As the USSR and its Satellites continued to talk loudly of "peace" and the warlike intentions of the Westernthere was no slackening of reports that the USSR Itself was preparing to initiate further aggressive moves around the Soviet perimeter. Although possessing the capability to move militarilyumber of places with little advance warning, with the possible exception of continued preparations for an attack on Taiwan, the USSR has not yet given any firm indication of its intention to expand the Korean conflict and increase the risk of global warfare involving the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Soviet diplomatic activity was aimed primarily at South Asia and the Soviet Far East.
Korean Support Although there has been no evidence of troop
movements from Manchuria into northern Korea since the outbreak of hostilities, North Korean forces may soon be reinforced by Korean veterans of the Chinese Communist Army. Within the next three weeks, North Korean forces will probably have made the maximum advance possible with the troops currently available In Korea, if the USSRuick victory before UN forces are further reinforced, it will have to call upon additional experienced troops for use in Korea. Although the North Koreans may have committed practically all their available organized and trained units merely touick victory regardless of the risk, It seems more probable (hat the Northern Command has been assured of reinforcements. Such reinforcements would at the minimum consist oforeans believed to be available in Manchuria and would be used to replace the heavy casualties resulting from the rapid North Korean advance, to cover the exposed flanks and rear, and, if necessary, lo provide momentum tor the final push against reinforced UN troops. The USSR could use these "Korean'
reinforcements with little danger of political repercussions. There is at present no indication, however, as to whether the USSR will risk the political disadvantages involved in committing non-Korean reinforcements shouldtep become necessary.
Taiwan Assault The considerable Increase in troopin South and Southeast China during the past two months indicates the probable concentration of Chinese Communist troops in assembly areas from which they could be rapidly moved to embarkation points for an assault on Taiwan. Further reports have suggested both accelerated purchase and movement to the Fukien coastal area of email boats and junks and the concentration ofsupplies, notably aviation gasoline. There are no indications that the US pronouncement of0 has caused the Chinese Communists to abandon these preparations. Barring effective opposition by US naval units, Chineseforces are capable of securing an Initial lodgment0 fully equipped troops on Taiwan and within two or three weeks of establishing control over the entire Island. An early assault may woll bo launched. Communist China is committed to the annexation of Taiwan and so long as Taiwan remains In Nationalist hands Peiping loses some political prestige. Although such considerations do not In themselves require an early invasion attempt, for military reasons tho Communists must attempt an invasion before the US strengthens its defensive screen of the Island. Inuccessful assault on Taiwanworld Communisttrengthen the Soviet and Chinese strategic position in the Far East;romote lack of confidence in US commitments and undermine non-Communist opposition to Soviet aggression. Although anof Taiwan, by enlarging the area of conflict between Communist and US forces, would increase the risk of global
war Involving the USSR, such an invasion would probably encounter much less international opposition than would Chinese Communist military operations against Korea, Hong Kong, or Southeast Asia. Moreover, in view ol the fact that the Kremlin has permitted North Korean forces to become directly involved with US forces, it may be willing to permit the Chinese Communists to become similarly involved, therebyurther drain on US resources.