EFFECTS OF A VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM KOREA.

Created: 7/10/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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UmiilGUiCE AGEXCT

MEtCRAHDON0

SUBJECTi Effectsoluntary Withdrawalorces froa Korea.

ItofGrencoi Conaequencoo of tho Korean Incident."

COHCyrjSIOHS

Voluntary withdrawal of DS forces froa Korea wouldalamity, curiously handicapping efforts to mints in OS alliances and build political Influence anong the nations on idwse strength aad energetic cooporotion tho policy of contairmsnt of 8oviot-Cctanmlst expansion depends. It would discrodlt DS foreign policy and uodonaino confidence in OS military capabilities. Voluntary withdrawal would be more damagingailure to send DS troops to Korea in the first place orailure of DS forces to hold Korea. Not only would DS cosnltments be shown to bevhen putevere test, but also considerable doubt would be cast on the ability of the OS to back up its commitments with military force.

Discussion

DS withdrawal froa intervention in Korea cm behalf of tho UN, capo daily since Oil action resulted mainly froa OS initiative, wouldall nations heretofore hopeful that OS leadership within the fratsswork of the CD could preserve world peace. oluntary act of theithdrawal would damage OS standing in ON affairs end would undor-nlno the effectiveness of the UWevice for mobilising westernto Scviet-Ccnmunist aggression.

The Western European allies snd other nations closely aligned with tho OS would lose confidence In the military value of DS commitments to assist them against armod aggrocaion. This lack of confidence would militate sgolnet energetic measures to oppose the expansion of Soviet-Cocmunicm through tho NATO end MDAP programs. Although sane slight credit

still might accrue to tho US for initially attempting to honor ite occsoitraent in South Korea, cost of the nations allied or aligned with tho US areconcerned about US ability to counter threats of &rrietthan about DS intentions to do so,

particularly in areas where the USSR could

initiate linitodrooolons without openly using Soviet forces, would auffer serious looooo of prestigo. In sow coses they might Icoo political wtttrel of tho country or feel cocpcllod to seek on accemewela. tion with the OSSR (for eramplo, Indochina, Iran).

Whether or not DS forces withdraw from Korea, the DSSR has the capability oferies of incidents gw-areliy similar to the Koreen affair, each one threatening either to btsucrupt tho OS policy of containing Soviet eonenaion or to disperse and overstrain US militaryn-rocdiness. Without directly and openly involving Soviet fore on, such Irnldecrto could bo created in Formosa, Indochina, Bursa. Iran, Tugo-slavie, Greece, end Turkey. The USSR will prooood with limited aggroB-exone otniler to the Korean incident if it does not estimate tho risk of global war to be substantial or is preparedlobal war If itoluntary DS withdrawal from Korea probohly would encourage rather then discourage Soviet Initiation of limited -uara in other areas.

5. Upon withdrawal from Korea or certainly after another Koroon-style incident, tho OS -romrahly would be forced to adopt one of the three following alternativesi

Drastically revise the policy of general containment by reducing or limiting DS oonaltaentB snd by planning to combat Soviot-inspired aggrcocion only at oelected points whore existing srilitory strength would be adequate for tbe teak;

Begin partial military and industrial mobilisation in en attempt to enable the OS to combat any further Soviet-inspired aggression anywhere in the world; or,

(e) Begin total mobilisation to enable the OS to threaten topmost any Soviet or Scviot-cponsored eggression with war against the

6. If the US, under the pressure of Sovict-cponsored aggrosaionc. did not drastically revise the policy of general containment but began mobilisationairly largo scale, it would bo politically and

conridiintial

ff^^ecous for the VS to .uobiUse in support

volunt^ o mobilise after a

voluntary withdrawal iron Rbroa.

fW, aw. y, fiaftcr aidthdrawal of USUdefeat!an that

3 aof the uithexewal? this diamuaion and defeatism might not be fatal, it

conomic efforts to strengthen the lorth Atlantic ccrananlty.

2 Dhoald wltbdraufarces froa Korea and then

begin partial mobilization, Soviet leaders uould bo more likely to anticipate war aimed directly at the USSR than if the mobilizationnln nupport of thetotorventtcn In Korea. L?

Original document.

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