Created: 3/17/1950

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Ho's Orientation Although Moscow-trained Ho Chi Minh has never been proven to beito-like nationalistoscow-dominated Communist, recent developments may indicate histo the Kremlin. Broadcasts from the Ho-controlled radio in Indochina have reportedly attacked Tito and failed to mention the diplomatic recognition extended by the Yugoslav Government to the Ho regime. French authorities have also reported that Ho is on his way to Peiping and Moscow to sign treaties of alliance with Mao Tie Tung and Stalin. Ho's brief flirtation with Yugoslavia regarding recongition may have been the resultistake by his Bangkok representative, who made the initial approach to Tito alongeneral invitation to all nations.



Current Soviet tactics in Germany reflect both the Kremlin's growing optimism regarding its improved world power position and its increased confidence in gaining eventual control over all of Germany on Soviet terms. These tactics are characterized by andesignation of the East German regime as the sole focal point of German unity and by Soviet insistence upon political progress toward the establishmenteoples Democracy In East Germany. This Soviet attitudehe demand for absolute acceptance of the National Front policy ol German unity through friendship wilh theonsistent reiteration by East German political officials that the Oder-Neisse boundary isand their acceptance of the recent Polish decision to evict the German minority;he purge of the bourgeois parties in East Germany. Tlie USSR is unlikely to change its present tactics as long as the Kremlin does not foresee participation of West Germany in an effective poliiical and military Western bloc.

The USSR is unlikely toeparate peace treaty wilh Ihe East German Government (GDR) In the near future unless the Western Powerseparate peace agreement with West Germany. The USSR could, however, take action shortormal peace treaty, sucheclared termination of the state of war. Anyaccruing to the USSReparate peace treaty at this time would be limited to propaganda and the enhancement of Ihe prestige of the National Front and the GDR. Moreover, the conclusion by the USSReparate treaty with East Germany would weaken the Soviet claim.




based on Ihe Yalta and Potsdam agreements,oice in West Germany and the Ruhr. The Kremlin may also be reluctant toeparate peace treaty in the belief that It would lead to the alignment of West Germanyestern political and military bloc.

Continuation ol present Soviet tactics in Germany will lead to further political consolidation in East Germany resulting, for all practical1 purposes,ne-party system by the time of the scheduled0 elections. At the same time, continued efforts will be made to expand and strengthen the East German internal security force. The USSR is unlikely to undertake actual troop withdrawal or rectification of the Oder-Neisse line, in order to enhance Soviet-Communist appeal In Germany. The current Soviet attitude toward the German problem, combined withharassing actions in Berlin, also reduces theof an early Soviet offer to reopen Four Poweron Germany. The city of Berlin willpecial situation" for the USSR and will probably beto increased economic and political pressure In the near future


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