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UN Dispute Soviet threats to boycott the Security Council unless the Chinese Nationalist delegateholding the SC presidency) Is unseated are unlikely to be carried out and are largely propaganda moves being made in the hope of hastening UN acceptance of the Chinese Communist regime. The USSR may also hope to impress upon the Chinese Communists the contrast between vigorous Soviet support of the Pciping regime and the lukewarmof other powers which have accorded recognition to theajority vote in favor of the Soviet resolution is unlikely at this time; only five nationson the SC have recognized the Chinese Communist regime and even the UK and Norway may abstain at this time. In addition to defeating the Soviet proposal, the SC wUl almost certainly decide to continue hi sessionof whether the Soviet delegate attends. Under these circumstances, the USSR,well aware that the Chinese Communist regime will not be admitted to the UN until it is recognized by atajority of the SC members, will probably not absent itself indefinitely. If the SC takes up any question of importance to or involving the USSR, the Kremlin can scarcely afford the luxury of remaining absent..
Soviet Relations Mao Tse-tung's protracted stay in Moscow
has aroused speculation regarding ain Sino-Soviet relations and Chinese Communist resistance to Soviet encroachment. Although the length of Mao's visit'may be the result of difficulties inevised Sino-Sovlet treaty, the treaty will probably
be signed Ihls month and it is unlikely that Mao is proving dangerously intractable. Maoenuine and orthodoxt, is in firm control of the Chinese Communist Party, and is recognized as* its head by all Party leaders and by the Chinese people generally. There is no evidence that any Communist faction is strong enough to succeed in an anti-Mao roup or that the USSR -would be so rash as to replace Mao at this time. The Kremlin probably realizes that for some time its position in China will be best served by retaining the voluntary cooperation of the Chinese Communists rather than by using open or implied coercion.
Communist Navy The Chinese Communists are making
strenuous efforts to build up the "People's Navy" and reportedly already have assembled sufficient miscellaneous vessels to transport to Taiwan an initial landing force of0 troops and to follow up with more than double that numbereachhead has been secured. It is unlikely, however, that the Communists now possess trained personnel in sufficient numbers to man such an armada. Moreover, the Communists probably do not have adequate supplies of fuel and ammunition to support the operation ofleet. The rapid development of the Communist Navy greatly improves Communist prospects for an early and successful invasion of Taiwan. Moreover, the appearance ofnaval units in support of an invasion force proband *ould seriously lower morale in the Nationalistand Increase the possibility of defections.
Troop Build Up The continuing southward movement of
ihe expanding Korean People's Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel probablyefensive 'measure to offset the gTowtng strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army, The influx of Chinese Communist-trained troops from Manchuria,will partially solve North Korea's manpower shortage and will add materially to the combat potential of the North Korean Army. North Korean military strength has been further bolstered by the assignment of tanks and heavy field guns to units in the thirty-eighth parallel zone and by the development of North Korean air capabilities. Despite this increase in North Korean military strength, theof an invasion of South Korea is unlikely unless North Korean forces canlear-cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Army.
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