THE NATURE AND PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET HOSTILE ACTIONS, SHORT OF

Created: 4/13/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

? sf ^central iriTELLTGENCE agbi*cy

TSLUGENCE MEMORANDUM

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SUBJECT:The Nature and Probable Future Development of Sovietostile Actions, Short of Wax, Against tha Unitede They Relate to US Internal Security.

doctrine; there: can be no such thing as peace-

'and.mutua^ tolerancebetween?the-UnitedSoVtea'^the; citadel;crfimes

This memorandum was prepared ln partial fulfillmenta specific request of Ihe Interdepartmental Committee 'on Internal Security, which' set the terms' of referencet-is [addressed specifically to the ;of the probable fatuxe development oZ hostile Soviet of war, against the US, in terms of US'

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tradlctionsi: This process of ,diflintpsratlr

11p> ae Communist view/ the;eventual disintegration andcapitalist society la inevirabie, as the result of its inherentcbtflwill be; marked by;

Note:-Irilfl memorarjdum bas not been coordinated with the Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State iAraJy; Navy, and the.Air Force.

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ncreasingly severe economic depressionsmperialist wars in which predatory capitalist sates seek their own survival by preying on others he development of "revolutionary; permit the final overthrow of capitalism inountriesussiaastern Europe, China.

The essential characteristicsrevolutionary situation" are:

he masses must be disillusioned and disaffected, ready

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The rulers must be discredited and themselves divided

disorganised, incapabla of operating their former system of

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here mostilitant revolutionary (Communist) minority cerganlzed and ready to seize control by

he general trend toward the eventual diointegraUDn ofociety.'is regarded aa constantsto.beorlodlcity of

;Moreover,-'during thlvanger that toe capitalist world,;in' atfcu* and destroy toe USSR in the

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b7 every expedient meansnal'disan4 for^^oWf pf

; The function of the Communist Party in toe-United States is to hasten, by every means of subversion, the fln^^mb overthrow of capitalism In the United States (the development of st^'revolutionarynd meanwhile to be cons^ntlyto serveifth column In behalf of the USSR in the event

ofanticipated wax oi survival. Tbe Communist Partyboa openlyegal political party and covertlyunderground apparatus.

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Communist Party In the United States la to:,

pread disillusionment and disaffection among the masaea of the population, working particularly on theeats' of those elements who feele victims t

Discredit the government and render, Ineflectrre j

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Develop an effective cadre ot raUtrar* nativecapable of seising and exercising power when Omtiralaripe, or of Berving as an effective fHm column tn me 1

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gms tn American democracy wbl^Sunate: CommnnVflt'splTverBtoni; the actual rolaUonJa TJS^capItalJ' to lan or and to governrnent -is not at ait in ac'corixince wtth' Coin -rnunlsl: preconceptions and,'In sptte of areae^of sub-normal living standards, the general standard of living haajbeen^

A most obvious target for Communist subversive agitation is the Negro minority <I0 percent of tliehichir4ttedly subject to many disabilities and frustrations by reason of racial dlscrlmliaUon. The Corormirdsts do not exeats ttdsf=:

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internal tension, but they do aggravate and exploit it. The measure of their success is not how many Negroes become militant Communistshow many despair of ever enjoying free and equal membership in the American community, or even of obtaining rudimentary Justice, and so become acutely resentful of their lot and indisposed to defend the established

StmlLirly, uroasimitated minorities of recent foreign originemunerative target for Communistercent Of the population are foreign born or native born ofny self -conscious minority with residual loyalties to its country of origin orense of injusticearget for subversion. The object is not primarily to convert these minorities to Communism, but rather to disillusion mem regarding American democracy and so to render them indifferent to the perpetuation of the established order.

According to Communist doctrine, industrial labor shouldarticularly remunerative target ActuaUy/ftfe supposition in based oo an out-of-date concept of industrial labor: relations, and of me actoal position of labor hi;hie;TJS; deinocratte sys^mi It is not particularly applicable In modernno the aituatloQ In, say, France' and ffaly^where the Commnnlflto control meonism has failed to gain cdrdroicf ftef any-maJo* ^segment of it; iReceatiyJ indeed, tqeCommuMsts^:'did control several major componentfl of the CIO and had fairprospect of gaining control of me CIO itself. Since then, however, the trend haa been toward their elimination.hey will keep trying and any important labor grievances will afford them fypportu tlw* for agitation.H'$*f'U ommunlet efforts to penetrate organized labor have been j; directed especially toward key unions ln the fields ofcommunications, and public administration, Although open Communist leadership of these unions Is being eliminated, that will not of itself uproot the clandestine apparatus presumably

established during the period of Communist ascendancy. This apparatus, of coarse, has significanceotential fifth column.

Agitation to promote disaffection merges wlih that tothe government and paralyze its ability to control the situation. Propagation of the Ideas that toe government toby Wall Street rather than by electorate, and that the police and the courts are Instruments of repression rattier than of order and Justice may seem absurd in particular instances, bat the Communists probably expect them to pay off ineffect in the long run. Government Intervention in labor isputes, with the risk of converting the conflict into one betweennd gxwernment, ma^

The Communists' greatest success in the United States baa' been, not among the proletariat, but among idealistic andintellectuals. Tbe Hiss caserime example.with Capitalism and antipathy towards Fascism-during the thirties brought la many recruits. Subsequent dis-muslonmerrt with Soviet policy9 has caused many to drop away,but not aHV _ -

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The CommuntotB may be expected to attempt to penetrate idealistic organizations whiraV might be used to weaken TJSl'vHdefenses, toermination to resistand to.eDcourage tongerous.concessions to the 'for the sake of an accommodation.

Communist activity wllifcontinne along toe lines indicated,without variation In Coniniunist-objectives and methods. Any' development in the situation willunction of changingin tola country rather man of Communist intentions and efforts. Any progress to me Improvement of social and Industrial relations will tend to reduce Communist capabilities. Conversely, any deterioration, and particularly the development of alike thattth Its cmBequen! social tensions, will tend to facilitate Communist agitation. Apart from the possibility ofepression, the principal opportunity for Communist

exploitation would be mounting apprehension regarding the disastrous consequences of an atomic waronsequent tendency toward pacifism.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government'sthemselves may be expected to attempt continual

espionage--economic, political, and mUltary--including the

penetration of important governmental departments,,

The Communist apparatus ia the US is presumablyplans for extensive sabotage operations againstinstallations and possibly also againstPreparations may also be under way forf;': -i: logical operations. An estimate of the extent of thesepa rations, or of Communist capabilities for Implementing

them, la not within the cognizance of CIA. it does not appear

ll&ely baat thall attempt to execute theirany wide scale prior to me approach ot openthe US and me USSR. It should beoviet attack upon me US or the oumreakof war the US and USSR would be preceded, or accompaniedurprise Sovietairattocfe_upon US Alight also be accompanied by attempts to deliver atomic :

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Original document.

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