eastern Germany aad probably vlUo-off iroaUon of veatem rights la and aoceei to Bar lla, Soriet nstptlatora, nowwvor, will take oare to inanre that raoh oancotflaaw to not Impair th* long-term capability ef the OSSR to dominate eastern Oeraazgr, Including Berlin.
V as tana power acceptance of ainlwum Soviet tens would pwbaaly leadamorarj mmmmi oa ikw, Tale would give theraatb^apeli, enabling it, (a) to Imam the eeoaoay of Ceroony's oast em Zona a* well ss that of eastern Europe; ft) to tighten political control, over tho satellite states; (o) to conduct peaao-of fens Ire propeMkia, and (dj to eaplolt veatem power diffaroTicae la order to weaken tb* preaent anti-soviet western rnsTltloa. yea torn Europe la lanaia. would welcomeeecent whichemporary raUaaaloa la present east west tonslna. while thoay hope to profit or agitation for national unity ia Germany.
Zbaould thus be in effect fiaabllag that the HiaWlliIln effecto of tho SEP aad otherthat tho westarotan outwoign tbae* of too renewed opi-ortuoitUs that will eccrue to too USSR far disrupting western Saropeaa recovery aad for fairingMntfltr, vti^aior, t1 mat tow of oar present illltawa. however, the enable vould appear to be
B. Be TLVMBXOBSm Rsarirector of Central intelligenceOriginal document.