*

rules for. tho struggle should ba astublialiodj




atbantodhe arriod!

flnllltitinarical superior:

! -it;*


mat ba fought iiavosntagco oii5 i

tion, discipllno and traditional outtiority on tlioirn

rxoto tiiatroat


his articlo "Advice of

superiority of forcos rust bo concontratjd at tlio docioivo

olaco and tlio doolsivo uonunto"

Antt-Ccmuniat forcos DUSt bo surprisad as longtroops.ocattorod-




Different friatoo final vicoc tlio victory of tho revolution nay veil depend on tJie initial successes of an aniod uprising. If it is quallod, tho ponding civil tor Day bo prevented and tho uprising llquidatocL,

(l) Prepcjatory

(a) Long-rasgQ iVoparation.

(b) ProlirdAary':

nurchsSf' or' picketTa .proto*c

Training in preparation for an incurroction ioan artacd forces cctaittoo and by its sub-cccaittoa, rfiichD3nbors in the ubo-af.:oxos* Hicio, sporting, and hunting clulis are ,for this purpooo, often under1 the sponsors] tipaborattempt nay also bo riado to have ;Cco^runl3to join toe IhtioDOlfor purposes of infiltration ,and noons of actiuiring practicetin US3 of-

too oollco, or nay holp to* transfomjairy gbijlth'oso^ of govoxmiantf roll of stations and in the socking of food stores* All suchJiilepecific purpose, are Intended to givo toe "dofonsaracticeo

(c) riaien*.'.

Communist groups trained for Insurrection *r* exjecltid to procure foronsiderable (mount of the necessarybach -ioicher of the croup Is loft to his own devices toevolver, gun, or rifle. ertain quantity of orns is usuilly secured through direct purehase,or is tehert over from rifle, sports, and hunting clubs, souvenir arrs brcught hoiM byveterans ore reconditioned; snd usable


surplus arry stocks are procured. If sufficient snail tyre umancnt

thearnsd groups kill, then be in-

l on hardware stores, National Guard posts, and.i; ill

Lon, each group is taught to irake hotihs, hand

- ii: t.




ft hi

iv1 litarms and. nrroinltionisj! H;

placirigin strategic 'obtain ,corr..ercial aviation

' !'wm^njii;:j

ofot^nTrolled rarltlmV aW'aockTOrkers^'uniods:"*


(d) Direct Prararntlcn.

When tlie situationountry becoras such that, in tho opln .on of the leaders of the party, an armed uprising for the purpose of


. i


seizing pover'bas become feasible, or. In case of war, if suchouid be of aid to en advancing Red Anv, the party will create anparamilitary organization. The Arced Koreas Committee night then be reinforced by specialists from Moscow. This willrogram ef action and prepare for tbe insurrection.

Croups will be organized for combat, consisting ef five men,ixth in command, Cosrnunicts bollevo that. In action, no -an can connand effectively more than five, and that, in tho preparui-ory stages of an

1 i. I tit ;'.

uprising, tho group-of-five system is best bocaiiso of concealment.

'f il J'; ll Hi *

' J "J'iii'Mit- c- -" i' '* *Vii'< I wl'J




of five isommand. Five groups headed by-one commandospany, and five companies thus formed under one cocaand is a;

A numerical combination beyond that is consideredi

.th the development of speedy: have been made by Ci


1 IP


groupa .nay;tations or. newspaper; capture' the. pr^clpaT'

t (XhiS (Capture? la usually accompliahod In the early*hours'

'i{ jjf;jjii The modern planned insurrection haa becomeffair; it generally required specific alfBianta for specific missions:1




(1) thet' and led by professional rablla-rouseirsY it* Jf iq frau-rniye, and deronstrate, to fill the streets and create the impression* of insuperablehe shock troops, trained 'illtary forces to co.-rloi. loyal nrr.-sd forces at strategically vital points;he il technicians, tt dec*remission vital utilities or to divert their, use to the insurrection. fourth olevwnt, the famous personality, isseful but rut essential force in insurrection.

Tho purjose of using I'-obs in the insurrection varies widely

in ciffering circuiistonces. The use of. the nob .creates; fop thehe cyth of the conron will, it gives the uprising the appearance of

itn the politically inert, and snails the chorus 'to ig proportions. Tho weight ofpparentjlyj"



iron purpoae'caneople

"essional insurrectionists nay ccve with relativelliSHtilf^Htiteay he used: to capture the


The ise of the -ab Has Its difficulties. Oncearaed, it trust bo disarrad. It io undisciplined and difficult to control; shen set in


icn.itapon of chaos and pomer for Us *ould-be Butluco In tho insurrection is na old is society itself, SemtlfJliij indeed, it lab iisclf which sots the Insurrection in iroticn.

The particular .rob action whichevolution generally gaiis its initial successes because everybody,x*rlao,agrees that reform rust cose, and xLrcst nobody realises that it is revtlutionof refer- that is ccrlng. peninr act of revclutlcr. also jalns lopular supfort because there is -enerally at the

;Jtlrt*.aoM aroclul cause for discontent (auch as shortage of food)..

Theni is one Iriportant reason whyite ordinary act of rob Violenceproves to be the start of revolution. It ia help-

.lesi'incoCiwtoncu revealed by the governing class in thesezergency. This

1 net

ecyfby the clrcursUneea.efHhe first (outbreakjjjlj

it,*' Vk



PSj:;cb's activities are' carefullywholet {ri

^procedure, far fro.'-pontaneous outburst of .violence, is tlie exact'ii'iQR such occasions zobvioloixs is used airily, for

1 purposes or btcMise sore effective forces, auch as an army nov*;inBnt,'r"'

legislative decree, are not available at tha snrent.

.Voba p' actions are decisive In revolutionary crises are olnays toils, (a) The lobolitioal

Tim cob ia ;ii excellent instmrentwhich to test tie direct .vn of iclitical kink, to dctenino whenine for insurrection iu ripe. Probably no charter of modern hisli.ry gives one clearerto tlie toner and behavlw' patterns of tbe revolutionary oob thanrh insurrection in letrcgrad7 This *as one of three extrcr-;ly ra-ra lnsta>:ces when the peorle were able to demonstrateoncli'-rive gamier that tlie state no longer had the assent of the governed. without any Jirection, even kit'-out any incitement to rebellion, the people of I'etrograd wontheir cause il.oet the entirety of th* state'sforces. This Incident isritical examination.

Byho Mr effort lia- created an utter disruption ora's econonlc life. Transportation had virtually broken dewn;e cities were faced hit' serious coal and bread shortages. The garrisons in such towns as I'etrcjrad could hardly be called soldiers. Trained cadres had been all but exhausted by tlie incredible casualtiesthe Hussion Any had sufferedA. Itost of tlie officers aere youtj; .md inexperienced, the private soldiers were rat* recruits and for-red in draft battalions. Long years of adversity had undermined tho discipline of thes abad treatmentvon the privateausetoe civil ians, the officers hud lost fsiti- in the corva.iu-nal sililary virtiies. There waa no coordinatingBPQ, no

conf idanee, no'desire for action.

There are, then, several specific uses to ehich the rubs ecu be tr".. Ihey say be used for frateriiixin- with theem-aenVs arced forcuji for the purpose of neutralizing then or fcinnlni- then (Tar is,

Theay also be ferric! into Lnd usedthe Insu'-ecti&jial arr-ed force if tbe conditions and duration of the uprising and universality of its api fciranee are sufficient (To. They may used ai tlie instrument of ehaoa by whose destructive actions thef tim fovemcent are so. cwhat paralyzed, and wltosi- actionscr-ehind which the organized forces of insurrection ray work with re-latinetection

They nay also be used purely as an instrurmnt of intimidation, aa '- al.iost always occurs where vass participation Is oxte;ii.ive andglas weak.

',bj Lial. .

There arerritations and Inconveniences in the ^ie of robs in an insurrectional ojention. * ofc^test astersinsurrectional techni ;ue of tho twentieth century, Leon Trotsky,

he question of limitation in this manner; "You cm inquire of all ill passengers as to what type cf cor theyo ride in, hut it isto yet Ion tier as to whether to apply theen the iraln is at fill speedceldont t'roateiLS. If tho jovinr r.

la caTiod cutiKMVor,tn tie,ovtl cf the


if I

unaeew-era is -war .ntcvlv,nce.M Ii: st.crt, Trot slythat -Uf"

o iiuiurtaction iaDooosolty,at popular

t.uihatcelcv.tqtorero Jl-

tT Intt,rrsctic:*jj tocUis tc the .ciders.

" h

u Stalin- "InOsurauicu uf thohu(.i" iia .rresticn,ttSt hurl tho awesintl tknwver, tritely wm his pointotlcUof;lieone under Ida direction. Thecserters etn aillod tliixvh the retro^iwl strootaKindred thousands in these ^overJaer days unwittinglyforve.iiont of shock troops, and technicians.

lacrorgo copcorninf theof unorcci.iv.ud

first, the desirability of encoufagip^en sill-prevent the mh fron

prec^etable extenthen, the'sob'can ba broken up into snail, -nnageable

r row pa.


The follorln" ru-wrjloiuiu'city has been dwolcjod

or [Olice head (uartero, ir.clutiln" thuond et'erfficialsthocoixisuicner, rayor, ano other of "idolrado to lira crtatement in sap} art

of lienists.

Seizure of the City Kali.

seisure of the potter houses for jurroao ol" rarolyainc all transportation and industries dependent on jowor.

Seizure ofi&in rallvay stations,tcr inula, air-pnrto lnolnHlnC derailirr of trains, snd c'verturnin- of luscs to i: jedeforces.

seizure of thu chief co;-vunication centers: telo;hcnc, telegroih,

s are intended to paralyse the ^overiL.itt and ita forces, and create tunic andon-

the populntion. nfflfflri effort is expended ejainst tho so-called "living


forces." living force" is ;ai, avail tibloforceich has not boon infiltrated ornd on uhich.thecan absolutely rely,ity has been:tary-organization is set up to

aa poss

tll reT^ilnlnri rcsi stiuica rs ill-iuidatedrapid}

seizureity or tbeormnist uprisingbe al aost irpc'isille without the elerent of surprise. Tha Co-runlsts frtKjurntlyufcber of trial robilizaticns beforeke their genuine effort..

Thi "jvomiient, responding to these fnlje alarra, ftill bacor* weary and ray

thus ta 'in;-repared then tha real aitacl: tnkos place.

Tne aetial insurrection usually occ ira in the early romln* hours nnd

groupsheir pre-detenrlnod objectives slmiltaaeooely.

- ft

Sibv-Tslon lr. the irrcd tbrct



arced ferae which the Coassunlet Partyot control li oonel-Ctrei by the Party toortel ensmy, and tho ro fore the aabrerslon of tho armed foroat and of tho poliosop priorityB It should be latad that the police farce la usually the first although not naooaaurlly the tost important target. In the ayes cf tha Ccoranlsts, mlllUrytim le the strength of the ruling classes and It la, therefore, the ro-sponsibility of the foroee of revolution to attenpt Infiltration long tKfffi before tha actual hour of lnaurrectlono Also, according to Marxreparations must be "sado tosuperiority of forces" to beat the decisive place at the decisive moment" (Lenin).. Tho Com- realism that the "armed forces which must be fought have all ;tha advantages of organisation, discipline and traditional authority, onsldei unless greater counter-forcee can be mobilised aj-sir.stefeat.

itrHit1nn' or* 1 -fAl

'land' annihilation ar*x)n




thatlitary point ofho revolutionarytand no chance in comparison with, their oppon<?nt, the Coeeuniste belike that theyake up for their laok of training, organization, ard .iiponent. Thia can be done, they reason, not only by numerical superiority, but first of all, by nethodlcal infiltration. The Party, therefore, placesoateat lr.rortKr.ce on the lUnistrlcs of Defense ann Interior which usually auj*;rvise the arsed forces and the police..

The rethods by which the party seeks to attain ita objectives are varied, ttore then one of trace -etbods,a employed sitwltaneously, dependent upon the country und the particular situation involved.


Infiltration at lllrfi levels.

""t'llrl* rrt't* *i .]

Infiltration is-desirable chiefly becuuse Co^ouir.ists in high ,

offices can hire their^own 'personnel for.key posts and arrange-for both, ,',

subversion^ and iiitalllgencaha activity,of the French-1 i

Contunist:d of lnf titration .before -orld jjar 'l

ia of interest as an exaoplo of these techniquee. Only after the (KJSRVift

waft attacked by the German Army inid Uie French Conmunists

be^in to take an active part ir. the war Az-alnst Germany. Thay began to

Infiltrate French resistance groups and by the end of tha war had

effectively ponetratcd larse portions cf the movement Thereupon thoy

d^SEe^inated hifhlyratedsanas about the pro Tin-nt role played

bycAxunista in the underpri.und andvce lnostwar



expl< itstion cf ,'riovancos; spreading of defeatist spirit; and atterpts at


cf loyalty and patriotism hythe beliefs in a


nation's traditional ideals. Prinarily, the objectives of infiltration

are to paralyze thu arrwd forces he fore they are called to strike nryiinst

Co.Tmx.isni,ore CoiTiuniaf" coiks to power. o/nmuniat retire weld

not ifly upon an arced force uhlan aas organized under rion-CcoBrcunist

lead'trship- It would first liquidate the officers' corps, then purge

tha non-ccARissioned officers and, finally, nold tho rank-on -file according.

to tiprevailing Cocauniat "cr-ula. It is understood that any such

Cocromist-rMrganized arCQr *Aild be under rore or less direct orders of

the Kremlin and of the Soviet







in. otrru:isT tactics (KsvourriotiArfT)

Tt gory of uovolutionnry Action.

Ccasnnfat theoreticians havelaablo uooy of doctrinal on tt* general aspects of revolution an) revolutionary activity. Specific theory, however, Ih -joinewhat scanty ln thr published rate-rial, t'laroed reasonllevu that Cosimuniot writers have roner in th* ievclojoent of the theory ofactivity thai, Is readily available fron published works, fovunist theory, for exaeple, calls Tor the use of bom action, for agitation, and fort the runner in which those plans aro-to bo executed is left to the judgment and experience of the local Cor.-au.iat groups.


Cite of the reasons for the saaraity of detailed .theoretical treatment of reiolutionarv action is the eoni-lex nature of .the pol ltlcal-social-

o mistakessr.uidance. To interpret and plan revolutionary activity primarily In terrastuld handicap theof rigidity.

enoa ConrunUt pointed out in the late twenties, "Revolution in various countries, orc sane country at various times, always ta es lace underconditions, for t) Is reason it is impossible to dovis; any general formulasthods to be applied during revolt; it





nposaii-lo lodirectiverevolution1 in this sense- Hulas fo be applied in any caseof necessity be exti-exaly general. The 't significance of these 'mlos' lies in the fact that they can shed light onof uprisings, that they aay permitinsight into theroblems of uprisings and thusuthod fcr practical

evaluation." fhec'< list for thef insurrection, th-tr^-

fore. is Inching*

To .t. large exlont, then, interpretation ofvsfits leading to an insurrectional situation depends upon the judgment of the Party leadership. The timing of violenceelationship to the political astuteness, training, courage, and an*;unl of Informationby the national loaders. Vihe'n attempting to anticipate the ramcnt for.Comrunist violence,

" 'consideration nust be given to the fallibility of the Concunist interpretion

.tnifrcr? j.jpf-ibhe political, events. Historyhat Coraruniats have nls*

et8d t,ical anao!^fsreala^frequehtly'as'/.

ave judeed1'incorrectly, lit: V- j.

0 Connunist theory of revolution rests on the basic premiseonraunist ascension to power is impossible without violence. Lenin ^'developed this thesisome lenQth fin State nnd devolution):

"There Is no denying that the state is the organ of class domination, or that class antagonisms are irreconcilable. !tut -what is forgotten is t! isj if the state is the product of the

irreconcilable character of class anta>;ouisu, if itorce standing above society, and increasingly separatingfrom it, then it ia clear that tbt liberation of the oppressed cless is lupossiile, not only without violent re-volution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of statewhich was created by the ruling, class in which this ^separation* iu embodied." (orphoais added)

One* the inevitability of violence is oatatlished, there are certain concrete nethods prescribed for the developrent of Corr-unist partiescint where they are capable of precipitating an insurrection.

Two general conditions have been set forth aa prerequisites forreparation'of the proletariat for ito dictatorship;ho existenceeneral crisisrin all' ruling .and in all bourgeois Iparties'. In orderftc achieve thb firsV cf^-these'^eneral'conditions, J Cos'Wist theoreticians erlh'asize' thatoletari ati cu

ediicl.tod ,to take, ever; the/ organs jof" stateAa'Lenin explains:

"Tlie proletariat" neodu state power, the centralized organisation of force, the organization of violence, both for the purpose of crushing the resistance of th< exploiter and for tlie purpose of guiding the creai raas of the populationthe peasantry, the potty-bourgeoisie, thuo'ctarlansln the work of organizing Socialist

Thaalrerequisite-revolutionaryoncerns the lack cf cijaMHty Of theelates" tc rule. Aa it result, they wouldt rovernrwnt crisise-roe which would drawhe zont backward HSMfl into politicoyaptoa o" every real revolutionapid, tenfold and even hundredfold increase in tho nw-ber ofof Um toil Iru: and oprreosed raiseshitherto apathiltewho are capable of waging the politicalinn theibWiI tad rake it possible for tha revolutionaries to overthrow it rapidly." (Lenin)

In preparing the proletariat for Its role in the revolution, theirty Is constantly enga-edrocess of educutin'1 and training this claao. in developing the tschniquosss action, ndnor preparatory demands are cade and dononatratiohs, strikesgitation ore carriod out, in the sane Banner,rallcr;scnle than if the insurrection were Iir inwit, "Bvery strike and every other pass action rust be made use of in order to at inulate Ihe revolutionary feelln* aer><

the Tuses, In order to enooi'rngeaeses, ln order to urjanlze than batter, in order to weld then together to united fronta and toilllcn atrong revolutionaryit is.uestion ofontinuous militant movurwnt. ,every case to op.eel toI. ,


Insurrection, an Art. Corarunist doctrine tenches that insurrection is an art which must be readied and practiced In anticipation of its use and Is different fron the ;onvantional technique of war- In the wordsermanrmed revolt tho 'front' la everywhere. Doth combatant parties are iVireatened fron all sides, and at the nana line are supported on all

side i, because everywhere they ari; surrounded by frienda and foes of th*

revcl.tion. ahichever side cannot draw the logical conclusions from this

ll be beaten and annihilated, according to longer.

"The broad masses of the workimjincluding women, old men

and children will not play the role of non-partieipatln', curious onlookers

but moot be engaged in active {anticipation; they will attack tho enemy

wherever they encounter him and beaty whatever means are .at


j Hliisjehtire 'struggle "Isurely cnMitary affairjj|

politicalhe Indivisibility of the military aspect of ithe'strugAe (:

r|uHjii- lit

frofp the political aspoct Is one of tho basic characteristics ofevolt." The principle rule of Insurrection, accordinr; to Lenin, is that an "audacious and detornlned offensive must be magod The first success must bo won, end that one must proceed from success to success, never censing the offensive against the enemy, taking advantage of his confusion."

The winning over of the trasses at the recent of armed revolt is notatter of verbal and written agitation, but depends essentially


upon tha derree of successr.ed in the early arncd attacks. In order lo ossur* those vacillating alotonts "who always follow the stron-est force and wU clwjgs veer to the safest side" It ia necessary, according lo Karl :arx, to -ain "cor.otant new victories, even tVourh tley be relatively uiiimpTtant, and lo publicise these victoriesaaei, as widely as po.'sibie, in orderttain coral enuilibrivm "

ataMished definite prlnclrles for the conduct of tlie revolutionary class during revolutioni

"First of all, an uprising should never be attested unloas there Is fim resolve to endure all its co:.sequercea. In revolt one dealshighly uncertain quantities whoso value to day Thehich mml be fought have all theof organization, disci Cine and traditional authority on their side; unless greater counter-force; can,be(opposed to then, defeat, and annihilation are inevitable.

" till-tS% ii

! - "iili

Secondly, onoejajreyplution has started, the offensive must be taken and ust be resolute. Defensive action is the death of aiy nraedthe battle will lie lest eeforo it has The opponente taken jy surprise while his troops are scattered; there must bo constantviatoriea, oven if they are not significant; tho coral superiority of thr fi'-st successful uprising rust he maintained; those vacillatinelements who a'.-isya follow the strongest force and who always veer to the safest side suytnttractod; themust be forced to retreat before he enn con-


centrato his forces in ain short, to quote Danton,reatest .Taster of revolutionary tactics known so far: 'Courage, ccurag* nd mors Timing*.

The conditions nocessaryevolutionary aituation cannot, of

course, be completely fulfilled when tha daclalon to launch an inaurrection la ta>cn, for this reason, the actual reusont when hoatilltiea begin depends or.udgment of tha local Comsmniat leaders. Communists rets that eons ijiuaual act sucharliamentary crisis, an isolated act of violenceeneral strike often is the inrr.odiate cause of an insurrection,

"Timely action la of dacisivo significance ln armed revolution,hoice' of the precise moment Is one of the most important problems of tho strategy* the art of revolution* It la up to the political leader-


ship to appraise the aituation and to determine tha proper moment for.overt

revolt, as in any other atruggle,-the ehanceaf.for

BU0C0 33

spasmodic They come and go. If they are allowed, to' slip [by The Offenalve.

Once the "insurrectionary career" haa been entered upon, however, Co-muists must "aot with the greatest determination, and act on the offenuiveB Surprise your antagonists while thoir forces are scattering,ew sucoeseea, however small, but daily; keep up the moral

ascendant which"the first successful rising has riven to you; rally those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest impulse aod which always look out for the safer side; force your enemies to retreat before they can collect strength against In armed revolt retreat is always coupled with heavy sacrifices.. Retreatevolttion,once it has begun, inevitably leade to ruthless extermination by th* white terror of the revolutionary class's best forces, regardless of whether retreat followed on the hell of frenzied battle or whether tho

armed workers capitulatedtruggle. Counter-revolution knows no reicy.." (Stalin)

Lenin, in his critique of5 laascow uprising, berates the

f the* strike action for not forcing tho offensive and developing

i ttt**:

tho struggle into an armed uprising. None of the organlxatlona which

called the strike was prepared to lead an uprising. "The atrika grew intoca^marilyeault of the preaaure ofonditions that .were'created after" treotuite sporadically and hesitatingly, aat up the first barricades without orders from tha organisationa. The mass proletarian struggle then developedtrike to an uprising. ccording to Lenin, the proletariat sensed the change in the "objective conditions" of tht struggle before tlie leadership. Practice starched ahead of theory:peaceful strike and demonstrations inrediately ceased to satisfy tho

they demanded nor^ reneluVi action. Instructions to m% up

tarrle-.fisl the rt? utricle axotJridaj'-Jlv ixte, ehar*. wattedHi* ir-fr i'tnu.*> :ed active v> res+w*

J ratr -sViQM fOffiU QMMI LiClU'iU'

t tot-iKi. And no*snl>trHlely ncVtt iwnR thi

r. favor of ir.wvake ic att-upc t: by Ulklag ktoot 'rr.littliv.ry

action nitt take the formesperate, bloody, sir of wleminatiun,"

On tho other hand, it la "aonaelees" too force the struggle,


"to accelerate it, to whip it forward, rrecisely because the struggle is inevitable.*

Th-ievaluation of the fighting spirit of the nasMSpossible only if tho Party organizing the uprisingn close, day-tor;day oontact with the rasaea, constantly active aaong them, living their life, and, to quote Lenin, "has beeotw rnrged with the rasses." In otherthe Party rajat b^ "Irmly ro-ted in the -asses, particularly at the point! where the everyday life of theshs1he unemployment bureaus >snd the workers* dintriet. Superiorityrres .

reat superioritye:

atJe;is_ve place at the uus-vnt. "


a cilitary point of view, the suppressed class stands no chones in comparison with the opponent' "The arnwd femes which must be fought have all the advanta-ei of organization, discipline and traditional authority on their side; unlisa greater counter forces can be opposed to them, defeat and annihilation are inevitable," (Kant). ths sup;leased class must make up for Its lack of training, organization and araartcnt by numerical superiority..

However, it Is tho over-all situation and not that prevailing at local, points, which la decisive for tho beginning of the struggletho moment ehojan to start the armed rebellion.ountry-vide scale the pOHoi' ratio must naturally ba favorable to tho rebola before the contest can begin, '

The tern "superiority" does not necessarily mean that the proletariat mat be superior In armament to tho opponent in prior.uccessful rebellion; that superiority may be caueod by -th'otdlyerslty-of


osaervedt after tho presence of national defense battalions beoamo knowi. troops of workers assembled from all nearby towns, sore or less poorly organized but ready to go into action against these battalions* This converging fron all aides created the necessary superiority at the decisive spot where ths opponent had taken position,,

Tba principle of concentration of foroeabat ln armed rebellion tho revolutionary part/ nut know how to assign ita entire machine, all ite work, ead all ite forces to tha armed confllct0 It doea not mean that every party mober anat actuallym and partiolpate in the physical fighticg, although all ahould be ready to do ao0 The antirw aotivlty of the Party daeing rebellionowever, exclusively serve tbea of armed caibate

In the boor of rebellion, tea Party of tha proletariatartlel party. Consequently, tbe entire Party, notart of it, moat be firmly grounded ln the oondoct of war0 Ia the Party there can be no dlviaions of functioas, sueb aa betreen etataaman and generalao Ivory Party aauabar moat be bothand "military,,"

Tba concentration of proletarian foroea In armed struggle ahouldabove all, by tha alanltaaeoneof foroea on ascale and by mutual support of varioua area* of The Element, of


Although tho eSeaant of aurpriae la vary important in staging rabellione, especially afaaa the enemies' troope aro aoattared, thoee movaa must not ba eoob aa to eurpriae the proletarian eleaenteo under no clroomatancaa must tneof the enemy ba permitted to load to the isolation of thaTh* messes muat realise that thay are entering aa armed, desperate atrugglet with much bloodshed ahead. Communists believe that surprise la possible to

Ufdto tba exact time of tba thinning of tha fighting} aa to tho resolutory an and tempo of action on Uio pirt of ths revolutionary masses| and as to Uotica In tba varioua conbet episodes.

h0 Thi Arned frarcaa (Dispersal,id Provoptlon of Concent rotlonj^ Tha technlqum of revolution provides for the prevention of conoentratione and ti) diaparaal end dltuxmlxig of the opponent's amed foroesc It should be tba pic of the revolutlooarieo to defeat the eaeay even beforee ular front. ront la famed, haeever (for oxscpls, if beoause of in adequate political work among the peasants in certain ruralondition favorable toactivity la crested),should bo done to harass tho enemy onront. Ha should bo left with aa little space, boo power, and natarlal oa possible, ell of mhich are vital to the development of enn no case nnat the ooomy'a hinterland be la itehind thefront tha forces of ro volution oust always be actlvo and seek dlslntagratlcai of-hostile atmngth0

Ihe proletariat Bustan energetic, rothleas battle for the vacillating

i'f Ytf-* r*

I,M Ir {ij ', -tri 'tSJ-

elcnsctft of the armed forces. It must strive to win over to the Militant pro*'

latarlat aa necy of tha armed forces personnel am possible.

leoln oltee some an=plo* of tba "mostloleot battle betaeeo

ths reactionary forooe and the Revolution for the vacillating military" during

tie rebellion of tha mbeeov proletariat la "The Oorornmont

rouarWd to the most diverse and do spa rate measures to keep the wavering on its sides flattery, bribes, distribution of matches, money, etc.

Theiers sore givenhey sere deceiTed, Intimidated; locked

in ia*andand these* considered tb* moat unreliabler. iVas tn* stoat or theirdes Iff fae>ue aud treason.." Th* raaaor. (hs QewriMjaatin keeping tb* epivrwith tha soldiersccoidr^gCommunistthatvolntioneriee did aot toio* a* to"thabrutal mwini*tha tfoveromant with an eq&AlJy active andtruggle fox*nd that, iti Jly3 theya> aim their {xw* at thaevolutionary etflsezi fwho incited the soldiers against th* people) sod to exterminate then,

aaant distributed In toe streets of ttwf-ow daring thef thsoother Rovilutlon" *at down the nflssians of the "battle for too mill-

. hsrp line between your ae&emiea and your lo volte tary,


eeeJdta.tal onomlee,. Destroy theaptire the latter.. Spore theiDflrfer an pooolble,. ooldlaro are children of the paople and do not ,

attack the peopletheir own free wllX, Thoy ore being incited by their;

-<ii Jx if 1* . '*

affioszBiorse Every office* who loads soldiers in thej-

of wcrltsrs sdAl be declared an eserv of the people and an outlswa Kill

whereTeT you ooconater him. In combat with the polios proceed aalhen-'

over pcaslblOj, kill all superiors up to the rank of Komndaaar<, Dlaara and

arrest rll eupervlaore end kill those known to be particularly vicious and

on far ordinary policemen, dismni them ord moke than sorra yoa Instead


2 - c*.lcc of Revolutionary f7,Uayl..


CorRuniot use of military for cob and weaponsets

*:iii ilriu than the military science practiced by modernmc-JLoos reveal the principle cf Integrating all alcaamts of fsrci wmh onn ba applied. Just aa an amy tho industrial peersrloa ar* mobilised for war., There la, however^ no rigid rulend amai ba applied insofar aa'Ccaoamist un of military lnstruaenta Ix (onoanvid Tho principle to bo applied, fron the Cowtiunlat riarv-poiii, is unbodied in the following statement by Ienini ,To have nt the dad::maal; at tha ceclsiva point, an over-holelng superiority of fern cihfci law of military succeoe ie also the law of political aooxctSo1*

Tho exact nature of the military inatruaaata la deUrmined

hy ttie spooiflo oondltiooaat the tins and place of tho rove- '


Intel: Tbaaa Include th* locale: of .operation, thoof 'rear thai

inflv: raetion takae place, and whether the society la Indusgrl

culUral or nomadic,* 'terrain, climate, and the siteountry are

alar influencing factors.

The Instrmeats available for use in the aeisur* of state

pew. aro uaually of tae saau type. here ie the power of*sed and trained revolutionary army, whose personnel may bathoor froa the oiviir

econd ie tho quosl-erilitery forceB without the formalie. of on armyj and the Guerrilla end partisan unltsQ

In the wery few instances where Ccmnunieta hare gaircd power throueh tte ueeormally organised army, this amy haa followed noro orrthodox patterns with regard to organiaotion,and oatbeds* Coaanmist poscasaloneU-organiaed and equipped army is ra tt, and if it does exists it follows the knownni<iai3 for the uoe of armad force* '

(b) Quaai^Milltary ForcaBo

The developsoent of quael-adlltary groups has been eeiptasised by the Coanauniet Psrtjo The potential of such groups con be relatively greatj as baa been doaaonatrated in Italy fi Franee^ endncber of'these formations now in existence such asithe partlaan groupa' In'lta^Jariiurgolyan outgrowthM of WorldJfiT?*

Ais usually;organised{

/ t" J''actaatryitJupoaeh the -formation of Ccwennlat calls :in|whloh!-Bn^tancy kajif ?

5 H* ! 'i tit.

both encouraged and domarded by the farty^ follmred byreation of additional cells along do re functional military lines* Forn the'eraedor in unions In heavyntil'tha stage ia reached where nenbe re of the union nay bo organized along strictlyline sP suchay be considered to be quasfc-military forces*.

In the early stages ofhe organisation of tha quaei-eiilitary forco is veryn nany respects beingtaff composed of trusted Party

- D6 -COU'IffltfTIAL


ths cerganisatlon progresses It becomes more foroaliaed, embodying what la Inunctioning general staff, transmitting its orders to ocaponents of the force a

Such forceu develop also along other lines, as In the Italian CoBauniet Party's quasi-military organisation mhich is ccmonly known as the Apparato., The Apparatoilitary head who is responai-ble to the Italian Comnunlat Party for military action,, This leadertaff organised Into rooogniied military etmff sections, personnel. Intelligence, operations, and supply* The Apparato la organised by rogionSe each regional command having Jurisdiction over Apparato personnel

In its araa0

trategy and Tact lea.

ituation In which the Communist Party has not been able to oeiao the poaor Of the etate by political means. It Is possible

flreaed evidonee on the strategy and tact loo of quasi-all Itaxy forome such aa were developed and used by the Soviet Union, there exists sufficient information from which certain deductions may be made concerning tha use of strategy end tactics,, Much of this Information la Interwoven with

the political, propaganda, labor, espionage, andpe eta of Cam-

munlaao There fare these aspects alsoearing on the organisation and oa* of armed forooso

G7 -

It la tba custom of tha Communists to hold critique* aftor each inaurreotionsl effort in order to dlmgnome the aotIon and lta results and to foncalato eenmrml principles to bo observed In futurets. } these oonferenoea were held openly, but thereafter the strictest security noasurea went observed^ and information concerningscansi difficult to obtain,,

xperiences with Insurrections wereuml<atod to the ncophyto laadera primarily through the elebornteschool system maintained in tho Soviet Urdhe principal Institution having boon tha Lenin Institute in Moscow,,1

This and several other schools of revolution typified one Bsthod of disseminating the lessons learned from the crltlquse*, Party nsnoala otmmm rising lea sons learned in critiques arm distributed to Party aioahersa

A Qormon Communist attempted to oynthesiae the broad pricelploe of the oonduot of revolution in general and the insurrection la particular,. Bis tenetstriklng resomblanee to oartaln of the reecgnisod principlee of warfare i ho ehoioe of the rightanoantratlon ofha attack at any cost} and (li) prevention of tho concentration of the enemy,

Tactics Against Armed forces and Policethese general principles another German Ccemnmlnt

fora-jlatad epncifle tootles to be oaed against most of the cooCf pt

apperatu* of the bourgeois stats,, Proa the Communist point of view the Boat dongaroua element of this apparatus is the armed forces,* Iliadeaorlbod hew the proletariat will be able to dominate the regularha fleets the various polic- orgEniaationa0 and the voluntary Military- organisationsThe Regular Arnyi

"The regular army, if It is nots the roost powos.-ful arm available against the proletarian revolution0 It is obvious that the amy operates to tho best advantage In tho fields and In tha daytime* Fighting within tho cities, especially at righttf hinders the operations of the various unite* These units as listed below arereater or lesser degree dangerous in tha CcBncunietlo fightt

" Infantry t

the majority of effective personnelglit til


< .umb fire power aa well aa the bayonet, it takes over a?eKri-fc territory and ooouploe conquered jpooit^^ ointe of thia arm* which thenow bow torei

"Their firearms can be used within the cities only at relatively short

"At tho beginning of thaha peouluritiee of th* town era little known from tho point of view of using tham for operational (difficulty of orientation}c

"Thore is always the danger of being attacked by hidden insurgents (inn roofs, in windows^ or in attics)*

"Ths Infantry le composed prlneipaUy of pw.pir.te and workaroo This ebbs is notin defending the ruling class aa or the nlddla clacsesjesult of this, frateraiiatlon and agitationnorsltse the ocnrpany and swing then over to the side of the insuiTeotioniet8u The neeeaslty of operating by little groups in tho etreetp which are not any longer under direct ernoand, eausea oertain groups of acldiexs to osaeo to be roliablo ittle good workit is relatively easy to swing then over to the Red There ia also tba necessity of putting out of oombat the wwarndante

"This. is the one which wakes the Doet

inpression on "the can nan, However, tbe material danger .to the insurgents who know how to make use of cover is quits There are tho mane possibilities of disorganising here as we saw In the case of thoinfantry*


: ;

"These era very dangerous to the insurrection- To fight them tha insurgents would uset Artillery, If they are in poeaesslon of onyj hand-grenades and high-powered bomba thrown under the tanks and cars

In group*ritches which are both wide and deep enough to go acroattreat; meterseters] depthetersCavalry I

arm is the most vulnerable In street fightingo Also its role in case of insurrection la insignificantc

[ff" q


"An as rial reoonnaissanoo con only give important results if tha insurgents fron tha bo ginninga polled only tho moot elementary aean? of camouflage*

"Chemical Weaponsr

"The beat offense pgainst chemical arms is the aalsure

of apparatus by Insurgents (gas tanks and equipment) and the destruction of psrsonnel..


"Tho artillery of the fleet can be used by the government only for the purpose of firing on certain buildings or How-ever, the crews from the float, it they are behind the governmontB can be ueed as forces of infantry ln the form of small detachments,. The Communists must look to the disintegration of these elstwmte."

"Police Agencies"

Tho Lenin Schoolew precautions !to:ben attacking police stations or pee tatj -

"Police forces are notoriously unreliable (from the Com-munlst viewpoint) for insurreotions0 Consequently, the city'a riot squai, euro to putight, ia studied* If it is on three shifts* th* woakist one ia picked for attack. If there is suspicion that police off! wrs are rlert to what is brewing, the advice i8 to telephone them on

nsurrectional troops: familiarity with the city, ease of orientation, awareness of existing conditions. In short, they have ths neanc "to insure themselvesapid attack, to apoe.iro (ixecute sucoeaaful raids,c) ticsg

Conclusions which would serveule inan of insurrection which have boon atoted by tha Conrnunists inoluooi

"Among the troops whose thoughts arclire to disarm themurprise attock,, In those units wherea Co-minlst cell hnvinc some influenceortion ofwe must organise the Insurrection ao as toater on use these soldiers srainst those units whichnot yet beenf

"In the caao there the surprise attcck has not boon 1

prevented from approaohing the city. In this caao, we met uso'barricades.

we mist ononis* tho elege of the barracks and cantonments until such

s the insurgents will have formed their armed forces and reinforced any conquered poaltlonac

regular troops havo entered the city to fight the lnav.rrection, we must aptly the tactics ofeeping them thuiront and at the same time organise to attack them from the roar, fron the windows and rooftops, organised thus



decsralise tho soldiers."


additioneneral strategic plan embracing

the entire country, there shouldetailed tactical plan for each city whloh would indioote, among other things!

An appreciation of the clrcumstanoas and the relation of the forces within the town itself*

"bo The date the Insurrection la to be aat in motion, "o. Tho principal objectives where the insurgents

oust succeed,

The distribution of forces among various objectives.

"ot The missions tha dot?ohmonts must accomplish after ozo outing their prinary mission.

"fo Some indication of alternative conduct to bo followed ln case of failure of one detachment or another,.

"g. Measures to ba taken to prevent loyal troope


from other cities or regions from coming in*

"b. The formation of regular unite' of tha fledj

H during tho course of thej jjilimjfHsHMfl

Oi'lV-*: f '


"lo The organisation 'of oommunicaptions during the


The location of the general military eoomandsr and other ccnmndera.

"kB ocial map of the city indicating favorable rtei ing to their aocial character.

The detailed disposition of and degree of loyalty within the police organization and military aaaooiationa which are

"m* The location of armorios and the force of

their guarda

"ne What countor-measures the forces of the city aay logically employ*

Information on garagess automobiles, trueelonging to tha atate which will be removed*

"p* The uso0 during the Insurrection, of urban lines

of communication*

"q* The personnel and arraanant of the revolutionary

The attackity ia visualized aa beginning inin the early morningeneral and; concentric attack oncentral/qiiar fere,'withother quarters*

While the main attack ie going forward,-special reeci-nalasance squads rv-raitod from soldiers* young Communists, and specially trainedscouts (Pioneers or Ked Falcons) would ascertain tho distribution of government forces at am unit* on magazinea, bridges,nd who would alao Attack and disarm small groups of aoldiero, organize revolts in the troopse and circulate rumors favorable to the


insurgents. Tha Intelligence missions were bo be partially fulfilled by woasn and children.

Ins Lructlons on at root flighting gave omphasio to the maintenance of conmunlcationa and liaison both laterally and from the front to rear, by telephone,couriere on foot, or using motorcycles and automobiles.

flTphaeia waa placed on offenelve operations, but the defensive action was to be based on the following principles,,

"a. To rain time in concentrating forces and roso'ircesiew to taking the offensive,

nb0 To contain the adversary to certain points so that tie main blow nay be struck at others*

"Co In order to na in tain lines of communication and occupied points.

( "d. To maintain the disposition of those units which ij4li&ro

W .itfl- tif-ttr

i'11 'so*

The primary objective .of?the Communist tactical doctrine is

H- i'i i' ' : '

that of overcoming the government's anosd forcesonbinod assault

and fraternisation technique. Their tactics aroV based on probing theeaknessses and exploiting then to tho utraosta Planning,and ths maintenance of communications for maximum coordination

8 tressed,. eakness of Coenunlst technique llee ln ite tendon oy toward standardisation which, ln tum0 nay eaeily lead to advance knowledga of proee dureBe

Tho plan for fighting government foroea may take varied forms*, There mayeneral offensive with the object of conquering an area* There may be an offensive directed against strategic points with the object of controllingoe without physically occupying all of 1t0 There mayurely defensive action of the barricade type* Thess actiona nay be used singly or in various combinations* As else-whora, local situations will govern tho tactics* An open, generaldesigned to occupy and capture an area or city may deviate only eligitly from orthodox fcarfaroo

Itharacteristic of city and house fighting that tb* function of control la oxtreaoly difficult* so that the individual- Uu;;

'i " ill ; I *

soldier must be thoroughly trained In the operation* (United States Army

Fieldomments that such fighting requires "the ^highest' rj

degroo of initiative, skill, punning, and .courage; on the. *soldier"

(d) The Internal Assault,

When the attook originates from Inside the city and ia an uprising in the proper eenaa of the word0 the tactics will differ to some extent in that the insurgent foroea are able to go directly to the polnte they wish to assault, and often even arrange their dispositions before tho assault is begun* his way the objectives may all be taken simultaneously,

Where such an operation Is conducted,,most bo pointedarrison which land that garrison must be rendered incapable ofand retaking tho individual points in Bucoonolono

Moat of tho available data on the Bolshevik insurrections of? deal with the events in Petrograd, where little street fighting occurred outside of the assault on the Winter Palace. This In-surroTtion has been described as one of the most peaceful in hlstoryc It is recorded, however, that some of the Bolshevik laadore had made extenjive plansulX-ecale assault on the city, aiming at the Govern-moot offices,. In the meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee on tho eve of theierjinafci recommended tho followingt

"7fo nust attack the government and beat It on the very groan1 where it Is defending the state0 In order to get possession of tho state- we oust hurl the masses against the gorerrmwint0n

Along the sana lines, Lenin recalled to the Central Cob -nittoi the rules of -Insurrection laid down by Ifarxit l 5sf

Applied'to the present situation in RuB3ias theae^rulasncluiOi wift and sudden general offenBlve onn attaet, both from the lneldo and out, from the workers* districta in Finland, from Revel and fromn offensive with the whole fleetj and (U) the concentration of troops greatly superior to thoorces which will not0 Cadets and Cossacks,, Ke must re cm Li tenaoioua storming troops whose duty it will be to occupy all Important bridges and take part in every decisive engagaosnt,, fie must also

form gangs ofood with rifles and hand grenades who will march on enomy poeltiona and on the officers' training schools and surround than,"

enin's plan was not executed because tho maases in Pntrograduooeasful epontaneoua uprlslng0 (e) Attack on Key Objectives.,

Often tbe aituation will be such that it will not be necessary to fright to occupy the entire town0 The insurrection can be consummated by attacking one or eeveral key military objectives in townr which will autau.tioally eliminate resistancer. Thla Is more likely to be thewhen the revolution enjoys wide popular support.,

Bolshevik rising in Fetrograd, for which Lenin hadrond assault, is an instance where capturepecific objective,inter Palace, was the only major armed engagement necessary to assure ;the apitulation of the government* KerensVy had made the mistake* of, hisingle point and trying to protect it with the aoagerif forenB available* eizure of the eltySa' eel cervices, combined with what Neuberg later referred to as "scouting aeticcrD gave tba insurgents control of Potrograd without casualties*) Ona school of thought maintains that tha capture of the Winter Palace and th* goveiTBaont therein was an entirely superfluous gesture since the government was isolated and hone* incapable of governing; yet even were the "inter Palaoe to beere symbol of power, its capture waa necessary, for the capture of auch symbols of power has an important psychological effeot<,

Fighting the armed forces of tho government mar be carried on V' guerrillaith tho purposs of demoralising governmentbrr.oualy0 whorea If victory through demoralisation, revolutionary conditions oust exist to an extreme degree before such tactics havelianee of succeeding,, At the earns tlmek guerrilla warfare Is the only prsntlcal no ana of fighting organised government troops when the latter's strength la relatively unlapalredo

The soldier vo dlecipllne and trailing show to beat advantage when heefinite and visible enemybati sniping, attacks on individuals or snail groups of soldiersee who strikes suddenly and disappears into nowhere does not offer the organised militaryarget, it nags him and saps his morale, deprives him of hie willn Has the advantage of guerrilla action* Inhe rebels combined barrios da tactics with gusrrllla warfare so effectively that thsy wan the dty from the garrison, and held out until fro ahjtroops, with heavy artillery,gainst them fronwiftly moving squads ambushed polios patrols to get their armso Poei*ra were prominently displayed for the instruction of civilian fighters!not form clusters, but attack in small groupn with lightning speed] Do not entrench in fortified positions but use thoroughfares and street con*'re toolley and dioeppsar again; Build barricade* to hamper troop movement rather than for defense*-"

These principles are still Basic doctrinec They were uasd ln Germany during ihea and ae late as

The success of underground resistance movements in occupied ocuntrieau for example, the Chetnlxs,artisans, the Ustaci in iugo-slavlap and tho French Maquis, Indicates that tact lea ofniversal application*

(g) v^^PjurtUan_ Movement- in World War II*

Since World (Tar II the Soviet Union has sponsored nestings ofpartisan organisations in order to control and furtasr indoctrinate and strengthen such partisan organisations,, lessons in military tactics, which can be used for guerrilla warfare, have bean published in Party propeg.nda distributed to Ccnmuniet Party members* Diagramsetches have appeared in French Communist Party

a ekatohnail infantry unit in the attack, ths under portion

?J Mr*i',S tank acosntarlly expoaed as itmall rise ln the ground p .

Jifi I T' i

, ill

and advice on how to seek tho best firing positions fron cover,.

During World War II partisan activityreat deal of oasiatence to the Soviet Union* Although this partisan activity occurred in the yearsIt demonstrates Soviet-Ccmaunlst methods of guerrilla warfare,.


In the falll when the Oeraan forces had alreadyonsiderable slice ofhe Council of Peoples8 Cosmic aa re passed,


xbk i'aareo pro Tiding for tho creationartisan movement in rear echelon of tho enemy forcesr. The center of ths partisan raovae established in Jfoacowo Appointed to head the Central Staffss P0 POHOIRRaiKOp tho Sooretary of the CKVKP (b) (Central Cost-Bittae of the All-Unionolsheviks) of Byelorussia, who occupied tho position until tho endc3o

ths Cental Staff of tho Part lean Movocont was directlyto tho CKVKP (b) (Stalin), ilitary level it mas likewisecoordinated directly with the Red Army General Staff, and indirectly, witi theancioearlat for Internal Affairs Inhs coordination of these agenciesop level was to provide complete haracny of policies and oporatlonOo In practice, hcwevarp it resulted quiteH.tly in frlotlon, antagonlan.snd,n hostile rivalry batmen the General Staff and the NKVDo;!:

Tho mission of the CSPD consisted of organising partisan activity lo tho rear of tho enemy armies, both within the USSR and in out-lying territories* The purpose of the partisan movement consisted not only of ijperatiaosurely strategic nature, but also of political^,and terroristic activityarge ecalo..

For the organisation of these activities, tha CSPD wasby ths following sections i

Intelligence and reconnaissance

bo Divers led arid terror (including sabotage, provocation, etc )

Oo Propcganda

d<> Liaison and communications

T1 o; -1

schools and training eoureea were established under the Central Staff for the purpose of training leaders and rank workers In political, diversionary, and terroristic methods andttention waa devoted almost exclusively. In view of the urgent neod for irondiate cctlor, to practical quostlonso The course lasted from one to thriie nonthe In most cases, after which period the atudent was considered qualified. One Central Staff school existed for more* thorough preparation of personnelwo-yeor training period) only3 oloso woeraduated,mong the graduates were partisan lea dors with training in all aspects of underground activity.

Each school and training oourse specialised In one particular pha;w? of work, such as propaganda, diversion, sabotage, intelligenoo,,ersonnel consisted chiefly of former NXVD workers, ndlltla man end Soviet administrative employees evacuated from enemy-oocupisd territories. Their families were usually forced to remain la the rear. The teaching staff In each case wse determined byi-theA,nature :

.of training. For example, intelligence 'andiraconnaissace were; teurfit by

Soviet intelligencea; RTCVD officers were used ss Inatruotors for

diversion, terrorism and sabotage; propaganda mas taught by officials of

tbe propaganda apparatus of the CKVKP

Tho occupied territories were divided into sectors cf partisan

lnflrence0taff for each, subordinated directly to tbe Central

Staff In Moscow, for example, 8PD Kalinins koi Oblastl, and SPD Byelcrueeia






All partisaninvolved as they wareystem of cross-cbarcals and more or less two-way subordination, carriedraotloaUy arr Hal oarlee of mlaalono along the lines of intelligence political and enorletio work} particular autonomy aas enjoyed by tha Special 0roups and the hTVD. All partisan organs establiBhed their own underground groups asotg the local civilian population in tba emeay-ocoapied territories rhiih were uaed almost exolualvaly for operational work ln oonforedty with lnatructiona Issued by the corresponding partisan organs* The sogroups may bo classified structurally according to the following typssi

ypoie fly by tho Komsomol c- Each Group consleted of three to five men, with one contact man whoso doty wasi hla way at regular intervals into partisan-controlled territories.

reoruitod and one member in turn roorulted by himself*

o< NKVD groups, organ lied according to tha agent system,esident chief was appointed for each sector and placed in charge of asperate groups of agents

de Underground groups of the ordinary type, consisting of any number of members up toeach of whom was Informed as to tha identity of all other members in the same groupD

A smoothly functioning system of liaison and conaaaication oxiBtod betaasn tho partisanthe Party and the NKVD in the enemy rear and the Control Organs in Uonoowa Principal Beans of communication were radio end aviation for the transclsoion messages, intelligence reports, directives and tbe like. Personnel wore transported to and from the enemy rear by air exclualvoly0 aanded in assigned areas of partisan activity on landing strips specially constructed by partisans,.


Ths Soviet Ccnarand devoted concldexablo attention to the

earl: of partisan organs along diversionary linos a Partisan diversionredominant role in tho activities of the Soviet underground In cn^ay-oocupied territory, Its significance, while primarily nilitaiy, extended ca wall into tho political and economic

Tho CSPD threw an enormous amount ofoney, and aanjrcwor into the field for tha purposes of diversion, sacrificing in many cases soma of their most able workers in the line0 losses, to be Barfly in-tine and life were proportionately heavier than in any other Una of partisan activity0

Means of Diver don i

Diversionary work waa accomplished primarily by means of explosives,ke all other supplies and materials, were delivered by air to thef partisan activity* Those materials were also smuggled into cities and areas under enemysually with the aid of well=

caaovflagod couriers, disguised fle peasants travelling from rural diotriots

to anou Weapons and explosives, were conccoled In wagons and carts. Innncrn. In milk cans, under women's clothing, etc.

were used to prepare toluene ond ammoniac mines weigh-inp anywhere0 torilograms- Tliese nines were net offime I'teehunlan with special electric or -echcnioel fusee.

Among rcody-iraide war materials used for diversionary work the following were most frequent:

f&ignaticng] loh and .'nericsn models, with alow-ectioil fuses. ovtet-oade magnetic nine appeared, copied nloont exactly from themodel. English and American delay fuses continue to be used however,.)

Thermite grenadesused ohiefly for Incendiary purposes.. for force and Phosphorousikewise used for incendiary purposes. The


usorood chance to reach security, inhe pillsl

burst into.flame'onlypecific time interval^

In"addition to the above, other ncterials were nloo uged,;however


esser extent,'due to limited effectiveness: OlaoB-sand'powderj'iHiiM gaa>llne tanks, ond toluene candles with incendiary wicks.

Btsie diversionary work, in particulrr Hut which Involved conspiraoy, woe accomplished largely by moans of the magnetic mine, which by virtue of Its convenient form and delayed action, proved to be the most effectiveecticnl type of material.



diversionary mission uos preceded by meticulous reconnaissance for the purpose of studying the target and the surroundings, chocking the amount of notorial available, end determining tho cost favorable time for accrcnplishing the act*. Reconnoitering use uaually done by persons not initiated into the subaecpiont phases of the mission. Then, on the basis of til availablelan una drown up with the participation of the pew ens who were picked to oarry it out,

Aa aoon as the plan of action was composed, the diversionary material was immediately brought to the appointed spot, or as near as conditions pGrxidtted., Material was selected according to the* nature of the target and the circumstances under which tiie act oust be Thus, for blowingailroad track at the momentransport should pass, or i'crighway, heavy toluene nines with eleotrioechanical fuses were used. These rdnea were installed at the pre- I scribed points and left there. Ifast important military tranaportedestroyed at railroad stations by means of magnetic mines installed in;; advance near the statlon0

In the former Instances the chief purpose was destruction"of road-bedf and tracks, while the transport merelyonvenient medium for the exploolon. The executors themselvee had no knowledge of what the trersport oontoined.

Diversion inarehouses, baaee*dumpo, tank parks and rotor pools, aa well as theoters and other public places, was aocompllehed

fnotie, tine nines, thermite and phosphorous. In nost canon, the ezploelvee were brought in ahead of time, sometimes several days in advance; there wprp cooes, to be euro, of explosion being pro* duoot: icmcdiiitely after the installation of tho ivitcriil. Foriveraloni-stheaterrlefcrise containing several taapnitic nines, vita the fuses set in advance Ten niorfces beforoe left the theater, having placed the briefcese under the stetanotherovle-house electricianegnotlc

nine vith electric fuse to the notion picture proleotor* This he did

durirt tNo norning. In tho evening, when iho house was full? tho lights wcredlJCTedj the projector turned on? ond tho explosion occurred.

lover linen end telephone networks in the eneny zone wereBfaco of nasll thermite grenades* and lnby reane ofaaas.

After acconpllshing large-scale, diversion in tho area of! enemy control^ the .executor, if he were under suspicion, or generally^ in banger/ vlthdrev '

MSVvf i'. :1 f.ilx 'isI. i- x.t

retrtat yna followed,ifferent member of the ease underground group vlthdrev instead of the extcutor* Tlio other member?on-participant orartial participant In the recently accomplished diversion, aay hove been under suspicion hinaelfj or, he cay hove*tried tottention away from the real culprit by leading the enemy to believe helio polity As eoon as he hud 'hus placed hiasolf in a


position, he retreated into thooe, lec ving thef tho underground group free to continue ope rati one unlnpeded by peroccutlont end the fx ecu tor retained in tho ohadova.

It Is clear that this dlveraion represented oil the

nilitary aspects of partisan activity, directed toward weakening the SOESy'a materiel otrcngth and potential in key spots, destruction of on. xy personnel, and consolidation of pnrtioan eontrol by direct moanso

Tne prinury purpooos of sabotage, on tho other hand, consisted of encouraging discontent oaong tho local population, incurring tha wroth of the eneay, tnxiernlnlag his authority, and inciting reprloalo, which In turn, further provoked the population andpirlt of resistance. Tho effective nelntenenoo of this vicious circlet which coLld be brought to the point ofperpetuationinimum of effort on tho port of tho pertisans, una tho result of sabotage.

A correlated purpose of sabotage una tho.organlo preservationhe Soviet syatccj in its fundasental etructure, uhich vos often as in the oase of faming technique and agriculturalask In vhich the enemy occupational authorities unwittingly assisted. Tho wide nptworl; of agents which enveloped the eneny administration needed only to profit by existing policies oral to provide the necessary correctives wherever such policies did not confem completely to partisan aims

Thus,ontrast to diversion, the methods of sabotage uero of an lnclrect nature, with political and economio conalderationa takingoedftTce over the Military..


Sabotage activities were initiated by all of tho partisan organs.

Those include tho RKVD, SFD, Brigades, partisan detachments, Party an-rl Komsomol contere, and epocial groups. eding role in the delineation and initiation of rjost niseions, was, however, performed by the Party organlsationn nt Oblast and Ralonact which further enphnnizes the politieol significanco of this type of

Sabotage nloslons wore executed nainly by local inhabitants.t-cnuoua attempt was made to enllat persons occupying key poaitionaspossibilityo mtorpi-etera end edvioers attached to the military administration and tlie economic apporotua were usually unfavorably dinposed toword the new regime; even such persons as nay have suffered ra;t tho Bolshevika or been violently anti-Communist saw that thentended to preserve the existing conditions of slavory In Ru'icta, merely changing tlie slogans and exploiting the people forheirJj, own ends. esult, many such employees could be drawn into:the:net^.'.

weak of partisans, and they made good use of their opportunity;forfv'

. jf'i*$fl

co:rdtting sabotage ln tho corresponding'agencies and dns Stations <> .

The number of saboteurs among the local population was swelled by

on Inflnx of special partisan agents into key institutions* These

agent-saboteurs were usually loft in the area in tho wake of the Red

Any where they posed as political poreecutees, enenioB of Bolsheviks,

concentration enrjp inmates, ex-Bulaka, and Rod Amy deserters,

Thd Germans on the whole were inefficient in the natter of distinguishing

gorxdne poreecutees from the small contingent of irjpoetors who were

nuT/TJeally vastly Inferior 'o the runs of peoplehe Soviet roglnc eo violently thatelcomed the invaders oe llbnrotoro In tlKi first contha of tho vpi.

Agent-saboteurs equipped with falsified docuacnte penetrated the occ lnational ednlnistretive aprcrntus ond the local cdnlnistrotlve age.mica. For example, many Oblnst odniinistrativo chiefs, bourgoacioters, viluicc overseersoctors, ocrlculturel teohnieiQnse and load chiefs of police 'rare active partisan sabotage worker*.

I'<entlon should oloo be redo of thevrark done by forcer necxire of the Corrwnlot Party end tho Konseaol who rcrmincd in the occupied soae either intentionally as fcnuino refugees or under force of 'ilrcuastanooo

Those people wore usually recruited by the underground croups.afterod already obtained eeiploynont on thoir own Initiative in Important agvitcles. erniting wan done by throe toning to expose thoir, past to the ponnn(autborltles unless they consented to cooperate with tho partisans*

.Womennrtlouler port ln sabotage Just as they did in eer'fiin phases of diversionary work. On the pretext of arorous inclinations,ntered into tho confidence of prominent enerr/ officials, whoa they induced by "friendlyo carry out various missions. The officialsiestlon rarely molitod that thay wore being used, or that their subsequent actions fittedlar which woe not epporent in the beginning,

In addition to the types of uorkera deecribed above, the CSPD sent out tra.'nod saboteurs whoa'- duty wes to remain ln the field and to direct nnfc'loge on tlie apot,.


Sabotage wto carried oat in all areas of the occupied territory! however, like diveroion, it was concentrated in the areas of enemy control

In partisan usage* terroristic acts refer to assaaoinatlon of iKportont persons or groups of persone.

Terroristic acts were ocrried out on the initiative of local partisan organs or in special oases, by direct order fron ttoscow (CSPD).

Terroriotic activity was largely conducted by tho IIKVTJ fron thet level on down, with the ether partisan organs usuallyecondary part0

The majority of missions were executed by fomer KTCVD workers, or Party aembcrs who had been subjected to special training in terroristic methods ond operations under the CSPD school systca in Ibscou and other large cities. Only in exceptional cases woro local inhabitants employed for tills typo of work, and oven then, thoir functions were usually of an auxiliary nature- whereby they lent indirect assistance" to the"

"il ^ ff" ' v.

person committing lira act* he Sej.|arro of Objectives.

Operations Involving the seleure of specific objectives, such cs con-uni.cations, utilities, ond supply depots differ froo fighting the arrcd forces of the government In that the purpose Is not to dofeat an arced force but rather to toko possessionhyolcal objoot or series of objects.* This nay obrioualy involve fighting, but it is the occupation ths? natters, and unnecessary fiGhting is to be avoided if possible.

Oich objectives no1 telegraph eye tens, rollroudn, olictrlc pcniesor and res uorku nrc highly complicatedf.publu of being op*ratrd only by lilghly skilled personnel.nient! the purpose is to destroy, rather than utilize such objectives, tne personnel assigned to take then mist beifferentntirely iron thc-so cMe rarely toifle Thesa non mat bo sijoeloltft* ctzit their reeruitrcnt oftenejer problem to Cw.sainir;fi forces *

There ere four diff (spent cethods by uhtoh key objectiveebe talon, l safest, lo by prior infiltration of revolutionary personnel, so that vhen tho insurrectionhe uso of the objective autoraticaily paasos to the rebolsi.

A second nothod is by neons of the twneral strike.

A third ond obviouB nethod is the taking of the objectives byethod which nay or mydvisable, depending onir cans tone oa. Where the InsuiTeoUbn'pe^tiwegree of irttriprxse^

it often happens that the objectives ore pnljrJlghtly guardedi:

T' ' 1

plebsly unguarded, soandful of arced nen nay ovorconc anywith

'Die fourth nethod is tho capture of the assigned objectives by en "invisibleothod porfeoted by Trotskya

Trota'cy ceseribed ouch en operation oo follows * Hie operational soiree beganw o'clock la tho naminghen small


pr-'iies of fetrogred rebels, coordinctod under on over-nil plan, sii'ltansously, or In prearranged order, the railroad stations, electric pl'int. minitIons and food stores, the waterworks, the telephone exchange, tho state bonk; tho large printing plants, the telegraph station, ondost office. Trotsky baaed his taotios on tho theory that tho Inircrrootion Istj tcchnlool exports aro required to start It and thoy alone con atop It, Ho liad gathered together'xture of soldiers and Bailors (cony uitJi technical skills) and ol'dllon technicians, and hedpecial etoff to load theai Antltc leaderoroor Csarlstod rol "Minnjoldier} andollor. Tho snail groups

wuvo organised according to tholr skills in reference to the objective tit;

f';''t I

to It) token. All were selected for aggressiveness and eenplote reliability.

The intensive preparation of those email, tightly organised ^assault;.

expinds has boon described as followsI jiiv i

;j I itt.Guard hod been rehearsing-In: the very contnrio

ii . i; M


toim during therpast ten daye prior to :fevonber*7. Antonov-Ovole-nxo


wuu who organised these tactical exercises, this sort of dross of the ooup d'etat, in brood daylight, wherever the stroctathrongingovement, and around buildings which were of the groateetrnortanee in tho govemaontol and politiool ctrongholdoo The policeilitary authorities ware no oboeoaod by the ideaudden revolt by the proletarian messes and so concerned with meeting tho danger, thatfailed to notice Antonov-Ovalcnko'e gangs at work.

'ruaid such widespread disorder, *dio should notice the little group of uniroedo soldiers and sciloro who vasdored about in the corridors of the telephone ond telegraph exchanges, in tho Central Post Office, in tha Gov er orient offices and goneral headquarters, talcing noterrangonent of the offices end seeing hoi/ telephones and lights were iMttedr They visualised and rononbered the plwi of theeo buildings and omdied tho ncona of getting into then suddenly andonant's notice. They :ijcfconed with their chances of cuooeaa, astireiting the opposition, and looking fbr tho places of least resistance, the weakest and nost vutnevnTole places in tho defensive organisation of the technical, ailltary, and secretarial cervices of the State* In the goneral. confusion, who should notice fierce three or four sailornouple of soldiers or strayhindering around some buildings, going in or clinbing the stairs; peoplo uho did notlook at each other when they net? tfo one/even uflpeeted these people 'of1obeying precise and dotedled orderoj' oflan orMorgoihg; exercises oUractod against thent)Ciithe state's defense*u Later tho Rod Guards would strike'>vjq beoanno they had conducted their invisible maneuvers on the very ground where the battle would shortly begin* Trotsky succeeded in getting hold of the plan oftown's technical services. Dybenko's sailors, aided by two engineers and engine rooo artiflcoro, mastered the underground gas ami water piping, the electric power cables and the telephone and telcgj'cph system* Two of then explored the drains under the headquarters Of thGeneral Staff*

"The isolation of tho whole district orore group of houseB lvu! to be rade practicableeu minutes; so Trotsky divided the town into sections, determined which werestrategic points, and allotted the lark, section by section^ to rangs of joldiers and skilled uorkoro. TedudcBl crperto wore neeecorxy as well os soldiers. Tho capture of tho railway station in Itoseow wis allotted to two squads consisting ofctvinnalloro, ondailway men*. Three Congo of sailer a* uorkncn and railwayen in all, were ordered to take over the Warsaw station* For the capture of other stations, Oybonkoumber of squads ofon each. elegraphist attached to every cqund controlled movements on tlie railway linos- On Octobernd (fovsnbencting under orderstonov-Ovoienko who uno in close touch with tho maneuvers, all tho gongs rehearsed tho capture of tlie railway stations, and tho general rehearsal was perfectly welltand precise in every detail. On that day,'throeto.the Ifain Electricity Plant noor the portj theun>by,tectnicel services, was not even guarded. The ennager eskod theuhetber they were the men uhon he lied asked the conmonder of the square. to send to hin. Ho hud beenuard for the Inst five days. Thesailors took over the defense of the Electric Plant, in casensurrection? they sold, In the sooeeu gangs of engine roomartificers took over ths other three municipal plants."

"In order to overthrow the nodomrotsky had said, "youtominc partyp technical exports nnd fangs of ernod non led by engineers*

ffie.Stalin Synthesis,

Trotsky's tactics uoro appliedity scale, Musaollni transposed thanationwide scale, and both Hitler and Stalin endeavored tohe patternorld-wide scale* Tho Ilazio, of course, failed; but iltolln bee built, through tho system of Conouniot Parties in allorpo of insurrectional tochnioiano trained to aciso the technical apparatusationignal fron Ibocou if conditio do aro favorable,,

An exacple of how this organisation is to work is contained In thenstruetiono given ct the Lenin fobool in Ifoscou for the capture of such oitloH as Chicago,, Conauniat operations ore porfomfid not by poratroop technic inns but by local Communist organizations. The airborne troojic are to be tho amy of occupation.

The plans call firstigh degreo.of preparationf tho technical serviceB of theto the inootu.:la The organisation and routine of .the police isfor the jUqufdat^

of socio ond tho use of others while their fonllles aro heldquetu? assigned to capture each objective ere trained in each particular operation. Their final Instruction will be the announcement of tho hour and zd-rmte for the strike.

To prevent calls for outside help, coixmni cat ions are interrupted inoecdataly* Railroads ore wrecked several miles outside of the city,



lar by sending out urrmnned locomotives or by blowingncomingrood oqtsids seise and hold the airports, awaiting incoming tropav

Cr.ptorod radio stationsenoral strike after power plants aro seised*. Thahief of police, and all leading officials an? immediately captured., The nayor Is "persuaded" toreviously rati wed proclamation over the captured radio. If he refuson, which aotevi his immediate death, someoneoice similar to his reads it.

The entire operation tokos ASt the end of whichreTiouoly selected go Vermont is In operation*

The role of the technical facilities of the state ere vital to

gov'tranent* Those nuot be seized by tho insurgento ih all caoos where the

govorooont doos not readily abdicate end hand thorn over, or where the warders in these installations Buy be hostile to the new revolutionary

govforoent. The well-organised uprising will take peine to allocate periionnel to positions giving: control of the technical facilities beforeoperation, or,ery minimum, strike at those facilities immediately so that surprise will provide their capture intiot. ernaent^ revolutionary or otherwise? is safely entrenched without complete control of tho technical apparatus of the stateAaflnaaljfttloP,oprdlnatcd foctio,

Although arrest or assassination alono doos not accomplish the ccup; exc-pt nndcr rare elrcirirrtsncpa, there In no question of the necessity of

ixtrx> Haing the personnel of tho governtsont. tiot only do these people. pooe fn ffirytob degrees of actual power, but, perhaps noro inport/int froc the viewpoint of the public at large, they ore oyobols of power and -t'io state. Thus,ter Trotsky's Red Ouardo had captured Pati'. fred, they still found it nacenaory to capture the Uinter Palace and e c. written deputation fron the niniotcro before they could con: eveneaders of thoir own Forty that the insurrectionccoeded, ite violent liunnvection or coup succeeds unless the ruliig fievros are arrested, killed, or driven into exile..

Cften, tho eniSro succoso of tho plot will hinge on acinutiMi or arrest, as In the case of the Revolt of theelsof the key figures nccenoary to tho plans

offerGicooperation (or their benediction) only on tho proviso ttetj una-dead. When ths baab intendeda^^iMchinc groundhsitand Danyjof Itielpivoitai



In the event arrest is to hesed to neutralize or eliminate thai

ntal leadors, thessets are pertinent:

Asideie factonsleep is ordinarily not sufficiently alert or perpared ti> offer rosistance, there ', bepsycho logically deroraliain? aio-ttttired inlothes ahlleell-amed 'an. Theerson nhose prestigeis public itjressiorordinarily take pains to avoidarsltuntlon in public and ahen he Is taken off guard, he Is,ertain extent, morally disareed and humiliated.

Ihe Technique of Assassination and

In certain situations, particularly Khars tho revolution attempts

a chai'o in the ruling class, the govarnmontal leadersbe considered


lopliubleenace to tho revolution aa long as they live. Here,of; assaaaination replaces arrest. This method also has thej

ii advanta-aof creating terror and thus breaking the resistance of thos^isf>|

; i'-Ui i'li



areful planning. .Therei>jfcsi3f'aiterhitlvo plins in case tha first one fails, as nail aa a'plan' of action in case of failure of the entire operation.

The first task cf theterrorist is tu destroy group solidarityne rccoapllshes by labelling ae ooelal crimes all acts aith which he disagrees. Propaganda, which publicizes terroristic acts so aa to make tha




populice more eaonable, has often been employed by tbe Comnwnists. Surceuie ia offered if the populace accedes to the terrorists1 demands,oining* the Communist Party-

Political inatrur-ants used. Die ease of CxechoSlovakia,ommunist cpup. d'etat was carried out in, illustrates thlo type of CommuniBt maneuver*

and Vera eonspirinf^ito fur*tnOa


penetrated by secret agents of reaction and *ore an early covernnentnl crisis inoverr--


ould be formed. n


A principal determinant of tho tl:.inj; of this coupprobably the main determinantwas the steady decline of Communist prospects in thelections (scheduled forogether with the Ostomists' increasing difficulties Ir. outsianeuvering their felloe-parties In the National Front, particularly the Social Democrats. eetlng of the Conrauniet Central Committee onhe party head,t Gottoald, enrvod notice that the Party would not acquiesce- (trend of affairs. He raised the accusatloi


The auceoeding steps leading up tb and through the Communists' oeiaure of power were the following* "

y; bandoning all pretense of hoping 'to ftain -a; majority in thenr: election, the CortnuniBtsrandioae program ofaal legislation,ar beyond anything agreed to by tTic partloa vtie National Front The program left the non-Coomnlst partiee


onlyalternatives: to accept this pfograa which would have completely undercut their influence, or torom the government,

(2) Attempting deliberately to provoke the other partiaa to choose tho second alternative, the Conruniata in8 arranged for monster coatings of their adhorenta. ongreaa of factory councils na^ called for Februaryo demonstrate for CorAunlst demands for further nationalization. ational congress of Uie Oocminlit-controlled farmers1 commissions aaa called for Februaryo demand the enactrent of Communist-sponsored agricultural legislation that had been steadfastly rejected by the noo-Comauniats. Doth congresses were to press for acceptance of tho draft constitution sponsored by the Communists, to which the other*parties wore opposed.

t the aamo time tho Communists continued;to strengUien their hand

the security police (which they controlled at thend prepart! HorfcersUllilitia for action. Large-scale replacements weree of nc

Cc.TTJunlat personnel in the Security Corps} activityiof apenta provocateurs on the local level was Lnoreased, and discoveriesde of alleged "reactionary" plots- These moves convinced the moderate parties that the

Col'Jtunists were determined to use all available means to gain an abaolute majority in Uie elections.,

(A) By this xeans Uio Coffcuniets provoked the National Socialists (the leadlxg moderate party) Into taking Uio initiative against thea. In an


effort, ap;arently, to sidetrack the debate.on the Constitution,ational Socialist Party introduced the inswe cf Comnviniat control of the polic?eetin? of the National Front on February 5witli then ofliowdown nith theileh would either forceo back down or provide the'pretext for holding elections Ira: cdiately. The Datlonal Socialists introduced the police

issue in the Cabinet on They demanded that the Conmuniat -inister of the interior rescind an order for replacement of all regional-Security Corps officers by- Communists. en the Communists evaded this demand, the National Socialists withdrew from the government,abinet criais.

(5) The Communists seized advantage of this criaia to create mass


seising" by force all government offices'.ind preventing non-Comrunist employees and even "Inistera from attending to their duties; (d) searching

* the"headquarters of the National Socialist Party through the security police, on charges of m. antl^etate plot; (e) preventin7 .ill non-Corwmists, including President Bones, from broadcasting by radio to the nation; (f)

'breaking up meetings of non-communist parties and seizing their printing


plants;) letting it bo understood that the USSR atood ready tpJfF^fr

intersane ogr-inst reappointmentoderate government. In the latter

connection, it i3 noteworthy that the Soviet deputy Foreign Itiniater,

Valerian Zorin, arrived in ira-ue onstensibly on other

official business, ana remained there wrougliout tlie crisis. It aecra

indubitable that his reirnrks to various Czech government officiale played

a port in inflnencini; President Bsnes andodorates to capitulate.

Tlie result of these pressures was that President Benes appointed

a rreconijiantly Cormunist cabinet on February

ho Pattern of Ccc-tuniat Participation in Coalition GovernmentsSince the ttar.

Cowatnist participation in coalition cabineta with bourgeois partIts baa becone an integral part cf Coominiat tactics since world Rsr II

nature and purposesfactors: the internal alignmentshe Communistsiven! j'.:i


country and the demands of Sovietivenhese<i

: ' f^ sVl 4 *

factors, in turn, have variedo two jtypes'of

Non-orbit, where ilcstorn influence iajsscendant and the ohancea for obtaining control are limited; in these countries, the Communists have participated.only in genuine-coalitions in which.the Party has been merely ona among several equal or stronger parties;


1 fHS

Orbit, where Soviet occupation or predominance hasomrrtiiist dominationogus coalition in which other parties have only nominal equality*

After the German attack lnad brought the USSRetogether as Allies, developments in both t; pes of countriesimilar pattern as Coroinists everywhere emphasized the necessity for the joint efforts of all parties and groups against fascism. Tho loirjTunists took part in all-party national committees which later became national ?overmients0 They, propagated nationalist slogans, contributedational res!stance movements, and denied their dependence onhange eyr.bolized by the formal dissolution of the Comintern

Co-tvcjoints wore ,too weak, outside the orbit-to seize power .andoi

" H;f"*M

V* i*ts'5 1'iJtr enough, inside the orbit;'V;in

contrast to the prewar Coneiuniflt policy of non-participation Sn cabinots

In tho period immediately following liberation and Allied occupation, the Communists continued this policy of participating in coalitionnig Three agreements

However, despite this emphasis on unity, it ahould be noted thatcitTouiists tried wherever possible to build up their own forces, some-tixas oven at the expense of the fight against fasoism. In Tugoalavia ard Greece, for example. Communist-led partisans fought rightist groups ae sell as Germans and Italians. The problem of armed Communist groups ccntinuod to vex tha govemmenta and occupation forces in Franco and Italy fallowing their liberation


or of parllartently alliances with other parties (popularhe Cojcunistg apparently decided that itaore advantageous to workovernmental rartyrattier than inin order to expend their national strength and influence the country's foreign policy.

Tho history of Connuniat participation in coalition governments since the war haa reflected the transition fron. the wartire Soviet-Western alliance to theidening of the chasm betweenand

In non-orbit countries,esult of the stresses which East-Kest tensions, togethor with Internal developments, have caused in Communist relations with other parties, the Comnuniats have been pushed out of the former coalitions and into increasingly bitter opposition to their respective governments. As relations between the USSR and the heat have deteriorated, the Communists have had to consider the .alternatives of coalition or of opposition. The other possibleoup d'etat.-


has,now been precluded at least in Vteatern,Europe, both because of internal;

J El'^"Tlfcil'f fill 1. * I 1 Irllirt . *

nearness and because *of :the"serIoua international repercussions of such, art

y the summer, the Coirauniets: were forced outveryICi'itl

government' in Western *'Eorcpe. Inesult of Uoscow's

1he Communists foreswore taking pert in bourgeois cabinets, they did act preclude participation in cabinets In which the "working class parties"ajority, as in the case of local German governments However, it should be noted that Communist weakness and the-reluctance of the other parties to give Communists cabinet posts mode the question largely academic before tho war. Spain, where the Comouniats did take posti.6peoial case becauae of tha civil war.

cornier ial


Ill j. - ]

ateeting of the Cominform, tha French and Italian7 Coiarainiste hod to give precedence to the Soviet campaign against the Marshall Flan rather than to their local aspirations. They have since attempted tc redefine their nationaliso in noro openlyterm, have oecome Tore anti-Western, and seem deter; ined to force the political situationeft-Right dichotomy in which they hope to assume the leadershipoftist coalition.

In the orbit countries, worseningelations accelerated Moscow's deaire to consolidate its position in the territories under Soviet influence.. esult, the Corrjunists gradually dropped the fiction of coalition government, and general Coicuniat predominance has been or is being transormed into exclusive Communist control. At the Comliform meeting oft was decided that-oven the bogus



coalitions in which the other partlea had only nominal autonomy,were^ to,under. Comunist direciionjji^Thr ""

tempi has'varied'from country to country o In Czechoslovakia ;thHjformatioi

' ii?of la'bogus-coalition ;waa not possible until after the: n Northern Korea and Eastern Germany, Cosr/uni at;fs' have been conditioned by the possiMlity of eventual union between the Soviefcif"-and -Mstern Zones and by the desire to maintain contaot with parties ^jaiife^Mj' Western'Zones and to build up the impression that Soviet Zone partiesof the whole country.


v' -

Since the Tito rift inoviot Cominformtho Communists into assuming ;sore active and exclusivethepopular fronts. The obligatory orientation of allthe uusll haa been givenemphasis. Atne time,affair has highlighted the question of how far Moscow cantactics gororally and with respect to the organizationcontrol*. It Is important to note that Yugoslavia waa theof any size In Eastern hurope where ths Communists -ainedby their own efforts* In other orbit countries, the prevalencepersonnel who arrived in the wake of the Red Army andof Communists on the USSR for the attainment of power haveeasier for Ifoscow to determine the nature of Communist activity7;*


IV. LITJDK3 INT.COUNTRIES.jf^helhigh' point of postwar!Communist pprt'icipaticnjincoalition-governments cams-in.the period immedia elyrfollonir.

the Communists identified themselves with specific national tasks on which they could work Jointly with other parties! for example, purges in varices countries under fascist and collaborationist influences, the struggl in Belgium and Italy against the monarchy, and reconstruction everywhere, [iy thus operatingational partyourgeois coalition, the

Coccnilists hoped to reap several benefits.

hoped to increasess support for theelections. They Wanted to take advantaje of thethey had gained by their disavowal of revolutionary alas,'vork in the resistance movements, and by Soviet preotige thatvictories in the war. They aimed at widening, thtir appealand agrarian eloaenta. In this period whena national issue, they did not want to alienate the support ofworking-class olerents. Itoreover, when British andwere still present, as for example in Prance and Italy, the

Comma lists felt the necessity of convincing the US and Britain that the CommuUst Party was not revolutiouiry in order to inaure participation in


the postwar elections in which they expected to make gain*..

Cooffliuniato, by their very presence in the government,Influence foreign policy. The other parties Mere obliged toconseauencos for social' atabll Ity and International prestige shouldbe forced into?opposition. Such considerations were

important In the case'of; France, far example, during the tbacow discussions -on Cermaiy in While the Comauniata ni.rht not have expected to

orUnte USSR, countries in fthioh theystill athey Kay hive ho-od at least to neutralise these nations in thot-.est con'-'llct. rbreovcr, panticlj at ion in the oeWnet opened up to the Corrunists sourcen of information and nam avimuis cfs^aRttniolicy


mattc-a. It ahouldtod that tho Caurauniet attitude toward aasumihg"onaibility for foreign policy has depended on the Individual situition. Thus, in Italy,6he Corrunists showed no predilection to accept any blama for the peace treaty being negotiated.

(3) They attempted tu infiltrate whatever ministries they did procure and to use th*ir position in tho /overnment to enhanco the position of tiie party. Tlie tei'.po of their operations dependod on the opposition they met from the other parties. Perhaps the best example of Cor-raunist infiLtration was provided in Czechoslovakia, which, though in the Soviet _ tiefore tho coup d'etat in8 resembled the non-orbit countries politically. Hero the Communists placed their men in the army,

the jocret police, and in economic positions which facilitated i?*

execution of tho February-sii-

(A) In several instances-,the Communists tried to correlate)l ii

participation an


Socialist'partiea In the hopei;bf -being able to.establish Communist;tilftsupremacy over tho working;Such unified aetiOn aas aimed: hancing leftist parliamentary strength against tha center and right and

although thoir attacks against the Socialists at the time were muted W'i"

'Vi. v. HHI

doninato Socialist policies and to wean tha Socialiat rank-and-file from its

leadership. However, Communist policy in this connection has varied


The United Front did not last Ion- in France. Ini European states, the Cceunists were not anxious for auch unity ainci it often meant that they would be subordinated to tho rore powerful Social Democrats- ifaroovor, it ahould be noted treat since their eliminationhe Hostem liiropean governments, and following the fom'itlon of the Comin'orm, Conrrunist profaoslonoesire to re-enter various coalition gove:iurants have been accompanied by strong attacks against tha Socialists.

As long as tho CoTrunlsto have considored participation in tho government efficacious for the achievement of these alesand while they have been too weak to seise powerthey have oftenwilling to attenuate temporarily both their political and econo-lc objectives. rJhile they have been especially anxious to receive cabinet poets auoh as those of. the Interior, Justice, national Dofetiao, and Information, which would place them close to tho sources of power and persuasionodern aooiety,f'.ive been willing to accept less. Thua in France, their apprehension over the initial successes of tho all-socialist Blum government in7 and their general fear of being isolated led the Communists toational Defense post hedged by restrictions, along withunimportant ministries. In addition, actuated by the desire to prolong their participation in government, the Communists have temporarily laid side certain aspects or their economic program. In France and other countries, for example, they tempered their insistence on nationalisation






it soared that pressing thorht split the coalition.

Corrunist tactics, however, have usually been subtle, Tfcen

CCT-ifiat cabinet ministers have voted for measures which were at varltice with theii stated airs, the Conaunists have agitated againstasures inays. For exacple, earlyrench Communist clnliters osterisibly supported tho government program on price reduction, iihllo the Communist-led General Confederation of Labor carried on extra-parlf.-mentary agitation against it. Thus along with their activity in the ftoverteent, ths Comsunlats have attached primary importance to organizing rass support outside'. They have been especially oager to secure control of

the trade-unions and to create fronts or infiltrate already existent mass crgaii.'zat ions' of oil typos..anon, youth, war veteran, peaeant, cultural socliitles. Strikes or the threat of strikes have been used to exertpressure^ on the government. The front organisations have participate^ ^in erbruitratldns to shoe alleged popular approval of Coieruniat demands^ mist mechanise for potential extrapariia^ntary ute haa been the national committee such aa tlie antl-De Gaulle "vigilance committee" In France, which ray represent tho equivalent of the tiction committees used by the Communists In tho Czech coup. Those Comalttees were formed following Conminist exclusion from the government in Franoe and apparently have not gain-ni mass support..

Original document.

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