cea'telal ijjiellioeoce aoehct
SOBJECT: Probability of Direct Chinese Cccrainist Intervention in
To assess the probability of an open Cocztiibnent of Chinese Ccssaainist armed forces in Korea.
The cccnitaont of both regular and local Chineseround forces, and the use of tho Chinese Cco-muniQt air Karoo in oupport of tho North Korean Invaders aro considered.
Limited covert Chinese Gcrrauiist assistance to the Ucrrth Korean invaders, including the provision of individual oo Idler a, is assumed to be in progress at present.
The provision of overt assistance by the Chinese Ceramists would require approval by the USSR and ouch approval would indicate that tho DSSR is prepared to accept an increased risk of precipitating general
r= 1. Concluei<
Although thero ia^4io^3irect evidence to indicate whether orhe Chinese Comnrtsts will intervene in' Bortfi Korea, it ishat tho ChinoOo Cccwsunists or the USSR taut supply trailedquippedeplacements if tho forth Korean invasion ic to achieve complete control over South Korea before the end of the year.
Ro ports of an increasing Chinese Ccuaunjct build-up of sdlitary strength in IJanchuria, coupled with the known potential in that area, make it clear that intervention in Korea .la wall within issasdiato Chlnoao Coaainint capabilities, cveci recent Chinese Ccermuttst accusations regardingggro sai on"violation of the Uanchurian border" nay bofor an imminont overt move*
This mcKKrandum has not boon coordinated with tho intelligence arganications of tho Departaonte of State, Array, Issvy, ond the Air Force.
Tho memorandum wao prepared in accord with tho request of the inrector of lntolllgor.ee. Itoadquartora, United States Air Forcenociuaeat Ko.
inoa momentous ropercuasicnj fron such on overt action, however, it appears ooro probable that the Chinese Comsainl st participation In tho Korean contlict will bo mare indirect,significant, and will be limited to integrating into tho ?forth Korean favecs "lianchuriar-erhaps including air unite as well as ground troops.
2. Present Status of llorth Korean For cos.
The decision idiethcr or not to con:it Chinese Contguniot forces will depend in part on tho availability of Korean nanpower, both In 'anchurla and that part of Korea now in Ccanonist hands. Current estimates by the Deporbaent of the drey state thatrained Korean veterans who had served with the Chinese Cosxnunista in the llanchurian campaignsGn Lanchuria and therotrategic North Korean reserve. It is noteworthy, however,ugust Uorth Koreans have been using coabat replacements with as little as too week's training;ho North Koreans would logically have comsitted all available organizod Korean units soon after UU forces had been committed because at that tine the Impact ofrained troops probably would have been decisive.
Tho foregoing considerations indicate either that any Korean reserve in tSanehuria was so dispersed that it did not constitute an effective reserve or that this reserve never in fact existed. Moreover, the possibility that Korean reserves in Lanchuria havo now boon collected and reorgonlBod and that sono aro now onrouto to the combat area tends to be discounted by the fact that the tine elapsed sinceune should have poradttcd the orgnnisation and ccxxdtoent of the raajarity of this reservo nhieh uould have boon far superior in quality to those virtually untrained North Korean troops that have actually been utilized in the fighting. On balance, therefore, it appears highly probable thatoo-tauniet victory in Korea is to bo achieved by the end of tho year the north Korean forces must now rely on either Soviot or Chinese Cocxamict resources for decisive augmentation.
3. Chinese Coacimist Capcbllitioa for Intervention.
The Chinese Coaaunists hove approximately four million men under anas, including regulars, "ilitary District troops, and provincial farces. Hollowing the fall of nanchuria there wereilitary District troops in Ifanchuriandf these UD troops have now been Integrated into tho regular army and organised aa combat forces. Those units, as well ao tho remaining UD troope, probably are Soviot-oquipped. In addition, reports during the past three months havoonsiderable increase in regular troop strength in lanchuria. It is estimated that tho aajor elements
of Lin Piao's uth Field Aran^totallingcobatnow in Lancliuria and are probably located alone or adjacent to tho Korean border, in position for raoid cciaaitocnt in Korea.
oDaamist regulars under Ilieh Jung-chon's coaaand are presently deployed in the Ifarth China area. Sono of those troops have been reported enroute to hanchuria.
The Chinese CoBrauniota are believed to possess anrcoperational combat aircraft, oomo units of which are reportedly deployed in Manchuria.
Indications of Chinese Cogr-runlct Lntontion to Intorveno.
huaerous Chineeo Cofltaintat propaganda attacks on tho OS Quring recent weeks, charging the OS withandfairan, havo been cliaaxed by too new protoato to the UU claiarlng OS air attacks in violation of the UancIsn-ia^Koroa border. It is possible that these charges, besides serving apropaganda function, may be alaed at providing an ercuco for Chinese Ckxaamist intervention in Korea.
Since the fall of Hainan ineliable reports have indicated that olcnonts of Lin Piao's Uth Field Amybeing novod northward from the Canton liajor elements of the hth Field Anay are now believed to be either in or enroute to Itu^churia Other reports indicate that military construction is in progress near Antung and along tho Talu River. Strengthening of Uinchurlan border defenses night eitherogical security development in view of the Korean conflictrelude to the offensivo ecploynant of forces in the area.
Reports of increased activity at Antung on the itachurla-Korea border include the reported arrival of Chinese Communist aircraft. Antung has also boon reported ao the main base of the
tfarth Korean Air Force, nhero that depleted force can seek refuge frofl DI> air attacks. Bnmerous reports of rocont Ifarth Korean activity, including revetment construction at airfiolda south ofh Parallel have been received. The so construction reporto could indicate the imminent forward movement of air reinforcements for the Iknth Koreans. Although some of this anticipated airmight bo provided by tho as jot untested Chineseir Force, tliaro is no firm evidence to supportontention.
5. Factors mutating Against Chlnooo Cqaranlflt Intervention.
The ccorndtmcnt of Chinoso Connunlot armed forces in Korea would clearly transform the Korean conflict from an oatensihlyispute to an international struggle. The decision to ccexsit Chinese Cocninlst troops to the Korean conflict nould oignificantly affect tho Soviet pooition in China as well as In Korea, and Soviot influence over both Peiping and Pyongyang night bo Jeopardized. Other factors which might tend to deter Chinese Cozramlatin the Korean war, but which would be of minor consequenco in soecision, arc: hinese national and nilitary pride might cause friction if Chineso troops wcro placed under Soviot or Korean cenmand;hineso Cocoarrist intervention would probably eliminate all prospocts for China's admission to the United Ifertiooa.Original document.